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A b s t r a c t
'Context' presents a challenge to political theory per se. In the history of political 
thought contextualism has severed historical from political and theoretical questions. In 
Marxism contextualism is thought of as a means to criticise ideas and institutions, hut also as 
providing grounds for rejecting political theory itself as ideological. Communitarians have 
argued that contextual considerations are compatible with those of morality, but that they 
count against the sort of abstraction from our concrete, culturally constituted, selves which 
liberal impartiality requires.
This thesis will, firstly, determine in what sense we may be said to be 'situated' in 
particular contexts, i.e. cultures and traditions, and then work out what implications 'situation' 
might have for politics and political theory? Secondly, what role might socio-historical 
contextualisation play as social criticism?
I argue that existing conceptions of situation and of contextual social criticism are 
prey to socio-historical reductionism and/or a social solipsism, and are incompatible with 
impartiality and deliberative politics.
A more appropriate conception of situation is one based on a conceptual pluralism 
that maintains the idea of an irreducible plurality of standpoints which we may adopt with 
respect to the world and our place in it. We need not choose once and for all between a socio- 
historical view of ourselves and the more abstract view required by impartialist morality. I 
argue that this novel view of situation and context can deepen our understanding of 
deliberative politics by showing how public reason must be conceived in terms of providing 
justifications acceptable to citizens who are differently situated with respect to one another. 
Socio-historical contextualisation can then play a role in deliberative politics without the risk 
of communitarian parochialism.
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In t r o d u c t io n
T h e  Pr o b l e m  O f  C o n t e x t
This thesis advances a distinctively pragmatic account of interpretation in 
order to set out an understanding of context and of social criticism which is 
compatible with liberal egalitarian politics. The argument is unusual to the extent that 
it seeks to overcome the commonly opposed claims of context and of impartiality. 
The claim advanced in this thesis is that, with the right understanding of context and 
interpretation, we can give due weight to context and situation without compromising 
critical morality. This avoids the communitarian deployment of context in support of 
an ethical parochialism, on one hand, but also refuses to accept the commonly held 
liberal belief that context is at best incidental to the conduct of normative 
deliberations, and at worst, that its influence on morality is pernicious. I argue that, 
properly understood, impartial public deliberation will require a concern with context 
in the shape of an interpretive social criticism.1
The problem of context is a problem for a liberal egalitarian political outlook 
which is committed to a critical morality and a deliberative politics. 'Contextualism' 
may be said to have two facets: one ontological, and the other theoretical. The 
ontological thrust of contextualism presents us as beings who are 'situated' in 
particular contexts not of our choosing, which serve to constitute our identities and 
perspectives.2 This 'thick' understanding of identity or selfhood is contrasted with the
1 Brian Barry sets out the traditional opposition of liberals to the encroachments of contextualism in the 
opening pages of Justice as Impartiality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). He argues that 
central tenets of contextualism, such as the belief in 'the homogeneity of belief systems within societies 
and the mutual incomprehensibility of belief systems between societies,' tend to undermine 
commitment to universalist morality. Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.5. Some liberals, notably David 
Miller and Will Kymlicka have sought to accommodate the concerns of contextualists, but they have 
focused on its relation to questions of justice, rather than on political deliberation, as I do here. See 
David Miller, On Nationality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), and Will Kymlicka,
Liberalism. Community and Culture. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2 For the ontological character of modem hermeneutics see Hans Georg Gadamer Truth and Method. 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1975); Philosophical Hermeneutics. D. E. Linge (trans.) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976); Reason in an Age of Science. (1976) Frederick Lawrence (trans.)
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implausibly 'thin' 'universalist' understanding of selfhood said to be typical of the 
liberal egalitarian outlook.3 The normative and theoretical thrust of contextualism 
derives from this ontological view and is directed against 'abstract' concepts and an 
impartial morality which is said to require of us that we step out of the situations that 
make us who and what we are.4 By contrast, contextualism tends towards an 
interpretive outlook, one focused on the interpretation of particular traditions rather 
than on the search for universal foundations for our theoretical and practical 
reasoning.5 We should not, however, allow ourselves to be forced to choose between 
contextualism and impartial, critical morality and the politics that follows from it. 
This thesis sets out an understanding of situation and of contextualisation which is not 
only compatible with liberal egalitarian politics but which shows how we can give 
these due weight in the conduct of such politics.
The attraction of contextualism is its realism. The idea that we are 
fundamentally situated beings is intuitively sound. On one hand, our identities and 
many of our beliefs are accidental or contingent, in the sense that we had no control 
over the situation we were bom into: our gender, class, ethnicity, family, society, 
religion, etc. These contingencies, however, are central to our self-understandings.
(Cambridge MA: MIT, 1981). See also Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), and Sources of Hermeneutics. (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1995).
3 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. (London: Duckworth, 1981); Michael Walzer. Spheres of 
Justice. (New York, Basic Books, 1983); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). These more recent, communitarian, critics of liberalism build upon earlier 
criticisms of liberal individualism advanced in the Marxist and feminist traditions, e.g. C. B. 
Macpherson's The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1962), and Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract. (Cambridge, Polity, 1988). For the differences 
between these criticisms of 'decontextual' liberalism see Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian critics of 
liberalism,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985), pp.308-21.
4 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1987) and Thick and Thin: moral argument at home and abroad, (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994). Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990).
5 See Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
and Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism.
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Subtract them from our sense of who we are and there would be nothing left, merely 
an abstract 'person' or 'individual', no longer myself with all of my particular features. 
We are our particularities.6 Set against this thick understanding of the sort of 
persons we are is the abstract liberal individual, committed to freedom from the 
constraints of tradition and community and to an impartial morality which demands 
that we exclude our particularities from moral deliberation. How can a convincing 
normative outlook rest on such an implausible ontology?
The sociological realism of this contextualism is problematic, however, in that 
it has prompted the adoption of normatively problematic views of politics and morality. 
The move from ontology to morality has not been persuasive.7 Contextualists have 
inferred from the fact of situation that truth, morality and political principles are little 
more than social practices, relative to particular contexts.8 In some versions, e.g. 
communitarianism, this entails the adoption of a parochial, traditionalist, moral 
outlook, a shrinking of the scope of moral obligation and a denial of the possibility of 
adopting an impartial, critical position with respect to the practices of the society one 
is situated in.9 In other, more radical, contextualisms, e.g. those of Marx and Foucault, 
morality is contextualised in order to be debunked, i.e. exposed as complicit in the 
operation of relations of domination.10 These writers, unlike the communitarians, wish 
to transform our situation, but cannot appeal to moral argument in order to convince 
people to alter their beliefs and institutions. What is needed, it will be argued, is an
6 Walzer remarks that, '[t]he crucial commonality of the human race is its particularism: we 
participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own,' Thick and Thin, p.83.
7 See Charles Taylor on the error of assuming that one can move directly from one position to the 
other. 'Cross-purposes: the liberal-communitarian debate,' in Philosophical Arguments. (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 181-205.
8 See Rorty for example, in Contingency. Irony. Solidarity.
9 See, in particular, Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin and Interpretation and Social Criticism.
10 See Marx's famous remark that talk of justice and rights is just so much 'obsolete verbal rubbish' 
The Critique of the Gotha Programme. (1875) Collected Works Vol. 24 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1987), p. 87. Foucault declares that 'For modem thought no morality is possible' in The 
Order of Things. (1966), (London: Tavistock, 1970), p.328.
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account of situation and contextualisation which combines a convincingly thick 
ontology with the critical normative outlook.
A liberal egalitarian politics entails a commitment to impartiality and to a 
deliberative understanding of democracy.11 A commitment to treating others as equals 
requires us to give impartial consideration to their needs and interests, and their beliefs 
about these needs and interests. It requires us to view our beliefs and interests 
impersonally, i.e. we must be resolved not to favour them simply because they are 
'ours'. This translates into a commitment to a specifically deliberative conception of 
democracy insofar as the requirement to treat others as equals by considering their 
beliefs and interests impartially will require the institution of a politics which will (1) 
ensure the articulation of these beliefs and interests, and (2) require participants in 
deliberation to transform their perspectives where these are shown to be problematic 
from an impartial point of view.
Majoritarian democracy, while resting on formal equality, places no constraints 
. upon the pursuit of sectional interest and to this extent it constitutes an inadequate 
understanding of the commitment to political equality.12 The liberal component of 
deliberative politics is provided by the idea that persons reasonably differ on many
11 The connection between impartial justice and democratic, deliberation is emphasised by John Rawls 
in Political Liberalism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), and Joshua Cohen 
'Deliberation and democratic consensus,' in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds.) The Good Polity. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34. See also Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). For impartial justice more generally see Brian Bany Justice as Impartiality, 
and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). On 
deliberation see John Dryzek Discursive Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
and Deliberative Democracy and Bevond. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Also James 
Fishkin Democracy and Deliberation. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) and Benjamin 
Barber, Strong Democracy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
12 This is the central theme of the work of deliberative democrats, but see also the closely related 
republican position of Philip Pettit who argues for an account of democratic government which 
reconceives the traditional opposition between liberty and democracy by presenting an account of 
democratic government as the exercise of republican freedom, Republicanism. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). What distinguishes these anti-majoritarian arguments from those of 
traditional liberals is the attempt to construct a normative theory of democracy which will enable 
democrats to criticise tyrannical majorities. Traditional criticisms of majoritarianism, such as J. S. 
Mill's On Liberty, accept the opposition of liberty to democracy, something which contemporary 
deliberative democrats seek to overcome.
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important issues, and that consequently collective authority must be exercised 
impartially with respect to such differences: it cannot be used to enforce a uniformity 
derived from a plan of life which is the subject of reasonable disagreement.13 This 
impartiality is embodied in the requirement that collective authority only be exercised 
for purposes which can be publicly justified. The commitment to deliberative politics 
does not rest on nostalgia for a more active citizenship but rather on the egalitarian 
commitment to impartiality.14
Central to this conception of politics is the idea that we must justify our 
political proposals to others in terms to which they cannot reasonably reject.15 That is 
to say, we must engage with the actual beliefs of our fellow citizens in order to show 
that a particular proposal is not simply justified in terms of our own interpretation of 
our beliefs, but that it is also justified in terms of their beliefs. The requirement to 
justify distinguishes which interests may be legitimately pursued from those which may 
not. It also ensures a large role in public deliberation for the contextualisation of belief. 
This combines with normative argument insofar as justification requires us to identify 
and interpret the beliefs of those with whom we deliberate and to arrive at judgements 
about the reasonableness of their arguments. Insofar as contextualisation can 
redescribe and problematise our interpretations of the world it can help to transform 
the judgements of those engaged in deliberation. The requirement of public justification 
is what makes the recognition of situation and the practice of contextualisation central
13 This is the formula central to Thomas Scanlon's contractualist ethics. See Scanlon, 'Contractualism 
and Utilitarianism,' in Bernard Williams and Amartya Sen (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). For a discussion of how this differs from 
reasonable agreement see Chapter Six below.
14 Some deliberative democrats, notably Benjamin Barber in his Strong Democracy. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984), are not immune to a certain nostalgia for the days of Athenian 
democracy, and the idea that the life of the citizen is the good life, however, this is not essential to the 
idea of deliberative democracy. See Chapter Six where Aristotelian, epistemic and egalitarian 
arguments for democratic deliberation will be distinguished.
15 See in particular Rawls' conception of the 'overlapping consensus' in Political Liberalism and Gaus' 
account of public justification in Justificatory Liberalism.
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to liberal egalitarian politics and it does so in a way that does not entail a weakening of 
its normative requirements. Contrary to the claims of those who criticise liberal 
impartiality, the requirement to treat others as equals and weigh their claims impartially 
requires participants in democratic deliberation to attend to the fact of situation and to 
give the phenomenon of context due weight if public decision-making is to be 
genuinely impartial.16
The contextualist arguments examined here can be divided into the following 
categories: firstly, there are two conceptions of situation, the 'epistemic' and the 
hermeneutic; and secondly, there are two conceptions of social criticism, the 
communitarian, and the radical.17 Each of these presents a different sort of challenge to 
the model of politics set out above. The first, the epistemic conception of situation, 
emphasises the plurality of perspectives to which the fact of situation in different 
contexts gives rise. Its special feature is its claim that certain of these perspectives are 
'privileged' in some way, or that the self-understandings of situated persons are 
specially authoritative.18 This conflicts with deliberative politics in two ways: it
16 Iris Marion Young vigorously criticises what she sees as an 'ideology' of impartiality which serves 
to censor the public sphere by excluding reference to particular contexts and identities. Young, Justice 
and the Politics of Difference. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). See also, Young, 
'Communication and the other,' in Seyla Benhabib (ed.) Democracy and Difference. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-35.
17 Feminist Standpoint Theory displays an explicit commitment to an epistemic understanding of 
situation, although the view of understanding which this conception of situation rests on also informs 
many common-sense views about cultural difference. See Nancy Hartsock's Money. Sex and Power. 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985); Sandra Harding's 'Rethinking standpoint 
epistemology: what is 'strong objectivity'?' in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds.) Feminist 
Epistemologies. (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 49-82; Liz Stanley and Sue Wise's Breaking Out 
Again. (London: Routledge, 1993). For the hermeneutic understanding of situation, which rests 
instead upon a linguistic model of understanding, see: Gadamer, Truth and Method: Walzer, 
Interpretation and Social Criticism, and Thick and Thin: also, Rorty's Contingency. Irony. Solidarity. 
The latter two writers espouse a broadly communitarian version of social criticism, although they 
differ on the question of the point of interpretation, with Rorty adopting a more Nietzschean, poetic, 
view of interpretation than Walzer. The radical social critics are, of course, Marx and Foucault, with 
ideology critique and genealogy as their respective versions of social criticism. Where communitarian 
social criticism idealises shared understanding and community solidarity and continuity, radical social 
critics emphasise the way in which power relations are involved in the maintenance of traditions and 
the construction of identities. With this in mind, they aim to disrupt, rather than restore, what shared 
understandings there may be.
18 Liz Stanley and Sue Wise take this to extremes in their Breaking Out Again, in which they 
undermine their own feminist aims by arguing that if a victim of domestic violence says she isn't
6
assumes that perspectives are inaccessible to differently situated others, and. that a 
self-understanding 'grounded' in experience is authoritative.19 The first sets a barrier to 
impartial deliberation insofar as we cannot judge the claims of others where we cannot 
be said to understand them while the second denies the possibility of transforming 
self-understandings insofar as it assumes that persons cannot be mistaken in* their 
interpretation of themselves and their situation. This latter view rests on a private 
conception of meaning and accords 'experience' a central place in the interpretation of 
situation.
The hermeneutic understanding of situation, the one on which the 
communitarian and radical contextualisms rest, does not attack the idea of 
communicability, as the epistemic understanding does. It is not a condition of there 
being a plurality of perspectives that these be inaccessible to those who have not had 
the experiences which formed them. Instead, the hermeneutic idea explains plurality 
with reference to the ideas of language and tradition. We are situated in particular 
cultures with particular languages and traditions through which we come to 
understand ourselves. This interpretation of situation poses a problem for deliberative 
politics insofar as it is supposed to be incompatible with the idea that we can adopt an 
objective, impartial stance with respect to the traditions which have constituted our 
identities and perspectives.20 Instead, our moral deliberations can only proceed by 
interpreting these shared traditions, and social criticism aims at a deeper, more 
authentic, understanding of who we are. While this admits that we may misinterpret
oppressed, then we are in no position to argue with her. It is characteristic of arguments informed by an 
epistemic conception of situation that they rely not simply on normative premises, such as respect for 
another's self understanding, but also on conceptual argument to the effect that the possibility of 
judging another's claims is denied us by virtue of our different situation. Stanley and Wise, Breaking 
Out Again, p.117.
19 Typically, this conflict is not acknowledged by those who defend an epistemic conception of 
situation. Often this is because writers in this vein are addressing themselves to problems in the 
methodology of the social sciences, as is the case with Sandra Harding, or Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, 
but this is also true of the work of someone like Iris Young, who explicitly addresses the issue of the 
conduct of democratic politics in conditions of pluralism.
20 See, in particular, Walzer, Thick and Thin.
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ourselves and that we may learn from hermeneutic encounters with others, it denies 
the possibility of a critical morality.
Finally, radical social criticism, which, like communitarianism, regards social 
institutions as constitutive of our identities and beliefs, is distinguished by its critical 
attitude to morality per se and by its emphasis on the effects of power upon our self- 
understandings. While those who have an epistemic conception of situation, like 
feminist standpoint theorists, regard self-understandings as authoritative insofar as 
these are grounded in experience, radical social critics are concerned that these self- 
understandings, as the products of a context characterised by inequality, will 
themselves embody those oppressive power relations.21 Consequently, radical social 
criticism emphasises the transformation of these self-understandings, not the 
recognition or endorsement of them. In itself, this does not present a problem for 
deliberative politics.22 What is problematic is the way that moral concepts, insofar as 
they embody class interests, or simply the effects of power, are themselves understood 
to be part of these structures of oppression and must therefore be debunked or 
exposed.23 This move, it is argued here, prevents radical social critics from presenting
21 Feminist critics of standpoint theory have argued that the standpoint theorists' idealisation of the 
maternal identity in fact plays into the hands of anti-feminists to the extent that it simply endorses the 
view that women are primarily mothers. See Mary Dietz, 'Context is all: feminism and theories of 
citizenship,' Daedalus 116 (1987), pp. 1-24. See also Susan Hekman, 'Truth and method: feminist 
standpoint theory revisited,' Signs 22 (1997), pp.341-65.
22 Joshua Cohen, for example, stresses the importance of sensitivity to 'adaptive' preferences, which is 
to say, those preferences which reflect the conditioning of circumstances shaped by inequality. Radical 
critics of liberal democracy have long argued that it is wrong to assume that the expressed preferences 
of individuals can be taken at face value, and the Marxist theory of ideology purports to explain why it 
is that the working class will express preferences contrary to their interests. Cohen's account of 
deliberation, however, takes account of this phenomenon, and he argues that participating in 
deliberation can bring to light the influence of oppressive circumstances and lead participants to 
reformulate their preferences in the light of this knowledge. In this way a deliberative decision-making 
process is superior to one which relies on the registration of uninterpreted preferences. See Cohen, 
'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy.' in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds.) The Good Polity. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34.
23 Marxism has largely been superseded by models of social criticism based on Foucauldian genealogy, 
in response to the perceived reductionism of the Marxist concept of ideology. See Michele Barret The 
Politics of Truth. (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology. (London: 
Hutchinson, 1986), and Terry Eagleton, Ideology. (London: Verso, 1991). While radical social 
criticism has been sensitive to reductionism in one area, namely social scientific explanation, it has 
remained insensitive to the sort of reductionism which disregards the claims of morality, as can be
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their redescriptions as elements of larger normative arguments. Consequently, such 
criticism cannot play a role in deliberative politics, which is premised on the idea that 
we must offer others reasons, including normative reasons, for transforming their 
beliefs.
In order to defend the sort of impartial deliberative politics outlined above, it 
is necessary to advance an account of context, i.e. of situation and contextualisation, 
which does not conflict with it as these understandings do. These contextualisms pose 
two sorts of problem. One is a problem about how we understand the relationship 
between social and historical context and abstract, theoretical and normative 
reflection.24 A response to this problem will focus on the way that contextual 
interpretation produces a relativist account of morality, by presenting it as no more 
than the practice of a particular social group or culture. The second sort of problem is 
a problem within morality rather than about it: contextualisms fall into two camps: 
those which deploy contextual arguments in order to argue against a 'universalism' 
which does not recognise the existence and validity of alternative perspectives; and 
those which regard both liberalism and the politics of recognition as insensitive to the 
way that power relations shape our identities and perspectives. These concerns 
conflict with each other, but both rest on a broadly egalitarian outlook and to this 
extent, it is argued, they must be accommodated by a liberal egalitarian politics.
evidenced by Chantal Mouffe's dismissive attitude to the work of Rawls, for example. Rawls is 
condemned not for some particular feature of his Theory of Justice, but more generally for assuming 
that political theory is a branch of moral philosophy. See Mouffe, The Return of the Political. (London: 
Verso, 1993). See Chapter Five for a discussion of the anti-normative cast of radical social criticism 
and 'agonistic' politics.
24 Influential historians of political thought such as John Dunn and Quentin Skinner have adopted a 
sceptical view of the claim that the historical contextualisation of political ideas can legitimately serve 
the aim of social criticism. Skinner in particular has argued that historical interpretation and social 
criticism can never be connected and that to attempt to do so entails a philosophical error. This claim is 
disputed in Chapter One. See Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas,' Philosophy 43 (1968), pp.85- 
104. Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas,' James Tully (ed.) Meaning and 
Context (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), pp.29-67. J.G.A Pocock, who is often associated with this 
Cambridge-based approach to the history of political thought has shown less interest in policing the 
boundaries between the history of political thought and political theory, and dissents from Skinner's 
intention-based model of interpretation. See Politics. Language, and Time. (1971) (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1989) and Virtue. Commerce, and History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
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It is worth underlining at this point that the argument advanced here does not 
aim to defend the value of equality from the ground up. This is, in any case, 
unnecessary as what is at issue between contextualists and liberals is not the value of 
equality, but rather its interpretation. That is to say, that both the contextualist 
arguments for recognition and those which emphasise the need for transformation, are 
derived from a commitment to equality. Both these forms of contextualism differ from 
liberalism in that they do not think that impartiality is possible, or desirable, whereas, 
liberal egalitarians argue that treating others as equals will require us to adopt an 
impartial standpoint from which to weigh their claims against our own. It will be 
argued here not only that this latter claim is correct, but in particular, that it is possible 
to set out a conception of impartial public deliberation which can accommodate the 
legitimate concerns of contextualists with both recognition and transformation. Indeed, 
it is argued that only impartial deliberation can provide the means to determine which 
identities are worthy of recognition and which are in need of transformation. What is at 
issue, to reiterate, is the interpretation of the requirements of equality, not its value as 
such.
Accommodating the concerns of contextualists requires an understanding of 
situation and interpretation which differs significantly from those on offer at present. 
These threaten impartial deliberation insofar as they set out to debunk moral argument 
and theoretical abstraction per se, and impartial morality in particular, and insofar as 
they suppose that situation establishes a barrier to communication between differently 
situated persons. The understanding of context advanced out here relies first of all 
upon conceptual pluralism, i.e. anti-foundationalism, in order to rebuff the relativist 
thrust of contextualism.25 This pluralism resists the attempt to show that any particular
25 While some of those criticised here also espouse an 'anti-foundationalist' position, namely, Rorty, 
Walzer, Foucault, and Young, it is argued in this thesis that much 'anti-foundationalism' is 
insufficiently pluralist, and typically accords a foundational status to particularising socio-historical 
categories to the exclusion of universalising descriptions and normative concepts. The emphasis on 
pluralism has been inspired largely by the work of Hilary Putnam, e.g. Reason. Truth and History. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). The work of these authors is distinguished by a rejection of 
the foundationalist claim that a particular range of description can be regarded as fundamental, the
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standpoint or range of descriptions is any more fundamental than any other: the claim 
on which contextualism's relativism and bias against generalising abstraction rests. On 
this view, socio-historical descriptions have no primacy over abstract theoretical ones, 
nor a historical standpoint over a moral.26
The second element of this account of context is provided by a public account 
of meaning, in which meaning is accounted for in terms of public rule-following 
rather than private mental representation.27 This disposes of the epistemic conception 
of situation and the idea that certain understandings are authoritative. It supports, by 
contrast, a hermeneutic understanding which rests instead on the idea that the 
conceptual frameworks through which we come to understand ourselves are social and 
historical artefacts (on a certain description). This explanation accounts for the way in 
which differently situated persons come to form distinct perspectives, but it does not 
suppose incommunicability. Because our self-understandings rest on languages and 
traditions which are not of our making, and which have histories of their own, we 
cannot be thought to be transparent to ourselves as standpoint theorists suppose. This 
means that our perspectives ought not be regarded as authoritative insofar as they can 
embody misunderstandings of our selves and of our interests.
Conceptual pluralism plays a significant role in this version of the hermeneutic 
conception of context. First of all, the plurality of identities and perspectives revealed 
by the hermeneutic emphasis on context and tradition are not reducible to a single 
foundation, but form a permanent element of reason itself. Secondly, I rely on this
concepts of physics, for example, coupled with a rejection of the relativism to which much 'anti- 
foundationalism' is prey.
26 Onora O'Neill argues that particularising descriptions are every bit as much abstractions as are 
generalising descriptions and that consequently the particularist animus against abstraction is 
misconceived. Towards Justice and Virtue. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.39-44.
27 The account of public meaning set out in Chapter Three is based on the discussion of rule-following 
in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958). For the contrast between 
public and private notions of meaning see Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). On the connections between the analytic philosophy 
of language and the continental tradition of the human sciences, see Karl Otto Apel, Analytic 
Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften. H. Hostelelie (trans.) ( Dordrecht: Reidel,
1967).
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pluralism to insist that the phenomenon of situation is itself always interpretable: there 
is no single fundamental way to understand it. For this reason we can reject relativist 
interpretations of it which exclude the possibility of adopting an impartial stance with 
respect to one's situation.
The argument of this thesis is by no means wholly negative, but rather aims at 
clearing away misunderstandings of situation and of interpretation in order that a 
better understanding of these can be constructed which can show how they may 
enrich, rather than undermine, impartial deliberation. The pluralist understanding of 
interpretation offered in this thesis can do this in two ways. First of all by redescribing 
identities and traditions in order to call our existing judgements about them into 
questions. Secondly, by providing narratives or genealogies of our current ideas and 
problematics themselves in order to reveal problematic elements in their construction. 
Contextualisation relies upon the hermeneutic idea that we are situated in such a way 
that our moral and theoretical perspectives and our self-understandings are not 
transparent. If they were, contextualisation could not bring out features of these of 
which we were not previously aware.
This thesis claims that while impartiality is usually thought to be diametrically 
opposed to the recognition of the particular identities and traditions revealed by 
contextualism, it actually requires an understanding of these, if not an unqualified 
endorsement of them, if we are to construct public justifications. This is because the 
requirement that public policies be publicly justifiable requires us, first of all, to be 
open to the legitimate claims of others.28 This obviously rests on understanding their 
perspectives and self-understandings, because where needs and interests are 
interpretable, like everything else, we cannot simply assume that our interpretations of 
the needs and interests of others are sound. Indeed, we cannot be certain that we are 
interpreting our own needs and interests correctly. To this extent, recognition of
28 It is argued that communitarian attempts to draw normative conclusions from hermeneutics are not 
only parochial from the point of view of liberal cosmopolitanism, but that they fail also to do justice to 
Gadamer's emphasis on the importance of openness to others. See James Risser, Hermeneutics and the 
Voice of the Other. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).
12
situation and its connection to reasonable pluralism with respect to the interpretation 
of value and principles is required by the obligation to deliberate with others in order 
to publicly justify the employment of collective authority. Equally, we cannot regard 
self-interpretation as privileged in any way, but must, as radical social critics insist, be 
sensitive to the possibility that the self-understandings of deliberating parties may be 
illegitimate in that they may rest on treating others as less than equals, or in the sense 
that they do not sustain the best interpretation of the interests of those concerned.
The conduct of impartial deliberation, it will be claimed, requires its 
participants not to ignore the fact of situation but rather to interpret it in order to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate claims. Contextualisation, it is argued here, 
forms an essential element of the process of deliberation to the extent that it can 
identify beliefs and explain dissent.29 To this extent it bolsters the demands of 
recognition, but equally it can serve the aim of transformation, where impartiality 
requires it, by identifying and removing obstacles to the justification of certain 
policies through problematising the judgements of our interlocutors. In this way 
contextualisation is combined with critical morality in order to form a social criticism 
consistent with the aims of liberal egalitarianism.
Chapter One addresses arguments about context in the history of ideas and 
history of political thought. While these have moved away from treating context in 
terms of causal explanation towards a conception of context as interpretation, serving 
to identify beliefs, the account of the identification of beliefs current in the history of 
political thought is problematic insofar as it is reductive and author-centred.
29 It is wrong to claim that the liberal idea that public justification be impartial is 'apolitical1, in the 
sense that it necessarily forecloses public debate. The pursuit of publicly justifiable policies is, on the 
contrary, envisaged here as a robust affair, requiring citizens not only to interpret themselves, but also 
to engage with the perspectives of others and to open themselves to their criticism. For the claim that 
'political' liberalism, which is to say, a liberalism which stresses public justification, is 'apolitical' see 
for example, Jeffrey C. Isaac, Matthew F. Filner, and Jason C. Bivins, 'American Democracy and the 
New Christian Right: a critique of apolitical liberalism,' in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon 
(eds.) Democracy's Edges. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.222-64.
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Chapter Two introduces an pluralist, antifoundationalist understanding of 
interpretation as providing a superior, interest driven account of contextualisation, one 
which does not place undue restrictions upon our interpretive projects.
Chapter Three sets out the epistemic, experience centred, account of situation 
found in feminist standpoint theory, and traces its connections to the politics of 
recognition. An alternative, public, account of meaning is set out, which counters the 
idea of privileged understandings and which shows how concepts may themselves be 
socially and historically variable, in the sense that they are features of language.
Chapter Four shows how conceptual pluralism and public meaning are 
combined to form a hermeneutic, i.e. language and tradition based, understanding of 
situation. The connection between this ontology and a relativist communitarian social 
criticism focused on the interpretation of shared traditions, is set out and exposed as 
resting on a reductive interpretation of situation. On a pluralist understanding, 
situation is shown to be compatible with impartial morality.
Chapter Five sets out Marxist and Foucauldian versions of social criticism. 
While ideology critique and genealogy differ in certain respects, both of these share a 
reductive socio-historical interpretation of morality, with the consequence that, as they 
stand, neither version of social criticism is compatible with the egalitarian requirement 
that criticism proceed by offering others reasons, including moral reasons, to alter 
their perspectives.
Chapter Six sets out a revised conception of contextualisation and situation 
and shows how these figure in deliberative politics. The redescriptive possibilities of 
adopting an objective socio-historical stance to our beliefs is harnessed to critical 
morality, and the normative aspects of contextualism, i.e. recognition and 
transformation are shown to be accommodated within a deliberative politics.
In summary, the argument of this thesis falls into two parts: firstly, a 
pragmatic, pluralist conception of context and of interpretation is set out. This 
counters reductivist theories of context and interpretation which support relativism.
14
Socio-historical contextualisation has featured prominently in a variety of projects of 
social criticism, Marxist, Foucauldian, feminist and communitarian, but this model of 
interpretation provides the means to avoid the reductionism which, it is argued, 
plagues contemporary contextualisms. The second part of the argument builds upon 
this innovative account of interpretation in setting out an account of the place of 
contextualisation in social criticism and the place of the resulting interpretive social 
criticism in democratic politics. While some liberals, notably Kymlicka, have sought to 
accommodate context and situation by giving greater weight to the identity- 
constituting character of traditions, others, like Brian Barry are dismissive of the 
weight attached to context and situation and of the parochialism which is usually 
associated with these.30 The argument of this thesis is that impartial deliberative 
politics must accommodate the legitimate concerns of contextualists both with the 
recognition and transformation of identities and that it is impartiality itself which 
requires that contextualising social criticism play a central role in deliberative politics. 
Contextualists are wrong to reject impartiality, and liberals wrong to dismiss the 
significance of context. My claim then is that given the right understanding of context 
and interpretation, that contextualisation can play a role in social criticism, and that 
impartiality requires that this sort of social criticism be central to the conduct of 
deliberative politics.
30 Kymlicka, Liberalism. Community, and Culture, and Barry, Justice as Impartiality.
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C h a p t e r  O n e  
Id e n t if y in g  a c t s
How do we conceive of the relationship between ideas and their context? The 
contemporary history of political thought has moved away from a causal account of 
context to a 'linguistic' account which treats the ideas of political thinkers as forms of 
action: speech acts.1 The claim is that by placing these acts in their proper, socio- 
historical, context we can hope to better identify the arguments concerned. There is 
much to recommend this 'linguistic turn', notably the way it makes historical context 
internal to an understanding of texts, where in the past it may have appeared to be 
little more than an incidental curiosity, with no claims on the attentions of political 
theorists.2 This is a promising direction for a project of contextual social criticism 
insofar as the strong link made between understanding and context provides an 
excellent reason to contextualise philosophical and political concepts.
However, Skinner, in particular, sets strict limits to the interpretation of 
arguments. Legitimate interpretation restricts itself to the identification of the intended 
meanings of the authors of historical texts and Skinner explicitly rejects 
interpretations which focus on the unintended meanings of the arguments present in 
these works. This is problematic insofar as social criticism, it will be argued, relies 
upon precisely this sort of interpretive project, For only where texts can carry 
unintended meanings can they be reinterpreted, and the essence of social criticism is 
reinterpretation.
1 John Dunn, 'The Identity of the History of Ideas,' Philosophy 43 (1968), pp.85-104. Quentin 
Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas,' History and Theory 8 (1969), pp.3-53, 
and reproduced in Tully (ed.) Meaning and Context The page references to 'Meaning and 
understanding in the history of ideas' which follow refer to this volume. The concept of a 'speech acf is 
first set out in J. L. Austin, How to do things with words. (1962) J. O. Urmson (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1965). J. G. A. Pocock, often associated with this Cambridge-based history of 
political thought, has preferred to focus on political languages, rather than on individual speech acts.
See Pocock, 'Verbalising a political act,' Political Theory 1 (1973), pp.27-45.
2 This characterisation of the character of the contemporary history of ideas is taken from Anthony 
Pagden, 'Rethinking the linguistic turn: current anxieties in intellectual history,' Journal of the History 
of Ideas 49( 19881. p p .5 19-29.
16
This chapter will examine the arguments which Dunn and Skinner advance on 
behalf of their closely related interpretive projects and it will conclude by contrasting 
their intentionalist approach with the work of another revisionist figure in the history 
of ideas, Michel Foucault.3 Foucault not only adopts a diametrically opposed 
approach which deliberately avoids the focus on authorial intention, but, it will be 
argued, he also rests his approach on a pluralist understanding of interpretation. That 
is to say, Foucault does not exclude the possibility that alternative styles of 
interpretation, operating at levels other than that he has chosen, and focusing on 
different ranges of objects, are equally legitimate. This is not a commonly remarked 
on feature of Foucault's 'archaeology' and, it will be argued in Chapter Five, it is not 
an insight which he follows consistently. However, it will be argued that this pluralist 
direction is one which an adequate account of context and interpretation must take.
Context and Causality
John Dunn argues that the history of ideas is insufficiently historical, dealing 
only with 'reified abstractions' like Empiricism and Rationalism, rather than with the 
ideas of 'real' men arguing in actual concrete contexts.4 To take these empty 
abstractions as one's theme is to neglect the fact that intellectual matters are really just
3 See, in particular, Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. (1969) A. M. Sheridan Smith (trans.), 
(London: Pantheon, 1972).
4John Dunn, 'The Identity of the History of Ideas.' C. B. Macpherson could be said to have provoked 
this debate with his attempt to trace the problems of contemporary liberalism back to their roots in the 
seventeenth century claiming that the 'possessive individualist' assumptions of market society were 
'embedded' in the founding texts of liberalism, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). Peter Laslett's critical introduction to Locke's Two Treatises 
of Government. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), is important for its presentation of 
Locke as a radical rather than a post facto ideologue of the Glorious Revolution. John Dunn was 
completing a study of Locke at the time that Alan Ryan published his response to the historical critique 
of liberalism. Dunn: The Political Thought of John Locke. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969); Ryan: 'Locke and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,' Political Studies 13 (1965), pp.219-230. 
In this article Ryan opined that philosophers had little to learn from historians, prompting John Dunn's 
attempt to rebut this claim in 'The identity of the history of ideas.'
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'complicated instances' of the 'social activities' of talking and thinking, activities 
which must be understood in their proper social and historical context. Rather as Marx 
claimed to have turned Hegel the right way up, Dunn wishes to set the history of ideas 
upon its feet. The second flaw of the history of ideas is that despite its abstraction, it is 
nonetheless philosophically weak, characteristically avoiding any attempt to form 
judgements as to the truth or falsity of the ideas under consideration. While one might 
be inclined to think that the solution to the problem is that students of ideas should be 
clearer about whether their interests are historical or philosophical and focus their 
attention accordingly, Dunn rejects this sort of solution apparently because it seems to 
suggest that historical criticism would then have no purchase upon the philosopher 
and vice versa. In order to avoid such mutual disinterest Dunn suggests that the 
proper view is that no account of an idea is complete unless it meets both 
philosophical and historical requirements, and he proposes to show that this must be 
so.5
Dunn's argument is dogged by an unfortunate ambiguity, however. He 
purports to show that historians cannot avoid being philosophers, and vice versa, but 
his actual argument turns out to have a very much more limited scope: it concerns the 
relationship between two types of historical explanation, rational and causal, and 
purports to show that the former necessarily relies upon the latter. When he turns to 
the relationship between this newly reconceptualised history, and the philosophical 
appraisal of the ideas concerned, he runs into difficulties. On one hand, he makes no 
attempt to show that historians must be philosophers, suggesting that a historical 
understanding has some sort of priority over philosophical understanding, and on the 
other, he finds himself admitting that history and philosophy have different objects,
5 '1, that the completion of both types of investigation [historical and philosophical] is a necessary 
preliminary to the construction of an indefeasible explanation of either type; 2, that a sensitive exercise 
of both types of explanation and a realisation of the sort of problems which an audience would have in 
following the story will tend to produce a convergence of tactic in this pursuit; that a rational 
explanation of a past philosophical dilemma, a causal explanation of a past philosopher's enterprise and 
an account of either of these rendered intelligible to an ignorant layman will display a considerable 
symmetry of form and that most of the unsatisfactory features of the history of ideas comes [sic] from 
its notable lack of resemblance to any such form.' Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.86-7.
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such that historians and philosophers cannot really be said to be talking about the same 
things in any case. At the heart of this puzzle is the problem of identifying an act, a 
problem subsequently taken up by Quentin Skinner, although no longer with the aim of 
uniting historians and philosophers. Finding the right way to approach this problem is 
the key to the problem of context. Dunn's strategy is interesting however for it tries to 
accommodate a certain pluralism by denying that 'rational' as opposed to causal 
explanation, or historical, as opposed to philosophical studies, can stand alone as the 
correct account of an argument. Instead, we must combine these to form a complete 
account.
I will take Dunn's argument about rational and causal explanations first and 
then consider his difficulties with the relation between philosophy and history. 
'Rational' and 'causal' explanation are both forms of historical explanation. Rational' 
history is initially characterised by Dunn as concerned with 'giving reasons for why an 
argument seems cogent in the past.'6 Each has its own limitations according to Dunn. 
Causal history, he suggests, is unable to explain why Plato criticises Thrasymachus, 
while rational history, for its part, is unable to explain 'why the Roman Empire in the 
West collapsed'.
On the basis of this recognition of the limitations of each form of explanation, 
Dunn suggests that instead of regarding them as diametrically opposed forms of 
explanation, they should rather be regarded as complementary. Dunn considers it a 
grave mistake to attempt to replace one with the other, and argues that, in the history 
of ideas,
6The terms are taken from an earlier debate about the place of Hempel's Covering Law explanation 
within history, involving William Dray, Patrick Gardiner, Alan Donagan and others. See in 
particular: Dray's Laws and Explanation in History. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1957) and his 
'Explanatory narrative in history,' The Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1954), pp. 15-27; Gardiner's 'The 
objects of historical knowledge,' Philosophy 28 (1952), pp.211-20; and Donagan's 'The verification of 
historical theses,' The Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1954), pp. 15-27. Dunn simply dismisses the 
partisans of narrative as 'idealist'. Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p. 89.
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.. .most abstract methodological arguments in the subject depend upon 
an effort to make one of the two descriptions of the act all important 
and the other trivial. They err in proffering one description as the 
overriding, the correct description of the performance in the place of 
the other.7
The point at issue for Dunn is to determine what is the relationship between 
the meaning of an idea and the circumstances of its birth. Rational historians will deny 
that these circumstances are in any way relevant. Proponents of causal explanation, on 
the other hand, will eclipse the ideas themselves, by stressing only the conditions of 
their genesis. Dunn argues that causal explanation, while a necessary component of a 
fu ll understanding of a statement, is clearly not a necessary condition of understanding 
that statement. Such an explanation could 'only give at best the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of its occurrence. It cannot give any account of its truth status.'8 
Equally, a philosophical account of a statement would fall short of a full account 
insofar as it neglected the 'stimulus conditions' of that statement's utterance. Dunn 
concludes that, 'the only account of a past philosophical performance which could be 
said to be complete at any one time must comprise the complete Skinnerian [B. F.] 
story of its genesis and the best available assessment of its truth status.'9
Dunn then argues that each form of explanation gives rise to its own style o f  
historiography. There is, first of all, the philosophical history of ideas: a 'history of 
philosophy,' concerned with a 'set of argued propositions in the past.' More 
specifically: 'All the statements contained in it are statements about the relationships 
of propositions to propositions. Men, breathing, excreting, hating, mocking, never
7Dimn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.91.
8 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.90.
9 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.91.
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step inside it.'10 Elsewhere it is characterised as 'a Platonic activity which has been 
extricated belatedly from causality, deodorised, anaesthetised, pure...'11 By contrast, 
the 'historical' version of the history of ideas is a 'history of philosophising.' This takes 
as its subject matter 'the set of activities in which men are engaged when they 
enunciated these propositions.'12 This history, then, is the history of philosophy as a 
social activity. It is Dunn's aim to argue that both forms of explanation have their 
place in a complete account. As indicated above, Dunn is not wholly even-handed in 
his account of their mutual relations and his argument can best be regarded as one 
which seeks to place limits to rational explanation. When distinguishing between 
rational and causal history, Dunn dismisses rational history as merely a 'story,' and, as 
such, not a form of explanation capable of explaining social change.13 Accordingly, 
Dunn seems to conceive of rational history, i.e. the history of philosophy, as 
dependent upon the history of philosophising, i.e. causal explanation, as it is the 
former, left to its own devices, which is the greatest source of confusion in the history 
of ideas: 'the causal story, in so far as we can still discover it, has always to be 
elaborated first.'14
Dunn's argument for the necessity of causal history as a foundation for rational 
history hinges on the idea that it can help us to avoid certain types of 
misunderstanding. There are, Dunn says, three ways in which one can misunderstand 
what someone has said:
The meaning one attributes to his words may not be a meaning that can 
be properly attributed to them in his public language... the meaning
10 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.92.
11 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.97.
12 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.92.
13 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p. 89.
14 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.97.
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that one attributes to them may not have been that which he intended 
them to bear. The meaning that one attributes to his act in saying them 
may be mistaken.15
The first two cases are deemed relatively unimportant, and are rapidly 
dismissed by Dunn. He makes it clear that the rational historian is usually well enough 
equipped to overcome these first two forms of misunderstanding. The third, however, 
is said to differ from the preceding two types of misunderstanding insofar as it is a 
misunderstanding o f an act. Identifying ’what Socrates said' is equivalent to 
establishing, 'not just what words he used, but what he was saying in using them - 
. what he meant.' Here the rational historian will baulk, for the explanation of action is 
not customarily taken to be relevant to the business of elucidating what someone has 
said.16
Dunn’s argument is that this view is mistaken: 'There are occasions on which 
one cannot know what a man means unless one knows what he is doing.'17 
Furthermore, it is causal explanation that a rational historian must turn to if  he is to 
discover what a man was doing, and hence, what he meant. In order to demonstrate 
that this is so, Dunn appeals to J. L. Austin's notion of ‘speech-acts’. Austin had 
argued that ‘saying’ could also be ‘doing'. Rather like Wittgenstein, Austin argued 
that philosophers had concentrated on the use of language to make statements at the
l
expense of the multiple other uses of language.18 In fact language is often used to
15 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.93.
16 It is not clear how the third misunderstanding differs from the second. Both are examples of 
mistakes about intended meaning, and the point of introducing the idea of speech acts is to show that 
the second may be described as the third.
17 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.93.
18 J. L. Austin, How to do things with words. As John Searle has pointed out, Austin's account of the 
performative dimension of language ultimately undermines his own constative/performative 
distinction, as the making of statements is itself a performance. See Searle, 'A taxonomy of 
illocutionary acts,' in Expression and Meaning. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
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perform, rather than simply describe, or report on, actions. To say, 'I promise' is in the 
appropriate circumstances to perform the act of promising. Of course, in other 
situations, this same pair of words can mean different things: it can be uttered, for 
example, by a teacher in the course of an English class, as a joke, or by an actor in the 
course of a play. In these circumstances this utterance would not have the 'force' of a 
promise, although its propositional content remains constant. The distinction between 
meaning and force is meant to capture the situation in which a sentence, the 
propositional content of which remains constant, nevertheless can be said to mean 
different things in different contexts. Incidentally, while Austin distinguished between 
performative and non-performative utterances, Searle has pointed out that even 
making a statement, i.e. asserting a proposition, is itself to perform an Elocutionary 
act with the force of an assertion such that ultimately, the distinction between 
performative and non-performative utterances collapses. To name the force of an 
utterance is usually taken to be equivalent to naming the act which has been 
performed.19
Dunn supports his claim with an example in which a person parodies an 
argument which he finds personally repugnant:
Suppose a person were to give a parody of the sort of argument 
normally produced in favour of a position which he particularly detests 
- say, in an argument about the justification for punishing homosexual 
acts as such, to describe an alleged causal relationship between 
changes in the sexual mores of the Roman aristocracy and the military 
collapse of the Roman empire in the West. If, at the end of the 
impassioned and sneering recital, a listener were to be asked what the 
speaker in question had said, it might be possible for him to provide a 
full record of the words used and in the correct order and with perfect
19 Peter Strawson, 'Intention and convention in speech acts,' in Logico-Linguistic Papers. (London: 
Methuen, 1971).
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understanding of the rules for the use for each particular word and yet 
still not have understood what was said. Of course, such a 
misapprehension could readily be described as a failure to grasp what 
the speaker was doing in saying those words; and this is clearly an apt 
description. But it does seem at least equally natural to describe it as 
not understanding ‘what he was saying’. ‘Doing things with words’ is 
saying things, just as saying things is doing things with words. Parody 
or even irony are not just acts which hold the world at a respectful 
distance. They are ways of saying things about the world.20
Dunn argues that by attending to the words alone, the rational historian would 
utterly mistake the speaker's meaning. By contrast, a causal explanation of what he 
was doing 'in' saying these words ensures the correct identification of what was 
meant. In this way causal history is shown to be necessary if  misunderstandings are to 
be avoided.
This is an interesting strategy for forcing casual explanation upon the rational 
historian, and thereby preventing him from misidentifying the meaning of historical 
arguments. It is not, however, a successful strategy. First of all, one must reflect on 
the scope of Dunn's argument. He advances an argument which apparently 
demonstrates that ironic utterances may only be correctly identified by causal 
explanation. Even if this were a successful argument, Dunn would still need to 
provide reasons for thinking that ironic utterances were sufficiently widespread in the 
histoiy of philosophy to justify the elaboration in all cases, of precautionary causal 
explanations. Alternatively, he would need to show how causal explanation can 
contribute to the understanding of a wider range of utterances than the simply ironic.
20 Dunn argues that while one could ask what someone was, 'doing in saying those words', one could 
equally be concerned with "what he was saying", p.94. This, of course, is to get Austin's theory back to 
front. Similarly Dunn argues, again in direct opposition to Austin, that acts such as parody and irony, 
'are ways of saying things about the world,' which directly counters Austin's explicit distinction 
between descriptive, or 'constative' statements, and performatives, i.e. speech-acts. How to do things 
with words. Lecture 1. See Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', pp.93-4.
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A more pressing theoretical difficulty with Dunn's account is that he does not 
provide a clear account of the role of causal explanation in the 'identification' of 
speech-acts. Dunn does not refer to a Covering Law. There is no reference to any 
repetition of such performances, by this speaker, or others, which might form the basis 
for an inductive generalisation. Neither dispositions, ends, nor motives are explicitly 
referred to. Similarly, while Dunn had previously identified knowledge of 'the 
conditioning-history and the set of present stimulus conditions'21 as essential, perhaps 
even sufficient, to a causal explanation, there is no attempt to detail what these are in 
this instance.22 To the question, ‘what caused this action?’ Dunn has, apparently, no 
answer.23
Even if he had, it would remain to be shown that providing such an explanation 
identified the act in question. Indeed, it appears that 'explanation' and 'identification' are 
taken to be synonymous, which is surely the point to be established. In fact it seems 
more plausible to say that one must first identify an act before one might look for its 
causes. In addition it seems a perverse use of Austin's theory to take it as a means to 
extend causal explanation to the understanding of speech. It would appear, rather, that 
Austin's theory shows that there is a class of actions which are not to be identified with 
actions in the physical world: the usual source of examples in these debates. There is 
doubtless a causal explanation of some sort to be given, for example, for the action of
raising my arm, and this is also true of the physical aspect of speaking; i.e: the
production of sounds. However, Austin distinguished this act from speech acts proper, 
of which he identified three main classes: locutionary, illocutionary, and
21 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p. 90.
22 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p. 90.
23 In addition, Davidson's means of introducing non-Covering Law causal explanation in to the 
explanation of action is not open to Dunn. Davidson argues that responses to the 'why?' requests could 
take the form of 'because' statements, and that these were sufficient explanations, even in the absence 
of explicit reference to any Covering Law. However, Dunn clearly linked 'why?' requests to 'rational' 
explanation and could consequently only adopt Davidson's suggestion at the cost of renouncing the 
dualism which he had proposed as a means of solving the dispute over historical understanding.
Donald Davidson, 'Actions, reasons, and causes,' in Essays on Actions and Events. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), pp.3-20.
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perlocutionary. It is not at all clear how causal explanation is related to these acts. It is 
more accurate to regard Austin as having shown how ways of speaking can be actions, 
e.g. naming a ship, or getting married, actions not easily susceptible to causal 
reduction.
Dunn's scheme seems to fail because he continues to think of the world of ideas 
as radically distinct from the 'real' physical world, and of action and society as 
belonging simply to this causal order. To be sure, Dunn is right to suppose that some 
information about the circumstances in which the utterance concerned was made will 
help to identify it as an act of parody, but he is wrong to suppose that we have to think 
of this 'social' context in causal terms. His attempt to make the study of political ideas 
more realistic by treating them as elements in the social activity of theorising is undone 
by his reliance on an extremely reductive model of the social. On top of this, however, 
there is the question of what counts as identifying an act, and whether we need to 
know that the utterance concerned was an act of parody at all? To take just one 
possibility: if we wish to determine whether what the speaker said was true or not, do 
we really need to know that it was meant as parody? On the relations between 
philosophy and history, Dunn is equivocal.
His original aim was to show that a 'full' understanding of a political idea 
required us to be both historians and philosophers: that we must see ideas as elements 
in the social practice of political argument and also be concerned with the truth of 
these arguments. Of course, one might wonder why we need a 'full' or 'complete' 
understanding, and Dunn's response to this is to seek to prioritise causal explanation 
within the historical account of an idea such that this fully historical account 
(comprising causal and rational explanations) becomes a precondition of the 
philosophical appraisal of the ideas concerned.24 It is the historian who has the 
techniques at his disposal to correctly identify the point being made by the historical
24 There is an ambiguity here: sometimes Dunn speaks as if the 'rational' account covers both 
'rational', narrative, history and also the philosophical assessment of ideas. Whichever he has in mind, 
the aim is clear: that causality is central to history and history is a precondition of philosophy.
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figure concerned: 'If the effort to leam from philosophers of the past is a plausible 
philosophical heuristic, it would be most odd if it can be best carried out in general by 
failing to grasp their actual arguments.'25 While this purports to show that 
philosophers must be historians, Dunn nowhere attempts to make the converse case. 
This is perhaps the fundamental prejudice of the contextualist: that the world of ideas 
must be made more realistic, that it must be brought down to earth in some way.
This aside, Dunn falters when he comes to the point where he must 
demonstrate the reliance of philosophers upon the contextualising work of the 
historian. Every argument is designed to meet a particular set of truth criteria: 'If we 
are to understand the criteria of truth or falsehood implicit in a complex intellectual 
architectonic, we have to understand the structures of biographical or social 
experience which made these criteria self-evident.'26 These truth criteria are 
historically variable, specific to a particular 'social experience'. When we evaluate the 
truth of an argument, we do so not with universally valid criteria, but rather with our 
own current truth criteria. The consequence of this, according to Dunn, is that any 
philosophical assessment of a historical argument must fatally distort that argument: 
'To abstract an argument from the truth criteria it was designed to meet is to convert it 
into a different argument.'27 The consequence of the '^ Jruth criteria argument' is that the 
philosophical assessment of an argument is necessarily unhistorical, i.e. the argument 
advanced by Plato, or Locke is necessarily not identical with that evaluated by 
philosophers in this century (or any other). With this conclusion, there seems to be 
little point in telling current philosophers that they must take more care to grasp the 
'actual' arguments of dead philosophers, for the moment that they begin to appraise 
their truth value, these arguments are converted into arguments of another character 
entirely.
25 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.96.
26 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.96.
27 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.96.
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The problem with this lies with Dunn's assumption that the author fixes the 
identity of his act. If we are historians we may think of 'it' as an 'act', but if we are 
philosophers we may rather think of 'it' as a 'proposition': an object of philosophical 
appraisal. Which is it? The best answer is 'both', depending on one's interests.28 There 
is not much to be gained by seeking to work out which of these it 'really' is, for 
reasons which I shall set out in the next chapter. To be sure, we cannot help but 
suppose that there is an 'it' which we identify as an 'act' or 'proposition', but there is no 
neutral, definitive way to say what this is, and so solve the puzzle. Dunn's argument 
founders then because he assumes that causal explanation would identify the act in 
question, although as it turns out, this presupposes an identification, rather than 
supplying one. The underlying problem is that he supposed that there might be a 
single right answer, which would then bind philosophy to history by determining what 
it was the historians and philosophers were talking about.
As it is, Dunn concludes with the rather uncomfortable assertion that we are 
left with two 'pasts', one open and one closed. The former is the past which is of 
interest to philosophers, one in which 'what we can learn from the past is always what 
we can succeed in learning; and the educative past can change - as if  some disused 
Mendip lead-working mine were one day to disclose a new and precious sort of 
uranium.'29 Here the suggestion seems to be that not only will philosophers identify 
the object of their concerns in ways which might conflict with the identifications of 
historians, but also that their identifications are not final, that we may reidentify 
arguments in ways that we cannot yet foresee. By contrast, the historian works with a
28 Strawson distinguishes between 'sentences' and 'statements' in the course of a discussion of what it is 
to logically appraise an argument. He reserves the term 'statement1 for the object of a strictly logical 
appraisal, i.e. it is a sentence to which we apply the calculus of truth functions. Sentences, by contrast, 
are collections of words which are not logically appraised. Introduction to Logical Theory. (London: 
Methuen, 1952). See also Wittgenstein, 'And to say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false 
amounts to saying: we call something a proposition when in our language we apply the calculus of 
truth functions to it.' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe (ed.) (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958) §136.
29 Dunn, 'The identity of the history of ideas', p.98.
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closed past in which acts are identified once and for all: The problem of interpretation 
is always the problem of closing the context. What closes the context in actuality is 
the intention (and, much more broadly, the experiences) of the speaker.'30 It is not 
clear why the context of the historian should be any less prone to alterations than that 
of the philosopher, but setting that aside for the time being, it is interesting that Dunn 
should close by introducing a new note: the suggestion that a proper, historical, 
identification of an act, is one which identifies it in terms of the intentions of the 
actor.
Intentions and Speech Acts.
Subsequently, Quentin Skinner addresses himself to Dunn's problem, i.e. that 
of determining the precise role of 'context' in the identification of acts.31 While he 
agrees with Dunn that the proper identification of an act is one which is made in terms 
of the actor's intentions, he dissents from Dunn's reliance upon causal explanation and 
in this way overcomes the reductionist idea that the world of ideas floats somewhere 
above the world of action, at best simply subject to its causal influence. However, 
while this is in some respects a more satisfactory use of Austin's theory, he is 
ultimately no more successful than:Dunn in working out an account of what .the 
identity of an act consists in.
Unlike Dunn, Skinner is focused more narrowly upon the correct form that the 
history of ideas must take, rather than upon the relations between history and 
philosophy. On the latter question he has not formulated a clear answer at all, and
30 Dunn, ’The identity of the history of ideas', p.98.
31 In 1988 Skinner noted, 'I think it was entirely due to discussions with John Dunn, and to reading the 
article cited in n.5 above, [’The Identity of the History of Ideas'] that I came to understand the way in 
which speech-act theory might be relevant to the interpretation of texts. See especially the invocation 
of J. L. Austin in Dunn's article, 'The Identity of the History of Ideas', p.22. in Skinner's 'Reply to My 
Critics' in Meaning and Context, J. Tully (ed.) (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), p.233n.
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seems tom between wishing to be ’pluralist' and following his arguments about 
meaning to their (reductionist) conclusion.32 His argument falls into three parts. The 
first is an analysis of what is wrong with existing histories. This is followed by an 
account of the twin errors he thinks responsible for the flaws observed in writing 
about the history of ideas: textualism and contextualism.
Skinner presents the history of ideas as embodying four characteristic flaws or 
'myths': the pursuit of doctrines; of coherence; a tendency to 'prolepsis'; and finally, a 
tendency to parochialism. He argues that these organising principles for constructing 
historical accounts are all misconceived. The myth of doctrines appears in a number 
of guises. There is a mythology concerning the doctrines present in a text, and a 
mythology in which doctrines are said to be absent from a text. Of the first there are 
two chief forms: that found in 'intellectual biographies' and that found in liistories of 
ideas'. The mythology of doctrines as it affects intellectual biographies is a matter of 
'mistaking some scattered or incidental remarks by one of the classical theorists for his 
'doctrine' on one of the themes on which the historian is set to expect.'33 This gives 
rise to the anachronism of 'crediting a writer with a meaning which he could not have 
intended to convey, since that meaning was not available to him.' Examples include 
the suggestion that Marsilius of Padua had a doctrine of the separation of powers, or 
the controversy as to whether Coke had a doctrine of judicial review. There are also 
doctrines which 'might in principle' have appeared in a text, but, which the-author, 'in 
fact had no intention to convey.'34
In histories of ideas, like those of A. O. Lovejoy, which are concerned to 'trace 
the morphology of a given doctrine,' ideas are, Skinner argues, hypostatised into
32 Richard Ashcraft pronounced Skinner's arguments 'devastating'. Nevertheless, Ashcraft goes on to 
voice the criticism that Skinner fails to show, 'how... one can proceed from 'history' or 'philosophy' to 
the activity of theorising about political life as one experiences it in the present.' Ashcraft, 'On the 
problem of methodology and the nature of political theory,' Political Theory 3 (1975), pp.5-25. p.22.
33 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.36.
34 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.33.
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entities and these in turn are discussed as if they were organisms. This gives rise to the 
practice of discovering 'anticipations' of subsequent authors in a particular writer's 
work and worries about whether an idea has 'really emerged' in the work of a 
particular author. These 'absurdities', Skinner claims, stem from the historians' failure 
to recognise 'that ideas presuppose agents.'35
The second problem identified by Skinner is the problem of coherence. 
Historians make the mistake of supplying the coherence which an author's work may 
lack. This produces the impression that an author's work is a 'closed system', when the 
work in question actually falls short of this, or may never have been meant to attain 
this level of coherence.36 This results in the practice of discounting an author's own 
'statements of intention', or the discounting of books which prevent a particular 
system from being established. Another abuse promoted by the search for coherence is 
manifested in the unwillingness of interpreters to accept that an apparent contradiction 
may very well be just that: a contradiction. Ultimately, practising textual exegesis on 
the basis of this mythology of 'coherence' produces 'not a history of ideas at all, but of 
abstractions: a history of thoughts which no one actually succeeded in thinking, at a 
level of coherence which no one ever actually attained.'37 This appears to be a 
restatement of Skinner's misgivings about the determination of historians to find 
coherent 'doctrines' in a text. In each case, the problem, as Skinner sees, it is the 
historians' tendency to discount the author's actual intentions.
The third problem is that of 'prolepsis', which is defined as: 'the conflation of 
the necessary asymmetry between the significance an observer may justifiably claim 
to find in a given statement or other action, and the meaning of that action itself.'38 
Examples of this include the suggestions that Plato and Rousseau were justifying
35 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.35.
36 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.39.
37 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.40.
38 Skinner, Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.44.
31
totalitarianism, or that Locke was a 'liberal' theorist. The 'necessary asymmetry' is 
between the 'significance' of a theorist's work for us and 'its meaning for the agent 
himself.'39 Thus Locke may reasonably be considered significant as the founder of 
liberalism but this should not be confused with statements to the effect that Locke was 
himself a 'liberal', or that he could possibly have 'intended to contribute' to the liberal 
'school of philosophy'.40 It is not clear why Skinner thinks of this as a 'necessary 
asymmetry', but it is clear that problems will arise if historians do not consider the 
possibility that the significance of a text for a later age may not coincide with the 
meaning its author intended it to have.
The problem of 'parochialism' presents itself when a historian misdescribes the 
'sense and the intended reference of a given work.'41 This problem arises in any study 
involving, 'an alien culture or an unfamiliar conceptual scheme.' This misidentification 
may give rise to a mistaken attribution of influence by a historian who fails to see who 
an author intended to refer to, supplying instead a referent of his own. The suggestion 
that Locke was 'really' referring to Hobbes is one example of this, as is the suggestion 
that Hobbes was influenced by Machiavelli.
Skinner concludes his account of these problems with two more general points 
concerning the writing of intellectual history, one 'empirical', and the other 'logical'. 
The logical 'consideration' is that, 'no agent can eventually be said to have meant or 
done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of 
what he had meant or done.'42 The 'agent' is said to have 'special authority... over his 
intentions,' and this rules out the possibility of accounts of an agent's actions in which 
criteria are employed by the historian which were 'not available' to the agent himself.
39 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.44.
40 See discussion below of Skinner's theory of meaning. Note that Skinner insists that we cannot 
identify Locke as a liberal, even though we may say that this is the 'significance' of his work.
41 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.45.
42 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.48.
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Skinner argues, 'it cannot (logically) be a correct appraisal of any agent's action to say 
that he failed to do something unless it is first clear that he did have, and even could 
have had, the intention to try to perform that action.'43 This is the linchpin of Skinner's 
argument, for his objections to the history of ideas assume that the history of ideas 
must be concerned with recovering the true identity of historical acts, where this is 
identified with their author's intentions.
The empirical consideration is a simple one, drawn from Dunn, i.e. that 
thinking is an 'effortful activity'. Historians should avoid pressing these ideas into the 
form of coherent doctrines.44 However, while Skinner has clearly provided a useful 
warning about the insidious problem of anachronism, we might wonder if  he has not 
simply assumed that the correct account of an idea or argument is one which treats it 
in terms of its author's intentions?
Having detailed the shortcomings of the history of ideas, Skinner goes on to 
argue that there are deep seated causes for these failures: the acceptance by historians 
of one or other of two orthodoxies: textualism and contextualism. The history of ideas 
cannot simply be reformed by taking more care, but only by finding the right way to 
organise our contextualisations, which, in Skinner's view, entails the clarification of 
just what the objects of contextualisation must be: the intended acts of individual 
authors. Both 'textualists' and 'contextualists' get this wrong as Skinner sees it. Taking 
his critique of textualism first, we see that under this heading he groups both
'intellectual biographies' and histories of ideas. Because they focus on the 'text itself
rather than upon its context and its author's intentions, these approaches are:
...incapable in principle of considering or even recognising some of
the most crucial problems which must arise in any attempt to
43 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.48.
44 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.49.
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understand the relations between what a given writer may have said, 
and what he may be said to have meant by saying what he said.45
Textualism in the writing of intellectual biographies will prevent writers from 
discovering whether or not the meaning of the words contained in the text have altered 
over time and consequently whether or not they meant the same for the author and his 
contemporaries on one hand, and for the modem reader on the other. 
Misunderstandings may also arise if the author has used some 'oblique strategy' e.g. 
irony in a text. The history of ideas, however, simply fails to recognise that ideas are 
not proper objects of historical investigation at all.
There is, he claims, 'an underlying conceptual confusion in any attempt to 
focus on an idea itself as an appropriate unit of historical investigation.'46 It is argued 
that words do not have 'essential' meanings. Citing Wittgenstein, Skinner points out 
that words derive their meanings from they way in which they are used. Even within a 
given historical era, a word may be used in more than one way. To illustrate this he 
cites the example of Bacon remarking that nobility adds majesty to a monarch. First of 
all, the word 'nobility' may refer to moral virtue, or secondly to membership of a 
social class. Bacon may be making a point about virtue, or about membership of a 
social class. In addition, Skinner notes, there was a Renaissance tradition of using the 
term in a 'studied' way, i.e. to indicate the possibility that there may arise a 
discrepancy between these two uses. A historian of ideas must necessarily go astray 
because he simply concentrates upon the 'forms of words involved' and ignores the 
possibility that these words may be used with particular intentions in mind.
45 Skinner, ’Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.50.
46 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.54.
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The basic mistake,
... may be most conveniently characterised, by adopting an extension of 
the basic distinction between meaning and use, as the result of a failure 
to distinguish between the occurrence of the words (phrases or 
sentences) which denote the given idea, and the use of the relevant 
sentence by a particular agent on a particular occasion with a particular 
intention (his intention) to make a particular statement:47
Admittedly, histories of ideas are not devoid of authors, but the point that Skinner 
insists upon is that these characters appear simply because a sentence of interest to the 
historian occurred in their work: they are appendages to their own utterances. 
Consequently, we cannot learn what role an idea may have had within the work of a 
particular author or in the culture at large.
There are two sorts of problem here: (1) whether it is true that the history of 
ideas is textualist? (2) whether Skinner's author-centred account of meaning is sound? 
Are intellectual biographies and histories of ideas textualist in that they focus solely on 
the content of individual texts? This appears to be a feature of certain styles of literary 
criticism rather than of the history of ideas. This textualism, associated with the 
practice of 'close reading', in which an individual work was studied in isolation from 
other texts, or its 'context', was a central tenet of what is called 'The New Criticism', an 
approach to literaiy criticism inspired by T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis, which flourished 
from the mid 1930s into the late 1950s. Skinner draws his definition of textualism from 
the work of W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, critics noted for their attack on the 
idea of authorial intentionality.48 The New Critics were explicitly unhistorical and their
47 Note that this reverses Strawson's distinction between statements as objects of logical appraisal and 
the sentences used to make them. Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.55.
48 Wimsatt and Beardlsey, 'The intentional fallacy,' in W. K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon. (University 
of Kentucky Press, 1954).
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'close reading' of single texts, usually poems, may well be liable to Skinner's charges. 
What he does not establish is that this particular approach was popular amongst 
historians of ideas. Given the explicitly anti-historical position of the New Critics, this 
seems improbable.
Unlike the explicitly textualist New Critics, intellectual biographers associate a 
variety of texts, e.g. books, manuscripts, letters and other personal documents, around 
the figure of an author, and place this figure in a variety of personal, social and political 
contexts. This looks like the sort of enterprise which would meet Skinner's criteria for 
a proper history. Similarly, histories of ideas necessarily group texts by a variety of 
authors, rather than taking an individual text in isolation, so once again it is hard to see 
how they might be thought of as 'textualist' in the requisite sense. A. O. Lovejoy is 
repeatedly censured by Skinner, but he explicitly criticised the idea that a work of art 
should be considered as a 'self contained kind of thing', calling it a 'psychological 
absurdity'.49 His 'unit ideas' are in fact complexes, and in the case of the Great Chain of 
Being, this complex comprises 'plenitude', 'continuity' and 'linear gradation'. The history 
of the Great Chain of Being is the history of the way different authors combined these 
ideas, not only with each other but also with other ideas.50 Nonetheless, it is clear that 
Skinner thinks that 'textualism' must fail because to confine one's investigations to a 
single text will most likely prevent one from correctly identifying the arguments 
contained in it. These derive their identity from their use by particular authors, in 
particular contexts, with particular intentions. It is the author's intentions which 
constitute the identity of the arguments concerned, arguments which will be 
misidentified if we do not concern ourselves with these intentions.
Before addressing the difficulties with Skinner's theory of meaning, let us see 
how he employs it against 'contextualism'. By this he understands the attempt to treat 
context as a causal determinant of action, and he groups together a variety of
49 A. O. Lovejoy, 'Reflections on the history of ideas,' Journal of the History of Ideas 1 (1940), pp.3-23, 
p.14.
50 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. (1936) (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p.22.
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reductionist contextualisms, e.g. Marxism, and behaviourism, under this heading. 
Skinner addresses himself directly to Ayer's argument that motives form the bridge 
between acts and their context insofar as they are open to causal explanation. Ayer had 
argued that motives could be regarded as causes insofar as they were contingently 
related and antecedent to the action to be explained.51 Skinner grants this point, but 
argues that it is possible to conceive of an agent's intentions in a manner which clearly 
distinguishes them from motives, and which separates them from causal explanation. It 
is possible, he points out, to distinguish between having an intention 'to' perform an 
action, and an intention 'in' performing an action. To have an intention 'to' do 
something is much like having a motive, i.e. it is antecedent to the action concerned, 
and is contingently related to it insofar as one might have an intention to do something, 
and yet never do it. On the other hand, to say of someone that they had a particular 
intention 'in' performing a given action is to suggest that the action and intention are 
'logically connected,' such that there can be no intention 'in' without an action. This sort 
of intention cannot be equated with a causal condition, Skinner concludes, as it is not 
antecedent to that which it is supposed to cause. Furthermore, to inquire about an 
agent's intentions in performing an action is, according to Skinner, equivalent to 
inquiring about the 'point' of that action. A necessary condition of understanding an 
action is to grasp its point, where according to Skinner, the point of an action is to be 
identified with the intentions of the agent in performing it:
Every statement made or other action performed must presuppose an 
intention to have done it - call it a cause if you like - but also an 
intention in doing it, which cannot be a cause, but which must be 
grasped if the action itself is to be correctly characterised and so 
understood.52
51 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', pp.59-60.
52 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.61.
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Skinner is not content with arguing that causal treatments of context fail to 
grasp the point of the utterances they contextualise. He goes on to elaborate his 
understanding of how the point of an utterance is constituted, in terms of a distinction 
between the 'meaning' and 'force' of an utterance. This argument is designed to show 
that even if we identify the meaning of an utterance we cannot be said to have 
understood it until we have correctly identified its force. This will close off the 
possibility that historians may simply disavow any interest in what an author intended 
by what he said, and instead focus on the significance of the text for contemporary, or 
subsequent audiences. By identifying the 'point' with the 'intended point' o f an 
utterance, Skinner hopes to show that this option is not viable.
Skinner takes the Machiavellian dictum: 'a prince must learn how not to be 
virtuous', and suggests that we take its sense and reference to be clear. We might even 
allow that this clarity may have been achieved by 'a study of the entire social context of 
the utterance' which may reveal that virtue typically tended to the ruination of princes. 
He then suggests that we consider 'two alternative truths' about the statement 
concerned: (a) that such cynical advice was frequently offered at this time, or (b) that 
such advice had almost never been offered in public before. If one takes the first to be 
true, the 'intended force of the utterance itself in the mind of the agent who uttered it 
can only have been to endorse or emphasise an accepted moral attitude.' If the second 
is taken to be true, then the 'intended force' is rather that of'rejecting or repudiating an 
established moral commonplace.'
Obviously one's understanding of Machiavelli's aims depends upon which of the 
'alternative truths' one chooses to accept. It is Skinner's contention that neither by 
paying attention to the meaning of the initial statement nor by focusing on its social 
context can one discover whether Machiavelli was attempting to subvert or sustain the 
moral assumptions of his era. Only by asking the additional question about the 
'intended force' of the statement can one achieve an understanding of that statement.
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What are the implications of this account of meaning? Dunn had hoped that if 
he could show that a study of historical context could identify an argument then he 
would have shown why philosophers must be historians, i.e. contextualists. Ultimately 
he was unable to make this argument work as it appeared that historians and 
philosophers were simply interested in different things and, therefore identified the 
object of their interests differently. Skinner's chief ambition is ostensibly more limited: 
an attempt to provide a conceptual grounding for a particular way of writing histories 
of ideas. A consequence of this is that traditional styles of narrative: intellectual 
biographies, histories of ideas, etc. are exposed as misconceived. The appropriate 
form of account is one which centres on the intentions of historical authors and 
Skinner's version of speech act theory rules out the possibility that we might identify a 
given act in ways which the author had not intended. If Locke did not think of his 
work as an episode in the history of liberalism, then we cannot legitimately characterise 
it as such.
This is a big claim with wide and uncomfortable implications. Not only does 
this rule out a host of narrative forms within the history of ideas, it also has 
implications for the sorts of things philosophers and others might want to say about a 
particular argument: they too will be constrained in their treatment of it. Skinner does 
not shy away from this conclusion but argues that the philosophical interest in 
historical ideas must be confined to the issues which arise out of the business of 
interpretation, i.e. the history of ideas may furnish examples for the philosophy of 
action. The content of historical arguments is placed firmly out of bounds: there are 
no 'perennial problems' or 'universal truths' from which we might hope to learn, there 
are only statements which are 'inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention, on 
a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus 
specific to its situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend'.53 The 
claim is that it is a mistake to try to abstract and generalise as we do when we suggest
53 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.65.
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that both Plato and Rousseau are concerned with the problem of determining what
. « • tlegitimises political authority. What they are 'really1 doing is nothing of the sort, it is 
claimed, and to abstract is thus to misidentify, to turn the argument concerned into 
something it is not.54 Obviously a claim like this extends beyond the academic confines 
of history or philosophy departments to our interactions with other people tout court 
and has the drastic consequences for what we may think about what others are doing 
and saying, such that individual actors exclusively determine what may legitimately be 
said about their activities. Indeed, in attacking abstraction and generalisation, Skinner 
appears to attack conceptualisation per se, and not only an understanding of ideas as 
Platonic objects of some sort. If we are not permitted to describe utterances in ways 
which pick out similarities in the way they are used, abstracting from the ways in which 
they differ and from non-relevant similarities, then it is hard to see how we could ever 
say that two different utterances ever express the same idea.
Skinner's use of Austin's speech act theory to defend this claim is unsuccessful.
In 'Meaning and Understanding' the claim is that while literal meaning lies outside the 
control of the author, it is the author who determines the illocutionary force, i.e. the 
point, of the utterance concerned. This strategy of distinguishing between aspects of 
meaning which are public and those which are private, i.e. determined solely by the 
individual, has some odd consequences. First of all, the attempt to explain the 
shortcomings of 'textualist' and contextualist histories as the result of a concentration 
upon literal meaning as opposed to force is simply implausible. It is one thing to 
suggest that an historian's analysis of the concept of meaning is not especially
54 'Any statement, as I have sought to show, is inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention, 
on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus specific to its 
situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend. The vital implication here is not 
merely that the classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and answers, but only with their 
own. There is also the further implication that - to revive Collingwood's way of putting it - there 
simply are no perennial problems in philosophy: there are only individual answers to individual 
questions, and as many different questions as there are questioners.' 'Meaning and understanding in 
the history of ideas', p. 65. Skinner then suggests that we can describe problems in ways sufficiently 
abstract as to make them appear the same, but that we cannot do this with the answers of different 
authors. Obviously the device of abstraction applies as well to one as the other. Whether it is always 
helpful to abstract in order to generalise is another matter, and the answer, I suggest, depends on the 
nature of the problem at hand. Skinner, Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p. 66.
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sophisticated, and that, consequently, she does not distinguish between sentence 
meaning and illocutionary force, but quite another thing to suggest that because of this 
she is incapable of grasping this aspect of meaning altogether.55 This would seem to 
attribute to historians of ideas a bizarre literal-mindedness, simply because they are not 
philosophers of language. The mistake Skinner makes here is to suppose that the lack 
of a theoretical account of a distinction is equivalent to the lack of a practical grasp of 
it.56 If this were so, then historians would not simply be prone to misidentifying 
examples of irony, but rather would be unable to grasp the concept of irony at all. Of 
course, Skinner requires a claim of this sort in order to show that existing studies in the 
history of ideas do not simply go wrong, but that they necessarily go wrong. To 
suggest that they sometimes fail to identify the intended force of historical authors' 
utterances would not suffice to justify the wholesale reformation of the history of ideas 
which Skinner proposes.
This is not the only problem with the way Skinner draws the distinction 
between meaning and use. Besides giving it undue weight in his analysis of the reasons 
why histories of ideas are so unhistorical, there is a problem with the way he conceives 
of this distinction. Skinner appears to believe that the basis of the distinction is that 
while literal meaning is established by public conventions, the use, or force, of the 
utterance is determined solely by the intentions of the speaker. The speaker must rely 
on the conventions governing meaning in order to be able to convey his point, but it is 
his intentions alone that invest these conventions with a force or point. This is crucial
55 As noted above, this distinction is itself not especially firm, and ultimately collapses into the 
difference between different types of speech act, rather than between speech acts and other sorts of 
utterances.
56 Felix Raab's study of the reception of Machiavelli is just one of the studies to which Skinner 
attributes this error. However, the organising principle of Raab's study is that Machiavelli not only 
meant different things to different readers, but also that they pressed this understanding of him into 
service as their ideological needs required. See The English Face of Machiavelli. (London: Routledge, 
1965). Skinner rejects all reception oriented studies although if these are treated as studies of what x 
or y meant by their respective uses of Machiavelli's Prince, or any other text, as opposed to 'what 
Machiavelli meant by what he said', then it is hard to see how Skinner could reject them. Provided 
some authors intentions are the focus of study, then even reception studies would seem to meet 
Skinner's criteria.
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to Skinner's attempt to draw specific conclusions about the correct form which the 
history of ideas must adopt from a theory of meaning. If  we can legitimately identify 
the act a speaker has performed in ways which that speaker did not foresee, then we 
should not be constrained to organise our narratives around the intended force of 
utterances.
Skinner's argument founders on the objection that a speaker's intention cannot 
simply fix the force of his utterances in the way that Skinner requires, as there are 
numerous instances in which the force of an act may be 'misidentified', i.e. where we 
might say that utterances carry forces other than those intended by the speaker. The 
very fact that historians of ideas may have mistaken what historical authors meant by 
what they said is enough to establish this. If Skinner failed to appreciate that utterances 
may carry unintended as well as intended forces, then this would explain why he 
sought to explain the shortcomings of the historians in terms of a failure to notice the 
dimension of force rather than in terms of a misattribution of it.
When critics objected that the 'force of an utterance is as much governed by 
public conventions as is the literal meaning of the words contained in it’, Skinner 
responds by allowing that this may be so, but nonetheless the identity of the act, as 
opposed to its force is fixed exclusively by the speaker.57 His critics:
...have failed to recognise what I take to be the distinction between 
illocutionary forces and illocutionary acts. The former term points to a 
resource of language; the latter to the capacity of agents to exploit it in 
communication. The illocutionary acts we perform are identified, like 
all voluntary acts, by our intentions; but the illocutionary forces carried 
by our utterances are mainly determined by their meaning and context.
It is for these reasons that it can readily happen that, in performing an 
illocutionary act, my utterance at the same time carry, though without
57 Keith Graham points to the problem of unintentional action in How do illocutionary descriptions 
explain?' Ratio 22 (1981), pp. 124-35, reprinted in Meaning and Context. Tully (ed.), pp. 147-55.
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my intending it, a much wider range of illocutionary force (For 
example, although I may intend only to warn you, my utterance may at 
the same time have the force of informing you of something.). But this 
is only to say that, due to the richness of our language, many, perhaps 
most of my utterances will carry some element of unintended 
illocutionary force. It is not in the least to point to a class of unintended 
illocutionary acts.38
This has the consequence that where an utterance carries an unintended force, e.g. if 
someone were to intend to make a joke but instead caused offence to his audience, 
then we could not legitimately say that the utterance was an insult, we should have to 
say that it was a joke. The audience may have identified the force of the utterance as 
that of an insult, but they could not say that the utterance itself was an insult. They 
have been insulted, but the speaker cannot be said to have insulted them. To be sure, 
when we come to apportion blame for the insult the fact that the author did not intend 
to insult anyone will matter, but it will not convert his utterance into a joke. The idea 
that illocutionary acts are a special class of act which cannot be performed 
unintentionally is clearly an odd one and all the more so as Skinner acknowledges that 
utterances may carry unintended forces. He is driven to this conclusion by his 
determination to hold on to the idea that it is the author alone who determines the 
identity of his action. Ultimately, we cannot accept the version of speech act theory 
upon which Skinner proposes to rest his author-centred history of ideas. And this 
throws his attempt to constrain our ability to contexualise in a variety of ways, into 
question.
58 Skinner, 'Reply', pp.265-6.
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Levels o f Description
Skinner's argument, had it been successful, would have eliminated a variety of non­
author-centred styles of history: the history of ideas, of problematics, of ideologies, or 
of traditions. None of these are deemed valid objects of inquiry, for all entail 
connecting authors' actions under larger schemes not intended by their authors, 
establishing equivalences and contrasts equally distant from the intentions of those 
authors. Indeed, the construction of historical narratives per se, is ruled out by 
Skinner's view insofar as the construction of a narrative involves devices he regards as 
misconceived. If Skinner's view had been shown to be correct, this would have proven 
a serious challenge to Marxist and Foucauldian styles of social criticism, as both of 
these connect a variety of objects, texts, ideas, traditions, images, films, material 
objects, etc. in systematic ways as elements of a larger ideological or discursive 
formation. These interpretative projects offer descriptive possibilities which can prove 
useful to the critical task of offering others reasons for transforming their beliefs. A 
comparison of Skinner's proposals for reforming the history of ideas with Foucault's 
criticism of this discipline indicates how we might arrive at a view of contextualisation 
which can combine sensitivity to particularity without sacrificing an account of the 
systematic relations between the objects of contextualisation. The key to this lies in the
distinction between levels of description. .........
Foucault elaborates his idea of 'discourse' and that of an 'archaeology' of 
discursive formations around the same time as Skinner launches his attack on the 
history of ideas and there are significant similarities between their analyses of the 
excessively abstract character of historical writing.59 Foucault contrasts 'total' history 
with what he calls 'general' history, which he thinks is beginning to displace the
59 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. A.M. Sheridan Smith (trans.) (London: Pantheon,
1972). See for example their concern about the historians' eagerness to resolve apparent contradictions 
in the works they study. Foucault says that one of the aims of archaeology i s ' to maintain discourse in 
all its many regularities; and consequently to suppress the theme of a contradiction uniformly lost and 
rediscovered, resolved and forever rising again, in the undifferentiated element of the Logos.'
Foucault, Archaeology, p. 156.
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former.60 This new sensibility is one which will question the teleologies and 
totalisations of its predecessor and in its place will elaborate a plurality of histories, not 
isolated from one another but connected in a host of ways. Foucault criticises the old 
models which privilege continuity over discontinuity and specificity and which elide 
the differences between statements in order to press them into the preferred style of 
narrative. Under the heading of 'the unities of discourse', Foucault details the devices 
used to group statements in total histories. These include: 'tradition', 'influence', 
'development and evolution', 'spirit', the 'book' and the 'oeuvre' and the idea of fixed 
genres like science, history, politics, and literature.61 These devices are simply taken 
for granted, Foucault observes, and if we are to make discontinuities and 
transformations visible then we must seek to avoid them as they serve to produce 
histories which centre primarily upon origins and continuities. Foucault's suggestion is 
that we should think instead in terms of a plurality of discursive formations, distinct 
but often interrelated and constituted by rules governing the ordering of statements 
within them.62 T)iscourse' is designed to be a relatively inclusive device for associating 
and differentiating statements, insofar as it covers a range of statements, their objects, 
concepts, strategies and 'enunciative' sites as well as the rules which make the 
production of statements possible.63
' 60 'A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre - a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a 
world view, an overall shape; a general history, on the contrary, would deploy the space of a 
dispersion.' Foucault, Archaeology, p. 10.
61 Foucault, Archaeology, pp.21-2.
62 Foucault's 'statements' are not positively defined: he is content to say that the statement in 'not the 
same kind of unit as the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act'. By this he appears to mean that 
we are free to take any of these as statements as the context demands, without simply identifying the 
statement with any one. Foucault, Archaeology, p.86.
63 The idea of the 'enunciative' element covers who is speaking, in what context and in what capacity, 
i.e. what Foucault thinks of as the various positions that a subject of discourse may occupy. In this way 
speakers/writers are included under the category of 'discourse' without the implication that they 
constitute its origin. The enunciative function, he says, provides a temporal and spatial ordering of 
statements to complement their logical or 'systematic' ordering. The enunciative function concerns the 
fact that statements were made by particular persons at a particular time and place. Foucault, 
Archaeology, p.173.
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The criticism of the traditional unities of discourse has much in common with 
Skinner's strictures on the 'myths' produced by the traditional history of ideas. Both 
object to narratives focused on influences, on the search for 'anticipations' and, 
generally to the way that the specificity of the past is eroded by contemporary 
historians. There are, nonetheless, great differences between the two, notably in their 
attitude to the figure of the author, for while Skinner argues that we lose the identity of 
an utterance when we fail to identify it with its author's intentions in uttering it, 
Foucault famously regards 'the author' as yet another device which serves to produce 
origins and continuities.64
Foucault historicises the idea of authorship, identifying four features of the idea 
of the author.65 Firstly, that the author establishes a relation between a collection of 
writings, i.e. that writings are grouped as the works of a single author, their common 
point of origin. Secondly, he notes the variability of our ideas of authorship. While 
nothing seems more obvious than that texts have authors, Foucault notes that folk­
tales characteristically do not, and that this is in fact a mark of their authenticity. He 
suggests too that Enlightenment served to alter the role of the author insofar as the 
arguments of scientific texts were supposed to speak for themselves, as it were, rather 
than to rely upon the names of their authors as a guarantee of their worth. Thirdly, he 
notes the existence of an apparatus for identifying the marks of authorship, citing by 
way of example, the employment of tests like St. Jerome's four criteria of authenticity 
in Biblical criticism.66 The attribution of texts to authors may be a complex business,
64 '...the subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the author of the formulation 
- either in substance, or in function. He is not in fact the cause, origin, or starting-point of the 
phenomenon of the written or spoken articulation of a sentence... If a proposition, a sentence, a group 
of signs can be called 'statement', it is not therefore because, one day, someone happened to speak then 
or put them into some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be 
assigned.' Foucault, Archaeology, p.95.
65 Foucault, 'What is an author?' in Language. Counter-Memory. Practice. D.F. Bouchard (ed.)
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 113-38.
66 'According to St. Jerome there are four criteria: the texts that must be eliminated from a list of 
works attributed to a single author are those inferior to the others (thus the author is defined as a 
standard level of quality); those whose ideas conflict with the doctrine expressed in the others (here 
the author is defined as a certain field of conceptual or theoretical coherence); those written in a
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involving the construction of an author out of the text itself. Finally, Foucault notes 
that the author, rather than representing the simple point of origin of a work, is not 
synonymous with the various 'subject positions' which are contained within it, i.e. that 
the texts themselves may unfold from a narrator, who is not necessarily identical with 
the author, or contain narratives told in the third person rather than the first.
In drawing attention to these details about the idea of the 'author', Foucault 
says he does not aim to abolish the idea, but only to problematise it. Having said that, 
it would be wrong to suppose that this problematisation is wholly innocent. In seeking 
to dislodge the category of 'author' from its central position in our interpretative 
repertoire, Foucault is articulating a deeper opposition to certain ideas of subjectivity 
per se, the idea, in particular, that the subject is a centre of choice and agency, a 
creator of meaning. He proposes that,
We should suspend the typical questions: how does a free subject 
penetrate the density of things and endow them with meaning; how 
does it accomplish its design by animating the rules of discourse from 
within? Rather, we should ask, under what conditions and through 
what forms can an entity like the subject appear in the order of 
discourse; what position does it occupy; what functions does it exhibit; 
and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse? In short, the 
subject (and its substitutes) must be stripped of its creative role and 
analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse.67
Foucault goes on to conjecture that if, having shown that the category of the author is 
contingent and variable in its use, then it might be possible to conceive of
different style and containing words and phrases not ordinarily found in the other works (the author 
is seen as a stylistic uniformity); and those referring to events or historical figures subsequent to the 
death of the author (the author is thus a definite historical figure in which a series of events 
converge).' Foucault, 'What is an author?', p. 128.
67 Foucault, 'What is an author?', p. 137-8.
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circumstances in which we would no longer feel compelled to trace discourse back to 
its anchor, its origin, in an author. This would liberate us, he claims, from 'tiresome' 
questions about the authenticity of a work and whether or not its author had fully 
revealed himself in the work.
Foucault is eager to present us with an alternative to the devices which produce 
histories of continuities rather than of discontinuities, but these devices are not simply 
rejected as 'misconceived'. While he introduces the idea of discourse as part of a 
project of setting out a 'pure description of discursive events', it becomes clear that 
these traditional devices are not rejected because they do not reflect 'how things are', 
but because if one is primarily interested in discontinuities they are not useful.68 His 
argument is essentially a pragmatic one in which the idea of discourse is thought of in 
terms of the choice of a 'level of description' which is appropriate to a particular 
interest in the matter at hand.69 In his account, 'statements' are treated as elements of a 
discourse, in which they are systematically related to one another, but this is not to 
deny that they may also be thought of as elements of particular speech acts. On this 
pluralist view we do not have to choose between one way of identifying acts and 
another, but only to specify the level of description at which we are associating them. 
We could allow that speakers intend their utterances to be taken in a particular way 
without limiting ourselves to determining what this is, or organising our account of 
that utterance around this narrative principle. The identity of the act concerned cannot 
be specified independently of our interest in it, on this view, while Skinner on the other 
hand assumes that the speaker's intentions fix its identity in such a way as to limit what 
we might say about the act in question.
68 Foucault objects to the fact that we take devices like the book or the oeuvre for granted, but cautions 
that they 'must not be rejected definitively of course...' Archaeology. p,25. The idea of discourse is to 
be conceived as a 'descriptive possibility' (p. 108) The organisation of statements in a discourse, 'does 
not claim to be a total, exhaustive description of 'language' (langage), or of 'what was said'. In the 
whole density implied by verbal performances, it is situated at a particular level that must be 
distinguished from the others, characterised in relation to them and abstract.' (p. 108)
69 This feature of Foucault's argument is not often remarked upon, but see Ian Hacking, 'The 
archaeology of Foucault,' in D. C. Hoy (ed.), Foucault: a critical reader. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 
pp.27-40.
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This view holds out the prospect of a pragmatic, pluralist, approach to 
questions of context and to the question of the identity of the objects of one's inquiries. 
It suggests that what is at issue is not so much the contrast between abstraction and 
context, a contrast in which context is thought to reveal the world as it is with real men 
living and breathing within it, as it were, but rather the problem of determining the 
level of description required by one's interests. The idea of 'context', while it is 
commonly taken to represent a particular level of 'thick' socio-historical description, as 
opposed to the thinness of abstraction and generalisation, might be better thought of as 
potentially encompassing both of these, as representing the idea of a plurality of 
potential descriptions per se.
Arguably, Skinner has, as time has gone on, felt the pull of this pluralism, 
although he has drawn back from affirming it. When we look at his historical work we 
find that perhaps a concern to understand what an author meant by his utterance does 
not necessarily constrain the way we can incorporate this understanding into a 
particular narrative, and it might be said that Skinner has accordingly produced both an 
intellectual biography and the history of an idea, that of the state.70 This suggests not 
that one cannot write a history which is concerned primarily with an author's intentions 
but rather than one can do so without limiting oneself to identifying their arguments 
solely as they intended.
In his explicit statements on these issues, Skinner appears to have considerably 
trimmed his claims, suggesting that his strictures really presumed an interest in writing 
a particular sort of history, and that they were not meant to apply right across the 
board:
70 Skinner claims that The Foundations of Modem Political Thought is a history of ideologies, rather 
than the history of an idea (p.xiii), but is the history of an ideology equivalent to the 'conceptually 
proper' history of statements? For the claim that the Foundations is the history of the idea of the 'state' 
see Boucher, 'On Shklar and Franklin's reviews of Skinner,' Political Theory 8 (1980), pp.403-6. 
Boucher details a variety of deviation into mythology. Skinner appears to speak about "perennial 
questions" in Vol.l p.48, 200, 63, and in Vol.2 p.239. 'influence' appears in Vol.l p.34, 91, 213 and 
Vol.2 p. 19; also Vol.l p. 149, 242 and Vol.2 p.22, 24, 26, 214, 337. 'Anticipations' appear in the form 
of'hints' in Vol.2 p.349, 349-54, 156, 165, 227, 239, 338. 'Evolutionary' understandings appear in 
Vol.l p.ix, 65, and Vol.2 p.23, 65, 81, 89. Skinner, The Foundations of Modem Political Thought. 2 
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
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.. .it can hardly be a relevant criticism to observe that we may approach 
a text with many other questions in mind besides the one I have singled 
out. I do not arbitrarily exclude these questions: I exclude them on the 
grounds that they are unconnected with - and must not be confused 
with - the hermeneutic enterprise in which I am alone interested.71
Skinner also suggests that there are circumstances in which it would be 'legitimate to 
go beyond, even if not to contest, the stock descriptions available to people we are 
studying', for example, to 'comment upon the place of these beliefs within some larger 
historical pattern or narrative' or to explain how the people concerned came to hold 
them.72 This would appear to let the traditional history of ideas back in again, provided 
that intentions themselves are not misattributed. However, Skinner cannot let go of the 
central idea that the author exclusively determines the identity of his action. It is in this 
same afterword that Skinner defends the idea that authors cannot unintentionally 
perform illocutionary acts and asserts that
...where a historian is trying to identify beliefs - as opposed to 
explaining or commenting on them - it will generally be fatal to revise 
the terms in which they are expressed [...] To revise these terms will in 
consequence be to talk about a different set of beliefs 73
Of course, if this is true, then it is hard to see how Skinner can exempt 'explaining' or 
'commenting' from these strictures.
71 Skinner, 'Reply', p.232.
72 Skinner, 'Reply', p.254.
73 Skinner, 'Reply', p.255.
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Having said that, there is some movement on the substantial ethical conclusions 
which Skinner draws from his contextualism. Initially, this amounts to little more than 
a bald assertion that the concerns of the past are not the same as those of the present, 
and that the lesson we should draw from this is that our concerns are not perhaps as 
universal as we might have supposed. In trying to learn from the past, we inevitably 
erase this difference, and so the attempt to do so must be regarded as misconceived. 
What the historical contextualisation of ideas underlines is 'the essential variety of 
viable moral assumptions and political commitments'.74 Contextualisation recalls us to 
the fact of pluralism, although it is a pluralism which is peculiarly uninteresting insofar 
*as we can never be said to learn from those whose beliefs and commitments differ from 
ours. Subsequently however, Skinner not only reaffirms the idea that contextualisation 
teaches us the lesson of pluralism, but he also wishes to say that we can learn from 
those in different contexts, with different perspectives. It is wrong, he argues, to 
suppose that a recognition that we act in particular contexts entails that we adopt a 
relativistic stance towards our own beliefs or those of others, still less a moral 
parochialism.75
Skinner has put his finger on the central problem of context here, although it 
cannot be said that he indicates how it might be solved. If his account of 
contextualisation is right, i.e. that one interprets in order to restore the proper identity 
of historical acts, the identity established by their author's intentions, and if alternative 
identifications are deemed illegitimate, then the sort of Millian attitude to the plurality 
of belief which Skinner has come to favour must be regarded as misconceived.76 We
74 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.67.
75 'A resurgent conservatism tells us that this is merely another way of proclaiming the relativity of all 
values, and thus of leaving us bereft of any values at all. This seems to me as far as possible from the 
truth. The kind of inquiries I am describing offer us an additional means of reflecting on what we 
believe, and thus of strengthening our present beliefs by way of testing them against alternative 
possibilities, or else of improving them if we come to recognise that the alternatives are both possible 
and desirable. As I have already stressed, a willingness to engage in this kind of reflection seems to 
me a distinguishing feature of all rational agents. To denounce such studies is not a defence of reason 
but an assault on the open society.' Skinner, 'Reply', p.286.
76 Skinner's commitment to the idea of historical study pursued in strict isolation from moral/practical 
considerations bears more than a passing resemblance to Michael Oakeshott's strictures on the
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will be prevented from redescribing the problems of others in terms which may reveal 
the extent to which they may be proposing answers to our own problems. What we 
need is a better understanding of what is involved in contextualising, an understanding 
which does justice to the plurality of people's beliefs, but which avoids the pitfall of a 
contextual solipsism. This account, on my view, will necessarily have a pluralist form 
in the manner sketched above, a form which will rest on the presupposition of the 
legitimacy of a variety of'levels of description' and which will neither privilege socio- 
historical particularity nor generalising abstraction.
The next Chapter will concentrate on setting out a pluralist, pragmatic account 
of context and interpretation, one which does not set a priori limits to 
contextualisation, but instead allows that the appropriateness of a conceptual scheme 
will depend on the questions posed by the interpreter. These may focus on the 
intentions of historical authors, or they may focus on 'discourses', 'traditions', of 
'ideologies', as appropriate. This account of 'pragmatic contextualisation' will serve as 
the basis for an interpretative social criticism, one which will be sensitive to social and 
historical context but which also avoids a reductivist, relativist understanding of these 
contexts. Having shown that interpretation can function as social criticism and need 
not be restricted to scholarly purposes, subsequent Chapters will flesh out this model 
of context and of social criticism through a series of examinations of alternative models 
of context and social criticism. In particular, Chapters Three and Four will return to 
the wider ethical implications of the view of context which governs Skinner's work, 
one which apparently assumes that communication and deliberation between persons 
situated in different contexts is either impossible, or pointless.
relations between history and 'practice1. See Oakeshott, On History. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) and 
'The activity of being a historian,' in Rationalism and Politics. (1962) (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 
1991), pp. 151-83. Curiously, this shared commitment to a categorical division between historical and 
normative problems is not remarked upon by contemporary Oakeshottians such as Kenneth Minogue, 
who prefers instead to criticise the appearance of 'method' in Skinner's history. See Minogue, 'Method 
in intellectual history: Quentin Skinner's Foundations,' in Meaning and Context, pp. 176-93. It will be 
argued below that there is no reason to suppose that we cannot combine both normative and historical 
concerns.
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Ch a p t e r  t w o
Pr a g m a t ic  C o n t e x t u a l is a t io n
We cannot identify objects of interpretation without some reference to our 
interests. The appeal to context can, in some hands, obscure the fact that 'context' is 
inseparable from 'contextualisation', or interpretation. The OED defines 'context' as 
'The whole structure of a connected passage regarded in its bearing upon any of the 
parts which constitute it; the parts which immediately precede or follow any particular 
passage or 'text' and determine the meaning.' The Latin root of the term, contextus, 
means 'connection' and contexere 'to weave together' or 'connect'. To place something 
in context is then to specify its connection with other items, be they objects, acts, 
events etc.
The claim of contextualists is that there is only one right way to do this, i.e. by 
describing objects in socio-historical terms, whether this means in terms of the 
intentions of a specific author, or in terms of an ideological or discursive formation.1 
Such interpretations focus on how ideas have developed, or what function they 
perform in particular cultures or eras. As the rhetoric of the historians of political 
thought suggests, these interpretations are thought to be more concrete, more realistic 
than the 'abstractions' of philosophers. The claim that socio-historical interpretations 
present their objects as they really are, as products of particular societies, has
/
problematic implications for the conduct of moral criticism however, insofar as it 
promotes a reductive, relativist account of morality.
I propose to challenge the idea that socio-historical interpretation is privileged 
in this way by questioning the claim that any range of description is more
1 I include here the historians of political thought, Dunn and Skinner, but also Marxist and feminist and 
communitarian critics of'abstraction'. See, for example, Marx on his fellow philosophers in The 
German Ideology. Collected Works Vol. 5 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p.23-4, or the 
claim made by Nancy Hartsock that 'masculine' thought is essentially abstract in contrast to 
feminine/feminist thought, in 'The Feminist Standpoint: towards a specifically feminist historical 
materialism,' in Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka eds.) Discovering Reality, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1983), pp.283-310. See Rorty's scepticism about 'universalist' morality in Contingency. Irony.
Solidarity, p. 196.
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fundamental than any other. To suppose that a particular range of description, or 
standpoint, can be shown to be more fundamental than any other, that it can be shown 
to form the basis of an absolute conception of the world is to adopt a foundationalist 
stance. By contrast, this view of interpretation is anti-foundationalist: it rests upon a 
conceptual pluralism, on which view no range of description can be shown to be 
fundamental.2 On this view, neither the particularising categories of sociologists and 
historians, nor the abstractions of philosophers can be accorded metaphysical primacy. 
Objects may be described in a plurality of ways: the task of the interpreter is to 
determine which of these are relevant to the questions she poses, whether historical, 
philosophical, or moral.
The main aim of developing this account of interpretation is to provide an 
alternative to reductive understandings of context and interpretation. The argument is 
based on the insight that we cannot separate context from interpretation. If there are a 
plurality of ways to interpret something, then there are a plurality of contexts or sets 
of significant relations in which it can be said to belong: there is no single 'authentic’ 
context independent of our interpretive projects.
This provides a basis for considering the relationship between 
contextualisation and social criticism. Once we have established that interpretation 
need not be restricted to particularising as opposed to universalising schemes, or to 
socio-historical description/explanation instead of normative deliberation, then we can 
turn our attention to the proper relations between these interpretive schemes. The 
argument of this thesis is that socio-historical contextualisation is not irrelevant to 
social criticism and democratic deliberation, but that once its connection to normative 
themes is clarified it can be shown to be central to these projects, without surrendering 
to relativism. The account of context and interpretation set out in what follows is the 
first step towards clarifying the connections between these questions.
2 See, for example, Hilary Putnam, Reason. Truth and History: Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); and Thomas Nagel, who qualifies as a pluralist to the extent that he 
subscribes to an anti-reductionist stance with respect to the tension between what he calls 'subjective' 
and 'objective' views, in The View From Nowhere.
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Context and Reduction.
Consider the difficulty of trying to limit the range of descriptions which'may 
be correctly applied to an object. Take a familiar example discussed by Elizabeth 
Anscombe: a man is pumping water into the cistern of a house. The source has been 
poisoned, with the aim of poisoning the inhabitants of the house into which the water 
is being pumped (Anscombe suggests that the individuals are political leaders of some 
sort, and that their being poisoned might avert some great evil).3 Now we could say of 
this man that he is (1) moving his arm, (2) operating a pump (3) replenishing the 
water supply (4) poisoning the inhabitants of the house. Anscombe's problem is this: 
is there any description of the action which is the description of the action?4 Before 
answering this she encounters a further problem: should we say that there are four 
actions here, or should we say that there is one action under four descriptions? Our 
choices about how to describe the action seem in this way to reach into the action 
itself. Anscombe concludes that we can speak of one action under four descriptions 
where we can serially order the actions concerned such that the final term is the action 
for which the preceding actions were performed, i.e. instead of listing each action: 
moving his arm, operating the pump etc., we could simply say that the man was 
poisoning the inhabitants of the house: 'For moving his arm up and down with his 
fingers around the pump handle is, in these circumstances, operating the pump; and in 
these circumstances, it is replenishing the water supply; and in these circumstances, it 
is poisoning the household.'5 The series is that of means-end ordering and in these 
circumstances we can just as easily speak of one action and one intention as we can of 
four actions and four intentions.
3 Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957).
4 Anscombe, Intention, p.37.
5 Anscombe, Intention, p.46.
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However, it would be wrong to read Anscombe as proposing some sort of 
reductive account here, for although the means-end ordering of the series allows one 
description to 'swallow' others, it does not rule out other descriptions which cannot be 
so included. Anscombe herself suggests that if the man were beating out the rhythm of 
'God save the King' as he pumped, then this would not belong to the series just 
outlined, i.e. while the moving of his arm is essential to the beating out of the rhythm, 
this latter is not a means to pumping the water into the cistern, or poisoning the 
inhabitants of the house, and so would constitute a separate action. Of course what are 
described here are simply intentional actions, i.e. actions about which we might raise 
the question 'why?' In discussing an earlier example Anscombe observes that any 
description of a man's actions (call that man '%') which have % as the subject will in 
fact be true, regardless of that person's intentions. Thus if  our pump operator was 
wholly unaware that the water was poisoned, he could still be said to be poisoning the 
household, or averting some great disaster in bringing it about that they were 
poisoned. It could also be true to say that he was earning wages, paying a debt, 
wearing away the soles of his shoes, making a disturbance in the air, sweating, 
relaxing and contracting his muscles, producing various chemical reactions in his 
body, etc.6 We could go on: we can imagine this being described as an episode in the 
class war; the destruction of the environment through the lowering of the water table; 
the continuance of a traditional pattern of labour, or the employing of antiquated 
technology; the operation of a system of levers; the conversion of carbohydrates into 
energy and motion; or the sending of electrical impulses through the nervous system.
6 Anscombe, Intention, p.37. In an earlier example, a man is sawing a log. This can be variously 
described as 'sawing a piece of oak, sawing one of Smith's planks, making a squeaky noise with a saw, 
making a great deal of sawdust etc.' (p. 11) Compare a remark of Wittgenstein's, 'I might make with my 
hand the movement I should make if I were holding a hand-saw and sawing through a plank; but would 
one have any right to call this movement sawing, out of all context? - (It might be something quite 
different!).' Wittgenstein, On Certainty. (1969) G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.) 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1979)(section 350). MacIntyre presents a similar example, of a man digging, with 
the aim of supporting the claim that 'Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and 
essential genre for the characterisation of human actions.' After Virtue. (London: Duckworth, 1981), 
p.194.
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These latter descriptions may be puzzling: are these actions performed by %, or 
are they happenings, i.e. events? We have noted that how we choose to describe what 
is going on can carve this 'going on' into one action or four: here we could say that we 
can also carve it up according to an intentional vocabulary of action descriptions, or a 
non-intentional vocabulary of physical events. This is where we might begin to feel 
that of the variety of things we can say about this 'going on' that some are more basic 
than others, i.e. that some are a matter of perspective while others actually tell us what 
is really going on, and that these are typically those which belong to the physical- 
event language of the natural sciences.
The pressure to accept such a view is quite strong and clearly draws support 
from the immense prestige which the natural sciences enjoy in our culture. 
Philosophers in the analytic tradition in particular may feel the pressure to accept such 
a naturalistic account as that which captures what is 'really going on' especially 
strongly, for such a position is often regarded not as one view within analytic 
philosophy, but as identical with analytic philosophy per se.1 Historically speaking, 
this view has much to commend it, although I think we must distinguish between 
reductionism and naturalism. From its origins, analytic philosophy was committed to 
a picture of analysis as reduction, where this meant the project of translating the 
complexity of natural languages into the elements of an ideal language, the 
components of which mirrored the world and were systematically related to each 
other, like a calculus. In the hands of Russell and the early Wittgenstein the emphasis 
of analysis fell on the logical form of this ideal language, and it is only with the rise of 
logical positivism that the project took an explicitly naturalistic turn.8 In the post-war
7 See Philip Pettit's 'The contribution of analytical philosophy' in A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, Philip Pettit and Robert Goodin (eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp.7-38. Also 
the 'Preface' to Metaphysics and Morality. P. Pettit, R. Sylvan and J. Norman (eds.) (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1987).
8 J. O. Urmson notes the dissatisfaction of the logical positivists with the metaphysics of logical 
atomism. Note that despite the similar conception of analysis, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus defined 
the world as the totality of'facts', and not as the totality of material things. Philosophical Analysis. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).
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era however, the emergence of ordinary language philosophy, with its radically 
different conception of analysis on one hand, and Quine's attack on the notion of 
analytic truth per se on the other hand, have contributed to the demise of the earlier, 
reductive, picture of analysis.9 Not unrelated to this we have also seen attempts to 
develop an explicitly non-reductive naturalism, such as that of Donald Davidson for 
example.10
The idea that we should identify 'what's really going on' with 'what's really 
going on, as described in the language of physics' was obviously a central tenet of 
positivism but this is itself bound up with certain features of modem culture in 
general, and modem, i.e. post-seventeenth century, philosophy in particular. These 
features may be gathered under the headings of'foundationalism' and 'epistemology'.11 
The former refers broadly to the idea that there are foundations for our moral and 
epistemic commitments which all rational persons must endorse and from which we 
may deductively arrive at sound beliefs. The particular form which the search for 
foundations has taken since the seventeenth century is that of the search for 
epistemological foundations, i.e. foundations of knowledge. This approach has been 
taken to be a problem about explaining the relationship between objective reality and 
subjective mental representations of it.12 Stated in these general terms, it is clear that 
both empiricism and idealism in their various forms are equally derived from this 
model of knowledge.
Various currents in contemporary philosophy express a dissatisfaction with 
this foundationalism, although there is little enough agreement as to what the precise 
problem is, and how best to respond to it. It is unnecessary to seek to untangle these
9 W.V.O Quine 'Two dogmas of empiricism' reprinted in From a Logical Point of View. (1953), 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp.20-46.
10 Donald Davidson 'Actions, reasons and causes,' in Essays on Actions and Events, pp.3-20.
11 Charles Taylor emphasises this difference in 'Overcoming Epistemology,' in Philosophical 
Arguments. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 1-19.
12 For the history of this problematic and its decisive influence upon modem philosophy see Richard 
Rortv's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
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here, let me only try to indicate three problems as they bear on the question of context. 
The first problem is that of the idea of an absolute or 'God's eye view' of the world as 
a goal of our enquiries. This view gives rise to the attempt to reduce the plurality of 
ways we have of talking about or more broadly, dealing with, the world, to some more 
basic, more fundamental, set of ideas. Historically, the language of science and of 
physics in particular has been identified as that which provides the true view of how 
things are. Having said that, the idea of the absolute view can inspire a host of other 
reductivisms, among which I would include that of the historians of speech acts, 
Skinner and Dunn. In Dunn, a prejudice in favour of causal explanation is evident and 
undermines his explicit attempts to outline a pluralist (dualist in Dunn's case) 
argument. Skinner rejects such positivism, but his own argument hinges on the idea 
that there is only one way to understand an utterance, and in this way it reflects a 
hostility to pluralism which may be traced back to the influence of the idea that there 
is an absolute view of the world to be had, a single version of reality.
A second problem is that the 'subject' is treated primarily in terms of the 
problem of knowledge. This gives rise to a tendency to think of our basic relation to 
the world as that of representing or mirroring it in consciousness, while neglecting, for 
example, the idea that we are also agents within the world, or that we are 
communicators with other subjects.13 One way in which this is significant is that it 
gives rise to ideas about objectivity, in ethics as much as in epistemology itself, which
!
emphasises detachment and passivity over activity and engagement.14
Finally, a third problem is that this idea of the epistemological subject and the 
idea that knowledge is founded on private mental representations distort the way we
13 Pragmatism is founded on the idea that we are agents rather than spectators. See Hilary Putnam, 
Pragmatism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Habermas objects to the monological account of reason which 
is founded on the epistemological view, and favours instead, a communicative conception of reason 
based on the idea of intersubjective communication, rather than upon the 'philosophy of the subject.'
See Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. F. Lawrence (trans.) (Cambridge: Polity, 
1987).
14 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); David 
Couzens Hoy, 'A history of consciousness: from Kant to Hegel to Derrida and Foucault,' History of the 
Human Sciences 4 (1991), pp.261-81.
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think about communication with others. The 'linguistic turn' in modem philosophy 
may be regarded as based on a burgeoning recognition of the shortcomings o f this 
view, but equally, the project of epistemology can be seen as having a decisive effect 
upon the understanding of language inasmuch as the task of mirroring the world is 
transferred from the subject's mental representations to language itself. Austin points 
to this when he objects to the concentration of philosophers upon descriptive uses of 
language rather than upon the performative use of language. The idea that language 
itself derives meaning from its relation to the private mental representations of the 
subject is another legacy of the project of epistemology and it gives rise to the idea 
that understanding is a matter of gaining access to the minds of others. This view will 
be examined in the next chapter, but here I wish to concentrate upon the idea of the 
absolute view and its implications for contextualisation.
My concern here is not so much with naturalism, as naturalism is only one 
possible version of reductionism, as with the idea that any vocabulary could claim to 
provide the sole comprehensive picture of how things are. We can call this picture, the 
picture of an 'absolute' or 'God's eye view'. Most often such a view is identified with 
that picture of the world supposedly presented by 'science'. 'Science' is a rather vague 
term however, for it leaves open the question as to which of the possible scientific 
accounts is the right one: that of physics, chemistry or biology? Quine, for example, is 
committed not simply to naturalism but to physicalism: taking the language of physics 
as that which is best suited for 'limning the ultimate structure of reality'.15 What is 
striking is the way this idea figures in ordinary discourse, and it is here that, however 
inarticulately expressed, we find the 'God's eye view' impinging on ethical and 
political questions. Even where our picture of'how things are' is only vaguely outlined 
and not obviously translatable into the language of physics, our sense of the rightness 
of this picture gains support from the belief that it is underwritten in some way by
15 See Christopher Hookway, Quine. (Cambridge: Polity, 1988). Also Hilary Putnam's 'A comparison 
of something with something else,' in Words and Life. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1995), pp.330-50.
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'science'. Some would say that this requires a rather old-fashioned view of science, but 
be that as it may, it is important to see why we must reject the idea of the 'absolute' 
view if  we are to arrive at a clearer understanding of contextualisation.16
Hilary Putnam calls this philosophical version of the idea of a God's eye view, 
'metaphysical realism.' As Putnam characterises it, there is both an ontological and 
epistemological component to this view: (1) The world 'consists of some fixed totality 
of mind-independent objects,' and there is 'exactly one true and complete description 
of the way the world is.' (2) 'Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation 
between words or thought signs and the external things and sets of things.'17 Analytic 
philosophy took over the epistemological project of explaining how ideas, thought of 
as mental images, resembled the world and turned it into the project of explaining 
how words 'hook on to the world'. The project of delineating the 'God's eye view' is 
thus one of determining how words refer: the assumption being that only a certain 
vocabulary, that of an ideal language actually hooks onto reality in the right way.
Philosophers like Putnam and Rorty object, however, that there is no way to 
make sense of this idea. Originally this is explained in terms of the similarity of 
mental representations to objective reality. The difficulty with this is that it 
presupposes this very similarity in order to explain it.18 More recently there have been 
attempts to provide a 'causal' account of reference which circumvents the problems 
associated with the idea that mental representations intervene between the mind and 
reality, with reference as a matter of similarity between these and the external world. 
These theories begin from the uncontestable fact that we causally interact with the 
world, and attempt to harness this fact to explain how we come to possess concepts 
which refer to the world. However, as Putnam points out, there is a crucial difference
16 Putnam emphasises the way in which modem physics is indeterministic and indicates that 
philosophers who cling to mechanism are, in his view, simply in the grip of'intellectual fashion'. 'The 
place of facts in a world of values,' in Realism with a Human Face. (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p. 154.
17 Putnam, Reason. Truth and History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.49.
18 Putnam, Reason. Truth and History, p.51.
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between causation and reference such that the causes of our coming to possess 
concepts are not identical with the objects to which these concepts refer. Thus while 
we might suppose that we come to possess the concept of electrons through 
interacting with them, the cause of our having (true) beliefs about them is usually 
textbooks. Furthermore, this view cannot be saved by attempting to exclude the 
'wrong sort of causes' and specifying the 'appropriate type of cause' for such an 
attempt clearly presupposes that which it purports to explain, namely reference.
Any attempt to claim the status of a 'God's eye view' for any particular 
conceptual framework must meet the challenge of explaining its privileged status as 
that framework which contains the concepts which 'really refer'. As Putnam has 
indicated however, this task cannot be carried out without circularity. The conclusion 
we should draw, however, is not that we never refer, but rather that we refer in a 
plurality of ways, none of which can claim a privileged status over another.19
If no way of talking about the world is any more fundamental that any other, 
does this not mean that we must give up the idea that some of what we say is true? 
Pluralism, however, is not devoid of the objectivity necessary for rational 
disagreement. Indeed, we should not forget that metaphysical realism has typically 
provided more support for relativism than its adherents might suppose. For while a 
reductive naturalism may seem to support common-sense realism, in fact it has often 
served to undermine the view that ethics may be the subject of rational discussion.20 
This is because the claim that the concepts of the natural sciences are the only ones 
which truly represent 'how the world is' renders the status of ethical concepts 
problematic. Positivism, a version of metaphysical realism, treated ethical concepts as 
mere 'projections' onto the world as opposed to reflections of it. It is a short step from 
treating ethical concepts as not founded in reality as such, to treating them as simply
19 Rorty points out that philosophical discussions have typically relied on a technical sense of'refer' 
which in his view is unrelated to our ordinary notion of'talking about'. Rorty, Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, p.292.
20 Indeed, as Putnam suggests, its relation to common-sense realism usually turns out to be fairly 
tenuous as well! Putnam, The Many faces of Realism. (Illinois: Open Court, 1987).
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expressions of subjective taste concerning which there can be no truth or falsity, right 
or wrong. It can hardly be said that philosophers have coped any better with the 
assumed truth of reduction than non-experts, for it is notorious that the emergence and 
development of a rigorously analytic philosophy was accompanied by a decline in 
Anglo-American moral and political philosophy, and that only with the demise of this 
project did these fields come to receive the attention they deserved. Prior to this, non- 
cognitivist metaethics sought to account for ethical statements simply as prescriptions 
or attempts to influence others. In view of the connection between metaphysical 
realism and ethical relativism, the rejection of metaphysical realism is better regarded 
as a premise of normative political theory rather than as a threat to it.
Once we can see that the demand for a God's eye view does not make any 
sense, we need not give in to the sense that any particular conceptual framework is 
more fundamental, 'more true' than any other.21 We must recognise that there are a 
plurality of ways of talking about the world, which is to say that the only limits to the 
ways we have for saying 'how the world is' are the limits of our language.22 The view 
set out here may be termed 'conceptual pluralism' in contrast to 'foundationalism'. 
What are the implications of this pluralism? In particular, does it amount to a relativist 
view of some sort, in which no way of talking about the world is to be preferred to 
any other? Pluralism is not a relativism because abandoning foundationalism does not 
amount to abandoning objectivity in relation to knowledge or ethics. The idea that the 
world is independent of what we think about it, and the idea that morality is neither 
the invention of individuals, nor of communities, remain in place on this view. What 
is questioned is the claim made for any particular range of description to be more 
fundamental than any other. The claim to absoluteness and the reductionist view that 
goes with it is distinct from the ideas of truth and falsity, rightness and wrongness. We
21 Putnam expresses this as the pointless attempt to determine 'which kind of'true' is really Truth.' See 
Truth and Convention,' in Realism with a Human Face, pp.96-104, p.98.
22 Which is different from the idealist thought that the limits of language are the limits of the world.
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can judge, for example, that it is true that an object is better described as red rather 
than some other colour, i.e. we are not free to ignore the facts of the matter, but we 
cannot go on to claim that colour descriptions present us with the ultimate truth about 
the world, in contrast to spatial or temporal descriptions, for example. It is only the 
claim made for certain ranges of description to be more securely rooted in reality than 
any other that is denied by conceptual pluralists. On a conceptual pluralist view we 
have too many possible true statements to choose from, rather than it being the case 
that the truth of our statements about the world is illusory in some way. Too often, 
critics of naturalism's claim to constitute an absolute conception of the world go on to 
reject the notions of truth and objectivity altogether, when all that is necessary is to 
expose the incoherence of the claim that any range of description could constitute the 
'whole' truth or the 'final' truth about anything, in virtue of its foundational status.
This does not mean, then, that in rejecting foundationalism we have rejected 
the idea of objectivity, for this can be separated from the foundationalist idea that some 
range of description could be shown to be absolute. Thomas Nagel forcefully argues 
this case, claiming that while the idea of providing an objective, i.e. impersonal, 
description of the world is important both for knowledge and morality, this objective 
range of description cannot constitute an absolute conception of the world, i.e. it can 
never amount to a complete description of it.23 Objective descriptions are just one 
possible way of talking about the world which exist alongside and ’ in an uneasy 
relationship with subjective descriptions, neither of which can be shown to be more 
fundamental than the other. Indeed, Nagel argues, many problems arise from the 
attempt to reduce the inevitable tension between these two different ways of describing 
the world by taking one or other as fundamental. If we treat objective description not 
as absolute, but as one possible way of viewing the world, one which tries to 'include' 
the subjective view by treating it as one of the contents of the world, objectively
23 Objectivity is 'essentially incomplete'. Nagel, The View from Nowhere. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), p. 18.
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described, then we can retain objectivity, while rejecting claims to absoluteness and, 
furthermore, we can exploit the idea that there are different types and levels of 
objective description for the purposes of social criticism.24
Given this irreducible plurality of conceptual 'schemes' which may legitimately 
be applied to the world, how are we to think of their relations to each other? In what 
ways do they include or exclude each other? This plurality of possible descriptions can 
be handled in a variety of ways, by devices such as: distinguishing between 'levels of 
description'; distinguishing descriptions in temporal terms; and distinguishing between 
parts of objects, i.e. employing the device of complexity. The first allows that different 
statements may be true of the same object because one is more general than the other 
and, being situated at different levels, cannot conflict. For example, one may say both 
that Socrates was a man, but also that he was a Greek man, i.e. a particular type of 
man. The device of temporality allows us to render compatible descriptions which 
might otherwise be thought contradictory: disputes about the colour of an object can 
be resolved by pointing out that it was blue at one time, but red at another. The device 
of complexity can resolve similar disputes by distinguishing between parts of the object 
concerned, such that one could say it was both red and blue, insofar as some parts are 
identifiable as blue and the others as red.
These devices can resolve a variety of possible conflicts of interpretation, but 
they cannot resolve all conflicts. Some conflicts cannot be explained away with 
reference to pluralism and the devices employed to manage it. For example, the 
difference between Skinner's speech-act-centred interpretive project and Foucault's 
notion of an archaeology of discourse cannot be reconciled by appeal to the device o f 
distinguishing between levels of description. Foucault, of course, allows that individual 
speech acts may be one of the types of object which may feature in his discourse 
centred contextualisations, but this rests on a view about the nature of speech acts
24 Objectivity 'is simply the step of conceiving the world as a place that includes the person within it, 
as just another of its contents - conceiving myself from outside, in other words.' Nagel, The View from 
Nowhere, p.63.
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which Skinner denies, namely that speech acts are themselves open to a variety of 
different descriptions, not necessarily conceived by the author. On a certain, pluralist, 
understanding of speech acts, intended meanings can figure in a larger interpretive 
scheme, but only on this pluralist understanding. The idea of conceptual pluralism does 
not entail a relativist view of the substantive issue between Skinner and Foucault: that 
of the role of the subject as the originator of meaning. For Skinner the author 
determines the meaning of his actions, while Foucault rejects this view.25 While we 
may not wish to adopt Foucault's Nietzschean view of the subject, the pluralist view 
certainly entails the denial of Skinner's view of the constitution of meaning.
Pluralism does not then entail the evasion of substantive disagreements. It is 
also the case, however, that there are certain disagreements which cannot be resolved. 
These specially intractable disputes are caused by the open and pluralist character of 
our conceptual resources themselves, giving rise to the phenomenon of essential 
contestability.26 Disputes may be characterised as resting upon essentially contestable 
concepts when alternative ways of conceptualising something come into conflict 
because one way of conceptualising the object in question excludes the other. In such 
cases, neither an appeal to further facts, nor to further analysis can help, for what count 
as relevant facts is dependent precisely upon what is at issue, i.e. how one conceives of 
the object concerned. Consider the problem about whether or not foetuses are human 
beings. On one view, aborting a foetus is killing a human being, and therefore counts 
as murder, while on another view, foetuses are not human beings, and aborting them 
cannot be murder.27 On a foundationalist view of our conceptual tools, this sort of
25 Foucault, 'What is an author?'
26 The idea is first set out by W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially contested concepts,' Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 56 (1955-6), pp. 167-98. See also William Connolly, The Terms of Political 
Discourse. (1974) 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), and John Gray, 'On the contestability of social 
and political concepts,' Political Theory 5 (1977), pp.331-48.
27 National identities provide another example: on one, 'nationalist' or 'republican' view of what it is 
to be 'Irish', this excludes the possibility that one could be 'British', while on one 'unionist' view at 
least, the two are compatible, with 'British' operating as the more general concept. In practice, the 
conceptual aspect of this dispute has receded, as unionists have increasingly accepted the republican 
view of 'Irishness', while denying that they themselves are 'Irish' in any sense. The progressive
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conflict could not arise: we should be able to show that one of these ways of 
conceptualising the disputed object was more fundamental then the other. The lesson 
of pluralism is that while we can often employ the device of distinguishing between 
levels of description, there are not only a plurality of ways of conceiving the world but 
there is also no way to show that one of these ranges of description can be shown to 
serve as a foundation which would in principle enable us to resolve all such disputes by 
means of distinguishing levels of description.
A conceptual pluralism may not pretend to resolve such disputes, but 
recognition that these are possible and that this possibility is built into our conceptual 
framework itself is important insofar as it points to the possibility that persistent 
disputes cannot always be explained in terms of the ignorance, irrationality or bad faith 
of our interlocutors. This in turn should bear upon how we respond to such disputes, 
for if disagreement is judged 'reasonable' then it must be accommodated in ways which 
'unreasonable' disagreement need not.28 It should be emphasised, however, that 
conceptual pluralism is distinct from ethical pluralism, for recognition of the former is 
insufficient to warrant the latter: the move from conceptual pluralism to ethical 
pluralism relies upon a substantive normative commitment to respecting the freedom of 
others to order their lives according to their own values and principles.29 Within this 
normative pluralism however, conceptual pluralism can serve to extend our 
understanding of the extent of reasonable disagreement .
elimination of the conceptual contestability concerning these identities has not been accompanied by a 
reduction in the level of the political conflict over them. Rather, it could be said that the reduction of 
conflict at the conceptual level has been a response to the sharpening of the political conflict. See 
Jennifer Todd and Joseph Ruane: 'In surveys over two thirds of Protestants now identify themselves as 
British, a quarter as either Ulster or Northern Irish, and a small minority (3 per cent) as Irish. This 
appears to mark a radical change from Rose's 1968 pre-Troubles survey where 39 per cent identified 
as British, 20 per cent as Irish, and 32 per cent as Ulster.' Todd and Ruane, The Dynamics of Conflict 
in Northern Ireland. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996) p.60.
28 This is the point of Rawls' elaboration of the burdens of judgement' in Political Liberalism. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 54-8.
29 This does not entail respect for pluralism per se, but only for 'reasonable' pluralism. Some outlooks 
rely upon the oppression of other persons and cannot themselves be the objects of respect or toleration. 
See Walzer for the variety of normative responses to pluralism, from forbearance to the positive 
valuation of difference in On Toleration. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
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Pragmatism and Pluralism.
The implications of this conceptual pluralism for the notion of context are 
considerable: it means that we can trace as many connections as there are schemes 
which permit us to do so: the range of true things we can say when we set out to 
contextualise is immense, perhaps infinite. Dunn is perplexed by the existence of two 
sorts of schemes: one which traces causal connections and one which traces the 
'rational' connections of a narrative. As we saw earlier, he tries unsuccessfully to 
reconcile these two. He proposes that in order to complete either sort of account one 
must complete both. Might we not reinstate some sort of external perspective by 
adopting some such strategy, and simply set out to provide a complete account of the 
object under investigation? i.e. to sort it into all of the possible schemes it may figure 
in? In tracing all of the possible connections it may figure in we should have built up a 
complete picture of it, or, to use Dunn's phrase, we should have 'closed' the context. 
The thesis seems to be that there is no successful interpretation without a complete 
specification of the context. This is mistaken in two ways.
Firstly, I do not think we can take talk of 'closing' the context seriously. In 
what sense can a context, a set of connections, be said to be either 'open' or 'closed'? If 
'closed' means 'fully specified' then Dunn greatly underestimates the difficulties of 
achieving this end. While he is dealing here with only two schemes, it follows from 
what I have been saying that there are many, many more schemes which could be 
successfully applied, and our prospects of ever completing our account of them are 
remote, not only because of the vast number of schemes we already have in our 
repertoire, but also in virtue of our capacity to invent new ones. Thus I can say of 
Hobbes' Leviathan that it belongs to the set of: 
all books written be Hobbes 
all texts of political theory 
all books written in English 
all books published in the seventeenth century
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all books ordered to be burned at Oxford 
all books containing a theory of sovereignty
all books which constitute an episode in the history of the idea of sovereignty 
all books which are not about cooking 
all books that are on a reading list at the LSE 
all books owned by me 
all books owned by me and read before 1990 
and so on..., including all true statements produced by any combination of possible true 
statements we can make. To be sure, we may have little use for many of the schemes 
we could invent, but the point is that, given the possibilities of combination and of 
invention, the set of all connections in which an object may figure is one which may 
never be fully specified and consequently the context can never be 'closed'.30 What this 
suggests is that if it is not possible to achieve an absolute view in this indirect fashion, 
it cannot be the case that successful interpretation, explanation, or understanding 
depend upon the construction of such a picture.
An example thrown up by the dispute over the role of covering laws in 
historical explanation will serve to clarify this point. William Dray argues that, 'there is 
an irreducible pragmatic dimension to explanation' and this holds for the correlative 
concept of understanding.31 He is concerned to reject the covering law theorists'
identification of explanation with prediction on the basis of identifying the relevant
covering laws. He argues that this definition actually departs quite radically from our 
ordinary use of the concept of explanation, which at that time was said by the OED to 
mean: 'to smooth out, to unfold, to give details of, to make plain or intelligible, to clear 
of obscurity or difficulty.'32 What ordinarily counts as explanation rarely involves the
30 See Elgin's discussion of Goodman's 'grue' and Ween' for the invention, and projectability of 
predicates. This argument plays a central role in Goodman's 'second problem of induction'. Nelson 
Goodman and Catherine Elgin, Reconceptions In Philosophy. (London: Routledge. 1988).
31 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, p. 69.
32 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, p.76.
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instantiation of covering laws and what is crucial is rather the context in which the 
request for an explanation arises, i.e. its connection to the person asking, their level of 
background knowledge, and their particular interest, along with the relevant stage 
setting conventions. By way of an example, Dray invites us to imagine a motorist 
asking a mechanic why his car won't go, to which the mechanic replies: 'there's a leak 
in the oil reservoir.'33 Dray's point is that there are contexts in which this is either too 
little information ('I can see that!') or too much ('what's an oil reservoir?') to count as a 
successful explanation, even though the statement may be perfectly true.
Dray then entertains the possibility that someone dissatisfied with this 
explanation, on the grounds that it is incomplete, might request ever more specific 
casual explanations ('and what caused that? and that?'). This is not simply a problem 
about the potential regress in explanation Dray suggests, but rather 'a person who 
adopts the policy of always refusing to accept % as an explanation of y, unless the % is 
itself explained, begins to empty the term 'explanation' of its normal meaning.'34 We 
can make no sense of the idea of explanation outside the pragmatic context in which an 
explanation was called for and offered. There are many things which may count as an 
explanation, and true statements alone may fail to produce understanding.
The person who asks for a 'complete account' is in the same position as one 
who is caught in a regress of casual explanations. It is not the case that we must 
understand everything in order to understand something, for that is simply not what we 
mean by understanding. The nagging suspicion that giving up the notion of a 'God's 
eye view' means that knowledge and understanding will be deprived of their basis is 
mistaken. We simply do not need an exhaustive description of some phenomenon in 
order to have true descriptions, successful reference, or useful explanations. In order
33 Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, p.67.
34 The point is not that there can be no covering law explanation on account of the regress involved, 
for on Dray's pragmatic account there can, and there are contexts in which this style of explanation 
may be appropriate. The regress emerges, he points out, only if we adopt the policy of changing our 
question. However, provided we ask only one question at a time, no regress emerges. Once the 
pragmatic dimension of explanation is recognised, we can accept covering law explanation as one 
among a variety of explanations. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, p.72.
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to fill out this picture in more detail, and avoid potential misunderstandings of its 
implications, it will be helpful to look a little closer at Collingwood's notion of a 'logic 
of question and answer1.35
The historian, on Collingwood's account, must seek evidence which will enable 
him to grasp what problems a historical actor conceived himself as trying to solve. His 
acts or statements are to be regarded as attempts to solve that problem. Collingwood 
says,
...you cannot find out what a man means simply by studying his 
spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written 
with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In 
order to find out his meaning you must know what the question was (a 
question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to 
which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer.36
Note that the problems to be identified are the problems which the actor thought 
himself to be facing, i.e. the situation as it struck him at the time, and not as it might 
have struck another. Collingwood insists on marking the difference: 'people will speak 
of a savage as 'confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining food.' But what really 
confronts him is the problem, quite transitory like all things human, of spearing fish, or 
digging up this root, or finding blackberries in the wood.37
Now if the actor is engaged in a problem-solving activity, so too is the 
historian, for that, as Collingwood suggests, is simply what thought is:
35 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography. S. Toulmin (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
36 Collingwood, An Autobiography, p.31.
37 Collingwood, An Autobiography, p.33.
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...the difference between conceiving and executing a purpose [is] not 
correctly described as the difference between a theoretical act and a 
practical one. To conceive a purpose or form an intention is already a
practical activity. It is not thought forming an anteroom to action, it is
action itself in its initial stages.38
The historian's problem is to discover the problems faced by those he is investigating,
and this search for knowledge is itself a practical activity. Not surprisingly, he is
scathing in his criticisms of those positivist historians who conceive of themselves as 
merely collecting facts. What these people neglect is the 'questioning method' of the 
critical historian, who must bring judgement and imagination to bear on the material. 
The historian's questions convert the 'data' into 'evidence', i.e. material which is judged 
relevant to the task of identifying the thought of the actor.39 'Imagination' comes into 
play when the historian seeks to work his material into a coherent form in order to 
answer the question: what problem did she think she faced when she did/said 
Collingwood draws an explicit analogy between the historian and the novelist: 'Each 
aims at making his picture a coherent whole, where every character and every situation 
is so bound up with the rest that this character in this situation cannot but act in this 
way, and we cannot imagine him as acting otherwise.'40 He provides an elaborate 
illustration of this at one point, with an Agatha Christie type scenario, in which our 
detective builds up a narrative question by question.
Collingwood also insists that certain constraints operate upon the construction 
of historical narratives: they are meant to be true, and so must be 'localised' to time and
38 Collingwood, The Idea of History. T. M. Knox (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
p.312.
39 Collingwood actually claims at one point, that 'there are properly speaking no data', The Idea of 
History, p.243.
40 Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 245.
73
place, be consistent with other narratives, and take account of all the evidence.41 
Collingwood gives this questioning method the status of a logic, a 'logic of question 
and answer' and argues that it can supplant formal logic. Using another automobile 
repair example, he draws attention to the idea that there are 'levels' of questioning, and 
that a question and answer must be correlative at a certain level: the 'detailed and 
particularised' or the 'vague and general' if they are to have the right sort of fit. Thus, if 
while trying to fix my car I eventually come to examine one of the plugs, and, finding 
that it is indeed working, I say, 'number one plug is alright' this, Collingwood claims, 
would be an answer to the question 'is it because number one plug is not working that 
my car won't go?' and not an answer to the more general question: 'why won't my car 
go?' Collingwood calls this the 'principle of correlativity' and uses it to dispose of 
'claptrap' such as the suggestion noted above that the 'savage' might be confronted by 
the 'eternal problem of obtaining food'.
He continues to claim that the logic of question and answer has a bearing on 
the issue of contradiction insofar as unless we can be sure how someone meant a 
proposition, i.e. what question it was meant to answer, we cannot say with certainty 
that it contradicts any other statement. Only if we can establish that two propositions 
are intended as answers to the same question can there be any possibility of 
contradiction. Collingwood then extends the principle of correlativity to truth: 'If the 
meaning of a proposition is relative to the question it answers, its truth must be relative 
to the same thing'. He then adds,
Truth in the sense in which a philosophical theory or historical 
narrative is called true [...] which seemed to me the proper sense of the 
word - was something that belonged not to any single proposition, nor 
even, as the coherence theorists maintained, to a complex of
41 Collingwood, The Idea of History, p.245.
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propositions taken together, but to a complex of questions and 
answers.42
Collingwood also enters a distinction, however, between truth and 'rightness' 
such that an answer may be 'right' without being true: by which he means that it is an 
appropriate, or justifiable answer to give in a particular context, even if it turns out on 
further examination to have been false.43
Collingwood, however, presents an overly formal model of pragmatic 
understanding when he presents it in the form of a logic: a logic which is supposed to 
do all the work which formal logic was supposed to do. In particular, this leads him to 
formulate the unnecessarily restrictive 'principle' of correlativity. The idea that there are 
'levels' at which question and answer must correlate, seems to be a version of the idea 
that statements and responses must in some way be appropriate in a given situation. 
But we cannot apply this idea too rigidly: there may be a variety of 'appropriate' 
responses in a given situation. For example, there seems no reason for Collingwood to 
deny that a 'particular' statement, like 'number one plug is alright' can serve as an 
answer to a general question: 'why won't my car go?' Isn't it all too easy to imagine a 
context in which one might say such a thing? In demanding that we fill in the deductive 
relations here, Collingwood begins to resemble Dray's covering law theorist. We see 
the deleterious effects of this formalising at work in the example of the 'savage', when 
Collingwood insists that a general description of that person's problem cannot be right, 
and that the appropriate one is the most particular. But again, can't we imagine 
contexts in which the general description might serve a purpose?
Collingwood unnecessarily restricts his account of the role of questioning in 
understanding, both by imposing an artificially formal 'principle of correlativity' upon it, 
and in the way he conceives of historical inquiry, by restricting the range of questions
42 Collingwood, An Autobiography, pp.33 and 37.
43 Collingwood. An Autobiography, p.37.
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which may be posed by historians concerning questions which may have been in the 
minds of the actors under investigation, a restriction all too readily accepted by 
intellectual historians like Quentin Skinner.44 If thought is a practical activity, and 
understanding always relative to some problem or puzzlement which we seek to 
remove, why should we think of ourselves as restricted in this way? Doesn't it make 
sense to suggest that there are at least as many forms of puzzlement as there are 
schemes and responses which might, in certain situations, relieve us of the obstacles to 
our understanding? If our conceptual resources are as varied as I have been suggesting, 
then surely we can form an equally varied set of requests for explanation i.e. requests 
for contextualisation?
Pragmatic Contextualisation and Social Criticism.
What we have now is, first of all, a conceptual pluralism which rejects as 
misconceived the idea that any particular level or style of description can be 
understood as fundamental, the one which ultimately represents reality. Secondly, we 
have a pragmatic 'logic of question and answer' which connects this conceptual 
pluralism to our particular purposes, such that these help to determine what range of 
description is best in a given instance. What can we do with this account of interest 
driven, or pragmatic contextualisation? I think it can serve as a basis for a model of 
social criticism which does not display the reductive attitude to normative argument 
and theorising which existing models of contextualisation exhibit.
By rejecting the foundationalist idea that some ranges of description or 
standpoints can be shown to be more fundamental than others, independent of our
44 Gadamer, while he regards the 'structure of question and answer' as a central part of the 
'hermeneutic phenomenon', and declares that 'the logic of the human sciences is a 'logic of the 
question", judges that 'compared with the hermeneutic experience that understands the meaning of the 
text, the reconstruction of what the author really had in mind is a limited understanding.' Gadamer, 
Truth and Method.. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1975), p.336.
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particular interests in the matter at hand, we can reconceive interpretation in pragmatic 
terms. This means that the way is open to approach the issue of interpretation and 
social criticism by asking what sort of interpretive schemes best serve the aims of 
social criticism? Given that social criticism aims at transforming or revising people's 
actually existing beliefs about themselves and their world, it should firstly focus on 
systematic relations between ideas: traditions, ideologies or discourses, for example, 
rather than on the intentions of individual authors. This is because social criticism aims 
at revealing unsuspected influences and features of one's beliefs. Secondly, social 
criticism need not restrict itself to particularising, e.g. social or historical schemes but 
may also make use of the generalising schemes of theory, for both can serve the task of 
redescription. Historical interpretation has no special privilege over theoretical analysis 
on this view.
This is not to say that all contextualisation must serve the purposes of social 
criticism, but only that it can do so. Some models of contextualisation, notably that of 
the historians of political thought, deny that it can serve such a purpose, while others, 
such as that of Marx, assume that it can, but think of how it does this in a reductive 
way. First of all, what do we understand by 'social criticism'? This is, in very general 
terms, the attempt to alter the beliefs of members of a particular society in order to 
persuade them to bring about social change.45 This leaves open the question of the sort 
of change desired: whether institutions are to be made more just; classes to be 
emancipated; or persons to be made more virtuous. It also leaves open the sort of 
reasons one might appeal to in seeking to gamer support for change. I will pick these 
questions up at a later stage when we come to look at different models of social 
criticism in more detail. What is common to different models of social criticism, 
whether Marxist, Foucauldian, or communitarian is that they aim at altering the 
existing beliefs of members of a particular society in some way, whether these are
45 See Max Horkheimer's contrast between 'critical’ and 'traditional' theory in terms of the former's 
emancipatory aims. Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory. M. T. O' Connell (trans.) 
(New York: Seabury Press, 1972).
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beliefs about their own beliefs, about their practices, their institutions, or their relations 
with other societies. The nature of the desired alteration may also be thought of in a 
variety of ways: for some Marxists it is a matter of replacing false beliefs with true, 
whereas for Foucauldians it is perhaps just a matter of replacing existing beliefs with a 
plurality of different ones, and for communitarians like Michael Walzer, for example, 
this alteration may be seen as a matter of replacing one self-understanding with 
another, deeper one.46 However the desired transformation of belief is thought of, it is 
clear that the core idea of social criticism is just this: a transformation of belief.
This is what connects social criticism with ideas about contextualisation, for 
transformation of belief is achieved by reinterpretation, recontextualisation, of existing 
beliefs. This is one reason why we must reject the historian's view of contextualisation. 
One could, of course, say that they too aim at a limited transformation of beliefs, in the 
sense that they hope that by placing political ideas in the 'proper' context they aim to 
transform our beliefs about these ideas, replacing false understandings with true ones. 
However, at the same time, Skinner's model of meaning denies the possibility of a 
certain vital sort of transformation, namely one's views about oneself and one's actions. 
Because the author is said to fix the meaning or the identity of his act once and for all, 
it is not only the case that others must, if they are to understand it correctly, 
understand it in this way, but also that the author himself must understand it in that 
way. Because his intentions in performing an act fix its meaning, he is subsequently in 
the same position with respect to it as everyone else, which is to say that it would be 
just as wrong for him to seek to redescribe it as it would be for anyone else. This 
denies the possibility that we can reinterpret ourselves, and our lives, and closes off the 
whole question of self-reflection. While Skinner's notion of the authority of the speaker 
rests on a certain strong view of the freedom of the subject with respect to meaning, it 
entails a radical curtailment of the freedom of the subject with respect to self­
46 The aim of Foucauldian criticism is not wholly clear, for reasons I will explore in more detail in 
Chapter Five. For Walzer's notion of the connected social critic as the interpreter of his society's 
values see his Interpretation and Social Criticism. See Chapter Four below for discussion of this 
model of criticism.
78
understanding, by denying that we could ever come to understand ourselves and our 
actions better than we did at the time we performed them. This possibility rests on the 
idea that acts can be redescribed in ways which take their meaning to be other than 
their intended meaning.47
Skinner, of course, thinks of contextualisation as a matter of doing 'good 
history' rather than as a way of engaging in social criticism, which is not surprising as 
his view of contextualisation could hardly serve as the basis for effective social 
criticism. We could seek to transform others' beliefs about the intentions of others 
perhaps, but it would be 'conceptually improper' to seek to transform people's beliefs 
about themselves, which is the central focus of social criticism. This suggests that the 
efficacy of his interpretive project for the purposes of defending a normative pluralism, 
in the sense that it serves to remind us of the essential variety of moral commitments, is 
extremely limited insofar as it must preclude any real engagement with others in 
different contexts. To engage with others and their beliefs in a normatively relevant 
manner involves more than simply discovering that people hold different beliefs or that 
they meant something other than what they thought they meant, but rather it is an 
engagement which is premised on the possibility of self-transformation, i.e. that one or 
other, or both of the parties involved could come to alter their understanding not only 
of the other but also of themselves in the light of their encounter. We could mark the 
difference between these two ways of conceiving of encounters with others as the 
difference between 'anthropological' encounters and deliberative or 'hermeneutic' 
encounters. The first of these is concerned only with establishing that others are 
different, while the latter is concerned not only with understanding the way in which
47 This is one reason why narrative conceptions of selfhood are attractive: they rely on the idea that 
we are never wholly transparent to ourselves, and for that reason our self-understandings are open to 
revision. This is not only because narratives are premised on the idea that the facts cannot be 
communicated at once, but must be revealed in a sequence, but also because narratives are open to 
retrospective reinterpretation. Alasdair MacIntyre seems to miss this point in his own treatment of 
narrative identity however, insofar as he prefers to emphasise the way that our identities are fixed by 
our situation in traditions, which themselves have the character of narratives: 'I am forever whatever I 
have been at any time for others...' MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.202.
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others differ from us, but with engaging in potentially transformative deliberations with 
others. This is an important distinction, inasmuch as it is widely thought that the major 
implication of the realisation that we are 'situated' in particular contexts is that our 
encounters with others can only, or must only, be of the anthropological sort. 
Typically, conceptual arguments of the sort proposed by Skinner are used to back up 
normative arguments about the propriety of seeking to transform the beliefs of others. 
I will be concerned to argue for the wider acceptance of the hermeneutic model over 
that of the anthropological model, which, it will be argued, is normatively unattractive 
as well as misconceived.
By contrast with Skinner's model of author-centred interpretation, a more 
useful model is provided by communitarian and radical social critics who locate the 
object of interpretation at the level of traditions, ideologies, and discourses, i.e. at the 
level of systematic relations between ideas and social institutions. These differ in ways 
which I will examine in Chapters Four and Five. However, the focus on this level of 
interpretation is correct insofar as social criticism is premised on the idea that we are 
not transparent to ourselves. That is to say, our context shapes our identities and 
perspectives in ways which we may not fully comprehend. The task of social criticism 
is to reveal these influences and enlarge our self understandings. For this reason, a 
contextualisation of ideas which treats them as having their meanings fixed by 
individual authors is unlikely to be helpful. Instead, we need an understanding of ideas 
which rests on the idea that these ideas have a certain objectivity, an institutional 
existence beyond the influence of individuals. Here it has been shown that the claim 
that the range of description used to identify an object can be fixed is unfounded. In the 
next chapter however, I will set out a social account of meaning which shows how 
meaning is precisely a social institution in the way a social criticism focused on 
traditions, ideologies or discourses supposes.
The question of the legitimacy of abstraction raises further questions about 
how we are to understand the idea of conceptual pluralism. It must be emphasised
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once again that this is not a relativism: it does not entail the view that no 
characterisation is better than any other, only that we must reject the foundationalist 
thesis that one particular range of description is in every situation the best, most 
truthful characterisation. Collingwood suggested that an interpretation may be judged 
according to its truth and comprehensiveness, i.e. that a good interpretation must not 
contain false statements and that it must take account of all the relevant facts. The role 
of interest, or of the 'question', is to help to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant 
facts. This idea may be rather vague in the sense that a judgement about relevance may 
be open to question, but as long as one recognises that such judgements are always 
open to challenge, this does not itself present a problem. Even those wedded to the 
idea of an 'absolute' conception of the world should recognise that some such 
distinction would be necessary to circumvent the unbearable epistemic burdens that 
would be imposed by the view that we should have to present the 'whole truth' about 
some object.48
Any interpretation will contain references to a variety of objects: persons, 
physical objects, beliefs, actions, events, etc. and these will be described in a variety of 
ways, as deemed relevant. Having said that, the device of relevance does not allow us 
to describe things just as we please: our descriptions must themselves be true, and this 
raises questions about the compatibility of different descriptions.
Recognising that devices like that of distinguishing between levels of 
generality cannot solve all disputes about the soundness of an interpretation does not 
mean that we can never make use of such devices in this way, but only that there are 
limits to what we can accomplish with them. In cases of essential contestability the 
device does not work because the conflict is between rival schemes, i.e. schemes 
operating at the same level. Some, like Skinner and Collingwood, argue that the device 
of abstraction, by which they mean the application of more general descriptions to an 
object, is simply illegitimate. Collingwood's discussion certainly indicates that in
48 The view of contextualisation set out above is that the 'whole truth' could never be presented, as it 
would always be possible to set out further true statements about an object.
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dialogue, getting the level of description at which the object of inquiry 'thought his 
thought' is important and it is a major influence upon Skinner's idea that the correct 
way to describe an act as its author intended it.49 Why is it not permissible to move up 
and down the conceptual scale, as it were, by generalising or even further 
particularising an object, and why might we wish to do this?
One good reason for seeking more general descriptions is that this seems to 
reveal similarities which are not apparent at a lower level of description. By treating 
the 'savage's' construction of his animal trap as a particular instance of the search for 
food, we bring this action into a certain relationship with others which might otherwise 
have seemed unrelated, e.g. the activity of shopping in a supermarket. This in turn may 
have wider ramifications, for by revealing an important similarity, this can prompt us to 
reinterpret how our way of life resembles or differs from that of a supposedly 
'primitive' person. We may wish to see the other in a more favourable light, or equally, 
see certain of our own practices in a less favourable light. By bringing otherwise 
unrelated things into relations of equivalence, generalising descriptions can serve to 
disturb our common sense ideas about ourselves and our world. Perhaps Collingwood 
goes astray because his example centres on the idea of conversation, of seeking to 
maintain communication, and for this reason, while implicitly recognising the 
disturbing power of redescriptions by means of generalisation, he deems it an 
illegitimate move. However, if our aim is social criticism, then we have an interest in 
disrupting and transforming common sense, and in this context, our redescriptions may 
be seen to have a purpose. Insofar as they have a purpose then, it is hard to see how 
Collingwood can object to such a move, for description and interest are related in the 
appropriate way.
One possible reason for denying this would seem to be provided by the 
adoption of a certain foundationalist attitude to 'thick' particularising socio-historical 
descriptions, such that these are deemed appropriate, regardless of the particular
49 Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', p.65.
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interest one has in the matter at hand. This would appear to be Skinner's view, but this 
can now be seen to amount to no more than a contextualist prejudice, i.e. the view that 
socio-historical description is always the truest way to describe something, such that to 
place something 'in context' is always to offer such a description. This view is a species 
of foundationalism, for no range of description can legitimately be thought of as 
universally correct quite independently of our interests. Contextualisation is the 
process of interpreting an object by choosing characterisations which relate it to other 
objects in a particular way. Pluralism is its premise, i.e. the recognition that there is 
always another way to do this, other possible context. It does not entail any view about 
what sort of characterisation is best and could not entail such a view without foregoing 
the pluralist aspect of the idea of context. We might see this as simply a distinction 
between two different senses of the idea of context, but even the socio-historical use o f 
the idea usually contains the idea of pluralism to the extent that it relies upon the claim 
that there are a plurality of socio-historical contexts in which we are severally 
'situated'. To offer a socio-historical contextualisation is to make a pluralising move, as 
Skinner does, for example, when he argues that the function of his history is to remind 
us of the essential variety of moral commitments.
In this, of course, socio-historical contextualists are right: such descriptions do 
indeed serve to bring plurality to our attention, and for this reason they are suited to 
the purpose of social criticism. Particularising descriptions can have a transformative 
effect on common sense every bit as much as generalising descriptions: we may move 
up and down the scale in order to achieve the desired end. Onora O'Neill makes the 
point that generalisation is not the only form of abstraction: particularisation is also a 
variety of abstraction. Abstraction, she points out, simply involves selecting from 
among the range of possible true things one can might wish to say about a subject.50 In
50 She contrasts this with idealisation: 'Abstraction, taken straightforwardly, is a matter of bracketing, 
but not of denying, predicates that are true of the matter under discussion.' Idealisation, by contrast, 'is 
another matter: it can easily lead to falsehood. An assumption, and derivatively a theory, idealises 
when it ascribes predicates - often seen as enhanced, 'ideal' predicates - that are false of the case in 
hand, and so denies predicates that are true of that case.' O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.39-44.
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this sense we abstract as much when we particularise as when we generalise. Another 
way of making this point would be to say that we contextualise as much when we 
generalise as when we particularise.
We need not accord ontological primacy to either, but rather should avoid the 
foundationalism of the socio-historical contextualist and those of the 'Platonist'. For the 
purposes of social criticism, we need to exploit both styles of contextualisation to 
effect redescription and transformation: one by pointing out similarities, the other by 
undermining them. In this way, we do not accord absolute primacy to either identity or 
difference. As Nelson Goodman points out, these are both 'incomplete' concepts in the 
sense that things are never simply identical or different to one another, but rather are 
identical or different in certain respects, which remain to be spelled out.51 The view of 
contextualisation set out here will enable us to exploit both possibilities for the 
purposes of social criticism.
This Chapter has argued against reductive understandings of context which 
reject generalising abstraction and exclude normative deliberation from the business of 
interpretation. It has set out an anti-foundationalist conceptual pluralism which refuses 
to accord any single range of description or standpoint a 'fundamental' status, and it 
has connected this pluralism to a pragmatic account of interpretation, one which 
recognises the limited and revisable character of any contextualisation. The goal of 
such interpretation is that it enables an interpreter to 'go on', to solve the problem at 
hand, rather than aiming to arrive at a comprehensive or final representation of the 
object of inquiry. The emphasis on the limited and revisable character of interpretation 
is significant for the practice of social criticism, which depends entirely upon the 
possibility of effecting plausible redescriptions of the world.
Subsequent Chapters will apply this account of context and interpretation to 
existing models of context and of social criticism which will be shown to be disabled by 
their reductive understandings of context. The next two Chapters will shift the focus of
51 Nelson Goodman, Wavs of Worldmaking. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979).
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the argument away from the nature of interpretation and onto the problem of what it 
means to be situated in a context. The conceptual pluralism set out here will be 
combined with a public account of meaning which will present the conceptual 
networks we employ in interpretation as socio-historical phenomena. These not only 
vary from society to society and from age to age but they also serve to constitute the 
identities and perspectives of interpreters and social critics themselves. To complete 
the account of interpretation set out here we need to appreciate the ways in which 
interpretation and social criticism are themselves 'situated' in particular socio-historical 
contexts, with the consequence that the questions posed by interpreters can themselves 
be seen as formed by traditions of inquiry.
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C h a p t e r  t h r e e  
E p is t e m ic  Sit u a t io n
The epistemic conception of what it means to be situated in a context provides 
a basis for a variety of normative and epistemic claims. First of all, it affirms a 
pluralist outlook in opposition to a version of 'universalism' which assumes that all 
persons share a set of foundations from which sound beliefs may be derived. This 
universalism is disposed to downplay differences in perspective and to accentuate 
similarities between persons as evidence for there being a universal human nature. 
The danger of this sort of universalism lies in its tendency to impose a particular 
perspective, e.g. Western, bourgeois, or masculine as definitive of this 'universal' 
nature.1 To insist, therefore, on the connection between perspective and situation is 
thus to demand, at the very least, an equal hearing for alternative perspectives, 
inasmuch as it suggests that these cannot be reduced to a unity or simply dismissed 
when they are shown to be incompatible with whatever set of beliefs have been 
accorded the status of 'universal'. The normative significance of the attending to 
situation is that it sustains claims for the recognition of plurality.2
The epistemic conception of situation has special features however, which 
connect ontological, epistemological and normative claims in a problematic fashion. 
While this conception of situation is widespread, the particular version of it examined 
here is that found in feminist standpoint theory.3 This not only asserts the existence of
1 On the ideological character of such 'universalism' see Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, p.l 16.
2 See, for example, Charles Taylor, 'The politics of recognition,' in Philosophical Arguments, pp.225- 
26. See also the overview provided by Elizabeth Kiss, 'Democracy and the politics of recognition,' in 
Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (eds.) Democracy's Edges. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), pp. 193-209.
3 For influential statements of standpoint theory see Nancy Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power: and 
Hartsock, "The Feminist Standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical 
materialism, in Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka (eds.) Discovering Reality. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1983, pp.283-310); Sandra Harding, 'Rethinking standpoint epistemology: what is 'strong objectivity'?'
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a plurality of perspectives, but also accords 'epistemic' privilege to certain of these. 
Central to the epistemic understanding of situation is the idea that experience connects 
situation and perspective. This works in two ways: firstly, experience is assumed to be 
transparent, and secondly, individuals have 'privileged' access to it, i.e. others do not 
have access to it. Different experiences give rise to different beliefs, and these are not 
criticisable by differently-situated others. The epistemic conception of situation not 
only emphasises the way that our different situations give rise to a plurality of beliefs, 
but entails a particularly strong claim for the authoritative character of these beliefs, 
one that conflicts with the idea that we can possibly understand others better than they 
can understand themselves. To this extent, this understanding of context is 
incompatible with social criticism, insofar as it denies that those in 'epistemically' 
privileged situations could ever have reasons for transforming their beliefs. The 
criticism of the epistemic conception of situation is therefore a prerequisite for 
establishing an understanding of context which retains pluralism, but dispenses with 
ideas about the private and transparent character of experience, which serve to 
undermine the idea of public deliberation.
The first element of 'epistemic situation' is the idea that each of us is situated in 
a particular socio-historical context, a particular time and place, in a particular society 
and in a particular location within that society. There are a plurality of contexts or 
situations, and our identities as particular persons are constituted by these situations. 
Even where these identities have a biological aspect, e.g. where they are connected to 
race or gender, they are nonetheless caught up in a complex of social relations, roles 
and responsibilities. The second element is the idea of perspective, i.e. the idea that to
objectivity'?' in Linda AlcofiFand Elizabeth Potter (eds.) Feminist Epistemologies. (London:
Routledge, 1993), pp.49-82, and Harding, 'Why has the sex/gender system become visible only now?' 
in Harding and Hintikka (eds.) Discovering Reality, pp.311-24. Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, Breaking 
Out Again. (1983) (London: Routledge, 1993). This view is far from universally accepted within 
feminism, and has come under severe pressure in recent years from feminists who adopt an explicitly 
anti-essentialist outlook, under the influence of post-structuralism. See Susan Hekman, 'Truth and 
method: feminist standpoint theory revisited,' Signs 22 (1997), pp.341-65. Also Seyla Benhabib,
'Sexual differences and collective identities: the new global constellation,' Signs 24 (1999), pp.335-61.
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this plurality of situations corresponds a plurality of perspectives, or beliefs. 
Perspectives and situations are connected in such a way that to be situated in a 
particular context is to have access to its corresponding perspective, available only to 
persons who share that situation. The connection between situation and perspective, 
the third element in this complex, is experience. Because it is assumed that one can 
only have certain experiences if one is situated in a particular context, and that that 
experience is private, i.e. inaccessible to others, this means that persons situated in 
different contexts cannot fully adopt my perspective and consequently they can have 
no basis for criticising it. In this way my beliefs, insofar as they are based on my 
experience, are authoritative.
This conception of context poses a problem about our capacity to understand 
those situated in different contexts and about whether it is possible and/or legitimate to 
seek to revise the beliefs of differently situated others. It is inspired by the 
epistemological subject insofar as it assumes that understanding is a matter of forming 
mental representations. The problem of knowledge, on this view, is a problem about 
forming accurate mental representations of external reality, of having ideas, which 
represent the world to the subject.4 While the original problem is one of explaining 
how our ideas represent the world, this idea of the subject as a mirror of nature comes 
to govern later ideas about intersubjective understanding too. Accordingly, for Dilthey, 
understanding others becomes a problem about gaining access to, or at least 'reliving' 
others' experiences, by means of a process of 'empathetic projection'. Collingwood 
criticises Dilthey's idea of understanding, on the grounds that we should be unable to 
know whether our 're-lived' experience was actually that of another, however, he 
clearly remains as much in the grip of the epistemological notion of understanding as 
Dilthey. His own solution to this problem is to treat understanding as a matter of re­
4 Ideas in the seventeenth century were thought of as images. See Ian Hacking, Why Does Language 
Matter to Philosophy?
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enacting others' thoughts in one's own mind.5 Dilthey's view of understanding as 
centred on the experience of others, a form of understanding particular to the human as 
opposed to the natural sciences, forms one of the major anti-positivist currents within 
the social sciences. The idea that understanding might involve the engagement and 
empathy of the researcher was a direct challenge to the positivist understanding of the 
social sciences which reigned until the 1960s, an understanding of scientific objectivity 
which conceived of it as a matter of the detachment and value-freedom.6 Having said 
that, both of these views have their origin in a common source: the idea of the 
epistemological subject. This lies at the base of Dilthey's view that understanding 
others is a matter of accessing their experiences.
One can adopt both 'individualist' and 'social' versions of epistemic situation,
i.e. if one chose to emphasise the way each individual has her own context, a situation 
occupied solely by her, then one might think of perspectives in an individualist fashion. 
However, the predominant tendency has been to think of situation in terms of the 
situation of social groups, chiefly classes, genders and races each with their own 
perspective. The origins of this view lie in nineteenth century historicism and the 
historicisation of the absolute view of the world. On this view the absolute view is 
pieced together over time as each age is superseded by another with a more 
comprehensive, less limited, picture of reality. On this broadly Hegelian view, the key 
division is between epochs and their respective Weltanschaungen, but with the advent 
of Marxism this picture is complicated by the introduction of distinct classes within a 
society, such that each class has a distinct consciousness of its own, and the 
characteristic outlook of an age is thought to be that of the dominant class.
5 His idea is that thoughts, unlike experiences, have the requisite objectivity to enable us to distinguish 
clearly between our own thoughts and those of others, whereas this could not be the case with 
subjective experiences. How thoughts are endowed with this objectivity is not explained however. 
Collingwood, 'Human Nature and Human History,' in The Idea of History, pp.205-31.
6 See William Outhwaite, Understanding Social Life. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), 
Joseph Bleicher, The Hermeneutic Imagination. (London: Routledge, 1972), and Zygmunt Bauman, 
Hermeneutics and Social Science. (London: Hutchinson, 1978).
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The Hegelian view introduces the element of epistemic privilege into the idea 
of situated perspectives, as each successive epoch's worldview is thought of as 
approximating ever closer to the absolute view, such that the worldviews of later eras 
are supposedly more comprehensive than those of earlier. In Marxism this idea 
undergoes some alteration, although it is not wholly dispensed with. The goal of world 
history is not self-consciousness, but the development of the economy to a point at 
which class divisions are abolished. In Lukacs' version of Marxism, the class which will 
succeed the current ruling class is epistemically privileged in that its ideas are 
considered superior to those of the class that it will succeed, until, with the demise of 
capitalism, class-situated consciousness will itself be abolished as the classes in which 
each perspective are situated will themselves have been abolished.7 The shift from the 
focus on perspectives which are more or less comprehensive to a focus on more or less 
class divided societies, poses a problem about how we are to understand the epistemic 
privilege of class based views.
This is reflected in the distinction between positive and negative conceptions of 
'ideology' within Marxism.8 Lukacs espouses the first of these, the positive view on 
which each class has its own consciousness or ideology and the superiority of one is 
simply a matter of its being the ideology of the class which will undermine the 
dominance of the existing ruling class. This view underlies the sociology of knowledge, 
which seeks to explain the prevalence and acceptance of certain beliefs in terms of the 
power and influence of the social groups who hold them.9 This is a reductive treatment 
of beliefs which treats 'epistemic' superiority as a function of the power of a given 
social group to compel acceptance of its perspective.
7 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness. (1922) Rodney Livingstone (trans.) (London: Merlin, 
1971).
8 See Jorge Larrain for this characterisation of Marxist views of ideology. Larrain, The Concent of 
Ideology. (London: Hutchinson, 1986).
9 See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. (London: Routledge, 1968) and Essavs in the Sociology 
of Knowledge. (London: Routledge, 1968).
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The second view treats 'ideology' in terms of truth and falsity, such that one 
would distinguish between true beliefs and ideological beliefs. The problem with 
capitalist ideology is that it is false, i.e. it misrepresents how things are, and the aim of 
Marxism is to expose the falsity of this view so that the working class might come to 
see that its interests lie in the overthrow of the capitalist system. On this view the 
superiority of a perspective is a matter of its being true, and not simply a matter of its 
social acceptance. The link between perspective and situation is accordingly weaker on 
this view than it is on the 'positive' conception of ideology, as it presumes that situation 
is no guarantee that one will hold a single perspective or that this perspective is 
superior to others. This view of Marxism as social criticism presumes that workers 
may hold false beliefs which must be challenged and replaced by better, truer beliefs.
Feminist Standpoint Theory
Nancy Hartsock draws explicitly upon Lukacs' conception of ideology in order 
to outline a theory of distinctively gendered perspectives, which she calls feminist 
standpoint theory. She distinguishes not only between bourgeois and proletarian 
outlooks, but also between patriarchal and feminist outlooks or 'standpoints':
... like the lives of proletarians according to Marxist theory, womens' 
lives make available a particular and privileged vantage point that can 
ground a powerful critique of the phallocentric institutions and 
ideology that contribute to capitalist forms of patriarchy.10
10 Nancy Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power. (1983) (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985), 
p.231.
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For Hartsock, the two things which do most to structure one's life are the capitalist 
division of labour and the sexual division of labour: these are the defining features of 
the social context in which everyone is situated. Of the two, she regards the second as 
more fundamental, insofar as it has its basis in biological differences.11 This ontological 
difference translates into an epistemological hierarchy, for while the point of view of 
the working class must be superior to that of the bourgeoisie, given women's 
subordinate position within even this class, it must be the case that their social location 
endows them with the clearest view of the workings of society.
Women's experience, she argues, is shaped not only by 'women's work', i.e. the 
cleaning and cooking etc. that are necessary for the smooth operation of capitalist 
production, but also, crucially, by the experience of reproduction and motherhood. She 
cites psychoanalytic studies to support her view that this feature of women's 
experience marks the feminist standpoint as distinct from the masculine inasmuch as it 
produces a perspective which is not 'dualistic' or 'hierarchical', these being defining 
characteristics of the male perspective, produced by the struggle of male children to 
differentiate themselves from their mothers. Women's experience, however, 'leads in 
the opposite direction - toward opposition of dualisms of any sort; valuation of 
concrete everyday life; a sense of a variety of connectedness and continuities with 
other persons and with the natural world.'12
Hartsock argues that the concept of'standpoint' has five features:
1. Material life (class position in Marxist theory) not only structures but 
sets limits on the understanding of social relations.
2. If material life is structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two 
different groups, one can expect that the vision of each will represent
11 She chooses to speak of a sexual division of labour, rather than a gender division of labour, because 
she believes that 'the division of women and men cannot be reduced to simply social dimensions'. It is 
vital to'keep hold of the bodily aspect of existence.'Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power, p. 23 3.
12 Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power, p.242.
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an inversion of the other, and in systems of domination the vision 
available to the rulers will be both partial and perverse.
3. The vision of the ruling class (or gender) structures the material 
relation in which all parties are forced to participate and therefore 
cannot be dismissed as simply false.
4. In consequence, the vision available to the oppressed group must be 
struggled for and represents an achievement that requires both science 
to see beneath the surface of the social relations in which all are forced 
to participate and the education that can only grow from struggle to 
change those relations.
5. As an engaged vision, the understanding of the oppressed, the 
adoption of a standpoint exposes the real relations among human 
beings as inhuman, points beyond the present, and carries a historically 
liberatory role.13
It is possible to show that a specifically feminist standpoint can be elaborated which 
displays each of these features. Note the claim that one's capacity to understand the 
world is limited by one's social/biological situation in it. Hartsock not only claims that 
women, in virtue of their position in the order of things, have a 'deeper and more 
thoroughgoing' grasp of reality than that available to the capitalist or the worker, but 
that there also different 'levels of reality' too, in which the 'real material ground of 
human existence ' is not the reality of class society as experienced by the capitalist or 
the worker, but is that of women, 'a ground constituted by women's experience and life 
activity.'14 Thus women do not only understand the world more comprehensively, but 
there are also aspects of reality which are only available to them.
13 Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power, p.232.
14 Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power, p. 10.
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Hartsock's view of a feminist standpoint has come in for considerable criticism 
within feminism itself. Some critics object to the particular understanding of this 
standpoint which Hartsock elaborates, while others have expressed doubts about 
standpoint theory per se15. Criticisms of Hartsock's particular construction of the 
feminist standpoint mirror the sort to criticisms to which Marxism has been subject, i.e. 
that it has neglected social cleavages other than class, e.g. race or gender, with the 
consequence that it cannot explain conflicts and inequalities other than those which can 
be explained in terms of the division between owners and workers. If  Marxists have 
accorded the category of class a central place in their analyses, then Hartsock appears 
to have done little more than replace that category with that of gender, generating the 
same sort of difficulties. Hartsock remarks that she is setting aside differences of race 
and class in order to concentrate on 'central commonalties across race and class 
boundaries' but this does not address differences between women in terms of race and 
class.16
Hartsock not only assumes that all women will have the same standpoint but 
she also makes questionable assumptions about what it is to be a woman. Her 
(hierarchical and dualist) account of the difference between the masculine and the 
feminist standpoints centres on the experiences of reproduction and motherhood, 
producing a distinctively 'matemalist' view of what it is to be woman. This strand of 
feminism is associated with the idea that women not only have distinct experiences, but 
also that maternal behaviour embodies a distinct set of values, e.g. care, as opposed to 
the abstract, masculine value of justice, for example. These maternal values, are said 
to pose a challenge to 'male' ideas about politics.17 Many feminists object that this
15 Liz Stanley and Sue Wise object to Hartsock's version of standpoint, theory, preferring a more 
individualist version of it. See Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again. Others, Like Anne Phillips, are 
careful to point out that they reject the essentialism of standpoint theory. Phillips, The Politics of 
Presence, p. 10.
16 Hartsock, Money. Sex and Power, p.233.
17 Mary G. Dietz discusses the 'matemalist' argument that feminist should aim to make politics reflect 
women's, i.e. maternal values, such as care, instead of masculine concerns with competition, justice 
etc. 'Context is all: feminism and theories of citizenship,' Daedalus 116 (1987), pp. 1-24.
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amounts to essentialism, i.e. that it presents a controversial normative claim about 
what it is to be a woman in the guise of a factual claim about women's experience. By 
contrast, many feminists take the view that defining women primarily as 'mothers' 
contributes to gender inequality. What this essentialist claim does is to establish a 
hierarchy of authenticity within the category of 'woman', such that women who do not 
accept this model of what it is to be a women would be regarded as less authentic, as 
women who are not in touch with those deeper levels of reality which Hartsock claims 
the experience of motherhood provides one with access to.18
While some think that standpoint theory is irredeemably essentialist and must 
be rejected tout court, others have sought to retain the basic idea of standpoint theory: 
the connection between situation and perspective, but seek to take account of the 
differences between women in such a way as to recognise a plurality of standpoints, of 
black or latina women, for example.19 A pair of British feminist sociologists, Sue 
Stanley and Liz Wise, take this a step further in apparently refusing to recognise even 
group standpoints, and adopting a highly individualist version of epistemic situation.20
In particular, they espouse a view which rejects the sort of essentialist claims 
made by Hartsock, and the idea of epistemic hierarchies, grounded in the situations of 
different groups. They retain the basic idea that situation and perspective are connected
18 Seyla Benhabib notes that deconstructive attacks on this sort of essentialist view has led feminists 
to adopt a certain scepticism about the usefulness of the category of 'woman1. 'Sexual differences and 
collective identities: the new global constellation,' Signs 24 (1999), pp.335-61.
19 See Patricia Hill Collins for the claim that there is a distinct black women's standpoint. Collins. 
'Comment on Hekman's 'Truth and method: feminist standpoint theory revisited," Signs 22 (1997), 
pp. 375-81. Bat-Ami Bar On argues that standpoint theory leads to a hopeless attempt to construct a 
hierarchy of oppression in the attempt to order the various standpoints thus established in 'Marginality 
and Epistemic Privilege' in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds.) Feminist Epistemologies. pp.83- 
100. Susan Hekman likewise takes the view that standpoint theory is hopelessly essentialist in 'Truth 
and method: feminist standpoint theory revisited,' Signs (1997), pp.341-65.
20 Sue Stanley and Liz Wise, Breaking Out. (1983) Page references are to the second edition:
Breaking Out Again. (London: Routledge, 1993). Their book precedes the publication of Hartsock's 
formulation of standpoint theory, but their attacks on Marxist feminism underline the truth of Sandra 
Harding's observation, that standpoint theory is a basically Marxist idea that was in the air long before 
Hartsock's book was published. See Harding, 'Comment on Hekman's 'Truth and method: feminist 
standpoint theory revisited," Signs 22 (1997), pp. 382-91.
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by experience in such a way as to make understanding of others’ perspectives 
impossible, but in such a way as to guarantee the truth of one's own perspective. 
Where Hartsock relied on a collective subject, Stanley and Wise are individualist, and 
where Hartsock seeks to order standpoints hierarchically, they are relativist. In some 
ways this is a more consistent application of the epistemic idea of situation, although it 
remains deeply problematic.
Just as Skinner and Dunn worried about the abstractness of political thought, 
and treatments of its history, Stanley and Wise express a concern about the 
abstractness of theory in general and feminist theory in particular. They counterpose 
the abstraction and generalisation of theory to the rich particularity of social reality and 
its 'lived experience'.21 Their concern, however, is not only with the apparent unreality 
of theory, but also with the authority of theory and theorists to interpret the world, to 
speak about the experiences of women, and to speak for the women themselves. 
Feminist theory has been guilty of usurping the authority of individual women over 
their own experiences, to the extent that it has questioned the 'validity' of these 
experiences, i.e. the authority with which women speak about them:
Generalised thinking, we believe, leads to women's accounts of our 
lives being downgraded, and us being told we're wrong or falsely 
conscious. In other words, if the facts of experience don't fit theoretical 
knowledge then these can't be facts at all.22
21 Feminist theory is condemned as 'abstract, generalised, 'objectified' theory which bears little 
relationship to anything very real. It is concerned with abstract ideas abstractly related and standing 
on behalf of lived experiences'. Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 90. This does not prevent 
Stanley and Wise from laying claim to the authority of theory inasmuch as they assert that 'we are all 
of us 'theoreticians' because we all of us use our values and beliefs to interpret and construct the 
world.' Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p.64.
22 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p.77.
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What is at stake is the authority of the individual as an interpreter of her own 
experience, and Stanley and Wise fear that feminist theory, in virtue of its preference 
for abstraction, simply denies this.
The authority of the individual woman is copperfastened by the assumption that 
experience is, strictly speaking, not interpreted at all, by anyone, but is rather direct, 
providing unmediated access to 'reality1. This view is familiar from the previous 
chapter: raw experience can act as a foundation for knowledge to the extent that it 
delivers up the world as it really is. Experience, of course, is not only direct, but also 
private: we cannot have each others' experiences, so that while we have direct 'access' 
to our own experiences, we can only have access to those of others, second hand, by 
means of their reports upon it. This view of our relation to the world, the view of 
classical epistemology, is also central to Stanley and Wise's account: 'none of us can 
ever convey to other people exactly what is in our minds, nor convey exactly what our 
feelings consist of and feel like.'23 They go on to suggest that while we may pretend 
there is such a thing as 'intersubjectivity', this is really just pieced together out of our 
several private representations of the world.24
This view is sometimes taken to underwrite the idea that the experiences of 
members of certain social groups are inaccessible to members of other social groups, 
while shared within the group concerned. This view animates Nancy Hartsock's version 
of feminist standpoint theory. Stanley and Wise themselves refer to 'women's 
perspective, women's knowledge, and women's experience', as if they too subscribed to 
this social version of epistemic situation.25 There are problems with this view even 
from the point of view of the epistemological perspective, for if experience is indeed 
private in the way outlined above then the experience of individual women will be just
23 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 11-12.
24 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 11-12.
25 These are said to provide an 'irrefutable critique1 of the claims of social science to be 'objective'. 
Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 163. They also claim that 'feminist consciousness' makes 
available to us a previously untapped store of knowledge about what it is to be a woman. Stanley and 
Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 120.
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as inaccessible to other women as it is to men. We may conjecture that women have 
the same experiences, but we cannot say for sure, as we are unable to compare 
experiences. Equally, if one were to abandon the claim that individuals have a 
privileged access to their own mental representations in order to overcome this hurdle, 
then one faces the problem of explaining how experience could be accessible to one set 
of people and not to another. The nub of the problem is the question of access, and 
not, it should be said, the idea that different groups of people may have different 
experiences, and that they may interpret the world in particular ways. Stanley and 
Wise, ultimately come down on the side of the individual: their aim, after all, is to deny 
the authority of feminist theorists over the experience of other women. They object to 
the idea that feminists have any access to the experience o f other women, let alone that 
they are in a position to form better founded views on it than the objects of their 
research: 'feminist consciousness is specific and unique to each feminist.'26
Stanley and Wise go on to embrace a far reaching relativism, in which not only 
is it the case that experiences differ from one person to another, but truth and reality 
are also variable in this way. They are influenced in this by the general turn against 
positivism in the social sciences, and they express this in terms of opposition to the 
idea of an objective reality per se and not simply in their opposition to the idea of there 
being a single right way to represent it. From the idea that there is no way for us to 
know whether another's representation of the world are identical with ours, they move 
to the idea that each of us experiences our own reality too and that, given that we 
experience it directly, our experience of it is absolutely authoritative: 'what feminism 
does is point out that this one 'real' reality isn't the one, real reality at all. It says that
26 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 133. They object to researchers writing 'about the 
experiences of others as though they were directly available to them.' Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out 
Again, p. 165.
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the 'objective' reality is subjective and it is merely one reality which coexists with many 
others.'27
Nonetheless, Stanley and Wise also want to hold onto the idea that we ought to 
respect other's experiences as absolutely valid, for them at least, if not for us. What this 
entails is that we ought not question others' reports of their experiences, as they are the 
only ones in a position to say whether these are accurate or not. However, there is a 
gap between accepting the privacy of experience and accepting the validity of reports 
upon it: given the former, it must be the case that we cannot ever have access to their 
experiences, and consequently should not be in a position to judge whether or not their 
reports are accurate. Privacy entails inexpressibility: if we could make our experiences 
transparent to others by means of language, then we could not be said to have 
privileged access to it.
Their objections to the 'imperialism' of feminist theory are evidently as much 
moral as they are epistemological, for the epistemological arguments clearly will not 
underwrite the idea that we have to respect others' reports of their experiences. This 
respect must be regarded as a moral principle rather than a conceptual necessity, 
especially as the relativism they espouse would seem to leave individuals free to take 
other's statements any way they please.28 Those feminists who would claim to speak 
for all women are criticised not only for mistakenly thinking they can have access to 
the experiences of other persons, but also for violating the egalitarian tenets of 
feminism, which requires, they say, 'an acceptance of the validity of all women's 
experiences.'29 This will be the case even where, as a feminist, one might want to say 
that a woman is misinterpreting her situation:
27 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 134. With respect to truth, they say: 'we also believe that 
there are may (often competing) versions of the truth. Which, if any, is 'the' truth is irrelevant. And if 
such a thing as 'truth' exists, this is undemonstrable.' p. 113.
28 'We see that positivist reality is invalid - but only for us.1 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, 
p .113.
29 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 102. Elsewhere they say that Teminism insisted that 
personal experiences couldn't be invalidated or rejected, because if something was felt then it was felt,
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If a housebound, depressed mother of six with an errant spouse says 
she's not oppressed, there's little point in us telling her she's got it wrong 
because of the objective reality of her situation...what she sees as the 
facts of her life is the truth for her as much as any alternative account is 
truth for the onlooker.
They conclude that to disagree with womens' assessments of their situations would 
simply amount to 'attempting to impose our reality on them when they don't want us 
to.'30
Sandra Harding's version of feminist standpoint theory tries to circumvent the 
difficulties present in Hartsock's position by weakening the link between situation and 
perspective rather than by multiplying situations and perspectives. Like Hartsock, she 
believes that,
One's social situation enables and sets limits on what we can know; 
some social situations - critically unexamined dominant ones - are more 
limiting than others in this respect and what makes these situations 
more limiting is their inability to generate the most critical questions 
about received belief.31
If we adopt the standpoint of the dominant group we will be unable to see certain 
problems, problems which are all too apparent from the point of view of the most
and if it was felt then it was absolutely real for the woman feeling and experiencing it.' Stanley and 
Wise, Breaking Out Again, p.63.
30 Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 117.
31 Sandra Harding, 'Rethinking standpoint epistemology: what is 'strong objectivity'?' in Alcoff and 
Potter (eds.) Feminist Epistemologies. pp.99-82
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marginalised groups in society. These viewpoints are epistemically privileged because 
they have a more comprehensive view than is afforded by other situations. This means 
that while members of marginal groups can understand the limited perspective of the 
dominant groups, the converse is not true.
Despite this talk of epistemic limits and their connection to particular social 
locations, Harding's view differs significantly from Hartsock's in certain respects. 
Firstly, there is no claim to the effect that different levels of reality correspond to the 
different standpoints. She also acknowledges that 'women' is a general category and 
that different women have different standpoints. More importantly, she does not make 
the sort of strong claims about the connection between biology and experience that 
characterised Hartsock's understanding of situation. If anything, Harding seems to 
empty the idea of epistemic limits of its content by presenting the difference between 
the standpoints of dominant and marginal groups as the difference between 'better' and 
'worse' 'starting points' for research. The lives and experiences of women are not 
philosophical foundations she argues, but are rather 'the site, the activities from which 
scientific questions arise.'32 These experiences are inaccessible, it seems, to those in 
different social locations, as 'the activities of those at the bottom of ... social 
hierarchies can provide starting points for thought - for everyone's research and 
scholarship...'33 The suggestion seems to be that we are not bound to regard these 
perspectives as authoritative, although we are bound to engage with them.
Harding goes on to argue that her view does not entail relativism: her claim is 
not that the viewpoints of the marginalised are more true, or that they access another, 
deeper, level of reality, but only that they provide better starting points for research. 
Nor is her view to be understood as a version of ethnocentrism. Harding's does not 
claim that one's own view is necessarily the best or only view from which to construct 
one's research agenda. This could only be the case if one belonged to a marginalised
32 Harding, 'Rethinking standpoint epistemology', p.54.
33 Harding, 'Rethinking standpoint epistemology', p.54.
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group oneself, and this view would be a good starting point for research not because it 
is one's own, but only because it is the viewpoint of a socially marginal group. She is 
not a critic of the idea of objectivity, she argues, as she presents her account of 
feminist standpoint(s) as one which will contribute to greater objectivity than will be 
found in research projects constructed from the point of view of dominant groups. She 
is offering both a methodological rule (start from the standpoint of the marginalised) 
and a conception of objectivity which appeals not to value neutrality but rather to the 
value of equality and by implication it would appear, to the value of impartiality. By 
formulating research problems from the standpoint of marginal groups one hopes to 
avoid biases, ways of posing problems which shape research projects conceived from 
the point of view of dominant groups. The aim is to acknowledge that there may be 
more than one way of posing questions and that given the dominance of certain social 
groups, certain perspectives may be persistently overlooked. Loyalty to any particular 
standpoint, even to the standpoint of the marginalised, is however, to be rejected, as 
this could only result in 'partial and distorted results'.34 On her view there is a direct 
link between epistemological and ethical questions: Democracy-advancing views have 
systematically generated less partial and distorted beliefs than others.'35
There seems to be little left here of the idea that a standpoint rooted in the 
particular experiences of members of particular social groups will be inaccessible to 
others. In Harding's version of standpoint theory there is no suggestion that only the 
marginalised themselves can truly understand their own standpoint. On the contrary, 
Harding argues that everyone, including members of dominant groups, can and must 
formulate research projects which try to address problems defined as such from the 
point of view of the marginalised. This would make little sense if these standpoints 
were 'inaccessible' to 'outsiders'. What then are the status of the limits which she refers 
to when speaking of the standpoint of the dominant group and what is the nature of the
34 Harding, 'Rethinking standpoint epistemology', p.72.
35 Harding, 'Rethinking standpoint epistemology', p.71.
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superiority of the standpoints of the marginalised? If these 'limits' do not prevent 
members of either group from understanding the points of view of the other, the links 
between situation and perspective seem to have been broken, in the sense that there is 
no longer supposed to be a necessary link between the two. There are different 
perspectives and different situations, but one's situation does not limit one to a 
particular perspective. This view would allow for the possibility that not only might a 
member of a dominant social group adopt the perspective of a member of a 
marginalised group, but also the converse: that members of marginalised groups might 
also adopt the perspective of the dominant group, i.e. that they might be said to 
misinterpret their situation in certain ways, an idea present in Marxism, but absent from 
standpoint theory.
The limits would appear to be less epistemological - they are not imposed by 
the privacy of experience - than moral. That is to say, the point of view of the 
dominant group is limited in the sense that it is not impartial. Members of this group 
will tend not to consider how the less powerful view the world. The possibility that this 
might also be true of members of marginalised groups appears to be implicitly 
recognised by Harding's treatment of the views of people in these situations as 'starting 
points' for research and not simply as authoritative as they are for Hartsock, or for 
Stanley and Wise. The suggestion that the perspectives of the oppressed offer 
epistemically superior starting points for research amounts to little more than the claim 
that the best interpretations will be those which take the plurality of perspectives 
present in society into account. Harding's theory appears to retain little of what made 
standpoint theory distinctive: the idea that there was a necessary link between a 
particular situation and a particular perspective, such that to occupy that situation 
entailed adoption of that perspective; the idea that one could not understand a 
perspective unless one occupied the relevant situation; and the idea that situated 
perspectives were epistemically privileged, which is to say that the truth of perspective 
was guaranteed by the situation of the person holding it.
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These views rest on certain problematic assumptions about the transparency 
and privacy of experience which are characteristic of classical epistemology. They 
exploit the idea of experience not only in order to argue that perspectives will vary 
with social situation but also to claim a certain authority, or privilege for these 
perspectives. This has not only epistemic, but also normative aspects, such that 
respecting persons becomes identified with respecting their beliefs. These ideas are 
reflected in different ways in each of the versions of standpoint theory considered here. 
In Hartsock's version we are presented with the strongest claim: that a particular 
situation in the social order enables those who occupy that situation to form 
'epistemically privileged', or more comprehensive, beliefs about society at large than 
can be formed by those who occupy other situations. In Stanley and Wise's version, the 
idea of privilege is restricted to the individual's self-understanding: we cannot access 
the experiences of differently situated others so we cannot challenge their self- 
understandings. In Harding's version only the rhetoric of limits and 'access' remains, for 
she simply argues that comprehensive views of society cannot be formed unless they 
take the various beliefs of those situated within it into account.36
Despite the fact that standpoint theory has its origins in Marxism and is 
presented by Hartsock as continuous with the 'emancipatory' aims of that tradition, 
standpoint theory constitutes a significant departure from the Marxist tradition on 
account of the way it treats experience as authoritative. This gives rise to a politics of 
recognition rather than a politics of transformation. The latter depends on the idea that 
perspectives are criticisable and that social critics can provide their audience with 
reasons to transform their beliefs, even those concerning their understanding of 
themselves. The former view, by contrast, on account of its understanding of the link
36 Harding affirms her commitment to standpoint orthodoxy, but reduces the idea of epistemic 
privilege to the bare and unexceptionable idea that 'that some discursive accounts provide richer 
resources than others for understanding natural and social worlds - that they are epistemically 
privileged in this sense - 1 did argue for as has every other standpoint theorist.' The idea that some 
understandings of the world are better than others is unproblematic: what distinguishes standpoint 
theory is the substitution of sociological for epistemic criteria to distinguish between better and worse 
understandings. Harding, 'Comment on Hekman's 'Truth and method: feminist standpoint theory 
revisited,' Signs 22 (1997), pp.383-91 (p.388).
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between experience and belief, rests on the view that this is not possible. At the very 
least, we cannot access the perspectives of differently situated others, let alone 
challenge them.
Without the idea of transformation, it is hard to see how standpoint theory, or 
any other view resting on an epistemic understanding of situation can be deemed 
'emancipatory'. Marxism rests on a much weaker notion of the link between situation 
and perspective, such that occupying a particular class position is no guarantee that 
one will understand one's interests as a member of that class. Indeed, given the control 
of the dominant class over the means of ideological production, it is eminently likely 
that one will fail to recognise one's interests. Marxism accords no privilege to 
experience. The task of the Marxist social critic is to provide an understanding of 
society which will reveal to the working class its true interests and in this way aid it in 
coming to self-consciousness;, in becoming not only a class in itself but also for itself.
It is not difficult to see how this model of criticism can be taken over by 
feminists to criticise oppressive understandings of gender relations and gender 
identities. It is difficult to see how standpoint theory can fulfil this role, however, for it 
denies the premise on which these emancipatory models of social criticism rest: the 
idea that people can misunderstand themselves and their interests - something which is 
not merely a random occurrence - but can itself be explained in terms of an analysis of 
the power relations pertaining in society. From the point of view of a Marxist, or non­
standpoint feminist social criticism, standpoint theory risks endorsing the oppressive 
self-understandings produced by a society marked by gender inequality. The 
matriarchalism of Hartsock's account of the feminist standpoint could be regarded as 
itself an ideological distortion. There is, then, a fundamental conflict between an 
emancipatory politics which seeks to transform people's self-understandings and a 
politics of recognition which makes overly strong claims for the authority of these 
understandings.
The previous chapter suggests that no interpretation, whether 'grounded' in 
personal experience or otherwise, can claim to be absolute, or final. To suppose that
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self-understandings could be guaranteed in some way by experience is to suppose that 
experience can be demonstrated to represent the world as it is in itself, in some way 
that other categories, e.g. those of 'abstract theory' do not, a claim that is inevitably 
circular. Self-interpretations are not more final or authoritative than interpretations of 
anything else. What I want to do next is to challenge the idea that self-understandings 
are 'privileged' in the sense that an understanding of oneself and one's experiences is 
conceptually distinct, or 'privileged' in the sense that an understanding of others is not. 
I will set out a social, rule-based conception of meaning which places self- 
understanding on the same level as understanding others, thus dismissing the problem 
of the accessibility of others' perspectives set up by the epistemic conception of 
situation. This account will form a key element of the hermeneutic account of situation 
which will be outlined in the next chapter.
Meaning: public or private?
If meaning turns out to be public rather than private, then the idea that situation 
in different contexts entails barriers to communication will have to be rejected. The 
epistemic model has fostered the belief that language is essentially private and that our 
public language is a patchwork constructed from these idiolects. This is because on this 
view, words have meaning in virtue of their referring to our private mental 
representations. Our public language rests rather precariously on regulative 
conventions which serve to coordinate our uses of already meaningful signs. Hobbes, 
for example, expresses this view as follows: 'The general use of Speech is to transferre 
our Mental Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our
Thoughts into the Trayne of Words...'37 The alternative, Wittgensteinian, view I will 
outline here, while not denying that there is 'Mental Discourse', reverses its position,
37 Hobbes, Chap.IV, 'Of Speech', Leviathan. (1651) C. B. Macpherson (ed.) (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1968), p.101.
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making it derivative from the public uses of language which serve to constitute the 
meaning of words.
The basic difficulty with the epistemic model of meaning is that it cannot show 
how mutual understanding is possible. It has been pointed out that this model did not 
originate as an attempt to account for language or intersubjectivity: the seventeenth 
century 'way of ideas' was concerned primarily with the relation of mind to world and 
not with the relation of mind to mind.38 To the extent that questions of intersubjectivity 
arose at all, it was in the form of remarks on the need for regulations governing public 
language as in Hobbes, or as the problem of knowledge of other minds, that is, how to 
have knowledge of others as subjects and not simply objects of experience. These 
questions are of course posed from within the epistemological tradition, when an 
adequate account of understanding requires that we step outside the confines of that 
tradition. Misconceptions about understanding which stem from this picture remain, 
however, extremely influential even today, and not simply in philosophical circles.
The shortcomings of this view of meaning become apparent when we turn to 
understanding, for it effectively renders understanding logically impossible.39If words 
are meaningful in virtue of their representing ideas, mental representations to which a 
subject has privileged access, then no one could ever establish what another meant by 
what he or she said. This is because the knowledge of what would serve to determine 
the meaning of that person's utterances would be denied them. An individual, it seems, 
could mean whatever he or she liked by an expression, as its meaning would derive 
solely from that person's idiosyncratic association between the sign and the idea before 
his or her mind.
Communication could only be possible to the extent that agreement can be 
reached concerning the use of words, but this cannot surmount the problem, for 
understanding could only be truly said to be achieved if one could know that another
38 Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?
39 Ryle, The Concept of Mind. (1949) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p.51.
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had the same ideas before his mind as oneself, and this, of course, is denied, for one 
can only be certain of one’s own mental representations. The conventions themselves 
provide no solid foundation for meaning, for how could one be sure that all had agreed 
to use the signs in the same way? Here 'the same way' refers not to a public practice, 
but to a private association between signs and mental images. There are in effect, no 
criteria by which to judge whether a sign has been used correctly or not. I could mean 
whatever I liked by a sign, depending on the image I had before my mind whenever I 
used it. There would not even be any need for me to maintain any regularity in the 
associations I made. This is remarkably like Humpty Dumpty's view that he could 
simply decide the meaning of his utterances. This view cannot account for 
intersubjective understanding, and on account of its epistemological bias it is led to 
confuse understanding with access to another's consciousness, which is to say, to 
confuse it with having another's experiences.
Ryle captures the difference between this view of understanding, and the 
Wittgensteinian view in terms of a contrast between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how', 
i.e. between a propositional (representational) view and a practical view, in which 
understanding is taken to be a matter of acquiring a mastery of a technique. 
Understanding, Ryle contends, depends upon the existence of those customs or 
practices which provide a background for both following rules and identifying those 
rules which our interlocutors are following. This requires, not knowledge that another 
has such and such an image before her mind when she says 'x', but rather knowledge of 
how to play the game concerned, for one could not identify a particular move, if one 
has not oneself learned what the game consists in. Ryle asks us to consider someone 
watching the people moving wooden figures around a chequered board, and argues 
that only if the spectator has knowledge of 'how' to play chess, will he be in a position 
to identify this situation as an instance of chess playing.
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Wittgenstein famously introduces the concept of a 'language game' to express 
the idea that a language consists of a multiplicity of uses of words and expressions.40 
This captures two important ideas. Firstly, the idea that the use of a word resembles 
making a move in a game captures the idea that language use is an activity. This serves 
to reorientate our conception of the subject from that of classical epistemology: the 
knowing subject, to a conception of the subject as primarily an agent, and from the 
idea that language represents the world to the idea that it is a tool used within it. 
Secondly, that the action of using an expression must be related to a background of 
institutionalised practices, i.e. the rules of the game: we can make no sense of the idea 
of 'making a move' without reference to these rules. These rules are, to use Searle's 
terms, constitutive as opposed to merely regulative, for in their absence there would be 
no game at all. Words could not be said to have a meaning at all: the conditions for 
their identification would be absent.41 For example, in the absence of the relevant rules 
we could not speak of moving wooden figures on a chequered board as 'chess'. These 
constitutive regularities mark the dividing line between meaningful utterances and a 
random collections of sounds and figures: meaning requires a certain stability in the use 
of expressions.
It is not enough, of course, that there should exist regularities in our production 
of signs, these 'rules' must function as criteria for the application of signs in particular 
contexts, i.e. they exercise normative constraints upon the use of language. As Peter 
Winch has pointed out, the concept of a rule is inseparable from the possibility of 
making a mistake. For there to be rule following in Wittgenstein's sense there must be 
the possibility of an external check upon one's use of a term.42 This emphasises the way
^...'I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 
'language game.' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. §7, p.50.
41 'As a start, we might say that regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms 
of behaviour; for example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist 
independently of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new 
forms of behaviour. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football 
or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing such games.' Searle, Speech Acts. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p.33.
42 Winch, The Idea of a Social Science. (London: Routledge, 1958), p.82.
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in which rules exercise normative constraints upon the participants in a language: 
correct or incorrect uses of language may be determined with reference to them. If this 
were not possible, meaning itself would be impossible, for no stability in use could be 
ensured. There could be no talk of correct, or incorrect uses of a term.
Talk of language users following rules is not to be confused with any 
conception of these rules as mere inductive generalisations about the occurrence of 
signs in particular contexts, for these rules are criteria, not the basis of hypotheses.43 
Equally, to say that a language user is engaging in a rule-governed practice is not to 
say that her use of signs is determined by causal laws of some soft, only that she is 
guided by these rules, and that we ascribe meaning to her utterances to the extent that 
we can regard her behaviour as an instance of rule-following.
Language is made up of a multiplicity of these language games, each with its 
own rules and purpose.44 It is of some importance that the same word or expression 
may appear in the context of a number of different language games. The meaning or 
identity of a word or expression is governed by the rule governed context in which it 
appears and consequently the same sign may have multiple meanings no one of which
43 See Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein: rules, grammar and necessity. An Analytical Commentary on 
the Philosophical Investigations. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 109.
44...'Here the term 'language game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of 
' language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them-
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- 
Constructing an object form a description (a drawing)- 
Reporting an event- 
Speculating about an event- 
Forming and testing a hypothesis-
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams-
Making up a story; and reading it-
Play-acting-
Singing catches-
Guessing riddles-
Making a joke; telling it-
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic-
Translating from one language into another-
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.'...
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. §23, pp. 11-12.
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can strictly be said to be its 'real' meaning. A word is meaningful to the extent that it 
has a use within a language game, which is to say that it has a meaning insofar as there 
is a practice or custom of applying it in a certain way. Meaning is constituted by the 
existence of practices of rule-following, - applying rules for the use of words.45
By insisting not only on the plurality of these language games, but also on the 
fact that they are not reducible to some more basic game, such as that of representing, 
or making statements, Wittgenstein contributed to the abandonment of earlier 
reductionist conceptions of analysis such as those of Russell, the Logical Positivists or 
indeed, his own earlier conception.46 Instead of seeking to analyse language into its 
constituent elements, which as 'basic propositions', for example, were conceived as 
representative of the world, whether of its logical structure or material nature, analysis 
could now only be conceived in terms of a mapping of the criss-crossing uses of 
language games in which no one game may serve as a foundation for any of the 
others.47
One of the most significant features of this new picture of language is that it 
treats language as primarily public, rather than derivatively so. How are we to 
understand the idea of public, meaning-constituting, rules? We will need to distinguish 
between the 'social' and the 'public'. To understand a language is, as Wittgenstein 
insists, to have the 'mastery of a technique'.48 One must be trained in the use of words 
before he can recognise others' use of them. Understanding does not require 
knowledge of another's mental processes or even that we produce hypotheses about
45 'For a large class of cases-though not for all- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be 
defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
§43, p.20.
46 That is to say, the conception of analysis advanced in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. C. K. 
Ogden (trans.) (London: Kegan Paul, 1922).
47 Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). J. O. Urmson, 
Philosophical Analysis.
48...To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be 
master of a technique.' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. §199, p. 81.
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these by analogy with our own (how should we identify these?), it simply requires that 
we recognise the rules they are following in speaking as they do.
In Wittgenstein's own discussion, he makes this point by asking us to consider a 
situation in which another is being taught to apply a rule, e.g. to continue an arithmetic 
series, for example, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. This person is said to understand, when he can 
continue the series (and not simply on one occasion, but ’often') that is, when he has 
mastered the technique involved, and knows, 'how to go on'. To understand is not 
merely to learn by rote, but to acquire a skill, enabling us to apply the rule in new 
contexts. The concept of understanding is severed from its connection with ghostly 
mental processes, and is applied rather to the 'circumstances' surrounding an utterance. 
We understand others by identifying their moves against a background of rule- 
following. Others attribute understanding to us on the basis of our showing evidence 
that we have mastered the relevant technique.
Understanding, then, relies upon the existence of public criteria embodied in 
practices which permit the attribution of meaning and utterances, All can judge
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whether a given use conforms or deviates from a given practice. The Cartesian view 
clearly lacks the necessary public criteria to sustain understanding. Wittgenstein warns 
us against thinking of understanding in terms of mental processes, although he does 
not deny that we often have mental images accompanying our uses of language. To 
think of understanding in this way would be to lose sight of the fact that without the 
public criteria supplied by a background of practices, there could be no understanding, 
for in their absence, there would be no way to distinguish between one use of a sign 
and another.
Much of the recent interest in this aspect of Wittgenstein's view has 
been stimulated by Saul Kripke's discussion of it.49 There is no need to engage with 
Kripke's argument in its entirety, only that part of it which most closely bears on the
49 Kripke, Wittgenstein: on rules and private language. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).
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issue to hand.50 Kripke argues that Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is 
effectively a 'sceptical solution' to a 'sceptical problem' he says is posed and from which 
the private language argument follows as a corollary.51 In this passage Wittgenstein 
appears to pose the problem of the foundation of rule following:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
rule, because every course of action could be made out to accord with 
the rule. The answer was: if anything can be made out to accord with a 
rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there 
would be neither accord nor conflict here...52
The whole point of appealing to rules is to provide some standard of correctness for 
the use and identification of signs. If, however, anything can be made to accord with a 
rule, even, a rule such as 'never use a sign in the same way twice', then this standard of 
correctness disappears. Wittgenstein's response is to argue that 'real' rule-following, as 
it were, is grounded in actual practices:
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact 
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after 
another; as if each one contented us for a moment, until we thought of 
yet another one standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a 
way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is
50 I agree, for example, that the generalised scepticism of Kripke's 'sceptic' is unlikely to be satisfied 
by an appeal to what a community does. See. Fogelin, Wittgenstein. (London: Routledge, 1976) and 
Simon Blackburn, 'The individual strikes back,' Svnthese 58 (1984), pp.281-301.
51 This reading of Wittgenstein has provoked sharp rejoinders from Anscombe and Baker and Hacker, 
who deny that Wittgenstein was concerned with sceptical problems at all. Kripke, it should be noted, 
prefaces his book by insisting that we should read it not as an exposition of Wittgenstein, but rather of 
Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke.
52 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. §201, p.81.
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exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in
actual cases.53
Kripke's question is 'what justifies us in saying that we mean 'x' whenever we 
use a sign, as opposed to 'y' or 'z' etc.? His sceptic alleges that no fact about me, 
whether about my mind, or even about my past usage of a term, could provide such a 
justification.54 The sceptical solution to this problem involves admitting that the sceptic 
is right: there is no such fact about me which will serve to justify the attribution of 
meaning to one's utterances. The solution lies in an appeal to a community's practice of 
using a sign in a given way, i.e. an appeal not to a fact about the speaker, but rather to 
a fact about the linguistic community to which he belongs. We are only warranted in 
our attributions of meaning when such a practice exists: only the fact that there is such 
a practice, that a sign has a role in our lives, warrants such attributions, for outside 
such a community there exist no 'justification conditions' for such attributions.55 As has 
been suggested above, meaning depends on the existence of public justification 
conditions, Kripke's conclusion, however, appears rather startling: the sceptical 
solution 'does not allow us to speak of a single individual considered by himself and in 
isolation, as ever meaning anything.'56
This claim clearly requires some explanation. We should not wish to say, for 
example, that an individual who happened to be the last surviving member of some 
tribe from the Amazon basin and the only person extant who spoke that tribe's 
language, was not speaking meaningfully, simply on account of the absence of a 
linguistic community who could understand these utterances. Another, more serious 
objection to this view is that there is nothing essentially 'social' about the idea of a
53 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. §201, p.81.
54 It may provide the basis for an inductive generalisation, but not for a justification. Kripke, 
Wittgenstein: on rules and private language, p.58.
55 Kripke, Wittgenstein: on rules and private language, p.89.
56 Kripke, Wittgenstein: on rules and private language, pp.68-9.
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practice.37 All that is required for a speaker to use a term meaningfully is that he do so 
in the context of a practice. This practice may be of his own devising, for all that is 
required is that his use of a given sign exhibit regularity, and that it exercise a 
normative constraint upon his actions. Such an individual could explain and evaluate 
any particular performance against the background of his practice. Of course, most 
practices preexist us, and are learned from an existing community of practitioners, as 
part of the process of initiation into that community. Furthermore, the technique of 
generating one's own practices is presumably dependent on one's having already 
learned a language. However it does not seem impossible to conceive of someone 
generating their own practice in this way.38 If it makes sense to conceive of an 
individual generating his or her own practices, then we can surely speak of that 
individual's utterances having a private meaning, constituted by their place within these 
practices.39
It is necessary to determine how we are to take the private language argument, 
before we can consider the points above. The private language argument follows from 
the treatment of meaning and understanding in terms of rule following, because no 
rule-following behaviour is in principle private. In other words, there can be no private 
rule following in the sense that it is inseparable from the concept of a rule that it be
37 Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules. Grammar and Necessity. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) 
pp. 170.
38 See Fogelin's view that mastery of a technique requires training, and we cannot conceive of training 
without reference to a social situation. Even if one were to maintain that mastery of a particular 
technique is separable from training (which itself must require a trainer and a trainee) one might 
object to the idea of a self generated practice on the grounds that one would already have had to have 
learned what it is to master a technique before one could go on to generate techniques of one's own. 
Thus my capacity to generate my own practices would itself have derived from my having been taught 
to follow shared practices. Fogelin, Wittgenstein. It is, incidentally, a commonplace of sociology 
textbooks to begin discussions of socialisation with reference to discoveries of feral children, who 
appear not to have generated languages of their own, although they exhibit a limited capacity to learn 
natural languages. See A. Giddens, Sociology. (Cambridge: Polity, 1989).
39 Finally, there is the objection that to propose the agreement of a particular community as a 
justification condition for the use of sign is to slip back into the mistaken view that rule-following is 
simply a matter of statistical regularity, for it is no justification of what one does to say that 'this is 
what we do'. Kripke's solution does not appear to recognise that rules must impose constraints upon 
communities and not simply individual speakers, i.e. or concept of a rule permits us to speak of 
communities going against them. See Baker and Hacker, Rules. Grammar and Necessity, p. 172.
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capable of being taught to another. The private language argument is directed, then, 
against the epistemic view that language is built upon our privileged access to our 
mental representations.60 There can be no language which does not rely upon rule- 
following, for there is no other way of fixing the identity of signs, and no rule- 
following is in principle private.
This does not imply that there cannot be instances of isolated individuals 
following rules, even rules of their own devising, provided these rules could be taught 
to another. The mere isolation of individuals is not to be confused with privacy in this 
sense, and the presence or absence of a community who share a particular practice of 
using a sign in a particular way is not a condition of meaningfulness. One can speak 
meaningfully even where there is no audience or one's audience fail to grasp what one 
is saying, as for example if one were to speak French to an exclusively Anglophone 
audience. This of course still relies upon the existence somewhere, or at some time, of 
a community from which one has learned one's mastery of a language. What of the idea 
that individuals can generate their own practices? This is simply to show that language 
may be contingently 'private', but not that it could be private in principle.61 It seems 
then that one could generate one's own language. However, it is clear that to be 
understood, one must train others in one's techniques, and once others have been so 
trained, understanding is simply a matter of identifying signs against a background of 
what are now public criteria.62 Any natural language is obviously public in the strong 
sense that its practices are in fact shared, and not only in the sense that they are
60 The essential thing about private experience is not really not that each person possesses his own 
exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The 
assumption would thus be possible -though unverifiable- that one section of mankind has one 
sensation of red and another section another.' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. §272, p. 95.
61 Baker and Hacker are not, of course, arguing for the possibility of a private language.
62 In defence of Kripke, one might note that his argument concerned ascriptions of meaning to others. 
Clearly this involves reference to some shared practice, even one which is no longer extant (one which 
has been learned by an archaeologist for example). He does not deny that Robinson Crusoe can be said 
to speak meaningfully, for example, but only points out that we attribute meaning to his utterances on 
the basis of our practices. We might want to say here however, that we could also attribute meaning to 
his utterances on the basis of our having learned his practices.
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sharable, and the possibility of a self-generated practice, does not, I think, pose any 
serious objection to the suggestion that language is social.
This public view of meaning disposes of the idea that something could be 
meaningful for an individual, or even for a group, and yet incommunicable, a view 
characteristic of standpoint theory. If this is so, then the idea that we are 
incomprehensible to each other on account of being situated in different contexts is 
untenable, as is the idea that my self-understandings are authoritative and immune to 
criticism because they rely upon essentially private meanings. This does not mean that 
in practice communication will necessarily be straightforward. First of all, this view of 
language as public adds another dimension to the conceptual pluralism set out in the 
previous chapter, insofar as it suggests that different groups of people may come to 
develop different practices, using words in ways that we may find unfamiliar, and 
incorporating them into language games other than those we know how to play. This 
may not only give rise to misunderstandings, but also to the more perplexing problem 
of essential contestability. Related to this is the problem of ambiguity. In virtue of their 
public, practice-constituted character, utterances will carry meanings which a speaker 
did not, or could not have foreseen or controlled. If  one thinks of meaning as 
essentially private, as Skinner does, for example, one can dismiss this phenomenon as 
secondary: as a matter of mistakes about the true meaning of an utterance by an inept 
audience, but the very fact that such mistakes can happen at all suggests that this is 
rather an essential feature of public language: a consequence of the fact that meaning 
does not originate with individual speakers.63
While this view of meaning does not purport to guarantee transparent 
communication, this is very different from the claim that meaning is incommunicable 
because it is private. Understanding may be difficult to achieve because of the 
inevitable plurality of meanings, but it is, in principle, possible. The loss of privilege 
with respect to our self understanding, which this view entails, also implies, however,
63 The way in which meaning is not determined by authorial intention is insisted upon by Derrida in 
his Limited Inc. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988).
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that dialogue with others may enrich that understanding, a possibility overlooked by 
those who view meaning as private. This model of meaning underwrites the suggestion 
made in the previous chapter that social criticism should focus on traditions, ideologies 
or discourses, i.e. on systematic, institutionalised clusters of ideas or problematics. On 
this view, language can be interpreted as a social institution, an institution into which 
we are socialised, particular languages having their own features, and their own 
history. This raises the possibility that a narrative about the development and uses of a 
set of ideas can bring to light features of our conceptual framework which escape our 
theoretical understanding. Where meaning is constituted by social, historical uses, we 
can employ concepts without all of their features being transparent to us. The 
possibility of social criticism rests on this lack of transparency.
The Politics o f Epistemic Situation
The significance of standpoint theory is that it opposes the sort of'universalism' 
that refuses to recognise that people have distinct experiences and that this gives rise 
to different ways of looking at the world. What is wrong with standpoint theory is the 
particular way that it conceives of the relationship between identity, experience, and 
perspective, which gives rise to unacceptable claims about epistemic authority, self­
transparency and communicability. These ideas have fairly clear political implications 
although standpoint theorists themselves have not sought to spell these out, preferring 
instead to concentrate on the significance of standpoint theory for theory construction 
in the social sciences. This is ironic, given the claims made by standpoint theorists for 
the 'emancipatory' focus of standpoint theory, but it may well be that this is a reflection 
of the Marxist legacy on which standpoint theory was originally constructed, with its 
characteristic subordination of normative argument to social theory.
One way in which this is reflected in standpoint theory is the way in which 
inequality is treated as an epistemological problem, rather than as a normative problem.
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It seems at least as plausible, however, to suppose that dominant groups favour the 
existing social order at least as much because they believe it to be justified as because 
they do not understand how it operates. Challenging their dominance will require not 
only an understanding of how institutions operate, but also some account of why we 
are justified in demanding that these institutions be altered and what form any 
alterations must take. Be that as it may, we can see how standpoint theory has 
contributed to demands for the inclusion of marginalised groups in the political 
process. The significance and limitations of this contribution can be better discerned by 
examining how standpoint theory might contribute to the sort of arguments for a more 
inclusive politics advanced by Anne Phillips and Iris Marion Young, not themselves 
standpoint theorists.64
Phillips contrasts two ideal-typical conceptions of politics: a politics of 
'presence' and a politics of 'ideas'. Our existing conception of politics is that of a 
politics of ideas, i.e. one which recognises a plurality of ideas, beliefs, opinions and 
preferences. What is distinctive about this politics is that it recognises a plurality of 
ideas, 'all of which may stem from a variety of experience, but are considered as in 
principle detachable from this.'65 This detachability is important for it is what allows 
representation to take place, i.e. beliefs can be represented by persons who need not 
have had the experiences which led them to be formed in the first place. In this way, a 
male representative can conceivably articulate and represent the beliefs and preferences 
of female constituents. The politics of presence, by contrast, focuses on the plurality of 
identities, e.g. gender and ethnic identities, present in society and its proponents argue 
for
64 This 'inclusive' politics has been termed a 'politics of recognition'. See Charles Taylor's The Ethics 
of Authenticity. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Elizabeth Kiss, 'Democracy and the 
politics of recognition,' in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (eds.) Democracy's Edges, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 193-209; and Nancy Fraser's 'Recognition and 
redistribution: a critical reading of Iris Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference.' Journal of 
Political Philosophy 3 (1995), pp. 166-80, and 'Rethinking Recognition,' New Left Review 3 (2000), 
pp. 107-120.
65 Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.6.
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...the political inclusion of groups that have come to see themselves as 
marginalised or silenced or excluded. In this major reframing of the 
problems of democratic equality, the separation between 'who' and 
'what' is to be represented, and the subordination of the first to the 
second, is very much up for question.66
From the point of view of the politics of presence, the separation of experience and 
belief perpetuates the exclusion of the marginalised because their presence in the 
political process is strictly unnecessary if their preferences can be represented by 
others.
Clearly a standpoint pluralism such as that of Stanley and Wise supports the 
purest conception of the politics of presence, that is to say, a politics which would take 
a strictly participatory form, rejecting the idea of representation entirely. On the other 
hand, other versions of standpoint theory support a modified politics of ideas, namely, 
representative democracy, in that while the ideas, of women could never be represented 
by men, they could at least be represented by other women who share the experiences 
and perspectives to be represented. Equally, we could imagine a situation in which the 
perspectives of black women would be represented only by black women, and so on. 
In allowing the representation of ideas, this is not a pure politics of presence, but rather 
takes the form of a modified politics of ideas, albeit one which denies the separation of 
experience, and therefore of identity, from perspective. Standpoint theory gives the 
strongest possible support for such a politics, one which centres on the inclusion of 
members of marginal groups in the political process, because it flatly denies that the 
ideas and preferences which arise out of the experiences of members of a particular 
group can be communicated to and represented by non-group members. If we are 
concerned to have an adequately inclusive politics of ideas, then we have no choice but
66 Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p. 5.
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to adopt measures to include representatives who share the identity of those they 
represent.
Phillips herself argues for a similarly modified politics of ideas but firmly rejects 
the support of standpoint theory.67 This is for the sort of reasons outlined above, 
namely that the idea that experience translates directly into an unambiguous set of 
political demands must fail, 'because each woman can lay claim to a multiplicity of 
identities, each of which may associate her with different kinds of shared 
experiences.'68 Because of this, she argues, the presence of female representatives is 
not necessarily a guarantee that the interests of women, however defined, will indeed 
be represented.69 She also argues that this complexity of experience may mean that 
'initial differences' between men and women in politics, 'may be far outweighed by the 
common experiences men and women will later share in making their way through 
political life.170 This even admits the possibility that men may understand and represent 
the interests of women: there is no conceptual barrier dividing differently situated 
persons, as is supposed by standpoint theorists.
Phillips continues to argue, however, that there is still a good case for 
increasing the participation of members of excluded groups in the political process, 
albeit one which 'inevitably operates in a framework of probabilities rather than 
certainties.'71 This is because, first of all, there are reasons to suppose that persons in 
different social contexts and roles will indeed experience the world differently and that 
they may have distinct ideas about the world, their place in it, and their interests. This
67 She says that, 'the central thesis of this book' is 'that while the politics of ideas is an inadequate 
vehicle for dealing with political exclusion, there is little to be gained by simply switching to a politics 
of presence.' Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p.24-5.
68 This idea that women have potentially conflicting identities, i.e. those of gender and class, is the 
theme of one of Phillips' earlier books, Divided Loyalties. (London: Virago, 1987). Phillips, The 
Politics of Presence, p. 10.
69 Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p. 82.
70 Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p.75.
71 Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p.82.
121
does not require that one adopt a standpoint theory account of experience and belief 
with its peculiar account of communicability and authority. Granting that ideas and 
preferences may be communicated to differently situated others and that they may be 
represented by such others, it is still probable that where women and members of 
ethnic minorities are not adequately represented in the political process, their interests 
will not in fact be adequately articulated, and secondly that they may not be pressed as 
forcefully by representatives who belong to different social groups. This is both 
empirically plausible and normatively sound: if interests are not properly articulated in 
the political process, where they may fail to be taken into account or be wrongly 
interpreted, then the policies formed as a consequence run the risk of failing to address 
the interests and needs of those represented. The recognition that differently situated 
persons may have significantly different interpretations of the world is a precondition 
of the demand for a more inclusive politics. In the next chapter, the link between 
situation and perspective will be accounted for in a way that preserves the idea of 
plurality but avoids the weaknesses of the standpoint theorists' understanding of this 
relation.
Iris Marion Young makes a similar argument for the representation of marginal 
groups, resting it upon an epistemic conception of situation.72 She also argues for a 
deliberative style of politics on top of the demand for increased representation. She 
does not appear to consider, however, whether this conception of situation can 
underwrite a specifically deliberative politics. Young argues that the idea that 
deliberation upon matters of public policy should be impartial has served to prevent the 
articulation of the perspectives of marginal groups in the political process. As long as 
policy makers are impartial, it is suggested, there is no need to worry about including 
members of marginalised groups in the political process. This way of conceiving of 
public deliberation simply ignores the way in which we are all situated in a variety of
72 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990).
122
social locations, with distinct identities and perspectives. When we reason impartially 
we are required to set aside these fundamental facts and to discount our particular 
perspectives, as if impartiality were, by contrast, itself a version of the 'God's eye view' 
to which our particular perspectives must approximate. In practice this results in the 
'universalisation' of the perspective of whatever powerful group has succeeded in 
presenting itself as the representative of this impartial view.
Young would like to see a public sphere which recognises the fact that our 
perspectives are decisively shaped by our social location and in which the plurality of 
these perspectives are adequately represented. In place of the homogeneity of the 
'impartial' public sphere in which the partial views of the dominant group are treated as 
'universal' we should aim for what she calls the 'effective recognition and 
representation' of the distinct voices and perspectives of oppressed and disadvantaged 
groups.73 By 'effective' Young envisages something more than simply proportional 
representation for the reason that this might not of itself prove 'effective'.74
Young is not simply interested in representation. She stresses that she is 
interested in something more than mere interest group politics, and her argument for 
the representation of marginal groups is not aimed to support this style of politics, one 
in which political activity is thought of as involving no more than the rational pursuit of 
the interest of the group to which one belongs. Young favours deliberative politics, 
which means that political activity is to be thought of as involving the attempt to 
understand and consider perspectives other than one's own. Her notion of politics is 
not only one in which a plurality of perspectives will be represented, but also one in 
which citizens will be expected to deliberate with others who do not share their 
particular beliefs. It is an inclusive, communicative conception of democracy. Political 
decision making should be guided by discussion which will 'enrich everyone's
73 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 187.
74 See Brian Barry's objection to the idea that groups are not adequately represented where they are 
not successful. Barry, 'Is Democracy Special?' in Democracy. Power, and Justice. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp.24-60.
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understanding'.75 Young argues that only if the true diversity of views present in 
society is articulated in public deliberation can we have proper deliberation.76 
Recognition and inclusion of this diversity in the political process is a condition of 
deliberation. Existing institutions are insufficiently inclusive on her view, and this 
directly affects the fairness of the decision-making process.
Young strengthens the case for representation at the expense of deliberation, by 
arguing that only members of oppressed groups can truly understand the perspective of 
that group. To suppose otherwise, she says, is to deny the fact that we are situated, 
that we are all placed in distinct social contexts, for if we can adopt the perspective of 
others then the idea of situation no longer serves any purpose. To the extent that this is 
the case, however, it is hard to see how differently situated persons can deliberate with 
each other, given that their respective perspectives are necessarily inaccessible to 
others:
To be sure, subjects are not opaque to one another, their difference is 
not absolute. But especially when class, race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, and age difference define different social locations, one 
subject cannot fully empathise with another in a different social 
location, adopt her point of view; if that were possible then the social 
locations would not be different.77
This restates the standpoint argument that perspective is connected to situation in such 
a way as to render one's perspective inaccessible to differently situated others and this 
view, as we saw, rests on a mistake.
75 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 189.
76 It would appear natural to say that without the articulation of the full range of opinion present in 
society, we should fall short of'impartial' deliberation. Young, however, despite objecting to the 
partiality of dominant groups, also says she rejects the idea of impartiality per se. Nonetheless, it 
seems more accurate to say that she objects only to certain ways of conceiving of impartiality, ways 
which deny obvious facts like situation.
77 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 105.
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Young fails to notice that deliberative politics requires not only the inclusion of 
diverse perspectives in political decision-making, but also that deliberation is supposed 
to involve a transformation of the views of those who engage in deliberation, so that 
decisions made following such a process will be better informed and more just. If 
participants in deliberation are to transform their views in these ways the following 
conditions must be met: participants must be able to communicate their perspectives to 
others, and they must be capable of adopting an impartial stance with respect to their 
own perspectives, if communication is not to fall upon deaf ears. There would be little 
point in communicating if participants obstinately retained their existing beliefs and 
continue to press their pre-deliberative interests irrespective of whatever 
communication took place. Deliberation could not take place without communicability 
but would be wholly empty without impartiality. Without the demand that participants 
modify their views in response to the just claims of others, deliberation would be 
reduced to a mere politics of 'testimony' in which 'participants' would do little more 
than set out their own 'authoritative' perspectives.78
Clearly this is all that can be extracted from an epistemic understanding of 
situation such as that advanced by standpoint theorists and which influences Young's 
conception of group identity. Personal testimony would be authoritative but 
incomprehensible to differently situated others and therefore immune to criticism by 
them. As noted above, Stanley and Wise extend this respect for the perspectives of 
others so far as to suppose that we ought not challenge the self-understandings of 
persons who otherwise appear to us as oppressed. The standpoint theory critique of 
'universalism' contributes to demands for inclusion. However, the point of 'inclusion' is
78Lynn M. Sanders criticises deliberative democracy on the grounds that it privileges the educated and 
articulate who are best placed to engage in argumentative discourse. She proposes to supplement this 
with 'testimony', on the grounds that this at least ensures the articulation of the perspectives of those 
who may not otherwise be able to ensure a hearing for their views. This proposal has some merit: 
Sanders does not propose to replace argument with testimony, and anything which can serve to enrich 
deliberation should be welcomed. The danger lies in an exclusive politics of testimony which 
displaces argumentation and would claim an authoritative status for such testimony based on 
standpoint theory assumptions about self-transparency, and claims to epistemic authority. Sanders, 
'Against deliberation,' Political Theory 25 (1997), pp.347-76.
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unclear, given the strictures of standpoint theorists about communicability and 
authority. Certainly, a standpoint theory understanding of the connection between 
situation and perspective is incompatible with a deliberative conception of democracy.
One might say, 'too bad for deliberative democracy', but this would be a 
mistake. As will be argued later, the idea that politics should be deliberative, which is 
to say, both inclusive and transformative, rests on a commitment to equal respect. If  an 
epistemic conception of situation such as that embodied in standpoint theory is 
incompatible with deliberative politics, this suggests that there may be something 
wrong both with its understanding of situation and with its interpretation of what is 
involved in treating others as equals. On one hand, standpoint theory contributes to 
arguments for the recognition of plurality, but while this recognition can play a part in 
our interpretation of the requirements of equality, it seems wrong to suppose that 
treating others as equals extends to respecting their views about themselves and the 
world at large as authoritative and uncriticisable.79
Far from embodying a determination to treat others as equals, one might argue, 
on the contrary, that such a position actually entails a profound indifference to others 
and their views. The idea of authoritative testimony to which standpoint theory gives 
rise does not imply that we ought to listen to others, but rather that we withdraw 
ourselves from them. If we universalise the standpoint theory account of situation and 
perspective, as Stanley and Wise do, then it is clear that this position gives no one a 
reason to engage with others at all, for we can neither understand nor learn from them: 
our own perspective would be as immune to their criticism as theirs would be to ours. 
The conclusion Stanley and Wise draw from their account is that sociologists may only 
speak with any authority about themselves, but what seems to be admirable humility 
from one point of view, has unfortunate consequences for the idea that we ought to try 
to understand and respond to the claims of others, when considered from a larger
79 Charles Larmore comments on the confusion of respecting persons with respecting their beliefs in 
Patterns of Moral Complexity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.64.
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perspective.80 A truly egalitarian recognition of difference would not rely upon such an 
epistemically copperfastened respect for others' beliefs. Instead it would require us to 
deliberate with them: to challenge and be challenged in return, in the hope that each 
may learn from the deliberative encounter. The suggestion that we respect others by 
respecting their beliefs does not provide reasons to respond to their claims, but rather 
supports a profound indifference to the claim of others.
In view of the unattractive ethical and political implications of this 
understanding of situation, it may appear tempting to reinstate some form of 
'universalism' which simply denied that situation could contribute to significant 
differences in perspective. On the other hand, we could choose to acknowledge that 
there are connections between situation and perspective and seek instead to arrive at 
an understanding of these connections which was not subject to the criticisms made 
here of standpoint theory and its epistemic understanding of situation. In this way we 
could preserve the idea of plurality while presenting an understanding of it which was 
compatible with the two preconditions of a properly egalitarian understanding of our 
relations with others: communicability and impartiality. It will be argued that a 
hermeneutic understanding of situation can form the basis of such an account.
The next Chapter will build upon the public conception of meaning and 
understanding set out here by outlining its place in the hermeneutic of tradition. This 
joins the pluralism defended in Chapter Two with the theory of meaning outlined here. 
The resulting idea of what it means to be situated in a context will combine the 
emphasis on the political significance of the existence of distinct identities and 
perspectives found in standpoint theory, with a hermeneutic emphasis on opacity and 
self-interpretability. Recognition of this feature of situation is, as has been suggested 
already, a prerequisite of social criticism, for if we were transparent to ourselves, or if 
our views were deemed immune to criticism, a project of social criticism could gain no 
purchase. The argument presented in this Chapter should serve to show that the
80 This conflicts with Harding's idea that social theory must try to take the perspectives of the 
marginal into account. Stanley and Wise, Breaking Out Again, p. 165.
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politics of recognition cannot be grounded in such claims, and that they cannot be 
regarded as counting against the possibility of social criticism. It will be argued in the 
next Chapter, however, that while the hermeneutic understanding of situation is sound, 
the version of social criticism which has been derived from it is unnecessarily hostile to 
impartial morality because it rests on an overly reductive understanding of context.
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C h a p t e r  f o u r  
H e r m e n e u t ic  Sit u a t io n
Hermeneutics provides the basis for an alternative understanding of what it 
means to be situated in a context1 The hermeneutic understanding of situation can 
explain how it is that people come to have differing perspectives without claims to 
transparency, epistemic authority, or the incommunicability that go with them. It is an 
account which incorporates both the anti-foundationalism set out in Chapter Two, and 
the understanding of language as a social institution set out in Chapter Three.2 
Unfortunately, this hermeneutic understanding of our situatedness has given rise to 
another sort of misunderstanding: it has bolstered the arguments of moral particularists 
against 'abstract' universalist morality, as it is taken to show that there are no universal 
or transcultural norms.3 In the place of universalist morality we must have a morality 
or practice of social criticism which, derived from this understanding of situation, is 
interpretive. This means that it is concerned with the interpretation of our shared 
values and traditions, and typically operates by appeal to a deeper understanding of 
these.
1 See Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method: Philosophical Hermeneutics: Reason in an Age of 
' Science: Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social Science (London: Hutchinson, 1978); Josef
Bleicher (ed.) Contemporary Hermeneutics. (London: Routledge, 1980); Anthony Giddens, 
'Hermeneutics and social theory,' in G. Shapiro and A. Sica (eds.) Hermeneutics: questions and 
prospects. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984); Jean Grondin. Sources of 
Hermeneutics, and Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics: D. C. Hoy, The Critical Circle. 
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The norm of impartiality is particularly heavily criticised as it is taken to 
embody the fundamental error of universalism: the belief that we can and must step 
outside our situation in some sense in order to view it objectively. The epistemic 
understanding of situation presented us with a problem about communication with 
differently situated others, but here the problem is that while communication is thought 
unproblematic, we cannot engage in moral deliberation with others because we have 
no impartial, objective stance from which we can judge the beliefs concerned. Without 
this, attempts to deliberate can amount to no more than the attempt to impose one's 
principles on others. If we are to show that deliberation is possible, then this objection 
must also be overcome.
The task is, firstly, to show how a hermeneutic conception of situation can 
account for the plurality of perspectives found in society, and secondly to show how 
universalism, and impartiality in particular, is compatible with this understanding of 
situation. My strategy is to exploit the conceptual pluralism set out in Chapter Two in 
order to argue that the attempt to draw particularist ethical conclusions from the 
(ontological) idea of situation is insufficiently pluralist. Particularism is pluralist in the 
sense that it argues that different cultures have their own particular moral outlooks and 
it relies on this idea to accuse universalist morality of seeking to impose uniformity. 
However, in order to draw these conclusions particularism assumes the truth of a 
reductive account of morality founded on the assumption that a socio-historical 
description of moral principles and practices provides a comprehensive account of 
those principles. By showing how particularists adopt this covert foundationalism and 
adapt morality to suit it, their opposition to universalism and impartiality will be shown 
to be unfounded, as it will be argued that the possibility of such morality is a matter of 
standpoint, and this cannot be eliminated from a pluralist view of the world.
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Hermeneutics: tradition and situation.
The term 'hermeneutics' covers both the practice of interpretation and reflection 
upon that practice. Originally, the field of hermeneutics covered the application of 
philological techniques to sacred and legal texts. The art of hermeneutics came into 
play whenever vague or conflicting passages in the text at hand made interpretation 
necessary. The central idea of the hermeneutic tradition is that of the hermeneutic 
circle, formulated by the German philologist Friedrich Ast in the early nineteenth 
century.4 The claim expressed by the idea of the hermeneutic circle is that 
understanding essentially involves a circular movement between the individual parts 
and the whole of that which is to be understood. It is not simply the case that the part 
is meaningful only in relation to some whole, but also that their relation has a circular 
character: in the course of reading the text one is compelled to anticipate the whole in 
order to make sense of the parts, but as one reads on one inevitably alters one's 
understanding of the whole and this altered understanding in turn reflects back upon 
the parts, and so on. The relation between whole and part is thus conceived as 
dynamic, each being modified in the light of one's understanding of the other.
The Romantic era saw the field of hermeneutics being expanded beyond texts 
as Friedrich Schleiermacher developed a psychological model of interpretation in 
which the interpreter was to aim at interpreting the individual text or work of art as an 
expression of the author's creativity. This necessitated inquiry beyond the text and into 
the author's intentions. Later the scope of hermeneutic understanding was taken to be 
that of human action per se as historical and social studies sought to stake out a special 
place for themselves in the face of the encroachments of the natural sciences. This 
essentially Kantian division between the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften remains 
very much with us today. Traditionally, the latter study human action conceived as 
intentional whereas the former treat human behaviour as subject to causal explanation
4 Friedrich Ast (1778-1841) See Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences, p.28.
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like other features of the natural world. What is distinctive about the contemporary 
hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer is that it takes its lead from Heidegger and is 
cast in ontological terms. This fact alone has presented some difficulties in determining 
its ethical implications. This is not to say that Gadamer's analysis of understanding does 
not itself reflect certain evaluative and normative preferences, but only that it is not 
presented in the first instance in a prescriptive form.
Contemporary hermeneutics, while still premised on the idea of understanding 
as a circular process, is not concerned primarily with texts or action but focuses on the 
connection between understanding and ontology, - the idea that we are interpreting, 
interpretable beings. On this view we are essentially self-interpreting animals, whose 
selfhood is tied up with self-understanding such that self-understanding is actually 
central to self-realisation. The circular movement between whole and part becomes the 
movement between our projected understanding of ourselves and particular actions 
and events in our lives. Gadamer credits the decisive shift in perspective to Heidegger's 
project of fundamental ontology: 'The concept of understanding is no longer a 
methodological concept [...] Understanding is the original character of the being of 
human life itself.' Heidegger, he says, 'revealed the projective character of all 
understanding and conceived the act of understanding itself as the movement of 
transcendence, of moving beyond being.'5
The claim that our being is inseparable from our self-understanding, while 
evidently anti-naturalistic, is not meant in the first place as a radically subjectivist, 
existentialist thesis about our capacity to choose ourselves.6 We are 'thrown' beings: 
we find ourselves thrown into a pre-existing world, into a particular situation within it 
and as Gadamer emphasises, we are thrown into a particular relation to tradition:
5 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.230.
6 On the contrast between a hermeneutic understanding of thrownness and that of existentialism see 
Charles Taylor's 'Self-interpreting animals,' in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), pp.45-76.
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... correspondence with tradition is as original and essential a part of the 
historical finiteness of There-being as its projectedness towards future 
possibilities of itself. Heidegger was right to insist that what he called 
'Thrownness' belongs together with that which is projected. Thus there 
is no understanding or interpretation in which the totality of this 
existential structure does not function, even if the intention of the 
knower is simply to read 'what is there' and to discover from its sources 
'how it really was.7
Self-understanding is thus always mediated by tradition, by the social-historical 
vocabularies within which we seek to understand ourselves. The starting point of any 
projected understanding of ourselves is not chosen but given in this way according to 
Gadamer: 'Everything that makes possible and limits the project of There-being 
precedes it absolutely.'8 So central is the notion of tradition to Gadamer's account of 
hermeneutic understanding that he terms the sort of consciousness, the outlook, 
characteristic of hermeneutics, 'consciousness of effective history'. This denotes an 
outlook which is not only attuned to the influence of history but which regards itself as 
fundamentally affected by it, in the sense that to view the world in this way is to be 
aware that it is tradition that shapes and makes possible ourunderstanding.
The idea of'thrownness' and of tradition are extremely useful for understanding 
the relationship between situation and perspective. On the epistemic view of situation, 
unmediated experience is what provides the link between situation and perspective. 
Because experience is thought to provide 'direct' access to the world, it is thought to 
determine your perspective such that to be placed in a particular social location will 
result in your having a set of experiences which then determine that you will share a
7 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.232.
8 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.234.
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perspective with others who share your situation and consequently your experiences. 
On the hermeneutic view, tradition provides the link between situation and belief. This 
explains how the situation one is thrown into shapes one's outlook and how one might 
share belief with others who have been shaped by the same tradition. However, it does 
not entail uniformity of belief because traditions are complex and open to a variety of 
interpretations. Secondly, it does not entail the idea that one cannot change one's 
beliefs: the traditions we encounter in the situations into which we are thrown provide 
us with starting points, no more.
That is to say that recognition of one's situatedness does not determine one's 
response to the traditions and identities which constitute it. It does not mean that one 
must simply endorse these. While we cannot escape our finitude, situation is itself 
complex and our response to our particular situation may likewise be complex. 
Consider, first of all, the variety of tradition and agents of socialisation which serve to 
constitute our identities. Our identities and perspectives may be shaped by our family 
background, gender, ethnicity, class, religion and nationality. They are shaped by our 
education, our work experiences, and our other pursuits, e.g. intellectual traditions. In 
each case, our position with regard to one identity can complicate our relation to 
another: differently gendered persons may be influenced by the 'same' culture, but more 
than likely in different ways. We need not endorse the identities and traditions that 
have shaped our self-hood: we can repudiate a religious identity, for example, or 
aspects of our national identity. These can be burdens as well as sources of self-esteem 
or respect.9 Each repositioning may have a knock-on effect on our relationships to 
other persons, communities and traditions: to repudiate one may complicate one's 
relations to another. The plurality of elements in one's situation and the variety of ways 
one can respond to these, including revisions and repositionings, mean that situation is
9 Modem literature, not surprisingly, provides plenty of examples of this. Consider James Joyce's 
attitude to Ireland: a country to which he felt he could only respond with 'silence, exile, and cunning' 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. See also the novels of William Faulkner, whose characters 
cannot escape their identity and traditions as Southerners, but who cannot reconcile themselves to 
them either. An identity can be a predicament.
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a complex phenomenon, and this suggests that we should be wary of characterising it 
in overly general terms, or of assuming that we can read off a person's perspectives 
from their perceived identity.
The relationship between a tradition and conceptual pluralism may be thought 
of in terms of the institutionalisation of certain interpretations, certain 'problems'. The 
idea of tradition serves to fill out the model of contextualisation set out in Chapter 
Two by introducing the idea that the problems which drive our interpretations, the 
questions which serve to select the objects and ranges of description with which we are 
concerned, are subject to institutionalisation. To the extent that we find ourselves 
thrown into a world not of our making, we find ourselves encountering a world in 
which certain problems and their attendant interpretations form socially 
institutionalised 'problematics'. Certain ways of thinking about the world become 
institutionalised, selecting objects and descriptions from the myriad of possible 
descriptions, and it is against this backdrop of problems and interpretations learned 
from our parents, schools, etc., that we learn to pose our own problems and offer our 
own interpretations.
However, while the hermeneutic idea of situation emphasises the way in which 
we find ourselves thrown into a world which is always already interpreted and 
problematised by the particular traditions we happen to encounter, we are free to 
modify our beliefs and revise our problems. It may be tempting to interpret Gadamer's 
insistence on our 'finitude' as implying that we are limited by our situation in such a 
way that we cannot break out of the limits of the particular traditions which serve to 
constitute our view of the world and of ourselves. This is a mistake, not only about the 
concept of situation, but also of Gadamer's interpretation of it. Finitude expresses the 
idea that we are in a certain sense, limited beings. Firstly, we are temporally limited, 
which is to say, our span of life is limited. Secondly, our beliefs are, in a sense, limited. 
Thirdly, we are limited in the sense that we are each just one person among others, 
living in a social world which we do not control. The first limitation needs no 
explanation, but the second two require a little explanation.
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In what sense are our beliefs limited? Does this mean that we cannot change 
them, or that we cannot understand the beliefs of differently situated others? We have 
seen that the public character of meaning excludes the latter possibility, so this cannot 
be a legitimate sense of finitude. Our beliefs are limited, then, only in the sense that 
they fall short of constituting an absolute conception of the world. Because no 
interpretation can be shown to be absolute, changes of belief, while they can result in 
more comprehensive views, cannot be thought of in terms of a move from a limited to 
an absolute view, but are rather essentially finite in the sense that they will always be 
particular interpretations. The finitude of belief is simply that which attends the 
plurality of conceptual schemes. They are finite, and therefore plural rather than 
absolute.
This in turn has an ontological implication to the extent that self-hood is a 
matter of self-interpretation. Just as we are spatially and temporally finite, bounded 
beings, so too our self-interpretations will be limited, particular views, which cannot 
aspire to completeness. We are free, of course, to reinterpret ourselves, and we will 
naturally seek better interpretations of ourselves and our lives. The third sense in which 
we are finite is relevant here, i.e. with respect to our self-descriptions. While we can 
repudiate institutionalised ways of interpreting ourselves by redescribing ourselves in 
various ways, we cannot control others' interpretations of who or what we are. We are 
self-interpreting animals situated in a world of other self-interpreting animals, but of 
course, we are not simply self-interpreters, but self- and other- interpreters. Others are 
not, as I have argued already, logically constrained to accept our self-interpretations, 
and this can generate a host of personal and political problems. This is a problem posed 
by our finite condition. How we respond to our ontological condition, however, is a 
matter of morality.
How has hermeneutics been received amongst Anglo-American political 
theorists? Firstly one might note that in the history of political thought, where one 
might suppose hermeneutics to have had some influence, it has made scarcely any
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impact at all. To the extent that historians of political thought have reflected upon their 
activities, they have chosen to articulate their concerns in terms drawn from ordinary 
language philosophy, but their concerns themselves clearly reflect the outlook of 
nineteenth century historicism. This history of political thought, which confines itself to 
the recovery of author's intentions, has essentially avoided any engagement with 
contemporary hermeneutics. Hermeneutics has not come to the attention of political 
theorists in this way.
One area in which hermeneutics has played a significant role in is the social 
sciences, where, along with a variety of other exotic theoretical perspectives, Schutz's 
phenomenology, Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, and Winch's reworking of Weber in 
Wittgensteinian terms, hermeneutics has formed part of a reaction against positivist 
conceptions of social science, and here we can begin to see what hermeneutics' ethical 
implications it might be.10 Social scientists turned to these continental perspectives in 
the 1960s in order to resist positivist demands that the methods of the social sciences 
reflect the ideal of a unified scientific methodology, that is, that they be conducted in 
essentially behaviourist terms. In place of this style of inquiry, with its rhetoric of 
scientific objectivity and detachment, sociologists were drawn to the idea that they 
should seek, to understand or interpret human behaviour from within as it were, rather 
than seeking to provide explanations of it based on observation. This approach, which 
entails entering imaginatively into the forms of life under investigation, is often referred 
to as Verstehen. In place of the ideal of detachment as a prerequisite of inquiry, the 
Verstehen approach entails an engaged, participatory style of investigation. In order to 
understand a particular piece of behaviour one must relate it to a context of beliefs in a 
hermeneutic fashion, a task which requires that one learn the conceptual system of the 
group concerned. Understanding on this view is not obstructed by immersion in the 
social world; this immersion is what makes understanding possible.
10 See Bauman, Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences: Winch, The Idea of a Social Science: and 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. (Harmondsworth: 
Peregrine, 1979).
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Gadamer was concerned with precisely this issue, so it is not surprising that this 
is where hermeneutics first came to have some influence. He announced that
The following investigation starts with the resistance within modem 
science against the universal claim of scientific method. It is concerned 
to seek that experience of truth that transcends the sphere of control of 
scientific method wherever it is to be found, and to inquire into its 
legitimacy. Hence the human sciences are joined with modes of 
experience which lie outside science, with experiences of philosophy, of 
art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a 
truth is communicated that cannot be verified by methodological means 
proper to science.11
So the first thing to note is that hermeneutics sets its face against an epistemological 
conception of truth which is premised on an ideal of detachment, and which is 
conceived as absolute. Gadamer's response is to find some place for the truth which 
may be experienced in other spheres, but not to outline an alternative method.
It is difficult, however, to derive any determinate ethical position from this 
association. Hermeneutics represented only one of a number of 'humanist' positions 
which contributed to this revival of the Geisteswissenschaften, and while it is fair to 
say that certain evaluative preferences lay behind this methodological dispute, the 
sociological idiom is not well suited to the articulation of ethical positions. What we 
can say is that the desire to reassert a place for an interpretive human science in the 
face of positivism was tied directly to a critique of the role of technology in society, 
and of the tendency to assimilate the social sciences themselves to the project of 
administering society. The fear that modernity as a whole was bound to the increasing 
instrumentalisation of human relationships was a theme in Weber's sociology, as well
11 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.xii.
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as playing a central role in the explicitly radical critique of the early Frankfurt School. 
Of course, while one can regard resistance to the technologisation of social life as 
violating the injunction that we treat others not only as means but also as ends, it can 
also be motivated by a more conservative fear of the disruption of traditional 
communities and patterns of life. However it seems clear enough that amongst social 
scientists of this era the turn away from positivism was motivated by something more 
like the former: that to adopt this approach was to affirm a commitment to an ideal of 
human beings as free and creative beings, rather than as objects of manipulation. In this 
respect, the social scientific reception of hermeneutics at this time is unlike its more 
conservative reception amongst political theorists in the 1980s.
As for Gadamer himself, while he is personally a man of a conservative 
disposition and unlikely to have been sympathetic to the more radical aspects of these 
movements, the objection he makes to a merely methodological understanding is 
surprisingly Kantian in tone. We aim only to understand another,
...in the same way that we understand any other typical event in our 
experiential field, i.e. he is predictable. His behaviour is as much a 
means to our end as any other means. From the moral point of view 
this attitude to the 'Thou' is something that is directed ultimately 
towards oneself and contradicts the moral definition of man. Kant as 
we know, in interpreting the categorical imperative said, interalia, that 
the other should never be used as a means, but always as an end in 
himself...12
Habermas, however, has expressed reservations about Gadamer's formulation 
of hermeneutics. Firstly, he fears that Gadamer tends to 'absolutize' language in such a 
way as to render hermeneutics idealist. To this extent, he argues, it must be
12 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 3 22.
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supplemented by causal explanation because what he calls the 'meta-institution of 
language' itself depends upon 'social processes that are not reducible to normative 
relationships'.13 As such it cannot be the sole basis of a critical theory of society. While 
praising the fruitfulness of Gadamer's notion of understanding as a fusion of horizons, 
Habermas also expresses concern about the role of tradition in his work. He argues 
that Gadamer fails to clearly distinguish between ordinary instances of understanding 
in communication and those situations which 'appear when traditions are disrupted or 
foreign cultures are encountered or when we analyse familiar traditions and cultures as 
if they were foreign.' Habermas argues that 'a controlled distanciation can raise 
understanding from a prescientific experience to the rank of a reflected procedure.'14 
Habermas worries that Gadamer's failure to articulate this difference is a result of his 
unnecessarily forceful opposition to scientific method on one hand and is, perhaps, 
motivated by a certain conservatism on the other. To Habermas it appears that 
Gadamer overstates his case against method and that it would be better to regard 
'hermeneutic experience as the ground of the hermeneutic sciences' rather than in 
opposition to such a conception. Gadamer's traditionalism leads him to downplay the 
extent to which, 'in grasping the genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and on 
which it turns back, reflection shakes the dogmatism of life practices.'15 Gadamer is 
charged then with harbouring a fundamentally anti-Enlightenment, Burkean position, 
insofar as he turns 'the insight into the structure of prejudgements involved in 
understanding into a rehabilitation of tradition as such.'16
This charge would seem to have some force, not least because of the way that 
hermeneutics has been seized upon by critics of liberalism in the 1980s. Gadamer
13 Jurgen Habermas, 'A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method1, in Brice R. Wachterhauser (ed.) 
Hermeneutics and Modem Philosophy. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp.243- 
276, p.272. A modified version of this review appears in Habermas' On the Logic of the Social 
Sciences. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark (trans.) (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1988).
14 Habermas, 'A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method', p.266.
15 Habermas, 'A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method', p.268.
16 Habermas, 'A review of Gadamer's Truth and Method', p.268.
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himself, it must be admitted, is not content with insisting that understanding is 
mediated by traditional categories and tropes and that it essentially requires a 
prejudgement or projection to begin. He explicitly questions the Enlightenment ideal of 
rationality as detachment, i.e. freedom from prejudice. He suggests, in a polemical 
vein, that hermeneutics must begin with a critique of the Enlightenment attitude to 
prejudice:
The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the 
enlightenment, will prove itself, to be a prejudice, the removal of which 
opens that way to an appropriate understanding of our finitude, which 
dominates not only our humanity, but also our historical 
consciousness.17
One might even see his deliberate choice of the term 'prejudice' over something 
like 'pre-understanding' as a mischievous expression of this anti-Enlightenment stance. 
Acceptance of the role of prejudice in understanding, he claims, entails acceptance that 
'the idea of an absolute reason is impossible for historical humanity. Reason exists for 
us only in concrete historical terms, i.e. it is not its own master, but remains constantly 
dependent on the given circumstances by which it operates.'18
Does this mean that hermeneutics is irredeemably conservative in its 
implications? Gadamer's language invites a particular reading of hermeneutics, one 
which is traditionalist and communitarian in its response to our ontological 
situatedness. This reading of the hermeneutic idea of situation is mistaken, however, in 
that it fails to grasp the fact that the attack on detached 'Enlightenment' reason is no 
more than an attack upon the idea of an absolute conception of the world and that this 
does not itself entail a traditionalist, parochial, ethical response to our situation.
17 Gadamer, Truth and Method*, p. 244.
18 Gadamer, Truth and Method1, p.245.
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Gadamer has invited this misreading, but despite his personal conservatism, the 
parochial reading of situation flatly counters his own notion of the 'hermeneutic 
encounter', which is more indebted to universalist morality than traditionalist moral 
particularists recognise.
Hermeneutic Situation and moral particularism.
Richard Rorty appeals to hermeneutics in his assault upon the ideas of 
epistemology and of philosophical foundations per se. After epistemology, he argues, 
comes hermeneutics. He says of epistemology,
The notion that there is a permanent neutral framework, whose 
'structure' philosophy can display is the notion that the objects to be 
confronted by the mind; or the rules which constrain all inquiry are 
common to all discourse on a given topic. Thus epistemology proceeds 
on the assumption that all contributions to a given discourse are 
commensurable. Hermeneutics is largely a struggle against this 
assumption.19
It's not hard to see why Rorty should think this. The idea of a hermeneutic circle in 
understanding has implications far beyond the methodology of the social sciences, as 
Gadamer's rejection of 'absolute reason' indicates. The idea that understanding is 
essentially circular strikes directly at the idea that there can, be such a thing as a 
presuppositionless, self-evident basis for knowledge. The claim that all understanding 
starts in medias res with an anticipation of meaning, a pre-understanding, supposes 
that there is no foundation we can work our way back to which will provide an
19 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 316.
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incontrovertible deductive basis for our beliefs. On this view this is as true of the 
natural sciences as it is of the human sciences, i.e. that while the techniques will differ 
and while it may never be fruitful to study Shakespeare with a particle accelerator, the 
basic idea that our questions arise out of a background constituted by tradition holds 
for both types of endeavour. The lesson of historians of science like Kuhn is that 
physicists work as much against a background of institutionalised problematics which 
orient their experimental projects as literary scholars do.20 If one adopts this view of 
the universality of hermeneutics, then one will feel that Habermas' idea that 
hermeneutics must be supplemented by causal explanations of extra-linguistic 
phenomena is misconceived, not because one cannot provide such explanations, but 
because even this falls within the ambit of hermeneutics. This view of the scope of 
hermeneutics is not that of Gadamer, who is much more cautious in the claims he 
makes, but is largely correct.
On Rorty's account, philosophy has claimed a special place for itself in our 
culture because of its special relation to knowledge, a relation constituted by the idea 
that there is such a thing as epistemology. The authority of philosophy stems from its 
ability to show how our claims to knowledge of the world are to be grounded and in 
this way it can carve culture up into distinct spheres like 'science', 'morality' and 
'aesthetics'. This is premised on the idea that there is something called 'mind' which 
confronts the world and which is capable of representing it. The twentieth century has 
characteristically resolved older questions about how our ideas come to represent the 
world into questions about how language hooks onto the world: how it refers. 
'Analytic' philosophy derives its name from the project of showing how meaningful 
statements could be analysed into an ideal language of some sort, the elements of 
which are thought to stand in some basic picturing relation to the external world. In its 
heyday, movements like logical positivism, whose partisans considered the concepts of 
physics to be such an ideal language, vigorously denounced as 'meaningless' any
20 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (1962) (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970).
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propositions which did not lend themselves to analysis into the elements of the ideal 
language.21 While this specific version of analysis is long gone, the idea that some such 
reduction is possible still haunts contemporary philosophy.
We cannot have such a grounding, however, because attempts to spell out such 
a theory of the correspondence of between propositions and the world fatally assume 
that which they purport to explain. With the failure of this project, we must bid 
farewell to the idea that we can have a comprehensive worldview: an ideal language 
which grounds all of our everyday concepts. In Wittgensteinian terms, this project 
entails the fruitless effort to get between language and the world in order to see how 
the two are related.22 Most recent attempts to fill out some such theory have set out 
from our undoubted causal interaction with the world and sought to explicate 
reference in terms of this relation. However, it is clear that there is a difference 
between what causes us to possess concepts and what it is that these concepts refer to. 
Faced with this oversupply of causes, one might seek to differentiate between 
appropriate and inappropriate causes, but this, of course, presupposes the very ability 
which the causal theory of reference was meant to explain. Philosophers like Putnam 
and Rorty agree that there is no way to explain how language hooks onto the world 
that does not presuppose an explanation of this very relation. Rorty chooses to express 
this insight in explicitly hermeneutic terms: 'we will not be able to isolate basic 
elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge of the whole fabric within which 
these elements occur.'23
The implication of this is that the attempt to claim a privileged epistemological 
status for any particular vocabulary must fail. In Putnam's terms it spells the end for the 
ideas that we can have a presuppositionless 'God's eye view' of the world. With the 
demise of this view go the various physicalist reductionisms, and in their stead we must
21 A. J. Ayer, Language. Truth, and Logic. (1936) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).
22 'Hilary Putnam and the relativist menace.' in Rorty, Truth and Progress: philosophical papers vol.
3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.48n.
23 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.319.
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learn to accommodate ourselves to a conceptual pluralism in which we have at our 
disposal a variety of conceptual schemes for our various purposes.
Having said this, the implications Rorty draws from this anti-foundationalist 
argument are extremely problematic. Hermeneutics is not to be understood simply as a 
new way of doing epistemology. Rather, the problems around which epistemology was 
constituted are no longer to be seen as important. In effect, Rorty argues that we can 
still do epistemology but that we must not endow it with the foundational significance 
which it once had. The old dualism of the 'hard' natural sciences and the 'soft' human 
sciences should be replaced with a new distinction which cuts across the old 
epistemological and ontological assumptions.24 Rorty proposes that we distinguish 
simply between 'normal' and 'abnormal' discourses where 'abnormal' discourse, the 
special business of hermeneutics, will be concerned with conducting 'conversations' 
with new and unfamiliar points of view, looking for agreement rather than 
presupposing it.23 He suggests that rather than thinking in terms of objective and 
subjective, we can now think instead simply in terms of familiar and unfamiliar. 
Hermeneutics, he says
... is the study of an abnormal discourse from the point of view of some 
normal discourse - the attempt to make some sense of what is going on 
at a stage when we are still unsure about it, to describe it and thereby 
to begin an epistemological account of it.26
Interpretation, on this view, is as much the business of scientists as it is of literary 
critics.
24 Putnam shrewdly observes that for a pragmatist, Rorty is remarkably fond of dualisms. Putnam, 
Pragmatism, p.64.
25 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.332.
26 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.321.
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Onto this distinction between normal and abnormal discourse he also wishes to 
map a distinction between 'finding' and 'making' which is central to his 'Nietzschean' 
view of hermeneutics. He argues that the distinction between 'what is out there' and 
'what we make', the traditional terms in which we think of the subjective/objective 
split, is undermined by the argument against the 'God's eye view'. Consequently, we 
cannot pretend to distinguish any longer between scheme and content in our 
apprehension of the external world. In view of this, we should stop pretending that it is 
possible to draw a clear distinction between what we contribute to knowledge and 
what the world contributes. It makes no sense then to continue to treat science as that 
enterprise concerned with 'finding out' truths about the world, when we might just as 
well say that the development of its increasingly sophisticated vocabulary for talking 
about the world is creating new possibilities, not finding them out.27
Rorty goes on to flesh this out in terms of a distinction between 'edifying' and 
'systematic' philosophy which serves to clarify what he means by 'making the 
unfamiliar, familiar'. On this view hermeneutics is essentially a poetic enterprise 
concerned with Bildung, or self-formation rather than with the discovery of truth. 
Gadamer, he says,
... develops his notion of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (the sort 
of consciousness of the past which changes us) to characterise an 
attitude interested not so much in what is out there in the world, or in 
what happened in history, as in what we can get out of nature and 
history for our own uses...
From this point of view, 'the way things are said is more important than the possession 
of truths.'28 Systematic philosophers on the other hand 'are constructive and offer
27 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.331.
28 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.359. Rorty also refers to 'the hermeneutic point of 
view, from which the acquisition of truth dwindles in importance...' p.365. This reading of
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arguments', while philosophers who are concerned with edification are more concerned 
with taking us out of ourselves, extending and changing us by encounters with strange 
and unfamiliar points of view.
Significantly, Rorty does not think that this can be done by offering arguments 
for adopting new views because these will provide justification in terms of beliefs 
which we already hold. In this way philosophers will fall back on familiar metaphors 
like 'finding' rather than genuinely transforming themselves. The aim of the edifying 
philosopher is simply to make his new vocabulary 'look attractive' to his fellows, and 
his tools are not arguments, but 'satires, parodies and aphorisms'.29 Rorty is careful to 
deny that he holds the view that we cannot break out of the particular vocabulary 
which we set out with: we are free to adopt new ones, but we cannot be argued into 
so doing, but only caused.30
He sets out this scepticism about the limits of justification as follows:
The trouble with arguments against the use of a familiar and time- 
honoured vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in that 
very vocabulary. They are expected to show that central elements in 
that vocabulary are 'inconsistent' in their own terms or that they 
'deconstruct themselves'. But that can never be shown. Any argument 
to the effect that our familiar use of a familiar term is incoherent, or 
empty, or confused, or vague, or 'merely metaphorical' is bound to be 
inconclusive and question-begging. For such use is after all the
hermeneutics is challenged however by Georgia Wamke, who rightly points to Gadamer's own focus 
on truth. Wamke, 'Hermeneutics and the social sciences: a Gadamerian critique of Rorty,' Inquiry 28 
(1998), pp.339-57, and Gadamer, (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).
29 Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.39 and 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.369.
30 'Within a language game, within a set of agreements about what is possible and important, we can 
usefully distinguish reasons for belief from causes for belief which are not reasons... However, once 
we raise the question of how we get from one vocabulary to another, from one dominant metaphor to 
another the distinction between reasons and causes loses its utility.' Rorty, Contingency. Irony. 
Solidarity, p.48.
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paradigm of coherent, meaningful, literal speech. Such arguments are 
always parasitic upon, and abbreviations for claims that a better 
vocabulary is available. Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination 
of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly a 
contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a 
nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which promises great 
things.31
From the point of view of the edifying, poetic philosopher the history of ideas 
must be regarded as no more than a sequence of 'tacit substitutions of a new 
vocabulary for an old one.' In each case we have simply 'made a change rather than 
discovered a fact.'32 Our end, on this view, is the process of edification itself, i.e. that 
we undergo as many of these substitutions as possible, free from the metaphysical 
illusion that any of these are bringing us any closer to the Truth or the Good.
This gives rise to two conflicting views about the implications of hermeneutic 
antifoundationalism for morality and social criticism. One view is Nietzschean, poetic, 
ironic, while the other is communitarian and ethnocentric. The ironist is someone who 
knows that she has a variety of vocabularies available to her for describing both herself 
and the world around her. At any given point in time she is likely to treat a particular 
set of descriptions as more basic than any others. This is her 'final vocabulary'. 
However, unlike those who subscribe to the idea that there is some vocabulary which 
is more basic than others in the sense that it makes possible an 'absolute' conception of 
the world, the ironist knows that ultimately no vocabulary is any more basic than any 
other. Armed with this insight, ironists experiment with different vocabularies,
31 Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.9.
32 Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.77.
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continually redescribing themselves with the aim of recreating themselves.33 In this way 
the ironist resembles Nietzsche's 'overman', who, knowing that he is the creator of 
value, that it is not 'found', aims to continually recreate himself with no other aim than 
to engage in this process of creation and recreation.34
The ironic or edifying philosopher will be a liberal according to Rorty. This 
foundationless liberalism is guided solely by the idea that 'cruelty is the worst thing we 
do' and it will dispense with the attempt to justify itself in terms of general principle, or 
appeal to ideas like universal human rights or other products of 'Enlightenment 
rationalism'. Rorty claims that his new vocabulary 'which revolves around notions like 
metaphor and self-creation rather than around notions of truth, rationality and moral 
obligation, is better suited for this purpose.'35 He suggests, for example, that we should 
try to think about morality without forming general principles to regulate our actions at 
all. We should give up Kant and adopt models like Freud, he suggests, who focuses 
our attentions on how 'particular present situations are similar to or different from past 
actions and events.'36
This sort of particularism is apparently the logical consequence of the denial 
that there is any rational basis for adjudicating the claims of different cultures. In the 
absence of any ultimate self-evident foundations for our ethics Rorty believes that we 
must simply give up the idea that we can or should seek to justify ourselves to others, 
there simply are no reasons which can function universally because justifications only 
have some purchase within a particular cultural tradition. What objectivity there is then 
amounts to no more than solidarity, Rorty claims, because we can give no more sense 
to the idea that our beliefs are warranted than that our community agrees that they are
33 We exploit the idea of redescription to 'make the best selves for ourselves that we can'. Given 
Rorty's anti-foundationalism, this apparently perfectionist idea, must be understood in Nietzschean 
rather than Aristotelian terms. Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.80.
34 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (1883-5) R. J. Hollingdale (trans.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1969).
35 Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.44.
36 Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.33.
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warranted: 'For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the 
limitations of our community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective 
agreement as possible.'37
Rorty argues that this view of objectivity is not to be regarded as relativist, but 
rather as ethnocentric. Rather than taking the line that every view is as good as any 
other, Rorty argues that 'there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality 
apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society 
- ours - uses in one or another area of inquiry.'38 Instead of adopting a nihilistic 
response to the plurality of competing descriptions of the world with which we are 
faced, or retreating into an untenable foundationalism, the rational thing to do is to 
privilege the beliefs and modes of justification characteristic of our culture. To 
condemn this view as parochial, Rorty alleges, is to commit oneself to an untenable 
relativism in which we are so open minded that our brains fall out!
This ethnocentrist position is not obviously liberal however: it excludes the 
possibility that a society's practices might be judged morally unacceptable either from 
within or from without, as communal agreement provides the last word in such 
questions. Redescription, central to Rorty's position as an alternative to justification in 
terms of general principles, is not designed to serve the end of social criticism. What 
role does it play then? Rorty's answer is not clear. It certainly plays a role in the life of 
the individual ironist, where self-description becomes an end in itself, but Rorty also 
suggests that redescription has a larger, public, role to play insofar as we can use the 
tool of redescription to foster solidarity beyond the confines of our existing political 
communities.39 This goal is supposed to replace the 'Enlightenment' goal of
37 Rorty, 'Solidarity and Objectivity' in Objectivity. Relativism, and Truth: philosophical papers vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.23.
38 Rorty, Objectivity. Relativism, and Truth, p.23.
39 'The right way to construe the slogan ['we have obligations to human beings simply as such'] is as 
urging us to create a more expansive sense of solidarity that we presently have. The wrong way is to 
think of it as urging us to recognise such a solidarity as something that exists antecedently to our . 
recognition of it.' Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p. 196.
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'discovering' a common humanity, and redescription serves this end by helping to 
present others as 'people like us', fostering solidarity by playing down differences.
Many would feel that this sort of solidarity actually reproduces the worst 
aspects of'Enlightenment universalism', i.e. that it is basically an assimilationist project 
which fails to respect people who differ from us in some ways. The only difference 
between Enlightenment universalism and Rortian solidarity, such a critic might say, is 
that the former was unwittingly biased in this way, while the latter is self-consciously 
ethnocentric. The 'public' use of redescription, however, runs into another sort of 
obstacle, one internal to Rorty's argument. Rorty proposes to retain the liberal idea of a 
distinction between public and private spheres, distinguished now by the fact that 
redescription will be restricted to the private sphere. The reason for making 
redescription private is that it is 'cruel' to redescribe other people.40 It is cruel because 
people want to be described in their own terms.41
The idea that we cannot, or ought not, question other people's self-descriptions 
was central to Skinner's notion of historical context, and to Stanley and Wise's 
understanding of situation. Here the argument is not that we cannot redescribe others, 
for conceptual reasons, but rather than we ought not to do so for moral reasons. At 
this point we might wonder if the appeal to moral reasons might not permit 
redescriptions which excluded a person's self-description? For example, we might want 
to suggest that an individual is themselves cruel, dishonest, or brutal in their treatment 
of others, even in the face of that person's preference for a more flattering self­
description. Rorty, however, disallows this for the reason that there are no general
40 'The redescribing ironist, by threatening one's final vocabulary, and thus one's ability to make sense 
of one's self and one's world are futile, obsolete, powerless. Redescription often humiliates.1 Rorty, 
Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.90.
41 'Ironism, as I have defined it, results from the awareness of the power of redescription. But most 
people do not want to be redescribed. They want to be taken on their own terms - taken seriously just 
as they are and just as they talk. The ironist tells them that the language they speak is up for grabs by 
her and her kind. There is something very cmel about that claim' Rorty, Contingency. Irony. 
Solidarity, p.89.
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principles which could act as a basis for such moral judgements.42 Faced with the 
problem of weighing the cruelty meted out by someone who deceives themselves that 
they are kind or honest, or the 'cruelty' of challenging this description, ordinary moral 
reasoners would look for some principle to determine whether a redescription was 
justified, though unpleasant. Rorty, however, has closed the avenue to himself with his 
determination to reject moral principles.
Conceivably, he could appeal to the practices of the wider community to 
'justify' such a redescription, but this too runs up against the ban on challenging an 
individual's self-description: a ban which cannot itself be justified in terms of any 
general principle. It is not clear, however, that the ban itself is warranted by what 'we' 
currently mean by 'cruel', i.e. the concept of cruelty is not simply applicable to every 
instance of causing harm or distress to someone, but only to cases in which the aim of 
the act in question is precisely to cause harm or distress. We can cause distress by 
accident, without being thought cruel, and as suggested above we can justifiably cause 
distress, where this is not the aim of our action, again, without being thought cruel. On 
one hand, Rorty's idea of 'liberalism' eschews the use of redescription as social 
criticism, while on the other hand the 'principle' which he appeals to in order to restrain 
a potentially redescriptive social criticism does not appear to be supported even by his 
own particularist 'ethic'.
Michael Walzer adopts a similarly particularist view, although he does not 
reject 'thin' universalist morality altogether, but rather places it in second place as a 
derivation of 'thick', particular, morality. He advances a 'radically particularist' account 
of morality and social criticism, based on the idea that meanings are fundamentally 
social and historical.43 As such, they are plural, varying over time within particular
42 'There is no neutral, non-circular way to defend the liberal's claim that cruelty is the worst thing we 
do...' Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p. 197.
43 Michael Walzer, claims that his position is 'radically particularist, and that meaning is basically 
social and historical Spheres of Justice. (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p.xiv and p. 9 respectively.
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societies and also from one society to another. Unlike Rorty, he provides no argument 
to this effect, but the idea that these meanings cannot be traced back to some 
fundamentally shared set of meanings, serves as the premise of his particularism.
Because there are no 'a priori definitions of murder, deception, and betrayal,' 
the work of the philosopher must be that of interpreting the shared meanings of a 
particular community.44 This motivates an attack on the idea of the social critic as a 
detached figure, whose criticism derives its force from this very detachment. This view 
is embedded in philosophical metaphors such as that of Plato's cave, or Nagel's 'view 
from nowhere', and in the idea that prophets, for example, must ascend a mountain in 
order to gain a critical perspective in society. Of this view, Walzer says
The moral world comes into view as the philosopher steps back in his 
mind from his social position. He wrenches himself loose from his 
parochial interests and loyalties, he abandons his own point of view and 
looks at the world, as Thomas Nagel argues, from 'no particular point 
of view'. The project is at least as heroic as climbing the mountain or 
marching into the desert. No particular point of view' is somewhere on 
the way to God's point of view, and what the philosopher sees from 
there is something like objective value.45
However, if meaning is social, and philosophy essentially a matter of 
interpretation rather than discovery or creation, the alternative views which Walzer 
considers, then the social critic must essentially be a 'connected' critic, a member of his 
society, if his criticism is to have any force.46 Only because he is a member of a
44 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, p.25.
45 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, p.5.
46 Walzer is not wholly consistent on this point: he declines to say that 'discovery' and 'creation' are 
simply impossible or that they are possible, but really forms of interpretation in disguise. His view of 
the implication of the idea that meaning is social commits him to one or other of these views however.
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particular society and his criticism is rooted in that society's shared stock of meanings 
can he effectively criticise it, but seeking to hold his fellows to his interpretation of 
their own best standards. There are no values independent of social meaning to be 
discovered, and the attempt to create them will either be wholly arbitrary, or, more 
likely, will in fact rely upon existing social values. The idea of creation covers not only 
Nietzschean interpretations of value, but also liberal constructivism such as that of 
Rawls, which adopts procedural tests for proposed moral principles.47
Unlike Rorty, Walzer does not wholly reject a certain moral universalism, but 
rather argues that instead of providing general principles which might be used to 
develop 'thick' local moralities such principles are themselves derived from local 
moralities and are strictly limited in their scope, being 'liberated' from their 
embeddedness in 'maximal' particular moralities at times of social change or crisis, 
when normal morality is disrupted. Walzer appeals to the phenomenon of 'thrownness' 
in according priority to particular moralities as this, he says, is how we first encounter 
morality. Consequently, we must conclude that it is 'thick from the beginning'.48
The view of morality as fundamentally local has implications for our relations 
with members of political communities: we must respect their particular thick morality. 
Arguing that mediaeval Christians, for example, had a very different set of beliefs 
about the meaning of life and death, he suggests, 'to this we ought certainly to defer, 
for it makes no moral sense to wag our finger at mediaeval Christians, insisting that 
they should have had our understanding of life and death'.49 This 'makes no moral 
sense' it appears, less because we cannot imagine any deliberative encounter between 
ourselves and genuine mediaeval Christians, but rather because their moral 
understandings simply differ from ours, precluding a common ground from which to
47 'Unless we can construct a neutral starting point from which many different and possibly legitimate 
moral cultures might develop, we can’t construct a proceduralist minimum. But there is no such 
starting point.' Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 14.
48 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.4.
49 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.30.
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make a sound moral judgement.50 This is evident from his consideration of the Chinese 
idea of democracy: 'I would explain, as best I could, my own views about democracy. 
But I would try to avoid the missionising tone... Since I know very little about their 
society I cannot foist upon the Chinese this or that set of rights - certainly not my 
preferred set.'51
Walzer's conception of inter-cultural encounters might be described as 
'anthropological'. It is one in which information is perhaps exchanged, but argument is 
scrupulously avoided for fear of ethnocentrically imposing our views on others. In the 
absence of any common ground, what else could argument be other than imposition? 
There is, in a sense, a contrast with Rorty here: Rorty expresses frustration with the 
anti-ethnocentrism of anthropologists like Clifford Geertz, as this view, taken to its 
logical conclusion, would undermine any basis for judgement whatsoever. Having said 
that, it is doubtful if Rorty would wish to simply 'impose' his views on others, for while 
there is no common ground, and he cannot appeal to values like impartiality to regulate 
his dealings with others, he would presumably invoke the 'principle' of avoidance of 
cruelty to restrain intercultural encounters, just as it limits the public use of 
redescription.
Walzer, while he will allow that thin moral principles may govern relations 
between states, sees them as weak as well as thin in the sense of'general', and says that 
while we may feel solidarity with others, in different political communities, this should 
not extend to interference in their affairs. While organisations like Amnesty 
International, whose campaigns are premised on universalist ideas such as 'human 
rights', are deemed praiseworthy, they must 'restrain whatever impulse their members 
have to impose a complete set of moral principles across the globe.'52 What we see 
here is a normative pluralism of a particular relativist variety entwined with Walzer's
50 By 'genuine' I mean to suggest a contrast between Christians from the middle ages, and 
contemporary Christians who share their religious beliefs.
51 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.60.
52 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.49.
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conceptual pluralism, much in the same way that Stanley and Wise combined the idea 
of respect with the idea of private meaning.
Walzer not only thinks that each political community has its own distinctive set 
of social meanings from which it derives its morality, but that the attempt to construct 
general, thin, principles which might be used to judge local moralities is often a cover 
for an imperialist attempt to impose one's views on another. Criticising another 
community's practices in the name of general moral principles is not simply mistaken, 
but unjustifiable. It is not so much an exercise in social criticism, but rather an effort at 
'conversion and conquest: the total replacement of the society from which the critic has 
detached himself with some (imagined or actual) other.'53 It is, Walzer says, a 'morally 
unattractive form of social criticism and not one whose 'objectivity' we should 
admire.'54
This worry about the propensity of a social criticism which relies on general 
principles, to overlap the proper boundaries of respect for cultural plurality is 
manifested in another way in Walzer's theory of justice. Walzer argues against 
procedural accounts of justice that they do not account for the way that social goods 
have their own specific social meanings and that they must be distributed according to 
these. This introduces another sort of pluralism into the equation, for not only must we 
respect the boundaries between different political communities and their beliefs, on 
account of the plurality of meanings, within a given society each good must be 
distributed according to its own distributive principle, drawn from its particular 
meaning. We have a plurality of goods and of distributive principles and equality 
consists of keeping these 'spheres' apart, that is, of not seeking to regulate their 
distribution according to some general principle of what Walzer calls 'simple' equality. 
Monopolies on the distribution of some good would be acceptable then, provided that
50 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, p.52.
54 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, p.52.
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those who held that monopoly did not seek to convert it into a monopoly of some 
other good.
This is an unconvincing interpretation of the meaning of equality, given its 
insensitivity to monopoly. Its weakness points to the general weakness of the 
particularist link between hermeneutic situation and morality. In order to derive 
determinate moral principles from the practices of particular political communities, it is 
necessary to overlook pluralism within communities in much the same way as the 
attempt to set out a feminist standpoint required Hartsock to overlook differences 
between the outlooks of actual women. If we acknowledge that there is deep 
disagreement within such communities and not simply between them, then we must see 
that 'social meanings' do not speak with a single voice, providing a determinate set of 
moral principles for a given community.55 As we saw in the earlier discussion of 
essential contestability, the plurality of meaning is at least as much a source of 
persistent disagreement as it is an expression of agreement. In the end, the normative 
preferences of the particularist covertly supply the missing consensus, and in Walzer's 
case this turns out to be a libertarian fear of 'statism' which operates to sustain the 
compromised egalitarianism of his conception of justice.56
A number of writers have drawn attention to the example of Northern Ireland 
in order to underline the implausibility of his belief in the efficacy of a social criticism
55 Seyla Benhabib notes that this particular style of'situated' social criticism suffers from 'a kind of 
'hermeneutic monism of meaning', the assumption namely that the narratives of our culture are so 
univocal and uncontroversial that in appealing to them one could simply be exempt from the task of 
evaluative, ideal-typical reconstruction. Social criticism needs philosophy precisely because the 
narratives of our cultures are so conflictual and irreconcilable that, even when one appeals to them, a 
certain ordering of one's normative priorities and a clarification of those principles in the name of 
which one speaks is unavoidable.' Benhabib 'Feminism and Postmodernism: an uneasy alliance,' in 
Feminist Contentions. S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell, and N. Fraser (London: Routledge, 1995), 
p.27.
56 Walzer claims that 'simple equality' will give in to 'statism' as 'within their own spheres, as they are 
currently understood, these three [wealth, education, and power] tend to generate natural monopolies 
that can be repressed only if state power is itself dominant and if it is monopolised by officials 
committed to the repression [of monopoly].' Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 17.
157
based on shared traditions.57 On one hand this example supports the general 
hermeneutic point that our identities and perspectives are constituted by particular 
traditions: in this case, individuals find themselves identified either as Catholic, Irish, 
Nationalists, or as Protestant, British, Unionists, and while individuals are free to 
reinterpret or repudiate aspects of these constellations of identity, this entails a host of 
complicated relations with others, from family and friends to the community at large, 
and of course, the state.58 Even where individuals choose to repudiate features of the 
identity that they are born into, this repudiation will be complicated by the fact that 
others may not recognise this repositioning, underlining another feature of our finitude, 
in hermeneutic terms, namely, the way that previous identifications cannot be simply 
erased, but can only be reconfigured.59
The difficulty posed by this example for communitarian social criticism is that 
while it underlines the importance of understanding the way in which one's situation 
shapes one's self-understanding and positions one in relation to others, it also shows 
how empty the appeal to shared tradition is in a political context characterised by 
pluralism. This is clearly evident in the case of the North of Ireland, where the two 
'communities' are effectively divided by a 'shared' history of colonial rule, in which the 
traditions of each sustain conflict with the other.60 The political aims derived from each 
tradition, union with the Republic, on one hand, or continued union with the UK, on 
the other, cannot both be satisfied, and no solution may be expected from more
57 See Shane O'Neill, Impartiality in Context. (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1997). 
Gerard Delanty, 'Habermas and post-national identity: theoretical perspectives on the conflict in 
Northern Ireland,' Irish Political Studies 11 (1996), pp. 20-29.
58 On the complexity of these identifications see Fionnuala O'Connor In Search of a State. (Belfast: 
Blackstaff Press, 1993). Andy Poliak (ed.) A Citizen's Inquiry: the Qpsahl Report on Northern 
Ireland. (Dublin: Lilliput, 1993). M. Crazier (ed.) Cultural Traditions in Northern Ireland. (Belfast: 
Institute of Irish Studies, 1990). Edna Longley (ed.) Culture in Ireland: division or diversity? (Belfast: 
Institute of Irish Studies, 1991).
59 Fair Employment legislation in Northern Ireland requires the monitoring of the 'perceived' 
religious affiliation of job applicants. One can cease to identify oneself with a particular religious 
organisation, but it does not follow that one will cease to be identified with it by others.
60 The language of 'community' is far from neutral in this context.
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'authentic' interpretations of each tradition. Instead, these traditions and identities must 
be revised in certain ways, if a just accommodation between Nationalists and Unionists 
is to be achieved. It is argued, pace Walzer, that impartial justice, not authenticity, can 
provide the outlines of such an accommodation.61
The idea that meaning is socially and historically variable does follow from the 
rejection of foundationalism, but the connection of meaning to public practices does 
not warrant the assumption that meaning within societies will be univocal, but on the 
contrary it suggests that meanings will tend to be plural within languages: they form 
clusters characterised by family resemblances. Walzer's view, by contrast, appears to 
assume the reinstatement of a certain foundationalism with respect to language at the 
level of particular linguistic/political communities. Within these, there are meanings 
which are essential, or basic, in direct opposition to the Wittgensteinian view. 
Secondly, the idea that our beliefs are indeed shaped by the traditions in which we find 
ourselves situated does not require us to adopt a traditionalist standpoint towards these 
beliefs, namely, one which requires no further justification for our continuing to hold a 
belief other than that it is 'ours'. The traditionalism of the particularist understanding of 
hermeneutic situation, inasmuch as it overlooks the plurality of meaning within 
languages and the possibility of alternative standpoints with respect to institutionalised 
belief, exhibits a failure to be sufficiently pluralist with respect to meaning and 
situation.
Situation and Impartiality.
Rorty and Walzer are wrong to draw particularist conclusions from the pluralist 
premises of the hermeneutic idea of situation. This notion of situation is equally 
compatible with universalist morality and impartiality in particular. Firstly, what do we
61 See Shane O'Neill, Impartiality in Context.
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understand by universalist morality? The views set out above seem to rely on the idea 
that we have no presuppositionless and therefore universally acceptable foundation on 
which we could rest a deductive account of our moral principles. The only response to 
this, the argument goes, is to embrace 'pluralism' and recognise that morality will 
inevitably rely on particular cultural assumptions and that it will only be intelligible 
within the confines of the particular traditions and values of the culture in which it is 
found. If universalist morality did rely simply on the assumption that some proposition 
on value could be demonstrated to be fundamental, such that it must receive universal 
assent, then the conceptually pluralist, hermeneutic view would certainly be 
incompatible with it. However, universalism need not be identified with 
foundationalism, and consequently it does not fail because foundationalism is 
untenable. Doubtless, many universalists have been foundationalists, today, however, 
many take a more modest view, recognising the pluralism that must come with the 
rejection of foundationalism, and acknowledging, as a foundationalist could not, that 
reasonable people may disagree on their deepest moral commitments. If universalism 
does not entail a belief that there is or ought to be universal consensus on values and 
principle, what does it consist in?
Onora O'Neill sets out three senses in which morality may be universalist. 
Firstly, universalist morality is critical in its outlook, in contrast to the traditionalist 
attitude of moral particularism.62 Instead of regarding morality as a codification or 
distillation of the practices of a given community, it aspires to criticise those practices 
and not simply on the basis of a more accurate interpretation of those practices. The 
latter is the basis on which Walzer's social criticism proceeds, but a universalist 
morality proceeds rather by asking whether practices are morally justified, rather than 
whether they are authentic.
Secondly, universalist morality is generally understood to be cosmopolitan in 
some way, that is, it recognises obligations to persons outside one's particular region,
62 O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue.
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ethnicity or state, simply in virtue of their being human beings. Some particularisms 
may prefer to deny that there are any such obligations while others simply grant greater 
weight to obligations to members of one's own group, and perhaps only on some 
issues. Rorty would seem to adopt a cosmopolitan outlook, which he justifies in terms 
of a particular interpretation of the universalist traditions of liberal democracies. This is 
not a small point: we should not underestimate the value of being able to show 
traditionalists that they have misinterpreted their traditions, and that these traditions 
enjoin a more cosmopolitan outlook than they had supposed.63 Nonetheless, 
particularist cosmopolitanism is hardly secure, as on this view, cosmopolitanism is not 
itself a moral requirement as much as it is a product of chance, which is to say, 
historical accident, lacking independent moral justification.
The final sense in which a moral theory may be universalist is in the minimal 
sense in which moral principles are taken to apply universally, i.e. without exception, 
within a given domain. For example: 'Cast your vote on election day', is a universal 
principle, but holds only for those who have a vote.64 This sense of universalism is 
distinct from the sense in which universalism is cosmopolitan, as it refers only to the 
form of principles, and not to the scope of the domains in which they might apply. In 
sum, the idea of universalist morality has content even when it is distinguished from 
claims about universal foundations for morality, and this content does not rely upon the 
idea of such foundations. Insofar as it is critical, universalist morality will be impartial, 
and insofar as it is cosmopolitan, it will rest on a commitment to equality Both of these 
commitments are compatible with the recognition of pluralism which follows from the 
rejection of foundationalism.
63 See for example Kevin Whelan's recovery of Irish republicanism's anti-clerical, Enlightenment 
character from Catholic, Nationalist tradition. This also has implications for the identification of 
Protestantism with Orangeism, an essentially reactionary tradition which came into being, not after 
the Glorious Revolution, but after the failure of the rising in 1798, a rising led chiefly by Protestant 
radicals. Whelan, The Tree of Liberty. (Cork: Cork University Press, 1996).
64 O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 75.
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On a constructivist view of morality, we do not 'find' principles, but rather 
construct them by adopting a procedural test for our maxims. Typically this takes the 
form of a contractualism: valid moral principles are those which are intelligible to 
others and which may be adopted or reasonably rejected by them. This proceduralism 
is acknowledged by its proponents to rely upon certain presuppositions, that is, it is not 
presented in a foundationalist manner.65 The substantive moral commitment behind the 
contractarian device, which prescribes justification to others, is the commitment to 
equality, while certain minimal ontological assumptions also figure in the construction 
of the principles.
In Onora O'Neill's account these include: 'plurality', 'connection' and 'finitude'.66 
These assumptions underlie our moral deliberations in that we assume first that there 
are others whom our actions may affect; that actors are connected in a variety of ways 
to each other, for example, causally; and that the powers of moral agents are finite in 
certain ways. The way in which non-moral assumptions about the world figure in moral 
deliberations is often overlooked, but as was mentioned in Chapter Two in the case of 
causality and responsibility, moral and non-moral assumptions are connected and this 
connection is often of central importance. Indeed, the central concern of this thesis is 
to determine the nature of the connection between ontological assumptions about 
context and situation and critical morality. Constructivism differs from other post- 
foundationalist accounts of morality in that built into the procedure is the idea that we 
must justify ourselves to others, and this can be extended to the justification of the
65 See Brian Barry: 'Clearly I have introduced substantive moral ideas in the course of talking about 
what could be reasonably be rejected. Since I have already said that nothing can be expected from the 
bare notion of rationality itself, I am not in the least embarrassed by recognising that this is so. The 
underlying assumption here is that claims to special advantages based simply upon membership of a 
certain bloodline, ethnic group or race are too transparently self-serving to form a basis of agreement 
that others can seriously be asked to assent to. More deeply, the whole idea that we should seek the 
agreement of everybody rests on a fundamental commitment to the equality of all human beings.' 
Bariy, Justice as Impartiality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), p.8. Rawls observes that 
'Justice as fairness is not procedurally neutral. Clearly its principles of justice are substantive and 
express far more than procedural values, and so do its political conception of society and person, 
which are represented in the original position. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 192.
66 O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp. 100-6.
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assumptions underlying the construction of those procedures. In this way the 
recognition of pluralism which distinguishes foundationalist and post-foundationalist 
morality is reconciled with the critical demand that we provide justifications for our 
beliefs. The clash between moral particularists and 'universalists' is not so much over 
foundationalism, as over the possibility of providing justifications for moral principles 
and perhaps, to a lesser extent, over the cosmopolitan scope of morality. In what 
follows, I will defend the idea that recognition of pluralism and of situation is in fact 
compatible with a critical, impartial, morality and argue that it is moral particularism 
which fails to be sufficiently pluralist.
The moral particularism of Rorty and Walzer fails because while it purports to 
be anti-foundationalist, it still aspires to an overly unified conception of the world. It 
simply fails to be pluralist enough in its treatment of situation, and for this reason, 
where it is 'pluralist', it is pluralist in the wrong ways. To see how this is so, we need to 
recall Thomas Nagel's idea that there is an irreducible tension between objective and 
subjective descriptions of the world, a tension which cannot be diminished by 
privileging either of these possible ways of viewing the world. Objective descriptions 
of the world are important insofar as they play a significant role in realist views of the 
world and also within a variety of ethical views, which rely on ideas about the 
objectivity of value and/or the impersonality of moral principles. Objective views, 
whether employed in ethics or in the pursuit of knowledge, are distinguished by the 
fact that they involve an essentially reflective attitude to oneself, i.e. in adopting an 
'objective' or reflective stance one describes oneself in the third person, as one of the 
contents of the world one describes.67 The fact that it is oneself doing the describing 
and that for this reason any objective description will unavoidably have a blind spot in 
a sense, is one reason why objective descriptions cannot, according to Nagel, aspire to 
be absolute.
67 As Paul Ricoeur notes, this idea is contained within the idea of self-hood itself. Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another. Kathleen Blarney (trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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Our problem is to determine how, and in what contexts, we can make use of 
objective and subjective descriptions. Nagel warns of the danger of over-objectification 
and repeatedly insists that both with respect to knowledge and to ethics, we must make 
room for the subjective view. One reason for this is that objectivity is so closely related 
to scepticism and to nihilism.68 It is easy to slip from the thought that the world is 
independent of how it appears to us (the objective view) to the thought that all of our 
views about it could be mistaken and that we could never tell if this was the case. 
Similarly, an objective viewpoint in ethics may lead us from the idea that there are 
impersonal values, or things valuable in themselves independently of our valuing them, 
to the idea that this is in fact an illusion, and that there are no such values, save for 
those 'created' by individuals or cultures, because, from an objective view, there seems 
to be no other way to explain the profusion of values we are confronted with.69
This is precisely what goes wrong with the particularist reading of hermeneutic 
situation: it is a view of situation which effectively privileges a particular objective, 
socio-historical, description of our place in the world. This is a socio-historical 
objectivity in contrast to the objectivity of physicalism, but it has the same impact as 
that particular reductive view with respect to morality. Instead of treating the world as 
fundamentally physical, this views takes a socio-historical description of morality to be 
fundamental, in the sense that morality is revealed as 'really' no more that a collection 
of social practices. As Rorty says of ethical objectivity, this is 'really' no more that an 
desire for the survival of our own particular community. General principles and 
impersonal values are debunked by this objective view as the illusions of particular 
communities.
68 As Nagel says, 'Nothing has any objective value, because objectively nothing matters at all. If we 
push the claims of objective detachment to their logical conclusion, and survey the world from a 
standpoint completely detached from all interests, we discover there is nothing - no values left of any 
kind: things can be said to matter at all only to individuals within the world. The result is objective 
nihilism.'Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 146.
69 For the connection of objectivity and nihilism see Nietzsche's argument about the way that 
Christianity's own 'will to truth' undermined i t  Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals. (1887) Keith 
Ansell-Pearson (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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One response to the 'truth' about morality, which this objective view reveals, 
would be to adopt a self-conscious nihilism like that of Nietzsche, who responds to the 
idea that values are not 'found' in the world with the idea of the 'overman', who self­
consciously 'creates' value. Rorty toys with this idea under the heading of 'ironism' but 
in the end retreats from it and, like Walzer, opts instead to try to salvage morality by 
presenting a view of it which seeks to lessen the tension between the view from 'inside', 
which is to say, the subjective view of the moral subject who believes there are such 
things as truth and morality, and the objective, reflective, view which purports to 
expose these as illusions as more mere social products. The adaptation of the 
subjective, in this case, moral, point of view, to the objective nihilist point of view is 
effected by trying to make the belief that morality is simply a social institution, part of 
the moral subject's first order beliefs about morality. What moral particularists urge us 
to do is to replace the idea that 'x is right' with the idea that 'x is right for us'. The 
objective point of view reveals a cacophony of ethical beliefs in the world, but we can 
cope with this by particularising morality, saving it by limiting its scope to particular 
communities.
This attempt to adapt a 'subjective', in this case, moral, outlook to a socio- 
historical objectivity is a prime example of the danger of privileging one range of 
description over another. Firstly, no range of description can be demonstrated to be 
more fundamental than any other without presupposing that which one purports to 
explain: the special relationship between the world and the particular range of 
description in question. For this reason, we cannot give particularising socio-historical 
descriptions primacy over other ranges of description, in this case both generalising 
and normative descriptions. There is no good reason why we cannot employ 
generalising descriptions to cultures and societies in order to reveal identities and 
similarities.70 For this reason, a blanket particularism with respect to moral norms such
70 The description of social practices is itself open to both behaviourist and normative interpretations. 
See above, for the difference between taking social practices as the basis for induction or in terms of 
normative constraint.
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as that set out by Walzer, which treats 'thick' description as primary, and 'thin' as 
derivative, is wholly arbitrary. There is no conceptual barrier to redescribing 'thick' 
morality in 'thin' universalist ways.
Secondly, not only does this view privilege objective description it does so in a 
way which contradicts the 'traditionalist' outlook of moral particularism. To adopt a 
reconciliation between objective and subjective descriptions proposed by Rorty and 
Walzer, we should have to engage in a massive revision of concepts like truth, morality 
and justification. As Hilary Putnam points out, Rorty's interpretation of these flatly 
contradicts our current usage. We do not think we are simply 'commending' a belief 
when we say that it is 'true', nor do we think that justification is really just a question of 
communal agreement. On the contrary, we think that if a belief is justified, then it 
remains so in the face of communal disagreement. If we were to adopt a particularist 
view of these concepts, we should effectively be engaged in revising or simply 
replacing them with new ones, and this contradicts that particularist claim to leave in 
place the social meanings which we find in the communities we find ourselves in. 
Many, although regrettably not all, people in the 'rich North Atlantic democracies' to 
which Rorty refers happen to subscribe to universalistic moralities, the form and 
content of which simply resist the reduction which particularists urge. In urging us to 
accept a reductive, particularist view of truth and morality, particularists contradict 
their own express view of the 'communal' character of ideas like truth and morality.
Walzer simply does not see this problem, but Rorty struggles with it, insofar as 
he is unable to decide whether to press home a poetic, nihilist view of truth and 
morality, the view which urges us to replace the idea of discovery with that of'making', 
or to try to save our concepts of truth morality and justification by providing them with 
a communitarian foundation. Rorty tries to resolve the conflict between these two 
possible responses to the anti-foundationalism by means of the distinction between 
public and private. On one hand, he is drawn to the view that we could come to have 
an explicitly ironic, anti-foundationalist public culture, much as we have come to have 
an largely secular public culture, inconceivable as this must have seemed to previous
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ages.71 On the other hand, however, he doubts whether our public culture, at least a 
liberal public culture, could be sustained by a thoroughgoing nihilism, and argues that 
we must restrain ironism by confining it to the private sphere.72 We have already seen 
that there is no support for the 'principle' he uses to draw this distinction to be had 
from our existing concept of cruelty, but it can have still less support from a nihilist, 
ironic point of view, for from this view the vocabulary of morality which would enjoin 
restraint is no more authoritative than any other. We simply could not be ironists in 
private, but communitarians in public. Rorty canvasses a second way to resolve the 
conflict between the ironic and the traditionalist interpretations of anti-foundationalism, 
one which explicitly parts company with liberal egalitarian politics, namely, that the 
public culture could be insulated from the corrosive nihilism of the ironic view if this 
outlook were to be confined to a class of intellectuals, leaving the general public to 
adopt a foundationalist view of their morality.73 These contortions underline the truth 
of Nagel's observation that the tension between subjective and objective descriptions of 
the world is often experienced as a tension within oneself, as it is T who describes the 
world in each case, occupying, in this case, the standpoint of ironist and communitarian 
moralist. The fact that the tension between these views appears within the subject is, in 
turn, one of the reasons why the pressure to reconcile these in some way is so strong.74
71 He notes that 'once upon a time atheism too was the exclusive property of intellectuals.' Rorty, 
Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.87.
72 'But even if I am right in thinking that a liberal culture whose public rhetoric is nominalist and 
historicist is both possible and desirable, I cannot go on to claim that there could or ought to be a 
culture whose public rhetoric is ironist. I cannot imagine a culture which socialised its own youth in 
such a way as to make them seem continually dubious about their own process of socialisation. Irony 
seems inherently a private matter.' Rorty, Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.87.
73 'In the ideal liberal society, the intellectuals would still be ironists, although the non-intellectuals 
would not. The latter would, however, be commonsensically nominalist and historicist.' Rorty, 
Contingency. Irony. Solidarity, p.87.
74 'The trouble is that the two attitudes have to coexist in a single person who is actually leading the 
life towards which he is simultaneously engaged and detached. This person does not occupy a third 
standpoint from which he can make two relativized judgements about his life. If all he had were two 
relativized judgements, they would leave him with no attitude toward his life at all - only information 
about the appropriate attitude from two points of view, neither of which was his. But in fact he 
occupies both of them and his attitudes derive from them both.' Nagel, The View from Nowhere.
p.216.
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The view set out above, by contrast, is one which does not seek to reduce the 
tension between objective and subjective views with respect to truth and morality by 
adapting the latter to a relativist, nihilist objective view of particularism. This view fails 
because of its foundationalist attitude to such objective description. Although I have 
criticised the privilege accorded to socio-historical objectivity it is not the case that on 
my view morality is to be regarded as simply 'subjective'. On the contrary, the 
assumption that there are objectively right and wrong answers plays a central role 
within morality. This objectivity is not the same as the objectivity of the socio- 
historical viewpoint. The latter is objective with respect to the 'subjective' point of view 
of the moral agent insofar as it is an objective view with respect to morality per se. The 
objectivity of impersonal, or impartial, morality is, by contrast, an objective view 
adopted from within morality, a view adopted from within the perspective of the moral 
subject. While the first sort of objectivity encourages a relativist or nihilist view of 
morality, the latter sort of objectivity assumes that there are impersonal values and 
reasons to be moral, while emphasising the importance of describing our own values, 
projects and principles in a third personal way in order to judge them impartially. The 
aim of this objectivity is not to suspend the force of morality, but only to suspend the 
potential force of the 'mineness' of my moral beliefs.
The objection to the idea that ethics requires 'a detachment from particular 
perspectives and transcendence of one's time and place' is founded on the idea that this 
requires the impossible insofar as we are situated beings.75 The demand that we 
transcend the context that we find ourselves in and adopt a 'view from nowhere', a 
'God's eye view' in order to make moral judgements simply does not make sense, given 
the sort of beings we are, located in particular cultures with particular histories, 
locations which render our beliefs necessarily perspectival. The objective view which 
reveals that moralities are specific to particular communities is what compels us to 
recognise that morality and social criticism cannot be thought of in terms of the
75 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 187.
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detachment of the social critic, but rather in terms of the connectedness of that critic to 
the community and its particular values and traditions. The fact that an objective 
description of morality plays a role in this argument should make us suspicious of the 
claim that detachment, which is to say, the capacity to offer objective, third-personal, 
descriptions, within morality is not possible, for if we can employ objective 
descriptions in one way, why can we not employ them in the other?
In fact, a commitment to an impersonal or impartial morality, does not require 
us to deny that we are situated, finite beings, nor does it rely on an absolute description 
of the world, as Walzer, for example, suggests. Insofar as one recognises that an 
objective description of the world, one that includes one's subjective view within it, is 
just one possible description and even just one possible 'objective' description, then the 
idea that morality requires objective descriptions cannot be identified with any 
foundational claim to present an absolute conception of the world. Clearly, this is the 
case with respect to an objective, moral description of oneself and one's values and 
projects, in which one figures as just one more moral agent, with his or her own values 
and projects. This view excludes, for example, physicalist or socio-historical 
descriptions which adopt a cultural stance toward morality, treating it as 
epiphenomenal or illusory. It also exists in an uneasy relationship with the subjective 
view, from which one emphasises the 'mineness' of one's values and projects in contrast 
to the detached, third person description one offers from the objective standpoint. 
Clearly it is a limited description, consistent with the conceptual pluralism upon which 
hermeneutics is based.
Within impartial conceptions of morality, such as consequentialism, for 
example, one is motivated to adopt such a stance, such a description of oneself and 
one's values in order to eliminate 'mineness', partiality with respect to the realisation of 
one's own goals, and such descriptions do this by placing one's projects within the 
world alongside those of others so that one can arrive at an impersonal, impartial, 
judgement as to which one ought to further. For instance, we might judge that projects 
hindered by a lack of basic goods such as freedom should be furthered in preference to
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those which required the supply of luxuries such as plover's eggs, irrespective of which 
of these projects happens to be one's own. The device of objective description only 
helps to drop the 'mineness' of beliefs and goals out of the picture in making such 
judgements, that is to say, impartial moral judgements only require us to exclude 
reasons of the form 'because x is mine' from our judgements.76
The very limited purpose of the device of impersonal description in morality 
should make it clear why insisting that such descriptive possibilities are open to us is 
not tantamount to denying pluralism or situation. Obviously, making any sort of 
judgement presupposes that one possesses some beliefs, from metaphysical 
assumptions about the nature of objects through epistemological beliefs about what 
counts as 'evidence', 'causality' etc., down to moral beliefs, for example, that one ought 
to adopt an impartial view in at least some of our moral judgements. All of these 
remain in place when one sets out to engage in impartial moral deliberation. Our 
impersonal judgements are subject to all the usual flaws to which any judgement is 
subject: not only faulty reasoning, but failures to recognise alternative and sometimes 
essentially contestable characterisations of the matter at hand. Impersonality is no 
guarantee of infallibility. Recognition of our finite nature, the awareness that our 
conceptual repertoire and our beliefs about the relations pertaining between different 
regions of it have been shaped by particular traditions, particular ways of posing 
problems, or characterising objects, can actually help us to make better judgements 
insofar as we will be prepared to accept challenges on these grounds. How we respond 
to such challenges depends on the precise character of the challenge of course: in some 
cases we may, by employing generalising descriptions, come to an agreement that 
value x, as an instance of y, should outweigh z, while in other cases we may find no 
agreement. Even here, we may continue to adopt an impartial stance, insofar as we
761 take no stand here on the sort of things that we might make impartial judgements about, that is, 
goods of various sorts to be distributed, or whether impartial judgements should play a role in 
personal relations, political deliberations, or both.
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may then seek a compromise rather than adopt the view that we should simply force 
through our favoured option simply because it is our own
A particularist might still object, however, that insofar as one unavoidably 
relies upon one's current beliefs in deliberation, the device of impersonal description 
will fail to produce an impartial judgement. As one's beliefs lack a universally 
acknowledged foundation, one's justifications must terminate in beliefs which one 
holds simply because of one's socialisation into the particular society in which one is 
situated, and which cannot be further justified without circularity. As such any 
judgement will simply amount to an affirmation of a particular, culturally specific, 
outlook and the idea of impartiality will be revealed to be empty in the last analysis.
This objection rests on a mistake about justification, however. Certainly, it is 
the case that justification relies upon beliefs one actually holds, and it is also true that 
in any given stretch of reasoning, we will be unable to provide universally 
acknowledged foundations for our more basic beliefs. Our justifications will terminate 
in beliefs which cannot be further justified and whose acquisition can only be explained 
in terms of socialisation. From the external, socio-historical position, we will be 
impressed by the fact that we can explain how we came to hold these beliefs, while 
from the internal standpoint of the moral reasoner, we will be uneasy on account of our 
inability to provide non-circular justifications for these beliefs. We should prefer to 
regard our holding a particular set of beliefs as the outcome of a process of 
justification, and not simply as the outcome of a process of socialisation. It would be 
tempting to try to remove this unease by adopting a parochial attitude to these beliefs, 
and treating the facts about their acquisition as themselves providing a justification, as 
Rorty does by insisting that there is no basis for distinguishing between justified 
acquisition of beliefs and acquisition by external causes. As we saw, this entails an 
unwarranted revision of the concept of justification. We can, however, choose to 
'manage' the tension between the demand for justification and the realisation that any 
justification will have to be circular, by adopting instead a fallibilist attitude to these 
beliefs. On this view we do not attempt to supply culturally specific foundations for
171
our higher order beliefs, but rather resolve to adopt an impersonal attitude to these 
too, where necessary, and recognising that they stand in need of justification, we 
should remain open to revising them when offered reasons to do so.
This view makes sense on a certain, pragmatic, view of justification. On this 
view we replace the idea that we should have to justify our entire system of beliefs all 
at once, with the view that we should treat justification in a more pragmatic fashion, 
coping with each request for the justification of a part of our system of beliefs as it 
comes up. On the former view, which we might call foundational justification, we 
should be forced to conclude that none of our beliefs were justified if we could not find 
an indubitable premise for our whole system, while on the latter view, justification is 
localised in such a way that we can accept reasons for retaining or rejecting any 
particular element of our system of beliefs, because in any particular deliberation, other 
beliefs are left in the background to do the work of justification. If we think about 
justification in this piecemeal, pragmatic fashion, then we can see how we can make 
sense of the fallibilist resolution to adopt, where necessary, an impersonal attitude to 
beliefs which, in other instances, do the work of justification themselves. If we can shift 
the burden of justification around the different elements of our system of belief in a 
pragmatic fashion then we can seen how we could accept reasons acceptable within 
that system for dislodging even those beliefs which are normally embedded deeply in 
that system.77 To the extent that this is possible, we need not accept the parochial 
'solution' to the problem of foundations: no belief is held to be exempt from potential 
challenge. It is conceivable that we could totally revise our complete set of beliefs, 
offering justifications at every step of the way, and arrive at a wholly new set of beliefs 
at the end of this process.
Walzer and Rorty ultimately arrive, by slightly different routes, at a model of 
the encounter with others which resembles that which was derived from the epistemic
77 See Charles Larmore, 'Tradition, objectivity, and hermeneutics,' in Brice R. Wachterhauser (ed.) 
Hermeneutics and Modem Philosophy. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 147- 
67.
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conception of situation, a model in which respect for others is taken to require of us a 
respect for their beliefs. On this model, we can understand others, but we have no 
ground for criticising them, for in the absence of shared meanings or values, this would 
amount to no more than imposition. Rorty's 'anti-anti ethnocentrism' seems to suggest 
that he would be less hesitant to make judgements about the beliefs and practices of 
others, but this tendency is restrained by the idea that it is cruel to challenge others' self 
descriptions, so that in the end, he is at one with Walzer in arguing for placing strict 
limits upon our engagement with differently situated others.
This attitude is in marked contrast with the outlook recommended by Gadamer, 
who suggests that, far from embodying respect, this 'anthropological' stance towards 
differently situated others is ethically undesirable. The guiding idea here is that of 
'openness', and in the form of the hermeneutic 'experience', an 'experience of truth'. For 
Gadamer the 'experienced' person is someone who is 'radically undogmatic', who is 
open to new and unexpected experiences. To be open then is to take one's 
interlocutors 'seriously', which is to say, to regard them as equals: whose discourse has 
as much a prima facie claim to truth as one's own. The hermeneutic conversation as 
conceived by Gadamer is thus distinct from the poetic individualism proposed by 
Rorty, for not only is it concerned with truth, but also with a model of dialogue in 
which interlocutors must ideally take each other 'seriously'.78 According to Gadamer, 
the Romantics, while apparently respecting the otherness of those they interpreted, 
failed to reflect upon their own horizon and place it in question in the course of the 
hermeneutic conversation. This is not a true conversation in Gadamer's eyes but 
instead, he says, it resembles an oral examination, or a conversation between doctor 
and patient. What goes wrong here, is that the interpreter has 'withdrawn from the 
situation of trying to reach agreement. He himself cannot be reached'.79 The 
particularism on this account has suspended the other's claim to truth and to this extent
78 James Risser emphasises the outward-looking character of Gadamer's hermeneutics in 
Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other.
79 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.270.
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his outlook embodies what Gadamer calls the prejudice of modernity, the view that we 
can learn nothing from the past. While this has a rather conservative ring to it, it is 
clear that the same criticism can be applied to the parochialism of communitarian 
particularism in its treatment of culturally distinct others. The counterpart of the 
enlightened prejudice which Gadamer complains of is simply the ethnocentric belief 
that 'our ways are best’.
My argument in this chapter does not answer questions about the relation of 
impartial moral requirements to one's personal projects, in the sense that the 
requirement to live 'right1, to live according to impartial principles, may conflict with 
the desire to live 'well', as Nagel puts it. Nor does it explain why we ought to adopt an 
impersonal stance in our dealings with others. I will say more about these issues in the 
concluding chapter. What this does answer, however, is the ontological or conceptual 
objection to impartiality, the objection that impartiality conflicts with the fact that we 
are all situated in particular cultures and communities with particular traditions and 
values and that therefore we cannot transcend our situation in order to arrive at some 
Archimedian point from which we could make truly impartial judgements. The view set 
out here is one of impartial morality stripped of such metaphysical pretensions. Just as 
we have no grounds for privileging socio-historical descriptions of ourselves, so also, 
we have no grounds for privileging a purely personal, or traditionalist outlook when 
we engage in moral deliberation. Objective descriptions are possible, and can be 
offered without the pretence that one is suddenly lifted out of one's situation whenever 
one sets out to employ such descriptions. The fact that one's situation may affect one's 
judgements should not lead us to conclude that it makes no sense to adopt an impartial 
moral view: we may not be infallible, but that does not mean that we ought to be 
parochial.
With this Chapter, the account of context, situation and interpretation is 
complete. The hermeneutic understanding of situation builds upon the conceptual 
pluralism set out in Chapter Two and the public account of meaning set out in Chapter
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Three. It adds to these the idea that our conceptual schemes have the historical 
character of social institutions. To be situated in a context is to come to orient oneself 
in a world characterised by the pre-existence of languages and problematics. This view 
can explain the plurality of perspectives and identities present within and across 
societies, but avoids the claims to self-transparency and authority which characterised 
the epistemic understanding of situation. As such, it is hospitable to the redescriptive 
aims of social criticism.
What remains is to determine the role which an interpretive social criticism can 
play within a deliberative politics governed by the norm of impartiality. First, however, 
we shall have to confront the radical social criticism of Marx and Foucault. Unlike the 
community-oriented criticism of Walzer, these critics contextualise ideas in order to 
transform social relations. While their emphasis on the way in which power relations 
play a part in the constitution of traditions and identities is salutary, it will be argued 
that their reductive attitude to context excludes the normative criticism of unequal 
power relations. Given the pluralist account of contextualisation set out in Chapter 
Two, this, it will be argued, is unwarranted and self-defeating. An effective social 
criticism will be sensitive to the effects of power, but it will also require the normative 
resources to criticise the problems identified by contextualisation.
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Ch a p t e r  F iv e
Ra d ic a l  S o c ia l  C r it ic is m
Radical social criticism differs from the communitarian social criticism 
proposed by Walzer in that while it acknowledges the fact that we are all situated in 
particular social and political contexts, it chooses to emphasise the way in which 
unequal power relations are a fundamental aspect of our context. The opacity that 
comes with situation: the idea that our self-understandings are mediated by public 
languages and institutionalised interpretations and problematics, is not so innocent as 
Walzer would have us believe for it can mean that relations of domination can come to 
shape our perspectives and identities in ways which we do not suspect. Radical social 
criticism is thus suspicious of the appearance of consensus, and unwilling to endorse 
tradition and the hermeneutics of authenticity proposed by communitarians. Instead, 
radical social criticism aims at revealing and reversing the operations of power which 
serve to shape our self-understandings.
The Marxist tradition has produced a style of social criticism conceived as 
'ideology-critique' which aims at exposing the way that class-divided society conceals 
its alienating effects from those caught up in it.1 Ideology critique serves a 
revolutionary politics the goal of which is a social revolution that will ultimately 
abolish class domination and class identities altogether. In this way, it aims to 
emancipate us from the social antagonisms that characterise our existing situation. This 
conception of social criticism has largely been superseded in recent years by an
1 For Marxist work in this area see Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy. (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1970); Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness. (1922) (London: Merlin,
1971); T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics. (London: Routledge, 1994) and with Max Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. (1944) (London: Verso, 1979); Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory. (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1972); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man. (London: Abacus, 1974), Eros 
and Civilisation. (1956) (London: Ark, 1987), An Essav on Liberation. (Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1972). On the place of these works within the larger Marxist tradition see J. G. Merquior, Western 
Marxism. (London: Paladin, 1986); Tom Bottomore, The Frankfurt School. (London: Tavistock, 
1984); Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination. (London: Heinemann, 1973).
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alternative model of social criticism derived from the work of Michel Foucault.2 
Foucauldian social criticism, or 'genealogy', aims at the critique of identities per se, 
seeing these as the effects of power. This project has been detached from Marxism's 
revolutionary politics, as the idea of eliminating antagonisms and the identities which 
make them possible is no longer regarded as feasible or desirable. Instead, genealogy 
finds its home in a conception of politics as a realm of ineliminable conflict, in which 
identities and perspectives are continually open to contest and reconfiguration. Their 
differences may be less important, however, than what they have in common.
The virtue of ideology-critique and genealogy is that, in their different ways, 
they adopt a critical attitude to tradition and identity. In contrast to those who appeal 
to contextual considerations in order to strengthen demands for the recognition and 
respect of identities and perspectives, radical social criticism emphasises the ways in 
which these call for transformation. Where differences simply reflect class or gender 
inequality, they are not worthy of respect. The difficulty with both Marxist and 
Foucauldian models of criticism, however, is that they each rest on a particular 
objective view of moral and epistemic concepts which present these in strictly socio- 
historical terms as the products of particular social relations. In each case, the result is 
an attitude to politics that has no place for deliberation. By taking up this external 
standpoint with respect to moral and epistemic argument, radical social critics adopt an 
implausibly reductive attitude to justification, which ultimately undermines social 
criticism itself. What grounds can we offer others for revising their identities and
2 See Foucault, The Order of Things. (1966), The Archaeology of Knowledge. Power/Knowledge. C. 
Gordon (ed.) (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), Discipline and Punish. (1975) (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 
1991), Language. Counter-Memory. Practice. D. F. Bouchard (ed.), The History of Sexuality vol. 
1(1976) (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978), The Uses of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality vol. 2, 
(1984) (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1985), The Care of the Self. The History of Sexuality vol.3. (1984) 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), Politics. Philosophy. Culture. L. O. Kritzman (ed.) (London: 
Routledge, 1988). See also Mark Poster, Foucault. Marxism, and History. (Cambridge: Polity, 1984); 
McNay, Foucault: a critical introduction. (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); Hubert Dreyfus and Paul 
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: bevond structuralism and hermeneutics. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982); Hubert Dreyfus, 'Being and power: Heidegger and Foucault,' International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 4 (1996), pp. 1-16; Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Nancy Fraser, 'Michel Foucault: a 'Young Conservative'?' in Michael Kelly (ed.) Critique 
and Power. (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1994), pp. 125-210. David Hoy (ed.) Foucault: a critical reader. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
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beliefs if our interpretive strategy presumes that truth and morality are nothing more 
than veils for manipulation? Social criticism which respects others as equals must 
proceed by offering them reasons for transforming their perspectives, and it cannot do 
this on the basis of a relativist attitude to truth and morality. The transformative 
potential of radical social criticism can only be realised if it is dissociated from the 
reductive outlook adopted by both Marx and Foucault.
Ideology Critique
Marx views us as historical beings, differently situated with respect to our 
respective places in history. Our situation, as members of a society at a particular stage 
of historical development, sets certain limits to our possibilities for action:
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, 
but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted 
from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brain of the living.3
These circumstances are also characterised by class divisions, so that in any given 
society at a given stage of its history, individuals will find themselves situated in a 
particular social location in virtue of their role in that society's relations of production. 
This situation is taken to colour one's outlook in certain ways although while there are, 
on this view, distinct class situations and distinct class outlooks, the relations between 
the two is sufficiently loose that members of one class may adopt the outlook of the 
other. Indeed, Marx observes that the ideas of the dominant class will tend to be
3 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Collected Works Vol. 11 (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1979), p. 103.
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adopted by non-members in view of the control exerted by the dominant class over the 
ideological superstructure of society.4 The phenomenon of situation itself, one should 
note, is itself transitory on Marx's view, for with the abolition of private property, 
classes, and the perspectives that go with them, they will cease to exist. Marxist social 
criticism may be construed as a critique of the ideas of the ruling class, and as 
attempting to foster a set of beliefs in the dominated class which will more adequately 
reflect their interests. Having said this, there are considerable differences within 
Marxism as to the nature of this criticism and even as to whether Marxism is properly 
understood as a form of social criticism at all, in the sense that social criticism appeals 
to values and principles to justify transformation of belief.
Marxist social criticism could be said to centre on the idea that private property 
in general and bourgeois private property in particular is dehumanising in its effects, 
i.e. it alienates us all from our real human nature. The aim of Marxist social criticism is 
to expose these effects and to explain their origin in the institution of private property: 
'Production does not simply produce man as a commodity, the human commodity, man 
in the role of commodity; it produces him in keeping with his role as a mentally and 
physically dehumanised being.'5 Capitalist relations of production, Marx argues, are 
alienating in a variety of ways: they render the worker's products alien to him, in the 
sense that he becomes a slave to the product rather than finding meaning in it as an 
expression of his creativity; the activity of producing is alien as it not experienced as a 
creative process, but as a constraint upon the freedom of the producers; the worker is 
alienated from his fellow workers with whom he is placed in relations of conflict and 
competition; and he is alienated from himself, alienated from his essential human
4 'What else does the history of ideas prove, than that the intellectual production changes its character 
in proportion as material production has changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the 
ideas of its ruling class.' Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto. Collected Works Vol. 6 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p.503.
5 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Collected Works Vol. 3 (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1975), p.284.
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nature, which is that of a cooperative and creative creature.6 Human beings on Marx's 
view are essentially creative, cooperative creatures, but under capitalism, this nature is 
distorted and turned against the worker, who finds that the basic human urge to 
transform the environment and in doing so, human needs themselves, becomes an 'alien 
power'.7 The goal of history, is the overcoming of alienation and the realisation of a 
reconciled, unalienated human nature.8
Like other contextualisms, Marxism is premised on a critique of abstraction. 
The distortion of essentially human characteristics is fundamentally a matter of 
abstraction and Marxist social criticism proceeds by identifying these abstractions and 
confronting them with the model of an unalienated, undistorted human nature. Marx 
emphasises that this is a process at work in 'reality' as such, and not simply in the 
sphere of 'consciousness'. That is to say, capitalist relations of production do not 
simply represent people in distorted, abstract ways, but also treat them in these ways, 
ways which rely upon abstraction from their true nature. In this way, the critique of 
abstraction is not a critique of ideas, but of reality. For Marx, the point is not to 
interpret the world as philosophers have done, but rather to change it.9
As with other varieties of contextualism, the true view of humanity, the 
description which represents humanity as it is, in contrast to the distorting work of 
abstraction, is a socio-historical view, a view presented in the 'materialist conception of 
history'. Those categories which present human beings as social-historical creatures are 
absolute, providing the description upon which all other characterisations rest. The
6 Marx presents alienation from one's fellows prior to alienation from human nature, or 'species 
being'. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. p.274-7.
7 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. p.278.
8 'Communism is the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and 
therefore the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as return 
of man to himself as a social, ( i.e. human) being - a return accomplished consciously and embracing 
the entire wealth of previous development.' Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 
p.296.
9 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change 
it.' Marx, Theses on Feuerbach. Collected Works. Vol. 5 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976),
p.8.
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favoured range of objects for Marxist contextualisation are societies, classes and 
institutions, and the favoured ranges of description are those socio-historical categories 
which serve to explain the relations between institutions. Within this view, economic 
institutions are thought to be basic, as Marx thinks that humans are basically animals 
engaged in fulfilling their material needs, but distinct from other animals in that they 
can transform the natural world and their own needs in so doing. The foundational 
character of the economic, and by implication, the categories which represent this, is 
neatly captured in Marx's idea of society as composed of an economic foundation upon 
which rests a superstructure of legal and political ideas, an idea he refers to as 'the 
guiding principle of my studies':
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations 
of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production. The totality of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. . It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness.10
This view of the foundational character of economic activity with respect to other 
social institutions leads Marxist social criticism to regard alternative ways of 
conceiving the world as forms of abstraction which serve only to mystify, or 
misrepresent, the basic facts of the matter, It is worth noting that the critique of
10 Marx, Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy. Introduction. Collected Works 
Vol. 29 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987), p.262-3.
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abstraction played a fundamental role in Marx's thought before he arrived at the 
characteristically 'Marxist' view that the course of historical development might be 
explained in terms of the development of economic institutions.11 Hegel is already 
criticised for treating man abstractly, in terms of his consciousness, rather than as he 
truly is: a concrete 'sensuous' human being.12 The idea that this concrete humanity is 
engaged first and foremost in transforming itself through economic activity comes later 
in Marx's intellectual development: the critique of abstraction, however, is basic.13 The 
break with Hegel and with German Philosophy at large is motivated by the idea that 
Hegel is wrong to represent world history in terms of a process in which mind 
advances toward an absolute conception of the world, because mind, or consciousness, 
is simply an abstraction. By taking this abstraction as fundamental:
...the human character of nature and of the nature created by history - 
man's products - appears in the form that they are products of abstract
11 Marx summarises his conception of history as follows: 'This conception of history thus relies on 
expounding the real process of production - starting from the material production of life itself - and 
comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e., 
civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history; describing it in its action as the state, and 
also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, 
philosophy, morality, etc., etc., arise from it and tracing the process of their formation from that basis; 
thus the whole thing can, of course be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action 
of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealist view of history, to look for a 
category in every period, but remains constantly on the real ground of history ; it does not explain 
practice from the idea but explains the formation of idea from material practice, and accordingly it 
comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental 
criticism, by resolution into 'self-consciousness' or transformation into 'apparitions', 'spectres', 
'whimsies', etc. but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which give rise to this 
idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of 
philosophy and all other kinds of theory.' Marx, German Ideology. Collected Works Vol. 5 (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p.53-4.
12 'The human character of nature and of the nature created by history - man's products - appears in 
the form that they are products of abstract mind and as such, therefore, phases of mind - thought 
entities.' Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p.352.
13 'abstraction comprehending itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing: it must abandon itself to 
abstraction - and so it arrives at an entity which is its exact opposite - at nature' Marx continues: 'The 
absolute idea, the abstract idea, this whole idea which behaves in such a strange and bizarre way, and 
which has given the Hegelians such terrible headaches, is from beginning to end nothing else but 
abstraction.' Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. pp.343-4.
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mind and as such therefore, phases of mind. The Phanomenologie is, 
therefore, a hidden mystifying and still uncertain criticism.14
In fact, the subject of history, of the whole process of alienation and reconciliation is 
'real, corporeal man, man'with his feet firmly on solid ground, man exhaling and 
inhaling all the true forces of nature.'15
The same notion of a concrete, corporeal humanity drives Marx to reject the 
religiously inspired criticism of the Young Hegelians as itself premised on an abstract, 
unhistorical, conception of humanity.16 The critique of abstraction, also, significantly, 
leads Marx to criticise treatments of man as 'citizen', whether in Hegel's monarchical 
system, or equally, in the works of democratic reformers.17 Political freedom is not real 
human freedom, because it can only be a limited, one-sided freedom insofar as the
14 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. p.323.
15 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. p.336.
16 He observes that 'German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never left the realm of 
philosophy. It by no means examines its general philosophic premises, but in fact all its problems 
originate in a definite philosophic system, that of Hegel. Not only in its answers, even in its questions 
there was a mystification...To begin with they took pure, unfalsified Hegelian categories such as 
'substance' and 'self-consciousness', after they secularised these categories by giving them more 
profane names such as 'species', the 'unique', 'man', etc. The entire body of German philosophical 
criticism from Strauss to Stimer is confined to criticism of religious conceptions. The critics started 
from real religion and theology proper. What religious consciousness and religious conception are was 
subsequently defined in various ways. The advance consisted in including the allegedly dominant 
metaphysical, political, juridical, moral and other conceptions under the category of religious or 
theological conceptions; and similarly in declaring that political, juridical, moral consciousness was 
religious or theological consciousness, and that the political, juridical, moral man - 'Man' in the last 
resort - was religious.' Marx, The German Ideology, p.29.
17 'Finally, man as a member of civil society is held to be man in the proper sense, homme as distinct 
from citoyen, because he is man in his sensuous, individual immediate existence, whereas political 
man is only abstract artificial man, man as an allegorical, juridical person. The real man, is 
recognised only in the shape of the egoistic individual, the true man is recognised only in the shape of 
the abstract citoyen....Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand to a member of 
civil society, the egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other to the citizen, a juridical person. 
Only when real, individual man reabsorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human 
being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular 
situation, only when man has recognised and organised his 'forces propre' as social forces, and 
consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then 
will human emancipation have been accomplished.' Marx, On the Jewish Question. (18431 Collected 
Works. Vol. 3 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), pp. 167-8. Here the twin abstractions of man as 
citizen and of man as the individual economic agent, the member of civil society are criticised.
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political conception of man, as citizen, is itself only an abstract, one-sided view of man. 
'Equality', is regarded by Marx as nothing more than a political category and for this 
reason is rejected by him as an abstraction.18
The critique of abstraction based on the materialist conception of history, a 
conception of humanity as historical, has important implications for the idea that 
Marxism is a form of social criticism. Given that political categories are themselves 
regarded as mystifying abstractions, it would seem that Marxist social criticism cannot 
function as a form of transformative redescription within the confines of democratic 
deliberation, for it must be committed to exposing a politically engaged criticism as 
misconceived, resting on the abstract idea of persons as citizens. By contrast, Marxist 
social criticism, tied to the idea of human emancipation as the liberation of humanity 
from such abstractions is committed to the liberation of humanity not only from 
capitalist relations of production, but also from political institutions per se.
This might seem a hopelessly utopian goal for Marxist social criticism, but of 
itself this is not necessarily a fundamental problem: the idea that the world should be 
other than it is, is arguably the fundamental premise of any moral project, and Marxism 
could be regarded simply as having set itself an especially difficult task. If it could be 
shown, however, that the ethical goal of Marxist social criticism was itself unattractive 
• in some way, or that it was internally incoherent, then it could no longer be defended 
as merely utopian, but would have to be rejected. The chief reason for doubting the 
coherence of Marxism as a form of social criticism is provided by the materialist 
conception of history, and the idea that morality itself may be explained by it as an 
ideological abstraction, because 'Right can never be higher than the economic structure 
of society and its cultural development which this determines'. Marx goes on to say:
18 'Equality is nothing but a translation of the German 'Ich=Ich' in to the French, i.e. political form.' 
Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. p.312.
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I have dealt at greater length with the 'undiminished proceeds of labour' 
on the one hand, and with 'equal right' and 'fair distribution', on the 
other, in order to show what a crime it is to attempt, on the one hand, 
to force on our Party again, as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period 
had some meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish, while 
again perverting, on the other, the realistic outlook, which it has cost so 
much effort to instil into the Party but which has now taken root in it 
by means of ideological, legal and other trash so common among the 
Democrats and French Socialists.19
As Allen Wood has argued, Marx is not a moralist, but is rather a critic of morality, 
who aims simply to explain it in terms of its function in society, as part of the legal and 
political superstructure resting upon the real foundation provided by the mode of 
production.20 Principles of justice are, seen from the perspective of the materialist 
conception of history, relative to particular societies, to particular modes of production 
and explained by them. In this way the 'individualism' of notions like that of human 
rights is a reflection of the market based economy of bourgeois society.21 The 
materialist conception of history constitutes an objective, socio-historical level of 
description, one which explains morality in historical terms as the product of a 
particular set of social relations and which has no application outside those relations. In 
adopting this stance with respect to moral concepts historical materialism adopts an 
objective interpretation of morality as a product of different cultures akin to that
19 Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme. Collected Works Vol. 24 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1989), p.87.
20 'As I read him, Marx is, like Nietzsche, a critic of morality. Like Nietzsche, he seeks to understand 
the actual function in human life of moral values and standards, and to make an assessment of them 
on the basis of non-moral goods.' Wood,' Marx on right and justice: a reply to Husami,' p. 125. This 
reply is to a criticism of Wood's 'The Marxian critique of justice', both pieces being published in 
Marx, justice, and history. M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon (eds.) (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), pp. 3-41 and 106-34 respectively.
21 See C. B. Macpherson's critique of liberalism The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism for 
an influential statement of this view.
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adopted by moral particularists like Rorty and Walzer. While these latter theorists seek 
to minimise the tension between this objective account of morality and the subjective 
standpoint of the moral agent, Marx, by contrast, adopts a debunking attitude to 
morality. The objective account which exposes morality as a product of class society in 
general, and talk of justice and rights as the ideological abstractions of bourgeois 
society in particular, is taken to be foundational, while moral concepts are regarded as 
mere abstractions. This claim, like any claim to absoluteness made on behalf of any 
range of description must be regarded as incoherent: it is unable to demonstrate its 
own special relationship to that which it describes without presupposing that which is 
to be explained, namely that very relationship. In view of this, the 'exposure' of 
morality on the basis of the sort of objective, socio-historical view produced by the 
materialist conception of history must be regarded as a failure.
The foundationalist character of historical materialism and the rejection of 
morality which follows from it, provide us with reasons for thinking that Marxist social 
criticism is not simply utopian, but rather that it is basically incoherent and necessarily 
morally inarticulate. In view of this it cannot serve as a useful model of social criticism. 
This may be a surprising conclusion to many 'Marxists', who, as Cohen observes, 
regard Marxism as providing a basically moral critique of capitalism.22 Others, 
however, have been happy to acknowledge that Marxist ideology critique carries no 
moral force, taking the view that Marxism's criticism has a strictly 'scientific' character, 
which is to say that it simply exposes ideology as false and in so doing enables the 
working class to see where its true interests lie. This view, that of 'vulgar' or 'scientific' 
Marxism, sees no need for moralising and takes its lead from Marx's frequent attacks 
on utopian, moralistic, socialism, and his insistence that communism was not an ideal 
to be established, but was rather the real movement of history toward the abolition of 
class society, a movement revealed by historical materialism. Another version of
22 G. A. Cohen notes that there is, nonetheless, 'a tension between the Marxist commitment to the 
advance of productive power and the Marxist commitment to those at whose expense that 
advancement occurs.' Cohen, 'Freedom, Justice, and Capitalism,' New Left Review 126 (1981), pp. 3-
16. (p. 16).
186
'scientific' Marxism, the orthodox view from Marx's death until the demise of the 
Second International (1889-1914), typically regarded class struggle as of secondary 
importance, and accorded primacy to the development of economic forces.23 On this 
economic determinist account, Marxism as science grasped the movement of history, 
but did not itself influence it. Its function was not that of social criticism because it was 
a mistake to suppose that the course of history could be altered by redescribing the 
world in order to motivate the working class to engage in revolutionary activity. .
It must be recognised that even this scientific critique of ideology is a failure, 
however, because it assumes the truth of the descriptions and explanations constructed 
with the aid of the concepts of historical materialism.24 As Lukacs insisted, Marxism 
cannot consistently exempt itself from the materialist analysis, and this means that it 
must include itself within the objective description of the world which it offers.25 To 
suppose that everything except the truth of historical materialism is to be understood 
historically would clearly be contradictory. On Lukacs' view, the possibility of 
historical materialism only presents itself as a certain stage in history, and being the 
product of bourgeois society in crisis, it is not strictly applicable to other eras of 
history as 'vulgar' Marxism had supposed. While this is a more consistent and a more 
objective Marxism, in that it includes itself within its own analysis, it does not remove 
the problem of relativism which simply went unacknowledged by 'scientific' Marxism, 
for, on Lukacs' view, not only the concepts of morality but also those of epistemology 
are the products of a particular social formation and are only applicable within that
23 See Karl Korsch's discussion of Hilferding's 'scientific' Marxism in Marxism and Philosophy. 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp.60-5. Also, Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin. 
(London: New Left Books, 1972).
24 This diminishes the significance of the distinction between negative and positive conceptions of 
ideology in the Marxist tradition, for both are undermined by the relativism required by historical 
materialism, even if this is not recognised by those who subscribe to the negative view, i.e. the view 
which regards ideology critique as opposing falsehood. See Jorge Larrain for this distinction: The 
Concept of Ideology.
25 Lukacs argues that historical materialism must be 'applied to itself despite the problems of 
relativism which this poses. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p.228.
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formation.26 If we were to adopt this view as reasoning agents, then truth would 
become 'true for us at this point in history'. This is the same sort of revision of our 
concepts advocated by Rorty, and it is subject to the same objections: ultimately we 
have no reason to suppose that the objective view is the correct one to adopt with 
respect to these concepts. Lukacs' Hegelian Marxism is incoherent just like any other 
form of relativism, in that if it is held to be true then it is false, and for this reason it 
false. It is clear then that a historical materialist social criticism is not possible, even if 
it seeks to retain truth while abandoning morality, for this version too, is still 
incoherent.
By focusing on the foundationalist claim made for historical materialism as 
subject to the incoherence attendant on any foundationalist claim, it should be clear 
that Marxist analysis cannot be saved by rejecting 'economic determinism' and 
affirming the possibility that elements of the legal and political superstructure are free 
to effect social change. Certainly, unless one adopts the view that class struggle can 
bring about social transformation, there is no obvious motivation for engaging in social 
criticism, but arguing that class struggle is possible is not enough to show that Marxist 
social criticism is viable. The virtue of a Hegelian Marxism such as Lukacs' is taken to 
be that it treats society as a 'totality' of mutually interdependent elements as opposed to 
distinguishing between an economic base as an independent causal variable, and an 
ideological superstructure which is then determined by it.27 Firstly, however, the move 
to 'totality' from the base-superstructure model does not seem to prevent most 
Marxists from believing that the economy remains fundamental in the last instance and 
if this move were to signify a break with 'ecnonomism' it would conflict with Marx's
26 'The substantive truths of historical materialism are of the same type as were the truths of classical 
economics in Marx's view: they are truths within a particular social order and system of production.
As such, but only as such, their claim to validity is absolute. But this does not preclude the emergence 
of societies in which by virtue of their different social structure other categories and other systems of 
truth prevail.' Luk&cs, History and Class Consciousness, p.228.
27 Allen Wood suggests that we must adopt a Hegelian view of the relations between the economic 
foundation and the legal and political superstructure, i.e. a view which treats these as moments within 
the development of the social totality, rather than in terms of two variables, one of which is causally 
determined by the other. Wood, 'The Marxian Critique of Justice,' pp. 9-11.
188
insistence on the primacy of economic factors in producing social change.28 Secondly, 
the precise causal role given to the economy or to the superstructure is strictly beside 
the point: even if we grant that economic forces have no special weight as motors of 
social change, the historical materialist outlook is still one which adopts an objective, 
external view of society and of our moral and epistemological concepts, such that we 
are dissociated from our standpoint as agents within society when we adopt this 
outlook. It is the foundational status accorded to this perspective which is the root of 
the problem with Marxism as a putative form of social criticism, and not 'economic 
determinism', for the incoherence remains even when determinism is denied.
This dissociation is evident in Lukacs' treatment of the class struggle. While he 
criticises the 'economism' of scientific Marxism for neglecting the role of 'violence' in 
bringing about historical change, his account of class struggle is curiously disengaged 
in the sense that he wants to say that it is an activity engaged in by free, intentional 
agents on one hand, while on the other hand his objective analysis compels him to 
speak of it as a happening, an event occurring in accordance with the 'profounder 
historical forces which in reality control events'29 He says of the consciousness of the 
proletariat:
...this consciousness is nothing but the expression of historical 
necessity. The proletariat 'has no ideals to realise'. When its 
consciousness is put into practice it can only breathe life into the things 
which the dialectics of history have forced into a crisis; it can never 'in
28 Lukacs himself says, 'Ideological factors do not really 'mask' economic interests, they are not 
merely banners and slogans: they are the parts, the components of which the real struggle is made. Of 
course if historical materialism is to be deployed to discover the sociological meaning of these 
struggles, economic interests will doubtless be revealed as decisive factors in any explanation.' 
Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, p.58.
29 Lukacs, 'The Changing function of historical materialism', History and Class Consciousness, p.224.
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practice' ignore the course of history, forcing on it what are no more 
than its own desires or knowledge.30
On one hand, historical materialism, is represented as a 'weapon' in the class struggle, 
but on the other hand, it stands in the same relation to events that Hegel believed 
philosophy to stand, which is to say, outside them, comprehending them as they come 
to pass, like the wisdom of Minerva.31
Nonetheless, a number of Marxists have wanted to say that Marxism provides a 
moral critique of capitalism. The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, for example, 
while eschewing discussion of morality, is motivated by the sense that capitalism is not 
only doomed by the 'iron-laws' of history, as it were, but also by the sense that it is 
ethically unacceptable.32 There are two chief strands of opinion regarding the place of 
moral concepts within Marxism: firstly, there is the view that Marxism contains a 
theory of justice according to which capitalism is an unjust social order; secondly, 
there is the view that while Marx was a critic of justice and morality in the sense that 
the latter consists of a body of moral principles, he has an ethic of emancipation 
centred on the concept of alienation.33 On this latter view communism will not be a
30 Lukacs, 'Reification and class consciousness', History and Class Consciousness, p. 178.
31 Lukdcs argues that the emergence of a self-conscious capitalism is a sign of its imminent 
dissolution, for only when a form of life has fully developed and is on the verge of being superseded, 
can it be comprehended. The same must be true too of the consciousness of the proletariat, in which 
the emergence of historical materialism must be a sign that class society is on the verge of being 
overcome. In neither case is consciousness accorded a determining role in bringing about the 
dissolution of social relations, but is rather viewed externally, as a 'symptom' of deeper processes 
which it can only reflect. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, pp.58-9.
32 See for example Herbert Marcuse: 'Concentration camps, mass exterminations, world wars, and 
atom bombs are no 'relapse into barbarism' but the unrepressed implementation of the achievements of 
modem science, technology and domination. And the most effective subjugation and destruction of 
man takes place at the height of civilisation, when the material and intellectual attainments of 
mankind seem to allow the creation of a truly free world.' Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation. (1956) 
(London: Ark, 1987), p.4.
33 As suggested above, the 'moral' Marx is something of a latecomer, as Marxist orthodoxy initially 
accepted that he was a critic of morality. Norman Geras notes that the literature on Marx and justice 
which he surveyed amounted to 'three dozen items all but one of which have appeared since 1970',
190
more just social order, but will rather be a society beyond justice, in which people will 
have been liberated from the various forms of alienation which pertained previously.
Allen Wood, while taking Marx to be a critic of morality per se, suggested that 
consistent with his materialist analysis of concepts like justice he would have judged 
capitalism 'just' according to the principles of justice proper to capitalist society.34 
Those who argue that Marx condemned capitalism as unjust point, however, to the 
references to capitalism as 'robbery' and 'embezzlement' with which Marx's writings are 
peppered, and also to the suggestion that communist society will be organised around 
a needs based theory of justice, in contrast to the 'contribution principle' which governs 
capitalism. Husami, for example, argues that because capitalism is a class divided 
society, it must contain a second, proletarian conception of justice and that 
consequently Marx need not accept capitalism's view of itself as just: an alternative 
view is possible, consistent with historical materialism.35 While Husami criticises Wood 
for confusing Marx's 'sociology of morals' with his 'Marxian moral theory' his own 
view of the clash between proletarian and bourgeois justice is itself 'sociological' in the 
sense that as in Lukacs' theory, the superiority of the proletarian conception is not 
explained in terms of the contents of the theory itself, but rather in terms of its being 
the theory of the 'rising class' as identified by historical materialism.36
The claim that Marx had a developed theory of justice is not textually 
convincing however: the reference to a principle of needs based distribution itself 
occurs in the same text in which justice and rights are condemned as 'obsolete verbal
suggesting that for the most part Marxists have either accepted that Marxism is not an form of ethical 
social criticism or that they have failed to recognise the tension between the demands of historical 
materialism and those of morality. Geras, 'The Controversy about Marx and justice,' New Left Review 
150 (1985), pp.47-88. (p.48).
34 'Whatever else capitalism may be for Marx, it does not seem that it is unjust.' Wood, 'The Marxian 
critique of justice,' p. 3.
35 Ziyad I. Husami, 'Marx on distributive justice' in Marx, justice, and history, pp.42-79.
36 'The rising class as the harbinger of the new society, embodies the future outlook, the outlook that 
will become dominant. In its struggle with the declining class, it criticises the declining society in 
terms of the would-be ruling norms. Class conflicts are reflected in conflicts of ideas.' Husami, Marx 
on distributive justice', p.49-50.
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rubbish', and it hardly amounts to a developed theory of justice.37 The fact that Marx's 
works contain numerous moral condemnations of the injustice of capitalism, but no 
attempt to elaborate a coherent moral critique of capitalism, indeed, that they contain 
on the contrary a coherent explanation of the pointlessness of such an attempt, 
suggests that it is more difficult to avoid morality than critics of morality might 
suppose.38
Others have made an altogether more convincing case for the view that Marx 
possesses an ethical outlook of an altogether different character, one based on the 
critique of alienation. This critique rests on a substantive account of human nature and 
the good life as that of self-realisation, in order to criticise capitalism as dehumanising 
on account of the way social relations alienate people from their true nature and 
prevent their self-realisation. History is tending toward the abolition of dehumanising, 
bourgeois institutions and in their place will be established a technologically developed 
communist society, characterised by abundance and the absence of social conflict, as 
private property and classes will have been themselves abolished. As Buchanan argues, 
this model of an unalienated humanity, no longer in the circumstances of justice, 
namely, scarcity, will have no need of principles of justice. Furthermore, this goal can 
motivate an ethical critique of the dehumanising effects of capitalism.39 The strength 
of this view is that it is consistent with the critique of morality as an individualising
37 Jon Elster observes that Marx's remarks do not amount to a theory but only 'useful first 
approximations'. Having said that, he takes the view that while Marx may have thought of justice in a 
non-relativist way himself, communism is conceived rightly or wrongly as a society beyond justice. 
Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.92-3.
38 Geras claims that Marx thought that capitalism was unjust but 'did not think that he thought so'. 
Marx was no moral philosopher, he notes, and consistently criticised those socialists who attempted to 
advance a moral critique of capitalism. Nonetheless, he could not avoid letting his own moral 
disapproval of capitalism show through in his writings from time to time. Geras, apparently 
deliberately, skirts what is clearly the real issue in this controversy, i.e. whether a normative critique 
of capitalism is consistent with historical materialism? Geras, 'The Controversy about Marx and 
justice,' p.72.
39 Allen Buchanan, Marx and Justice. (London: Methuen, 1982). Also his 'Marx, morality, and 
history: an assessment of recent analytical work on Marx,' Ethics 98 (1987), pp. 104-36.
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abstraction, which, contrary to the true nature of humanity, represents human relations 
in terms of conflict between rights-bearing individuals.
While this view is superior in this respect to the claim that Marx thought 
capitalism unjust, it is still subject to the criticism that it is itself not consistent with 
historical materialism. As Lukacs' version of Marxism makes abundantly clear, the idea 
that communism represents emancipation from alienating or reifying bourgeois social 
relations is not itself sufficient to warrant the view that Marxism is a form of ethical 
social criticism, for this can form part of an objective interpretation of history as a 
process in which man is alienated from his true humanity, only to have it restored again 
at a higher level as history works itself out. It would remain the case then that 
communism is the 'real movement of history' rather than an ethical ideal to be 
established. To adopt the critique of alienation as an ethical ideal would still come into 
conflict with the objective standpoint of historical materialism, in which alienation is a 
necessary element of the historical process, and not simply an evil to be combated. The 
differences between the morality of justice and the ethic of freedom pale into 
insignificance against the basic conflict between the subjective view of the 
ethical/moral subject and the objective explanation of that view from the standpoint of 
historical materialism.
Even if it were not the case that 'ethical Marxism' remains unavoidably 
inconsistent with historical materialism, it is not clear that the critique of alienation is 
an attractive model of social criticism in itself. This is because it is incapable of 
recognising the fact of pluralism. One way in which this is reflected is in the fact that 
the critique of alienation does not in any way counter Marx's consistently dismissive 
attitude to politics, because politics and the idea that we may relate to one another as 
citizens, with the particular rights and obligations that this entails, is itself taken to be a 
mystifying, alienating way of relating to one another. Even if we regard Marxism as a 
form of social criticism premised on an ethic of emancipation then, it would not alter 
the orthodox Marxist interpretation of the political sphere as something we must be 
emancipated from , rather than something we must participate in. Relatively 'political'
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Marxists like Gramsci, who attached considerable weight to political activity and the 
construction of hegemony, still reflect an attitude to politics which is strictly strategic, 
an attitude in which politics is treated solely in terms of strategies for acquiring 
power.40 The only consideration, even on the ethical view, is that of hastening the 
establishment of communism, and even those who defend the notion that Marxism is a 
form of ethical criticism admit that it has fostered an overly cynical attitude to political 
conduct.41
This attitude to politics reflects a deeper problem within the ethic of 
emancipation with respect to pluralism, which is to say, the view that people may 
legitimately differ on questions of ethics and morality. This is reflected in Marx's 
attitude to the phenomenon of situation, which as we have seen, is typically brought in 
to explain the fact of pluralism. Historians of political thought make use of the idea to 
explain why persons situated in different contexts hold beliefs quite different to those 
held by contemporary readers; feminist standpoint theorists use the idea to insist on the 
idea that there exist distinctly gendered ways of thinking about the world; and moral 
particularists like Rorty and Walzer use the idea to explain the plurality of beliefs 
located at the level of cultures and societies. While each of these uses of situation 
differs from the others in some way, namely, in the way that they draw the line 
between situations, for example, between genders, eras, or cultures, and, while they 
differ in their understanding of the implications of this for understanding and moral
40 See Gramsci's military conception of politics in the Selections from the Prison Notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.) (London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1973), pp.229-41.
41 Buchanan argues that Marxists have failed to address the problem of revolutionary morality in 
Marxism and Justice. Geras, for his part, concludes his survey with a remarkable condemnation of 
Marxist cynicism, saying that, 'there is a real and deep-seated inconsistency on Marx's part, and one 
with not very happy effects. Some of these may have been innocent enough: the many socialists who 
have simply followed him in the same obfuscation, confusing both themselves and others, in one 
breath denying the normative standpoint clear as noonday in what they say in the next. Not so 
innocent, within the complex of historical causes of the crimes and tragedies which have disgraced 
socialism, is the moral cynicism that has sometimes dressed itself in the authority of traditional 'anti- 
ethical' pronouncements. Geras, 'The controversy about Marx and justice,' p.87. Steven Lukes argues 
that while it is correct to say that Marx adopts an ethic of emancipation rather than a morality of 
'Rechf, this ethic is unreasonably dismissive of the idea of human rights, and cannot constitute an 
adequate ethical outlook. Lukes, Marxism and Morality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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judgement, all use it to explain the fact of pluralism, regardless of the level at which 
this pluralism is thought to be located. The Marxist deployment of the idea that we are 
situated in different contexts differs from all of these, in that there is thought to be only 
one significant form of situation, namely, class situation, and this is thought to be 
basically transitory, i.e. capable of being abolished. This is not a contingent feature of 
Marx's analysis but is rather built into the substantive view of human nature as 
cooperative and creative on which his perfectionist ethic rests, one which regards the 
harmony of communist society as a necessary consequence of the elimination of 
alienation.42
This view fails first of all to recognise that there are other, non-class based 
ways in which we are situated with respect to one another, such as gender and 
ethnicity - situations which would not be abolished even if we were to abolish class 
situations. The ethic of emancipation, conceived as emancipation from situation, is 
necessarily incapable of recognising differences between people and on account of this 
it is powerless to offer guidance as to how we should respond to these differences. 
While we are inevitably situated in particular societies, roles, traditions, institutions and 
identities, this is not to say that one situation is as good as any other: some identities 
we assume in virtue of our situation may be implicated in dehumanising and oppressive 
relationships, as class identities clearly are, and as many forms of gender and ethnic 
identities are; What we require, however, are moral principles to help guide us in our 
judgements as to what identities and practices, or what aspects of these, are illegitimate 
and also to help us determine what we may reasonably do about this. The suggestion 
that we could simply transcend our situatedness altogether, which is Marx's 
suggestion, seems on one hand to require the impossible of us, while on the other 
offering little practical guidance as to how we are to make our way in a world 
characterised by such pluralism. The conclusion we must draw from these 
considerations is that a viable form of social criticism must be equipped to offer such
42 See Marcuse's Eros and Civilisation.
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guidance, and that the Marxist ethic of freedom cannot therefore constitute such a 
form of criticism. Social criticism must proceed by giving people reasons to transform 
their belief. On account of its relativism with respect to truth and morality, Marxism 
cannot provide the basis of such criticism.
The strategy of Marxist social criticism, namely, that of exposing power 
relations at work in diverse, and apparently unrelated, phenomena, by tracing their 
connections to wider social forces has tremendous redescriptive force. However, the 
force of this criticism is weakened to the extent that historical materialism is hostile to 
normative deliberation. To be sure, this is usually overlooked by Marxist social critics, 
who espouse a broadly egalitarian ethical outlook, but it has traditionally rendered 
Marxist social criticism unable to engage in detailed normative deliberation of the sort 
required in the conduct of criticism in a world characterised by ethical conflict. It will 
be argued in the next section that the successor to ideology-critique, namely, 
Foucauldian genealogy, is similarly handicapped by an antipathy to normative 
deliberation. To this extent there is a basic continuity with Marxism which underlies 
the apparent conflict between these styles of criticism, that between a dialectical 
philosophy of history and the Nietzsche-inspired insistence on plurality and 
discontinuity. This is not to say that the relations of Marxism to Foucauldian genealogy 
are uncontroversial within the left. On the contrary, many are explicitly concerned with 
the dubious ethical import of Foucauldian critique. As the foregoing will have 
indicated, however, it is not at all clear that Marxism is any more normatively sound 
than is its successor.
Foucauldian Genealogy as Social Criticism
Increasingly dissatisfied with the perceived shortcomings of Marxism, radical 
social critics have come to adopt a basically post-Marxist stance, and the critique of 
ideological mystifications has been superseded by the analysis of discourse as the chief
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form of radical social criticism. Marxism is thought to be too reductionist in the sense 
that it mistakenly treats class identities and antagonisms as the fundamental explanation 
for social conflict. This has the consequence that Marxism treats other forms of 
conflict and alternative identities such as gender and ethnicity as of only secondary 
importance. If these divisions cannot be explained in terms of class conflict, however, 
then the Marxist ideal of human emancipation is thrown into question. Post-Marxists 
like Laclau and Mouffe think that radicals must consequently break with the 'classism' 
of the Marxist tradition, break, that is, with the 'ontological privilege' accorded to class 
relations in the Marxist analysis of society and social change.43 This 'classism', they 
insist, is at work even in the work of popular Western Marxists like Gramsci, who is 
widely thought of as offering an alternative, less reductionist analysis of politics and 
culture than that provided by Marxist orthodoxy. The rejection of 'classism', they 
argue, also entails the rejection of the model of revolutionary action as the means by 
which social antagonisms will be abolished once and for all. This 'Jacobin imaginary' 
must give way to a model of society and politics in which plurality and antagonism are 
seen to be permanent features of the social world.
Because there is no privileged fissure in society which will abolish all 
antagonisms when it is overcome, we should no longer think of politics in terms of the 
model of one great revolutionary cataclysm, after which all antagonisms will have been 
abolished. The construction of hegemony is no longer to be thought of as a 
precondition for this revolutionary outbreak because any hegemony is necessarily 
fragile on account of the plurality of 'subject positions' which persons may occupy. 
Herbert Marcuse, by contrast, had turned to students as a potential agent of 
revolutionary change when it became apparent that the post-war proletariat could not 
be counted on to perform this role, but while breaking with orthodoxy on this point, he 
remained in the grip of the revolutionary imaginary, hoping for a 'Great Refusal' which
43 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. (London: Verso, 1985).
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would then be followed by total human emancipation.44 Laclau and Mouffe, however, 
recognise that because it is possible to find oneself aligned in different ways depending 
upon the issue at hand. One could be both worker and patriarch, feminist and racist; 
antagonisms cannot be abolished once and for all, nor can any be singled out as 
fundamental in the way that Marxism had singled out class antagonism.45 This break 
with revolutionary politics and the sociology of identifying potential revolutionary 
subjects leads them to a rediscovery of politics and the espousal of a commitment to 
radical democracy.
This analysis has the idea of plurality at its centre: a plurality of identities and 
possible conflicts attendant upon these. This new analysis requires in turn a new form 
of social criticism, not one which regards plurality as a form of alienation from our 
essential humanity, but one which will undermine hegemonic constructions of identity, 
a social criticism conceived as the critique of identity. In order to elaborate a model of 
anti-essentialist social criticism, post-Marxists have turned to the work of Michel 
Foucault and his conception of discourse and the archaeology, or genealogy, thereof 
has increasingly replaced ideology critique as the leading form of radical social 
criticism.46 While Foucauldian social criticism is not subject to the charge that it 
neglects plurality, it remains open to the charge that it unnecessarily excludes moral 
considerations from the conduct of social criticism, and in this respect it is ultimately as 
self-defeating as ideology critique.
In Chapter One we saw that Foucault's notion of a discursive formation, or 
practice, is thought of as constituting a certain level of description, permitting one to 
systematically relate a variety of objects, speakers, strategies and rules. This idea, that
44 See Marcuse, An Essav on Liberation. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
45 They claim that 'unfixity1 is the condition of all social identities. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, p.85.
46 See, for example, Jana Sawicki's use of Foucauldian ideas to criticise the essentialism of 
'matemalist' treatments of women's identities, 'Foucault, feminism and questions of identity,' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Gary Gutting (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp.286-313.
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systematic relations pertain which stretch across traditional boundaries like the oeuvre 
or discipline, is something the notion of discourse has in common with that of 
ideology, namely, the idea that a book, statement, film, a picture or a piece of music 
might all be related to one another as instances of a larger whole, an ideology. There 
are a number of important differences however. Foucault insists that the analysis of 
discourse is not to be thought of as 'interpretation', by which he means that one traces 
the systematic relations between elements of a discourse not in order to find a hidden, 
essential truth lying behind the appearances.47 By contrast ideology critique proceeds 
by uncovering the secret truth behind the mystifying appearance of ideology.48 The 
analyst of discourse however, should, Foucault says, avoid treating discourse as 
'allegorical', which is to say, as a version of some deeper truth. The analyst should 
rather seek to remain focused on its 'positivity'.49
One feature of this notion of the positivity of discourse is that discourse is not 
thought of, as ideology was, in terms of a strict division pertaining between ideas and 
reality, in which the former were treated as mere reflections of reality. While Marxism 
frequently insists that ideas are to be studied in terms of their effects and that ideology 
is something 'real', it nonetheless struggled with the tension between these claims and 
the materialist premise from which Marxism proceeds.50 Instead of trying to balance 
the competing views that ideas simply reflect reality on one hand, but that they are part 
of it, and have effects within it, on the other, discourse, in common with the treatment 
of language found in the work of Austin and Wittgenstein, is regarded as a practice, a
47 Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that in this respect, Foucault's method constitutes a clear break with 
both structural analysis and hermeneutics in Michel Foucault: bevond structuralism and hermeneutics. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
48 Lukacs, for example, while he holds a 'positive' theory of ideology, nonetheless believes that there 
is such a thing as 'false consciousness' and that Marxism dispels it by penetrating 'beneath the surface' 
of appearances. Luk&cs, History and Class Consciousness, p.224. It should be noted, however, that 
there is a passage in The Archaeology of Knowledge in which Foucault speaks as if discourse and 
ideology may exist alongside one another, rather than that the one replaces the other. This underlines 
the way in which Foucault is less concerned with Marxism than with Phenomenology.
49 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 125.
50 See Korsch's argument to the effect that Marxism must see ideology as something 'real'.
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way of acting in the world, and not as a reflection of that world.51 Discourse is 
analysed in terms of its function and effects and not in terms of the adequacy of its 
representations. In this way it avoids the limitations of the representationalist treatment 
of ideas which Marxism cannot quite free itself from, and the implied reductionism of 
the contrast between ideas and reality. Some have argued that this entails a form of 
idealism, but this is mistaken, for by treating language as action, and discourse as a 
social institution, rather than as a reflection of social reality, we do not deny the 
existence of an independent world, although the foundationalist idea that we could 
compare the world as it is with the world as it is discursively constructed, is obviously 
rejected.52 Foucault's interest in the discursive construction of objects, like sexuality, is 
consistent with the conceptual pluralism set out in Chapter Two and simply challenges 
the claim that there are ways of conceiving the world which are not themselves already 
interpretations of it. This is the significance of the rejection of 'interpretation', and it 
should be clear that it does not in fact conflict with the pluralist understanding of 
interpretation set out in earlier chapters.
Finally, the refusal to treat discourse in terms of allegory means that while 
objects, strategies etc., are systematically related in such a way as to form distinct 
discursive formations, the relationship between discourses is not itself systematic in the 
way that all the different legal, political, and religious elements of the ideological 
superstructure were thought to be tied together in virtue of their relation to the mode 
of production of a given society. Foucault, by contrast, insists upon the specificity of 
discourse and, while it is by no means illegitimate to compare different discourses and 
look for identities and differences, we should take care, he thinks, to remember that 
such comparisons are 'always limited and regional'.53
51 See Emesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 'Post-Marxism without apologies' in Laclau, New 
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. (London: Verso, 1990). Also Michele Barret, The Politics 
of Truth. (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
52 See for example Terry Eagleton's fear that 'discourse' abandons the idea of a language independent 
world altogether Ideology. (London: Verso, 1991).
53 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 159.
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Where Marxist ideology critique is guided by the desire to discover a hidden 
identity, Foucault's archaeology or genealogy of discourse places its emphasis rather 
upon the local and the specific. The resistance to ideas of identity, essence and origin is 
the guiding thread connecting Foucault's studies. While his work has been taken up as 
a response to the perceived deficiencies of Marxism, he himself has drawn attention to 
the influence of Nietzsche upon his thought and the fact that his initial intellectual 
motivation was to find an alternative to phenomenological ideas about the centrality of 
the subject to understanding the world in virtue of its supposedly meaning-constitutive 
role.54 To adopt this phenomenological outlook would be to regard discourse as 
unified and in principle traceable to a single point of origin, an origin provided by the 
speaking subject.55 Foucault's idea of archaeology is rather conceived as a way of 
studying ideas which would resist the tendency to discover unity, or continuities 
provided by such origins.56
The idea of an archaeology of discourse is usually contrasted with Foucault's 
later notion of a 'genealogy' of discourse, insofar as the latter is taken to be concerned 
with power, while this is absent from his conception of archaeology. In fact, the 
'switch' from archaeology to genealogy signifies less a change of approach or method 
as much as a shift of focus, or theme on Foucault's part, from a concern with the 
history of the sciences to an interest in disciplinary techniques. The idea of an analysis 
which is a critique of identity remains constant.57 The idea of genealogy, he says,
54 Foucault remarks of his intellectual development that 'the first people who had recourse to 
Nietzsche were not looking for a way out of Marxism. They wanted a way out of phenomenology.' 
Foucault, 'Critical theory/intellectual history' in Foucault: politics, philosophy, culture. L. 0.
Kritzman (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1988), p.24. In another interview he remarks, 'Nietzsche was a 
revelation to me. I felt that there was someone quite different from what I had been taught. I read him 
with great passion and broke with my life, left my job in the asylum, left France: I had the feeling I 
had been trapped. Through Nietzsche I had become a stranger to all that.' Foucault, 'Truth, Power,
Self: an interview' in Technologies of the Self. L. H. Martin, H. Gutman and P. H. Hutton (eds.) 
(London: Tavistock, 1988), p. 13.
55 Foucault, 'What is an author?' Language. Counter-Memory. Practice.
56 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.203.
57 This is obvious from his remarks at the end of the Archaeology in which he maps out his 
subsequent interests, as possible spheres in which the idea of archaeology might be applied.
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indicates a way of tracing the descent of ideas which is non-teleological, it is 'not the 
erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered 
immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what 
was imagined consistent with itself.'58 From the point of view of the genealogist, while 
it is the case that the present has come to be the way it is on account of the past, it 
could have been otherwise and the aim of genealogy is to expose the identities, unities 
and essences of the teleological reading of history as contingencies and in so doing 
reveal a plurality of possible alternatives: 'the purpose of history, guided by genealogy, 
is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation.'59
Foucauldian social criticism, as an archaeology, or genealogy, of discourse, is 
basically a critique of identity, of essentialism, aimed at the liberation of alternatives. 
Given this determination not to treat discourse as a mask for some more basic 
description, or analysis of the world, for example, one which reveals class at work 
behind every appearance, the products of this criticism appear rather disparate: there 
are books on the history of medicine and the sciences, on prisons and on sexuality. 
However, while he has frequently insisted that each work be read in isolation from the 
others: readers should avoid organising them into a unity centred on the concepts of 
the author or the oeuvre, Foucault has equally offered a variety of interpretations of 
the unity of his work: for example, that he has been concerned with 'the different 
modes by which in our culture human beings are made subject.'60 In a late interview he 
says:
I tried to locate three major types of problems: the problem of truth,
the problem of power, and the problem of individual conduct. These
58 Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Language. Counter-Memorv. Practice, p. 147.
59 Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, p. 162.
60 'I should like to say, first of all, what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It 
has not been to analyse the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis.' 
Foucault, 'The Subject and Power' an Afterword to Michel Foucault: bevond structuralism and 
hermeneutics. H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, p.208.
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three domains of experience can only be understood in relation to each 
other, not independently. What bothered me about the previous books 
is that I considered the first two experiences without taking the third 
into account.61
The guiding idea throughout is the critique of identity: the concern with truth, power, 
and individual conduct, or subjectivity, forms the basis of what he has called his 
'critical ontology of the present', a historical enterprise which will show the 
contingencies at work in the ways our identities have been constituted.62 I want to 
start by examining the connections made between power and truth first of all, before 
discussing the connection between power, subjectivity, and morality. I will argue that 
while a case may be made for denying that Foucault adopts a reductive attitude to 
truth, the same cannot be said of his treatment of morality.
Foucault makes three central points about power. Firstly, he contrasts 
the traditional conception of power in terms of sovereignty, that is, power as 
centralised, with the idea of power as a network. By this he means that power is 
dispersed throughout the social body. Secondly, where power is customarily thought 
of in negative terms, as prohibition or repression, Foucault would rather have us see it 
as productive. Thirdly, where power has been contrasted with truth, as it is in the 
Marxist idea of ideology, in which possession of the truth is thought to be
61 Foucault, 'Return of Morality' in Foucault: politics, philosophy, culture, p.243.
62 Foucault suggests that there is a choice to be made between 'a critical philosophy that will present 
itself as an analytic philosophy of truth in general, o r ... a critical thought that will take the form of, 
'an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present; it is this form of philosophy that, from Hegel, 
through Nietzsche and Max Weber to the Frankfurt School, has founded a form of reflection in which 
I have tried to work.' Foucault, 'The Art of Telling the Truth' in Foucault: politics, philosophy, 
culture, p. 95. Elsewhere Foucault argues that there is a connection between his own enterprise of 'a 
critical ontology of ourselves' and Kant's, in 'What is Enlightenment?', in that both are engaged on 
critical reflection upon the role of their philosophical work in the context of their times. Foucault, 
'What is Enlightenment?' in The Foucault Reader. Paul Rabinow (ed.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1986).
203
emancipatory, Foucault insists that the two are intimately related. Indeed, power 
produces bodies of knowledge and truth: it is creative, not repressive.63
The idea that knowledge and power are linked is not itself especially original. 
Their connection is discussed, for example, in Francis Bacon's project for an inductive 
science.64 Foucault however reverses this relationship. Marxism presupposed a clear 
distinction between ideology and science, with science serving to demystify capitalist 
social relations. On this model, power would seem to reside with the bourgeoisie, 
while truth lies on the other side, with the proletariat. Foucauldian criticism cannot rest 
on such an assumption however, because, on Foucault's account, knowledge cannot be 
thought of as essentially opposed to power because 'truth is already power.'65 It would 
appear then that Foucauldian criticism is not epistemological in the way that scientific 
Marxist ideology critique was. Even studying the relationship between power and truth 
may not be innocent, because there is no sense in which we are ever outside power 
relations: 'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere.'66 Discovering the truth about our situation will not 
necessarily set us free.
63 See Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, (1976) R. Hurley (trans.), (Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1978), pp.82-97. Also Foucault, Two Lectures' and 'Truth and Power' in Power/Knowledge. 
C. Gordon (ed.) (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).
64 'For there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of state in the spirits and souls of 
men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.' 
Bacon, The Advancement of Learning. (1605) (London: Dent, 1915), p.65. Note the discussion of 
Bacon in relation to the development of the Enlightenment in Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. (1944) John Cumming (trans.) (London: Verso, 1979).
65 'It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera; for 
truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the system of hegemony, social, 
economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.' One might argue that the 
'traditional' model of the relations between power and truth does not simply oppose them as Foucault 
suggests: knowledge is commonly said to be power after all. It may be the case that what Foucault has 
in mind is that unjust exercises of power may not be opposed by an appeal to truth, while the 
conventional assumption is that truth and justice will not come into conflict. Foucault is at pains not 
to include the category of justice within his account of power, however, save in the sense that it 
belongs to an outmoded conception of power. Foucault, 'Truth and Power’, p. 133.
66 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1, p. 93.
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This apparent identification of knowledge and power seems to open up the 
prospect of a different sort of reduction: one which sees power, newly liberated from 
the interpretive framework of the class struggle, everywhere, behind, or perhaps 
flowing through all areas of social life including the activities of social criticism itself. 
Detaching power from the class struggle has the effect of alerting us to hitherto 
unnoticed exercises of power but it appears to involve little more than a slightly more 
sophisticated version of the sort of objective socio-historical standpoint adopted by 
historical materialists, one which explains 'truth' as the effect of power. If this were so, 
then Foucault would be open to the same anti-foundationalist criticism to which Marx 
was subject.
However, there are some indications that an alternative reading is possible. 
Firstly, he has insisted that despite his loose remarks about truth being 'already power', 
his interest, all along, has been in the relations between truth and power: 'The very fact 
that I pose the question of their relation,' he says, 'proves clearly that I do not identify 
them.'67 He insists, for example, that in showing that truth is connected to power 
relations, this does not in any way suggest that it ceases to be truth and, while 'truth' is 
inevitably connected to power, it does make sense, he argues, to suppose that 
knowledge can nonetheless 'separate itself from the practices in which it was formed'.68 
This seems to suggest that power does not make ideas true or false, despite the 
connection of what Foucault might call 'games of truth' with power relations. Indeed, 
Foucault suggests that his analysis of knowledge actually brackets the idea of truth in 
order to see how it functions in society. In this way he can study different conceptions, 
different uses, of 'truth' without offering a judgement as to the ultimate truth of any
67 When I read, and I know it has been attributed to me - the thesis that TCnowledge is power' or 
'Power is knowledge', I begin to laugh, since studying their relation in precisely my problem. If they 
were identical I would not have to study them and I would be spared a lot of fatigue as a result. The 
very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify them.' Foucault, 
Critical Theory/Intellectual History," Foucault: philosophy, politics, culture, p.43.
68 Afterword to Michel Foucault: bevond structuralism and hermeneutics, p. 194.
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one of these.69 This interpretation of Foucault's views on truth and power does not 
entail the relativism with which he is often charged.70 Like J. L. Austin he is simply 
approaching knowledge at a certain level of description, taking sentences as acts, while 
not denying that they can also be taken as propositions which are true or false.71 This 
is not only a more plausible view than the view that power is truth or that it creates 
truth, but it is also consistent with the view that Foucault is a pluralist with respect to 
interpretation and with his resistance to 'allegorical' interpretations of discourse, in 
which power, for example, would turn out to be the hidden meaning of discourse, right 
across the board.72
When we turn to what Foucault has to say about morality, however, the 
situation is more complex, for while conceptual pluralism could render a moral outlook 
compatible with his analysis of the relations between power and subjectivity, Foucault's 
stated view of morality is actively hostile to it and does not invite such a reading. When 
Foucault rejects the ideas of power as 'sovereign' and of power as prohibition he is not 
only making a point at the level of socio-historical analysis: that we should cease to 
analyse power as centralised, possessed ultimately by a ruling class, or vested in the 
State, he also means to exclude a range of questions about power associated with this 
'juridical' conception, namely, about 'right and violence, law and illegality; freedom and
69 'They don't have the same regime of truth as ours, which, it has to be said, is very special, even if it 
has become almost universal. The Greeks had their own. The Arabs of the Maghreb have another. 
And in Iran it is largely modelled on a religion that has an exoteric form and an esoteric content.' 
'Iran, the spirit of a world without spirit,' in Foucault: philosophy, politics, culture, p.223.
70 'All those who say, that, for me, truth doesn't exist are being simplistic.' 'The concern for truth,' 
Foucault: philosophy, politics, culture p.257. Foucault adopts the same attitude to 'reason', observing 
that, 'For me no given form of rationality is actually reason,' 'Critical Theory/Intellectual History' 
Foucault: philosophy, politics, culture p.35.
71 Hoy observes, '...Foucault does not deny truth, but, on the contrary, is interested in uncovering the 
historical conditions that make it seem worthwhile to gather and formulate certain kinds of truth...' 
Hoy, 'A history of consciousness: from Kant and Hegel to Derrida and Foucault,' in History of the 
Human Sciences 4 (1991), pp.261-81.
72 Foucault actually describes himself as a 'pluralist' with respect to his anti-reductionist analysis of 
discourse in Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' in The Foucault Effect. G. Burchell, C. 
Gordon, and P. Miller (eds.) (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.55.
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the will, and especially the state and sovereignty.'73 This conception of power, Foucault 
claims, is essentially a product of monarchy, however, by means of the idea of popular 
sovereignty this anachronism continues to exercise a hold on our imaginations: 'we still 
have not cut off the head of the king.'74 In place of a concern with legality and 
legitimacy we should 'substitute' a focus on the methods by which power is applied, 
and in particular we should focus our attention upon 'the extreme points of its 
application' and at 'the techniques and tactics of domination.'75
The chief reason for this appears to be because these questions belong to the 
idea of power as sovereignty and that this era has passed or is passing as new forms of 
power, which operate in very different ways, have developed. Foucault calls this 'bio­
power' or 'pastoral power' and what he has in mind are the disciplines and knowledges 
associated with the welfare state.76 Bio power, with its statistical techniques and 
'normalising* effects, requires a new set of analytical techniques and, perhaps, a new 
sort of politics in which localised, tactical, resistance replaces the old idea of 
emancipation through a single revolutionary outbreak. Even if this were true, as a 
matter of the sociology of power, it is not clear why we cannot continue to pose 
normative questions about the proper exercise of bio-power.
The answer lies with the Nietzschean basis of Foucault's outlook. One way in 
which this is reflected is in his claim that morality is 'over', that morality is no longer 
possible for the present age:
Modem thought has never, in fact, been able to propose a morality. But 
the reason for this is not because it is pure speculation; on the contrary, 
modem thought, from its inceptions and in its very density, is a certain
73 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1. p. 89.
74 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1. p.89.
75 Foucault, 'Two lectures,' p. 102.
76 Foucault, History of Sexuality Vol. 1, p. 140. Afterword to Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism 
and hermeneutics.
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mode of action. Let those who urge thought to leave its retreat and to 
formulate its choices talk on and let those who seek, without any 
pledge and in the absence of virtue, to establish a morality do as they 
wish. For modem thought no morality is possible. Thought had already 
'left' itself in its own being as early as the nineteenth century; it is no 
longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles,
attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help...........
but liberate or enslave.'77
It is not simply that the exercise of power has altered, by dispersing itself throughout 
society, but also that the 'secret' of morality is now out, as it were, namely that it is a 
form of action and as such it must be regarded as itself an exercise of power.78 
However, a debunking move of this sort leaves itself open to the charge that it simply 
assumes the foundational character of a certain description of morality as action and 
hence as an expression of power. Foucault's resistance to morality must have deeper 
roots than this for his own avowed pluralism is not consistent with this treatment of 
morality.
His hostility to morality actually relies closely on Nietzsche's claim about the 
connections between punishment and identity. Nietzsche argued that morality was 
itself a product of resentment and the desire of the weak to revenge themselves upon 
the strong. This is not picked up by Foucault, but what does inform his views is the 
idea that there is a connection between punishment and the constitution of identity, 
namely, that morality creates identities in order to apportion responsibility and apply
77 Foucault, The Order of Things. (1966) (London: Tavistock, 1970), p.328. Years later Foucault 
reiterated this view in an interview saying that morality was ’now disappearing, has already 
disappeared.' Foucault, 'The Aesthetics of Existence' in Foucault: philosophy, politics, culture, p.49.
78 Foucauldians like Francois Ewald simply endorse this analysis. Foucault and the contemporary 
scene,' Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (1999), pp.81-92.
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punishment.79 While we may have reservations about the claim that morality is an 
expression of resentment, it is clear enough that identity plays a fundamental role in 
concepts like freedom and responsibility, and therefore, in morality. The concept of 
freedom relies on the idea that our actions spring from an identical point of origin, a 
point within ourselves, and even from the same place within ourselves: the conscience, 
reason, or ego. To be driven from without, or by competing impulses from within, 
would mean that we were not free to direct ourselves, but rather that we were, in 
Kant's terminology, 'heteronomous'. Equally, responsibility requires that the moral 
agent must be identical, in some sense, over time in order that he or she may be held 
responsible for past misdeeds, for example. Given the necessary link between morality 
and identity, it becomes apparent that morality as an institution runs directly counter to 
Foucault's genealogical task of dissipating identities.
This Nietzschean understanding of morality is clearly at work in Foucault's 
study of prisons which is, he says, 'intended as a correlative history of the modem soul 
and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex 
from which .the power to punish derives its bases.'80 The emergence of the modem 
prison, he argues, is connected to a host of other developments: techniques for 
disciplining the body, for examining and surveying individuals, present in barracks, 
schools, hospitals and prisons. These techniques should not be thought of as basically 
repressive, he argues, but rather as creative, in the sense that they have created the 
modern individual, which is to say, they have created a conception of humanity as the 
object of concern for an array of experts and administrators.81 The concept of the
79 Nietzsche poses the question of how it was that responsible individuals, creatures with consciences, 
and the 'right to make promises' were created, in the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals.
See also William Connolly on the connection between morality and identity. Connolly, 
Identity/Difference. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
80 Foucault, Discipline and Punish. (1975) A. Sheridan (trans.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991).
81 The holding of examinations 'is at the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as 
effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge' (p. 192). 'We must cease once and for all 
to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', 
it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and
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normal healthy individual is a product of the scientific concern with the abnormal, 
delinquent individual, the criminal.82
Morality must be avoided by the genealogist because it is inevitably caught up 
in the production of prescriptive, essentialist identities. A Marxist-style criticism of 
morality as a form of alienation gets things the wrong way around on this view: it is 
not that morality represses or alienates us from our 'humanity' but rather that it 
produces it in a particular, contestable, way. Such ideas must be subjected to 
genealogical analysis if we are to liberate ourselves from the particular identities and 
'models of freedom' attached to them. For this reason Foucault is resolute in avoiding 
moral prescription, preferring to use his genealogy as a tool for creating spaces for 
freedom by criticising established notions of normality and freedom.
This Nietzschean antipathy to the institution of morality must be borne in mind 
when considering the scope of Foucault's late 'ethical' turn. This centres on the idea of 
freedom, and is presented in terms of an aesthetic project of self-creation. Whereas his 
earlier work seemed to present subjectivity as the product of 'carceral society' and 
argued that, in consequence, 'freedom' was illusory, the later works examine the way in 
which subjects can discipline themselves and in so doing refashion themselves.83 This is
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained from him belong to this 
production.1 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 194.
82 The 'man of modem humanism' is a product of disciplinary techniques. Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish, p. 141. Foucault connects 'humanism' to the idea of normalization, arguing that psychological, 
medical, penitential and educational techniques have created a 'normative' and supposedly 'universal' 
way of being human. This 'humanism' 'presents a certain form of our ethics as a universal model for 
any kind of freedom.' Foucault, 'Truth, power and the self,' p. 15.
83 Lois McNay seems to read too much into the return of the subject in Foucault's later work, seeing in 
it the elaboration of a ethics rather than of the possibility of an ethics. She mistakenly attributes a 
utopian view of the aesthetic to him, which is more properly located in the work of the Frankfurt 
School. Foucault, far from opposing the aesthetics and the instrumental as they did, makes the 
instrumental an essential element of the aesthetic. Lois McNay, Foucault: a critical introduction. 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p. 134. Marli Huijer claims that there is an '...ethical commandment to 
problematise the relationship with 'oneself to work on it and to follow the precept of transforming 
'oneself into a work of art.' Huijer, 'The aesthetics of existence in the work of Michel Foucault,' 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (1999), pp.61-85, (p.81). The source of this 'ethical 
commandment' is, however, not discussed by Huijer.
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not so much a departure from the earlier work as a shift of standpoint, from one which 
viewed subjectivity from afar, emphasising the way in which it is produced behind our 
backs by social institutions, to an internal standpoint, concerned with the problem of 
how subjects may exert power over themselves in order to make new selves for 
themselves. It does not cease to be the case that subjectivity is constituted by social 
processes behind the back of individuals, or that we are situated in such networks of 
power and knowledge, but neither is it the case that we are wholly at their mercy. 
Instead, Foucault emphasises the ever-present possibility of tactical resistance to such 
'domination', arguing that this concept is necessarily tied to that of resistance.84 This 
notion of resistance is altogether more localised and 'tactical' than the Marxist notion 
of a one-off revolutionary act of emancipation. Nor does it entail a particular view of 
the good life, namely, the idea that we are to realise our essential nature and in so 
doing organise ourselves around a set of pre-established, 'truly human' goods and 
virtues. Foucault's ethic of the 'care of the self is a version of the Nietzschean aesthetic 
ideal which Rorty's ironist embodies: it involves the creation of oneself, and not the 
discovery of a true self. As Foucault puts it, 'the main interest in life and work is to 
become someone else that you were not in the beginning.'85
This is an ethical view of sorts, but it is one which is extremely limited, and 
deliberately so because, even here, Foucault wishes to avoid prescription, saying of 
this work that: ....................
People have to build their own ethics, taking as a point of departure the 
historical analysis, sociological analysis and so on, one can provide for 
them. I didn't think that people who try to decipher the truth should
84 Which is not to say that a logical connection such as this means that resistance is always feasible or 
that it is likely to be successful. It does suggest, however, that resistance to power is itself an exercise 
of power and may be implicated in a series of new resistances when it is enacted. There is in this 
sense, no escape from power but only the possibility of reversing the direction in which it flows, and 
of establishing new networks of power relations.
85 Foucault, 'Truth, power and the self,' in Technologies of the Self, p. 9.
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have to provide ethical principles or practical advice at the same 
moment, in the same book and the same analysis. All this prescriptive 
framework has to be elaborated and transformed by people 
themselves.86
His concern is not to offer an ethic as such, but rather to outline a possibility for a sort 
of relationship to oneself that subordinates the search for the truth about oneself to an 
ethical/aesthetic relationship to oneself, a model of which he claims to have found in 
Classical antiquity. It is no part of his project to discuss what sort of identities one 
should try to construct, projects to pursue, or virtues to cultivate.87 Freedom can only 
be exercised as part of an aesthetic commitment to the continual refashioning of the 
self. The purpose of this is not to cultivate virtue, but takes the refashioning, or, 
destruction, of identities, as itself the end.
Foucault's genealogical social criticism runs contrary to Marx's critique of 
alienation. Marx's critique was designed to bring about a world in which conflict 
would be abolished as antagonistic class situations were themselves abolished. 
Foucault, by contrast, envisages a world characterised by endless conflict, a never- 
ending cycle of dispersed, local, tactical resistances to the network of power relations 
in which we are situated. Foucault wants to exclude the possibility of moral 
deliberation because it contradicts the genealogical project of the dissipation of 
identities. If this is supposed to be the dissipation of all identities whatsoever, without 
regard to moral or ethical judgements as to the goodness or legitimacy of these
86 Foucault says here of the History of Sexuality that 'If you mean by ethics a code that would tell us 
how to act then of course the History of Sexuality is not an ethics. But if you mean by ethics the 
relationship you have to yourself when you act, then I would say the it intends to be an ethics, or at 
least show what could be an ethics of sexual behaviour.' Foucault, The Minimalist Self in Foucault: 
philosophy, politics, culture, pp. 14-16.
87 Peter Dews sees Foucault's return to the subject as belated recognition that earlier presentations of 
the subject as no more than an effect of power left no place for freedom in Foucault's scheme. He 
notes, however, Foucault's continued unwillingness to offer ethical/normative indications as to how 
this freedom might be directed, preferring instead the 'advocacy of an arbitrary stylisation of life.' 
Dews, 'The return of the subject in the late Foucault,' Radical Philosophy 51 1988, pp.37-41.
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identities, for example, whether they involve those bearing them in sexist or racist 
social relations, then the critique of identity seems wholly arbitrary. The aim of the 
critique of identities remains unexplained: what is wrong with identity per se that it 
must be dissipated? If there is no moral basis for criticising identity, is it condemned on 
conceptual grounds? Are those categories which we use to identify less 'true' than 
those which we use to distinguish? Ultimately, Foucault not only contradicts his 
'pluralism' but falls into the same trap into which Marxism falls: the claim to offer an 
absolute, objective, understanding of morality, involves genealogy in a claim to 
absoluteness which cannot be made good. Nonetheless, many Foucauldians have taken 
this route, ignoring the problems which attend this claim, and have gone on to 
elaborate a non-moral conception of politics under the banner of 'agonism'. This has 
two elements: firstly, politics is characterised by ineliminable conflict; and secondly, 
that everything is political in the sense that it is 'contestable'. To these two, we might 
add a third: that politics is about conflict: that conflict is the end, not the means to 
some other 'non-political' goal.
Agonistic Politics
An agonistic conception of politics is expounded by post-Marxists like Laclau 
and Mouffe.88 This is a conception of politics which centres on the idea of conflict and 
competition. Against the background of Marxism's basically anti-political stance this, it 
is claimed, constitutes a 'return of the political'. What this means is that a radical 
political outlook is no longer premised on the idea that a revolutionary outbreak will 
bring about a society 'beyond justice', but that the sources of political conflict are 
multiple and that conflict is ineliminable. While Marxism is reproved for its 
ambivalence towards democratic institutions, radicals will now be radical democrats,
88 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.
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committed not to the abolition of politics, but rather to the dismantling of hegemonies 
by means of a critique of the identities they construct and by which they are sustained. 
This entails the creation of new ’subject positions' by working out equivalences 
between groups who might otherwise be thought unrelated or even antagonistic to one 
another. In so doing, the possibility for concerted action on some particular front will 
be realised. This is not to say, however, that the new hegemonies which this may give 
rise to will be permanent or unchallengeable. On the contrary, all such constructions 
and the identities they establish must be regarded as temporary and contestable. 
Politics is 'agonistic' in the sense that it represents an ongoing series of struggles or 
'agons' over the construction and destruction of identities and hegemonies.
Certainly, this is a view espoused by Foucault, who rejected the idea of 
universal human emancipation in favour of the idea of localised, tactical struggles 
against particular organisations of identity constituting power and knowledge 
relations.89 As resistance is not resistance to power per se according to Foucault, but 
is itself an exercise of power, such tactical opposition, when successful, establishes a 
realignment of forces, which may itself be overthrown in due course. However, this 
renewed sense of the significance of the political does not bring with it a sense that 
political conflicts ought to be considered from a moral point of view. As we saw 
above, the moral point of view is inevitably wedded to the construction of identity in 
Foucault's eyes, and for this reason, his ’ethics' offers no normative guidance in 
political matters. Instead it relies upon genealogy to detect possibilities for freedom, 
opportunities to resist existing power relations, without indicating what aspects of 
these are problematic, or what sort of realignment one ought to establish. The 
agonistic politics which this gives rise to is a basically non-moral conception of politics 
which treats everything in terms of tactics and power, and which does not distinguish 
identities which might be worthy of preserving, or which must be respected, from 
those which are illegitimate and oppressive.
89 See Mark Neocleous, 'Perpetual war, or 'war and war again': Schmitt, Foucault, fascism,'
Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (1996), pp.47-66.
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Mouffe, for example, criticises Rawls for conceiving of political theory as a 
branch of moral philosophy, and argues that 'To think the political in terms of moral 
language as Rawls does, necessarily leads to a neglect of the role played by conflict, 
power and interest.'90 It might be argued, of course, that to think about politics and 
society from a moral point of view does not entail neglecting these phenomena at all, 
but rather that it entails thinking about them in a particular way, posing questions 
about the proper limits of conflict, and the legitimate exercise of power. While this 
differs from a sociological treatment o f power, one which details how power is 
exercised in particular contexts, it is not a standpoint which is indifferent to the 
operation of power, as Mouffe suggests. It may lack the empirical richness of the 
socio-historical account, but it makes up for this by offering normative guidance as to 
how to respond to the exercise of power as we find it. Furthermore, distinguishing 
between sociological and normative questions enables us to see the limitations of each 
so that we can better gauge how each sort of question may be related to the other. 
Mouffe, however, is not interested in combining these perspectives on power, but 
rather wants to replace the normative point of view with a purely tactical one: 'Political 
discourse attempts to create specific forms of unity among different interests by 
relating them to a common project and by establishing a frontier to define the force to 
be opposed, the 'enemy'.'91 What matters, from this point of view, is not the 'rightness' 
of a theory, but rather whether it is likely to 'capture the imagination of the new social 
movements', and she argues that judged in these terms, Rawls' liberalism is a failure. 
Marxists like Lukacs regarded theories like historical materialism as 'weapons' in the 
class struggle but the new 'agonism' not only judges theory in terms of its effect, but 
sees the political struggle itself as its own end: 'A project of radical and plural 
democracy...requires the existence of multiplicity, of plurality and of conflict, and sees
90 Mouffe, The Return of the Political. (London, Verso, 1993), p.49.
91 Mouffe adopts Carl Schmitt's view that the friend/enemy relation is the fundamental political 
relationship. Mouffe, The Return of the Political, p.50.
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in them the raison-d'etre of politics.'92 If this is the raison-d'etre of politics, what is the 
status of democracy in this scheme? It no longer appears to be regarded as an ethically 
desirable end to be secured by political struggle, as struggle has become the end.
The extension of the idea of struggle and conflict to the evaluation of moral 
and political arguments indicates the basic incoherence of this model of politics and the 
model of social criticism that attends it. For it implies a radical dissociation from our 
own values and projects, in the sense that we no longer to see them as giving us 
reasons to engage in politics, but are rather to see them as means to the end of 
engaging in politics. These values must motivate our engagement, on one hand, but we 
must be ready to abandon them should they appear to be unpopular. This cannot even 
be explained in terms of the cynical pursuit of power, however, because this is a 
conception of politics without any purpose other than to engage in politics. This 
impossible view is one produced by an objective description of politics which regards 
it as essentially about conflict, because, having debunked morality, it includes within 
this description an understanding of the reasons why persons might come into 
conflict.93 It is simply impossible to adopt this view from an internal, subjective 
perspective without dissociation.
This problem is not recognised by Foucauldians who respond to the charge 
that Foucault espouses a directionless conception of politics by claiming that these 
critics are guilty of'foundationalism'. Jon Simons, for example, says:
Foucault's critics delineate some of the constraining parameters of 
humanist political philosophy by grounding themselves in the limits of 
truth, value, future and subject. In so doing, they arm themselves with 
regulative principles that allow them to declare that some exercises of
92 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, p. 18.
93 Note that while one could include beliefs about truth and morality within one's explanation of 
conflict, but regard these as 'ideological' as Marx did, the problem here is that of integrating this into 
one's own practical standpoint.
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power are excessive while some others are just. These principles are 
presented as neutral standards of judgement that stand outside political 
contest, just as the pre-modern sovereign claimed to be above the 
disputes he adjudicated. However, such philosophical judgements about 
the proper limits of power conceal and involve other exercises of 
power. It is as if elaborate philosophical fortresses had been built to 
repel the enemy of excessive power, but it had been overlooked that 
some enemies were already within the gates and that the effort to build 
the walls killed some citizens.94
The claim here is that Foucault's critics do not see that their objections already rest on 
contestable, or 'political' choices. By this Simons means that they are already exercises 
of power. But this is not only to adopt a reductive attitude to morality, but also to fail 
to grasp that we cannot make this reductive attitude part of our first order, subjective 
view of the world.
Given that conceptual pluralism gives us reason to suppose that contestability 
is an inevitable part of our conceptual repertoire, does this not mean that a consistent 
pluralist must adopt this position? This depends on how we understand contestability. 
On the reductive understanding proposed above, ideas are contestable because the 
discourses in which they are situated are themselves products of conflict. As Simons 
argues, the arguments of Foucault's critics are already exercises of power. However, 
the view outlined in Chapter Two is not one which is reductive in this way; on the 
contrary, it is supposed that there may be reasons counting on both sides of an 
argument about some disputed object. To suppose that there is no reasonable way to 
secure agreement in such situations is very different from supposing that 
disagreements are 'really' just power struggles. Far from adopting this reductive view, 
we might instead argue that in such situations it is improper to press one's interlocutor
94 Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political. (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.66-7.
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to accept one's own view of the matter at hand, lest reason give way to manipulation.95 
Recognition of contestability therefore has a place within reasonable deliberation: it 
does not expose it as no more than an attempt to bend others to one's will.
Paul Ricoeur has called the interpretive strategies of thinkers like Marx and 
Nietzsche 'the hermeneutics of suspicion' on account of the way they are designed to 
'unmask' the operation of power in our institutions, traditions, and even identities.96 In 
this way, they depart from the positive evaluation of tradition found in traditionalist 
hermeneutics. The suggestion that tradition may be problematic in this way, that it is 
not only the case that we are not wholly transparent to ourselves because we are 
situated, but also that this may be concealing the extent to which power is being 
exerted over us, is a valuable one and a useful antidote to rosy communitarian 
accounts of tradition. However, this valuable insight is promptly squandered by the 
reductive, debunking strategy adopted by the hermeneutics of suspicion. By exposing 
truth and morality either as the products of class domination or of the more 
anonymous workings of Foucauldian 'power', radical social critics cut the ground out 
from under their own feet, effectively denying their own critique any epistemic or 
moral force. By adopting reductive explanations of our concepts, radical social critics 
rob themselves of the means necessary to convince their audience that their beliefs, 
identities and institutions are in need of revision. Marxists have characteristically failed 
to acknowledge the way in which historical materialism undermined Marxist social 
criticism itself, either by failing to include Marxism within its objective description of 
the world, or by flatly denying that the resulting account of our concepts is relativist.97
95 See Charles Larmore's insistence that liberals, encountering persistent disagreement of this sort, 
will cease to press their point and seek to contain this disagreement by seeking agreement at another 
level. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p.53.
96 Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 
p.93.
97 Husami and Wood both seem to think that the claim that moral norms are relative to particular 
social relations is not a relativist view. Geras, likewise, chooses to read Marx as a 'moral realist'. 
Husami, 'Marx on distributive justice'; Wood, 'The Marxian critique of justice'; and Geras, 'The 
controversy about Marx and justice.'
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Foucauldians, by contrast, while arguably not reductive with respect to truth, lapse 
into a reductive view with respect to morality and go on to explicitly affirm the 
unavoidability of a non-moral personal aesthetic and an 'agonistic' politics. While this 
may be more consistent than the Marxist approach, it does nonetheless involve 
Foucauldian genealogy in a claim to absoluteness which it cannot make good.
We should reject the global debunking strategy of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion because it relies on the claim that a certain range of socio-historical 
description provides an absolute conception of the world, one which privileges a 
reflective stance with respect to the world and which excludes the possibility of a 
moral point of view. The attempts made to combine this particular reflective stance 
with the subjective, agent point of view, inevitably result in problems of dissociation. 
That is to say, the view from which our concepts are effects of power and the view 
from which we employ these in coping with the world cannot be combined. However, 
the problematising of tradition and situation which these projects have contributed to 
is valuable. A social criticism which is premised on conceptual pluralism, premised, 
that is on the idea that no range of description can be shown to be absolute, can 
exploit this insight because it regards the account provided by socio-historical 
contextualisation as inevitably incomplete. Limiting the application of socio-historical 
descriptions in this way does not entail the view that these are irrelevant to social 
criticism, as if we were simply to reintroduce an unproblematic fact/value distinction. 
Recognition that this is only one possible way of describing or relating to the world is 
the necessary preliminary to the attempt to combine socio-historical reflection with the 
subjective moral and epistemic standpoint of the agent. It is from this standpoint that 
we weigh the information provided by socio-historical reflection by employing our 
beliefs about what constitute justified beliefs and from this standpoint that we can 
bring to bear our values and principles in order to judge what aspects of our situation, 
as described in socio-historical terms, are ethically problematic. In place of a 
debunking but self-defeating hermeneutics of suspicion we can have a social criticism 
which is prepared to transform the contexts in which we are situated but which is
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grounded in a pluralism which enables it to coherently exploit a complex of different 
standpoints and descriptions.
This Chapter has examined the two leading forms of radical, transformative, 
social criticism and their relation to each other. It has been argued that, while the 
popularity of Foucauldian genealogy is based on its rejection of Marxist economic 
reductionism, there is, nonetheless a basic and problematic continuity between these 
styles of social criticism, namely, their opposition to normative deliberation. This is 
expressed in their respective insistence on exposing the normative standpoint itself as 
an effect or instrument of power. They both employ contextualisation as a means to 
effect potentially transformative redescriptions, but see socio-historical 
contextualisation and normative deliberation as mutually exclusive, a position they 
share with Quentin Skinner. The next Chapter will argue that socio-historical 
contextualisation and normative deliberation may, however, be combined in the form 
of an interpretive social criticism. This, in turn, it will be argued, must play a central 
role in the conduct of impartial public deliberation.
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Ch a p t e r  Six
DELIBERATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM
How should we understand the relationship between liberal egalitarian politics and the 
idea of context? Existing contextualisms have been shown to be hostile to such politics 
insofar as they oppose impartial morality. This Chapter sets out a model of deliberative 
politics derived from a commitment to equality and embodying the idea of impartial 
public justification. My contention is that this model of politics can accommodate the 
concerns of contextualists, about the abstract character of universalist theory, and their 
concerns with the recognition of identities on one hand and the need to transform 
these, on the other. With the right understanding of 'context* - one that rests on a 
conceptual pluralism and a public conception of meaning, we can dismiss 'conceptual' 
arguments against impartial deliberation, while at the same time coming to appreciate 
how the sort of objective socio-historical reflection upon our situations can come to 
play a role in such deliberation.
It will be argued that a critical morality can make use of socio-historical 
interpretation in both the application of principles to particular contexts, which is to 
say, judgement, and also in the criticism of theories and principles themselves. This will 
rely on conceptual pluralist arguments to set out a view of situated, but critical 
morality. On the second point, it will be argued that an ethics of social criticism must 
respond to two different ethical imperatives: one requiring a respect for pluralism; and 
one requiring a sensitivity to the possibility that beliefs and identities may be products 
of unequal power relationships. These conflict insofar as a concern that identities and 
beliefs may reflect an adaptation to existing inequalities will require us to challenge 
rather than simply respect others' self-understandings. The task is to show: (1) how 
socio-historical contextualisation can be combined with moral deliberation and (2) to 
provide an account of the principles of moral deliberation which balances the demands
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of recognition and transformation. No existing model of social criticism meets these 
requirements. A model that can must rely first of all on conceptual pluralism, and 
secondly on a model of public reason which embodies an ethical pluralism in the form 
of an impartial conception of public deliberation.
Critical Morality and Contextualisation: an interpretive social criticism
In this section a model of interpretative social criticism will be set out. This 
relies on the conceptual pluralism and the pragmatic account of interpretation set out 
in Chapter Two in order to resist the reductive claims made by contextualists on behalf 
of socio-historical contextualisation. This establishes that claims for the precedence of 
particularising descriptions, or for the precedence of a socio-historical, 
descriptive/explanatory standpoint over that of normative deliberation, cannot be made 
good. Having set out this interpretive pluralism, what remains is to indicate how socio- 
historical contextualisation may be connected to normative deliberation. In line with 
the pragmatic account of interpretation set out in Chapter Two, the nature of this 
connection is established by asking what sort of problem brings into play both 
contextual and normative considerations. This, it will be argued, is the problem of 
revising judgements and their normative bases. Insofar as judgements both bring 
contextual and normative considerations into play and themselves take place within the 
context of institutionalised languages and problematics, then the revision of these 
judgements and the reorientation of actions may be effected by a contextualist social 
criticism directed both at the objects of judgement and the terms in which judgements 
are made. It is the fact that our practical activity takes place in the context of traditions 
and institutions which are never wholly transparent to us that gives interpretive social 
criticism its purchase.
The idea of 'context' appears to present us with an unpalatable choice between 
two extremes. We can choose between a 'situated' morality which is embedded in a rich
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social and historical context, and which is in consequence both realistic and practical, 
taking as its starting point the actual beliefs of actual moral agents, or we can have a 
critical 'universalism' which is not relativist in the way that 'situated' morality is, but 
which purchases its rigour at the cost of abstraction from the 'real' world and which is 
in consequence impractical. The aim of this thesis is to support this 'universalist', 
critical, cosmopolitan, morality from the contextualist challenge. This does not mean 
that we should reject 'contextual' considerations altogether, but rather that we need to 
understand better how to combine a sensitivity to context with a critical morality. The 
contextualisms considered here are unacceptable on account of their relativism and 
traditionalism, but there must be a way of acknowledging the situated character of 
moral deliberation which does not surrender the critical force of universalist morality 
but rather can draw on socio-historical contextualisation to enrich our moral 
deliberations.
The first step in dismantling this opposition between realistic relativism and 
impractical universalism is to expose the foundationalist character of particularist 
understandings of morality. The claim that morality is no more than a set of culturally 
specific practices and traditions is simply reductive: while we can describe morality in 
this way this does not mean that this is the only way that we think of it, still less that 
this is the most perspicuous way to think about it. As argued in Chapter Two, the 
appropriateness of a description cannot be established a priori, but must rather be 
established with reference to a particular question or problem. The descriptions which 
serve the anthropologist or the historian are not necessarily those which are most 
useful for the deliberations of the moral agent, who cannot simply suspend her belief in 
the need to distinguish between true and false beliefs and right and wrong principles. It 
is not only, however, that such descriptions are not helpful: we might argue that if they 
are indeed true, then it is right that we should revise our beliefs accordingly. Besides 
the fact that this raises the usual problem about the coherence of relativism, namely, 
that if it is true it is false, there is also the more general problem of the foundationalist 
assumption on which this relativism rests. To assume that describing morality as
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fundamentally a social practice reveals the basic truth about it is to assume that this 
range of description and the standpoint from which it is offered is ultimately more basic 
than the standpoint from which we see the point of moral deliberation and seek to 
guide our actions with reference to moral principles. But this claim can never be made 
good because it assumes the very relationship of concepts to the world which it must 
explain if the foundational character of this range of description is to be demonstrated. 
Given that no such demonstration can be provided without circularity, we do not have 
to accept the particularist claim that morality is no more than a social practice, relative 
to particular societies. This does not mean that we cannot describe morality in those 
terms, nor that historical and sociological accounts of our beliefs are never helpful, but 
it does mean that we are not bound to forego a critical morality in order to be 
sociologically realistic.
Doesn't the conceptual pluralism which undermines particularism also 
undermine critical morality by showing that we cannot demonstrate that there is a 
single moral principle or value which all rational persons must acknowledge as 
fundamental? Yes, it does, but as was argued in Chapter Four, a critical, cosmopolitan 
morality has no need of this foundationalist iassumption: we don't have to choose 
between particularism and foundationalism. If we adopt a constructivist account of 
morality, in which moral principles are constructed rather than discovered in our 
culture's traditions, or in some realm of Platonic ideas, then we can set out a morality 
which provides a sufficiently objective basis for criticising our traditions and individual 
judgements, without the assumption that all rational persons must agree on a 
fundamental principle or value.
A constructivist account of morality can acknowledge the situated character of 
moral reasoning, while insisting that morality be critical. What can it gain from socio- 
historical accounts interpretation though, once it is recognised that such interpretation 
cannot take the place of moral justification? The way to approach this question is by 
means of the pragmatic idea that , we relate to the world as agents, rather than as 
detached spectators. Moral deliberation is not a matter of discovering moral truths, but
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of 'bringing an objective view into the determination of our conduct’, a matter of 
guiding our actions according to objective principles.1 If we view moral deliberation as 
a matter of solving moral problems, we can get a clearer sense of how socio-historical 
interpretations of the world may come to bear on our deliberations. Such 
interpretations are not thought of as metaphysically fundamental, but rather are called 
upon to resolve questions which bear on our moral problems. What sort of questions 
might such interpretations address and how do these relate to moral deliberation?
The moral agent is situated in a particular society, constituted by a particular 
set of institutions and traditions and inhabited by persons with a particular range of 
identities. Problems are themselves open to interpretation, and we can take our 
interpretations in either of two directions: we can choose to particularise through 
entering social or historical distinctions, or we can choose to abstract from these 
particularities by seeking more general descriptions of the problem at hand, by 
identifying it as an instance of this type of problem rather than that. Abstraction and 
particularising description are equally valid tools, and in our deliberations we typically 
employ both. While theorising is primarily thought of as treating problems in relatively 
abstract terms, it is worth noting that abstraction and particularisation are relative to 
what one is conceptualising and consequently socio-historical interpretation can itself 
employ particularising and relatively abstracting descriptions in order to distinguish or 
identify phenomena.
This sort of interpretation enters moral deliberation in the first instance because 
as moral agents we respond to the world under certain descriptions. That is to say, 
moral problems are not presented to us pure, and uninterpreted, but rather they rely on 
how a given situation is interpreted. Whether % presents us with a moral dilemma at all, 
and then if it does, what sort of dilemma it is depends as much upon how we describe 
% as it does on the content of our moral beliefs. One interpretation of the situation at 
hand seems to require the application of one principle, while another interpretation
1 This rather Kantian formulation is that of Thomas Nagel in The View from Nowhere, p. 139.
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may require that we act on another principle. Judgement, which is to say, bringing 
general principles to bear upon particular situations, requires us not only to have a 
theoretical grasp of the relations of priority pertaining between the various moral 
principles which we recognise, but also that we have a sound understanding of the 
situation we are faced with. Moral judgement goes awry not only because of 
theoretical errors in our system of moral beliefs, but also because our understanding of 
the world is itself deficient. A concern to make sound judgements will lead us to be 
concerned with the correct interpretation of the identities, traditions and institutions 
which we bring our principles to bear upon. Sometimes this can be a matter of 
presenting facts about these of which we were not previously aware, but it can also be 
a matter of providing better, more comprehensive interpretations of the situation at 
hand. The role of socio-historical interpretation is that of redescribing the familiar 
social world which faces us in ways which call into question our judgements about it. 
By describing the family, for example, in ways which bring out aspects of it which 
resemble apparently unrelated phenomena we are called upon to bring new principles 
to bear in our judgements about it. This has happened in response to the work of 
feminists, who not only draw attention to the existence of domestic violence but also 
to the redescription of this in ways which render it identical with other forms of 
assault, e.g., as upon a stranger in the street, in order to place in question the 'domestic' 
qualification which has traditionally determined a different moral response to such 
incidents.2 Equally, housework has been redescribed in ways which connect it to the 
operation of the wider economy and which raise questions about the way in which the 
benefits produced by this labour have been distributed.3
Description and redescription are fundamental to moral judgement. The 
construction of historical and sociological accounts of the world in which we deliberate 
serves us by rendering the familiar unfamiliar and vice versa in ways which are morally
2 For example, RE. Dobash and R  Dobash Violence Against Wives. (New York: The Free Press,
1979).
3 Anne Oakley, Housewife. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974).
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relevant. That is to say, these accounts help to determine which principles we ought to 
act on in a given situation: whether we should regard the family as falling within the 
scope of principles of justice, or whether our economic institutions are characterised 
by freedom of choice or domination and control? The solution to such problems relies 
as much on 'thick' socio-historical interpretation of the sort of world we live in as much 
as it does on the theoretical analysis of our moral beliefs.
However, to restrict socio-historical interpretation to the sphere of the 
application of moral principles would not adequately recognise the usefulness of this 
style of interpretation. We can extend it to the analysis of ideas and theories 
themselves, without displacing the idea that arguments still require justification in 
moral and epistemic terms. Quentin Skinner sought to separate these two stances, in 
order to preserve the historicity of political argument, while Walzer and Rorty 
displaced the idea of justification by blurring the line between it and the interpretation 
of traditions of thought. Even critical morality can gain, however, from genealogical 
treatments of ideas. How can posing questions about the historical development of our 
beliefs be related to questions about the validity of those beliefs?
We must go back to the hermeneutic idea that the world is always already 
interpreted and that in our deliberations we are, in Gadamer's words, 'always on our 
way'. What this means is that not only are the objects of our concern, the identities and 
institutions which we seek to judge, already presented to us in particular ways* but also 
that the terms in which we pose our moral and theoretical questions about these 
objects are themselves given to us by tradition. Our questions, as was argued in 
Chapter Four, in the discussion of hermeneutics, are posed against the backdrop of 
traditional problematics which we have inherited without necessarily fully 
understanding. This does not simply mean that we do not know the history of the 
questions we are posing, but also, crucially, that we may not fully appreciate the way 
this history continues to operate upon the way we pose our questions. The relationship 
between the world and the moral and theoretical questions we pose as we try to cope
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with it is basically circular in that we encounter a world already problematised in 
particular ways.
What we inherit from traditions of thought are particular ways of posing 
questions about the world which rest on particular complexes of distinctions, which we 
can find ourselves employing without our necessarily being aware that we are doing so. 
The role of a genealogy of philosophical ideas is to bring out the particular constitution 
of a current problem, revealing the nature of the conceptual complex which constitutes 
it by tracing how the schemes involved came to be mapped onto one another. We 
could imagine a genealogy of the problem of context being provided which set out 
how the contrast between the abstract and the particular came to be mapped onto the 
contrast between the practical and the impractical and then onto the further contrast 
between contextualism and universalism.
The history of liberalism provides a good example of how the structure of a 
theory can be called into question by contextualisation, which is to say, how aspects of 
that theory may be redescribed in such a way as to make them candidates for revision. 
Liberalism has come in for considerable criticism for its conception of the individual, 
and the way that this concept figures within liberal political theory to exclude certain 
sorts of problem. For Marxists like Macpherson, the liberal individual is shaped by the 
assumptions underlying market society, chiefly in the way that the individual's basic 
relationship to the world and to himself is conceived as one of ownership.4 Feminist 
critics, such as Carol Pateman, argue that not only is the individual conceived in these 
possessive terms, but also as characteristically male. For this reason, she argues, 
feminists ought not simply to aim at achieving recognition for women as 'individuals' 
because 'the individual is a patriarchal category'.5 To this we might add the 
communitarian objection to the conception of the individual as an 'atom', without ties
4 C. B. Macpherson claims that the defining feature of possessive individualism 'is found in its 
conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, owing 
nothing to society for them.' Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p.3.
5 Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract. (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), p. 184.
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to the society and culture around him.6 Closely connected to this is the Foucauldian 
objection that the individual is not a pre-political figure, whose choices can be used to 
construct a theory of political legitimacy, as contractarians suppose, but is already a 
product of power relations.7
These critics regard their contextualisations of liberal theory as counting 
against liberalism per se. Liberals can respond however, by revising their conception of 
the individual, distinguishing it from these particular conceptualisations of 
individualism which have served to undermine the 'universalism' of liberal theory: the 
idea of the individual as owner, not worker, as male, not female, as pre-social, not 
social, as transparent, not opaque. Liberals can acknowledge gender differences 
between individuals; they can refuse to accept the idea that respecting individual 
freedom necessarily means respecting private property; they can acknowledge the 
situated character of individuals, and the implications this can have for preference 
formation.8
Because contextualisation need not render a body of thought unusable, as 
Marxists might have hoped the exposure of the 'liberalism' as bourgeois ideology 
would have done, it does not mean that it is irrelevant to theory construction. Without 
contextualist challenges to the central concepts of liberalism, the need for revision 
would not have been recognised. Contextualisation can serve to bring to light certain 
characteristic sets of uses of a term which either prompt us to abandon it altogether, or 
to reinterpret it by eliminating certain of these uses, certain contrasts which are deemed
6 Charles Taylor, 'Atomism' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 187-210.
7 Jon Simons, for example, claims that 'liberalism is a set of practices for the constitution of subjects.' 
Simons, Foucault and the Political, p.58.
8 See Susan Moller-Okin's liberal feminism in Justice. Gender, and the Family. (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989); Will Kymlicka's acknowledgement of situation in Liberalism. Community and Culture. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Joshua Cohen on adaptive preferences in 'Deliberation and 
democratic legitimacy, in The Good Polity. Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1989), pp. 17-34; and Rawls on the way that 'the difference principle represents, in effect, an 
agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits 
of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.' This clearly sets his liberalism apart from that of John 
Locke. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 101.
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unacceptable. As a liberal, I favour a reinterpretation rather than a rejection of liberal 
individualism, but the general point to note here is that contextualisation of a term, the 
construction of a narrative of the various ways in which it has been used and the way 
this has determined the way it is currently used, can be of central importance to theory 
construction, not merely a historical ornament.9
This does not exclude the sort of study promoted by Quentin Skinner: my 
account is pragmatic, which is to say, interest driven. It aims at showing how, if we 
hope to effect social change through revising beliefs, we can make use of socio- 
historical contextualisation. The level of description primarily employed in this project 
will most likely be one which enables us to connect diverse statements, texts and 
practices in order to reveal continuities and discontinuities at the level of traditions, 
ideologies, or discourses. This is because social criticism relies upon the idea that one's 
current beliefs and actions are never wholly transparent, but rather can be redescribed 
in a variety of hitherto unsuspected ways. Typically, this will entail identifying one's 
acts and beliefs as instances of some larger whole, a tradition, for example. The precise 
categories required to characterise such complexes of ideas and beliefs will depend on 
the needs of the particular project that we are engaged upon. Sometimes we will want 
to reveal continuities while at other times we may hope to redescribe by focusing on 
discontinuities. On some occasions we may choose to focus on a body of thought 
alone while at other times we may wish to focus on the particular practices it gave rise 
to and which, in turn, may have modified it. For such purposes a scheme such as 
Foucault's 'discursive formation' may be most helpful. The point insisted upon here is 
that whatever categories we employ, social criticism must be free to make use of 
generalising and well as particularising abstractions if it is to effectively redescribe and 
it must be free also to connect historical and normative problems rather than pursuing
9 A good example of how a historical interpretation can reveal the particular features of a current 
problem is provided by Kymlicka's analysis of the way that the problem of 'multiculturalism' came to 
be posed as a problem of 'inclusion' on account of the way that the paradigm case was understood to 
be that of the black population of the US. To the extent that multiculturalist arguments centred on the 
inclusion/exclusion scheme, the problem of autonomy vs. assimilation could not be recognised. 
Kymlicka, Liberalism. Community, and Culture, pp. 140-7.
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one to the exclusion of the other. If, like Quentin Skinner, we choose to pursue some 
other aim in our investigations, for example, the recovery of authorial intentions, then 
this is by no means ruled out by this account of pragmatic contextualisation and 
interpretive social criticism. My argument with the version of the history of political 
thought advanced by Skinner is only that its intentionalist focus specifically excluded 
the possibility of the sort of reinterpretation necessary to the conduct of social 
criticism.
A historical narrative of the development of a theoretical problem can always 
be provided. Sometimes it has little bearing on how we define that problem, but on 
other occasions, as with multiculturalism, it can have a bearing on our understanding of 
the problem itself by revealing the assumptions which came to be built into it. This 
does not of itself invalidate those assumptions of course, but it does bring them to light 
and clears the way for us to judge whether they are still useful or not. In this way we 
can benefit as theorists from the construction of historical narratives about our 
theoretical ideas, without surrendering the contrast between narrative and justification.
The Ethics o f  Social Criticism
Having shown what redescription has to offer morality, I want to approach the 
second question, namely, what sort of morality should direct our redescriptions? 
Clearly, redescription without morality is arbitrary: this was the flaw of Foucauldian 
genealogy, i.e. that the critique of identity per se was directionless in that it lacked any 
means to distinguish between identities in need of revision and those which may be 
judged to be legitimate and worthy of respect. Rorty restricted redescription to the 
private sphere on the grounds that redescribing others was potentially cruel, but this 
was judged too restrictive in that it did not allow for the possibility of legitimate 
challenges to the self-understandings of others. Redescription needs to be directed by 
moral principles if it is not to be simply arbitrary. Everything can be redescribed and in
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an almost infinite number of ways: what we need is some account of why a description 
or redescription of something is relevant, and the interest of the moral subject in 
making sound moral judgements provides one way of determining the relevance of a 
redescription. Now we need to work out what sort of moral principles we can bring 
into play.
First we must review the sort of ethical problems posed whenever an appeal to 
'context' is made. Appeals to the idea that we are situated in particular social and 
historical contexts and that our identities and beliefs are shaped by social institutions 
and traditions tend to emphasise one or other of two ideas. Firstly, the idea of context 
signifies pluralism: we appeal to context in order to draw attention to some difference 
or other in beliefs or practices. Secondly, the idea that we are situated in a context 
tends to raise the issue of opacity, which is to say, the way in which our identities and 
beliefs are constructed 'behind our backs' by social forces outside our control. Each 
aspect of situation poses a different ethical problem. The idea of plurality is emphasised 
by those who are concerned with the recognition of and respect for differences, while 
the idea of opacity is emphasised by those who worry about the way in which unequal 
power relations can shape our beliefs and identities unbeknownst to us. An adequate 
ethics of redescription will have to address both concerns. As it stands, no existing 
model of social criticism does this.
Those concerned with the recognition of differences worry that if we are not 
sensitive to context - if we are 'universalists' - then we will overlook the way in which 
the outlooks of persons of different genders, or with different cultural backgrounds 
differ. We should resist the temptation to challenge the self-understandings of others in 
particular, for to do so is to fail to treat them with equal respect. 'Universalism', is 
regarded as lacking the requisite sensitivity to context and difference and consequently 
risks becoming a form of authoritarianism. Rorty worries that if we challenge others' 
self-descriptions we may simply be acting cruelly, and Walzer fears that if we do not 
recognise the cultural specificity of our moral beliefs, then we will end up simply 
imposing our beliefs upon others. Feminist standpoint theorists not only assume that
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gender difference entails a difference of belief, but also that it entails the immunity of 
these beliefs to criticism: self-understandings are peculiarly authoritative because we 
are transparent to ourselves. This leads Stanley and Wise, for example, to adopt the 
extreme view discussed in Chapter Three, that if a battered woman, does not believe 
herself to be oppressed then, quite simply, she is not oppressed. Standpoint theorists 
and communitarians differ in their theoretical understanding of the nature of situation 
and plurality, but they agree in their response to plurality, namely that we ought not to 
challenge the self-descriptions of others for to do so exemplifies a lack of respect for 
them.
I have argued against the theoretical bases for this self-restraint, namely, the 
idea that we are transparent to ourselves and that we cannot communicate our self- 
understanding to others, and the idea that we cannot judge the beliefs and practices of 
others impartially. I share the concern of radical social critics that unequal power 
relations can shape our identities and beliefs without our being aware of it and that 
consequently, we should not regard anyone's self-understanding as immune to 
criticism. Radical social critics point to the way that our situation can conceal 
inequality from us and to the possibility that we may have adapted ourselves and our 
preferences to these unequal circumstances. This concern motivates not only the 
traditional Marxist focus on the conservatism of the working class, but also the 
concerns of many feminists with the ways in which gender identities are constructed in 
such a way as to sustain inequality. Ultimately this is the concern lying behind 
Foucault's interest in subjectivisation and the construction of models of normal 
subjectivity, although, to be sure, he would probably not present his work in quite this 
way. If we appreciate the extent to which our self-understandings may be implicated in 
unequal social relations in ways which either oppress us or involve us in the 
subordination of others, then we will be sceptical about the claim that equal respect 
requires us to refrain from challenging the self-understandings of others. Instead, we 
will be inclined to argue that a commitment to equality must not only allow that we can 
challenge the self-understandings of others, but also that sometimes it demands that we
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must so challenge them, and of course, by the same token, that we expose ourselves 
and our own understandings to challenge as well.
Somehow we must work out a normative conception of social criticism which 
balances the demand for recognition with sensitivity to the way our self-understanding 
can be implicated in unequal social relations. I have argued in Chapters Three and Four 
that a blanket demand for respect for the self-understandings of others rests on an 
inadequate interpretation of what the requirement to treat others as equals entails. 
Placing self-understandings of others beyond criticism also places one's own self- 
understanding beyond criticism by others, and it therefore embodies a profound 
indifference to others, not respect. Equality requires that one place oneself 'at risk' in 
conversation, in Gadamer's phrase, and this exposes the self-understandings of all to 
public scrutiny. This interpretation of equal respect is strengthened by the sort of 
considerations presented by non-standpoint theory feminists, Marxists, and 
Foucauldians, which indicate that self-understandings may embody adaptation to 
unequal circumstances. Respecting others' beliefs about themselves would permit their 
continued acquiescence to inequality. This form of 'respect' would permit inequality to 
go unchallenged and for this reason it must be regarded as an inadequate interpretation 
of the demand that we treat others as equals.
Having determined that treating others as equals can entail challenging their 
self-understandings and, by the same token, exposing one's own self-understanding to 
challenge, we must recognise that the demand that we recognise differences in 
perspective does address a real problem: namely the danger of authoritarianism. The 
contextualist critique of the sort of'universalism' which does not recognise the plurality 
of perspectives present in or across societies is directed at the danger that this lack of 
attention to plurality will result in an interpretive and in consequence, political 
authoritarianism. We must allow the possibility that people do not always understand 
themselves in ways which serve their best interests, but we should be wary of simply 
imposing our interpretations upon them even where we do so with the aim of helping 
them to escape their oppression. One example of an issue about which there may be
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reasonable disagreement of this sort is that of the wearing of headscarves by Muslim 
women. On one hand, this can reasonably be interpreted as an oppressive practice 
when it is imposed as it is in Afghanistan at present, but when it is chosen by Muslim 
schoolgirls in French schools, then the ban on these signs of religious affiliation by the 
authorities might well be thought to raise questions about respect for religious 
differences by the French state.10
Is redescribing others essentially authoritarian? One could simply disagree 
privately with another's self-understanding, for example, and this would seem to raise 
no particular threat of authoritarianism. However, if one fears that another's self- 
understanding actually obscures their true interests from them, and ensures their 
continuing subordination, then it would appear that one has an obligation to raise this 
possibility with them rather than keeping it to oneself. Of course, should they disagree, 
we may then simply refrain from pressing the matter any further. This may not be 
wholly satisfactory, but it fulfils one's obligation to alert one's interlocutor to the 
possibility that they may be misinterpreting themselves and their interests and it does 
not seem to raise a problem of authoritarianism. But what of situations in which the 
self-understanding which one challenges is not that of an oppressed group, but that of 
a member of a group which benefits from the oppression of others. Clearly it would 
not be permissible to raise the matter and then refrain from further action in the face of 
dissent. While we might judge in the first case that we should respect our interlocutor's 
right to judge whether to accept our redescription of their situation, even where we 
think they are wrong to do so, it would be wrong to adopt this position in the second 
case. Given that the self-interpretation of our second interlocutor entails treating others 
as less than equal, this person has no right to continue to act on this interpretation, and 
we have an obligation to those who are affected by his actions to intervene in such a 
case. Imagine for example the self-understandings of those white South Africans who 
supported the regime of apartheid: an identity based on a belief in racial superiority
10 N.C. Moruzzi, 'A problem with headscarves: contemporary complexities of political and social 
identity,' Political Theory 22 (1994), pp.653-72.
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and implicated in social and political institutions designed to sustain racial inequality 
could not be a candidate for respect. Sometimes, then, we have to adopt coercive 
policies derived from our interpretation of the situation concerned, and where coercion 
follows from our interpretations, then we must be concerned with guarding against 
authoritarianism.
This latter situation is perhaps the defining context for a specifically social 
criticism. That is to say, social criticism is social not only because it is situated in a 
particular context but also because it is addressed to society at large. Because it is 
social in this second sense it is distinct from individual moral deliberation, distinct from 
deliberation about my personal conduct. 'Social' criticism by contrast, is addressed to 
the problem of collective action and consequently entails the potential coercion of 
some members of society. Where coercion is at stake, the problem of authoritarian 
redescription becomes pressing.
If we look at the four models of social criticism discussed above: feminist 
standpoint theory; Walzerian interpretation of shared traditions; Marxist ideology- 
critique; and Foucauldian genealogy, it would appear that social criticism is indeed 
understood as something distinct from strictly individual deliberation. In feminist 
standpoint theory the epistemically privileged standpoint of women is supposed to 
contribute to the reordering of society at large. Walzer treats social criticism as a form 
of public activity directing the affairs of political communities. Marx does not conceive 
of ideology critique as forming part of political deliberation as politics is a form of 
alienation, but ideology critique, like Hartsock's standpoint theory is supposed to 
contribute to a process of social revolution with clear implications for class identities 
and self-understandings. Foucauldian genealogy is perhaps the odd one out insofar as 
genealogy is neither intended as an element of the political process, nor as part of a 
revolutionary strategy. Even if it is informed chiefly by Foucault's anarchistic 
aestheticism it still appears to be connected to 'political' struggles in the sense that even 
the personal aesthetic is inextricably connected to wider networks of power and will
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inevitably involve the aesthetic subject in at least 'local', 'tactical' struggles to 
reconfigure existing power relations.
While all these models of social criticism regard such criticism as in some way 
directed at collective problems, this has not meant that social, or public deliberation is 
clearly distinguished from individual deliberation. In one way, this is because radical 
social criticism has, as we have seen in Chapter Five, tended to avoid or even reject 
moral deliberation per se, with the consequence that it has tended to focus on 
epistemic or simply instrumental problems in place of moral questions. Even on a 
moralised interpretation of these projects, however, it is still hard to see how a 
distinction between individual and public deliberation could be elaborated. This is 
because the device of distinguishing the two relies on the distinctively liberal concern 
with working out a system of principles under which persons with diverse moral 
outlooks may live. That is to say that we would only distinguish between individual 
and public deliberation if we supposed that persons might reasonably differ in their 
moral outlooks and that consequently the principles appealed to in deliberation about 
potentially coercive collective decisions must differ from those appealed to in 
deliberating about problems of individual conduct. To simply impose decisions justified 
only in terms of one particular moral outlook would be to violate the norm of equal 
respect.
'Social' criticism poses special problems with respect to redescription to the 
extent that (1) it involves collective and therefore coercive decision-making and (2) to 
the extent that we recognise reasonable pluralism. This is distinct from simple 
pluralism, in the sense that it is held not only that a plurality of beliefs pertains but that 
at least some of this plurality is reasonable, and consequently must be respected.11 
Existing models of social criticism risk authoritarianism to the extent that they fail to 
recognise the existence of reasonable pluralism in person's perspectives. Hartsock’s 
standpoint theory fails to recognise differences between women with respect to their
11 The contractualist device for determining the limits of the 'reasonable' will be set out below.
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perspectives. The pluralising response to 'universalism' within standpoint theory then 
reproduces this sort of 'universalism' at lower levels to the extent that differences 
between black women or between lesbians are not recognised but subsumed under the 
rubric of distinct 'black' or 'lesbian' standpoints. Walzer's social criticism while 'political' 
in the sense that it plays a part in the public deliberation of particular political 
communities, makes the mistake of locating pluralism at the inter-state level, 
demanding respect only for differences between political communities and ignoring 
differences within them. Only where the possibility of internal differences is recognised 
does the question of distinguishing between public and private justifications arise. 
Finally, Marxism, in its ethical version, is wedded to an Aristotelian perfectionism, and 
is consequently unable to recognise reasonable pluralism, and it too runs the risk of 
sanctioning authoritarian redescription.
One bulwark against authoritarian redescription is provided by the anti- 
foundationalist account of interpretation outlined in Chapter Two. If  we recognise the 
irreducible plurality and incompleteness of our interpretations, a recognition which 
must follow from the critique of the circularity of foundationalist claims, then we may 
be more hesitant to compel others to accept our interpretations or to adopt courses of 
action based on these interpretations which will have an impact on others. The 
conceptual pluralism of this understanding of interpretation does not do away with the
idea of truth or the idea that we may distinguish between better or worse  -
interpretations but it is at least open to the possibility of conflicting interpretation in a 
way that foundationalist understandings are not. This pluralism supports a fallibilist 
attitude to interpretation which provides some check to authoritarianism.
On its own, however, fallibilism is not sufficient. Firstly we need to adopt 
mechanisms which actually expose our interpretations to challenge from others. 
Fallibilism on its own amounts to no more than a willingness to accept that one may be 
wrong: it represents a position of openness to criticism. If we are to avoid 
misinterpretation, we will need more than a willingness to accept criticism, for this on 
its own may not lead to any revision of beliefs: we need the criticism itself. Fallibilism
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simply points us in the right direction, namely that of deliberating with others in order 
to expose weaknesses in our interpretations.
There is, nonetheless, a deeper reason for deliberating with others than this. 
Deliberation in order to secure epistemic gains would find only an instrumental 
justification. The true reason for deliberating with others is not that we may learn from 
this interaction, although this is a welcome benefit. Rather, the reason we must 
deliberate with them is that where coercive measures are at issue, we treat those 
potentially affected as equals by deliberating with them about these measures. On its 
own, conceptual pluralism simply alerts us to the idea that our interpretations are only 
ever partial in the sense that they fall short of being comprehensive and that others may 
well interpret things differently. This may give us an instrumental reason for discussing 
our interpretations with others, but the idea of avoiding authoritarianism appeals rather 
to moral considerations and places us under an obligation to discuss our 
interpretations, at least those aimed at collective decision-making, with others.
The obligation to discuss one's interpretations with others is a necessary but not 
a sufficient element of the normative framework of social, that is to say, public, 
criticism. Consider the objections made to the political implications of standpoint 
theory made in Chapter Three. There it was argued that on account of the strong 
claims made for the transparency and authority of experience, standpoint theory was 
incompatible with deliberative conceptions of democracy because it reduced - 
deliberation to 'testimony'. If deliberation can make no difference to one's position then 
it cannot safeguard against authoritarianism. Imagine a situation in which two groups, 
each proposing alternative courses of action based on distinct interpretations of a given 
situation, simply articulated their own understanding without taking the slightest 
interest in that of the other side. Following this 'exchange' the group which could 
marshal a majority simply proceeds to impose its favoured policy. This might meet a 
requirement to discuss one's interpretations with others, but would it be acceptable in 
terms of the principle from which this requirement was derived, and would we really 
call such an exchange 'deliberation'?
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The idea of engaging in deliberation with'others involves more than offering 
testimony about one's own perspective. It involves exposing one's own views to the 
criticism of others and a willingness to revise them in the light of this criticism. This is 
not just a matter of fallibilism, but of justice, and specifically of impartiality, which we 
might say, underlies the epistemic idea of fallibilism.12 When parties deliberate 
impartially they are willing to criticise and accept criticism from others, where this 
involves a willingness to set aside the 'mineness' of the particular beliefs and interests in 
question. This does not mean surrendering either of these, but only that a precondition 
of fair deliberation is that each party be prepared to view their own position 
objectively, and to revise it where it is plain that viewed from this third personal 
perspective it is either wrong or cannot claim priority.
In summary then, social criticism must balance two sorts of concern: that with 
respecting reasonable differences and that with exposing adaptation to inequality. 
Because social criticism involves public deliberation, concerning collective decisions, it 
must adopt a distinct normative framework for coping with these competing moral 
imperatives and this framework is provided by the idea of impartial public deliberation. 
Existing models of social criticism fail to address these issues, either rejecting moral 
justification altogether or adopting a version of it which does not admit the possibility 
of reasonable pluralism.
Liberalism and Deliberative Democracy
This account of a social criticism sensitive to pluralism connects deliberative 
democracy to liberal public reason, however, many deliberative democrats choose to 
contrast liberal and deliberative democracy. To clarify the nature of the connection, we
12 It seems plausible to connect the two, on the sort of pragmatic understanding of the interpenetration 
of fact, value and theory set out by pluralists such as Hilary Putnam. Our epistemic judgements, on 
this view are themselves normative inasmuch as they appeal to norms like consistency, impartiality, 
etc.: Putnam, Reason. Truth and History.
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need to distinguish between several different arguments for deliberation. There are 
three types of justification for adopting a deliberative conception of democracy: 
Aristotelian, epistemic and egalitarian. Only the last of these provides the basis for a 
satisfactory account of deliberation, one which can incorporate the liberal distinction 
between public and private justification.
The first sort of argument for favouring deliberation is provided by the basically 
Aristotelian conviction that the life of the active citizen, of political participation, is the 
best life for human beings. This view is found in theorists like Hannah Arendt, for 
example, who regards the political sphere as distinct from social and economic 
institutions in that it affords citizens the opportunity for self-disclosure through action, 
something she regards as impossible in any other context.13 Others, like Benjamin 
Barber, favour 'strong' participatory democracy because it suits our basically 
communal nature better than competitive, individualistic liberal politics.14
This sort of argument for deliberation is wedded to a contrast between direct 
and representative democracy. The former is generally agreed to be ill-suited to the 
complex division of labour which characterises modem states and to this extent the 
preference for participation and deliberation appears to be driven by an impractically 
nostalgic notion of politics. Connected to this is the problem that idealisations of the 
Greek polis tend to ignore the massive inequalities required to permit male Athenians 
to devote themselves to the life of the citizen. Secondly, the assumption that the life of 
political participation is more choiceworthy than any other is open to the value pluralist 
objection that there are equally valuable ways to live and that no single value can be
13 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). She makes 
it clear that she thinks politics should remain above the grubby business of redistributing wealth or 
even providing minimal guarantees of social welfare in On Revolution. (1963) (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1973).
14 Barber complains that Liberal democracy is based on premises about human nature, knowledge, 
and politics that are genuinely liberal but that are not intrinsically democratic. Its conception of the 
individual and of individual interest undermines the democratic practices upon which both individuals 
and their interests depend. Liberal democracy is thus a 'thin' theory of democracy, one whose 
democratic values are prudential and thus provisional, optional, and conditional - means to 
exclusively individualistic and private ends.' Barber, Strong Democracy.
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shown to be the highest good for all human beings. Clearly, liberalism could not be 
compatible with this understanding of deliberation as it clashes with the Aristotelian 
view on the idea that there is a single way to live a good life. For liberals, politics is 
essentially concerned with constructing and maintaining common institutions in 
conditions of pluralism, conditions in which there is deep disagreement between 
citizens concerning their ideas of the best or the right way to live.
The second reason for favouring deliberation is 'epistemic'. James Fishkin 
argues that deliberative democracy will produce better decisions than those produced 
by the ill-informed preferences of electors and their representatives.13 Fishkin does not 
contrast deliberative and representative conceptions of democracy, as Aristotelians do, 
but rather focuses on ways of making representative democracy more deliberative. Not 
only does he think of deliberative democracy as distinct from direct democracy, he 
even expresses doubts about the effectiveness of direct democracy in safeguarding 
deliberation: direct democracy is too prone to demagoguery, he suggests.16 
Deliberation is one of three key elements of an adequate conception of democracy: 
deliberation; formal equality; and non-tyranny, by which Fishkin means the avoidance 
of arbitrary rule. The value of deliberation is that in contrast to the 'inclinations of the 
moment' which are reflected in a purely preference based notion of democracy, 
deliberation produces 'public opinions that are refined by 'sedate reflection'.17 Because 
the 'citizens of mass publics show little in the way of knowledge, sophistication, or 
consistency in their beliefs and opinions,' we should try to improve the quality of 
political decisionmaking by introducing deliberative elements into the political process.
The particular innovation which Fishkin suggests is that of the 'deliberative 
opinion poll' which will function like a 'citizens jury' in which selected citizens will be 
invited to discuss public issues with each other and then have the outcome of their
15 James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation.
16 Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, p.50.
17 Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, p.36.
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deliberations publicised, in the hope that this will serve to improve the quality of the 
decisions made by voters and representatives alike. This sort of concern with 
institutional innovation is a growing part of the deliberative project as it must be if it is 
to amount to more than a nostalgia for direct democracy.18
Critics might wonder, however, whether the putative epistemic gains of 
discussion are sufficient to justify deliberation as an element of democracy, especially 
in view of Fishkin's admission that the emphasis on epistemic gain can conflict with 
political equality. If we are interested solely in improving the quality of decision­
making we might deem it more efficient to consult experts rather than ordinary 
citizens, perhaps even adopting a form of corporatist democracy in which the input of 
these experts was given an institutional role. Obviously, Fishkin's own conception 
would not permit this, as this would be incompatible with the requirements of formal 
equality, but this underlines the way his theory seems to allow for a potential conflict 
between deliberation and equality.
Within Fishkin's theory, liberalism, in the person of Mill, is connected with 
deliberation, and the two contrasted with the requirements of political equality. As 
Fishkin notes, Mill was prepared to countenance plural voting, that is to say, 
additional votes for the educated in order to ensure that the quality of public debate be 
maintained. The connection here lies in the way liberals like Mill and deliberative 
democrats like Fishkin fear that democracy will lapse into populism and majoritarian 
tyranny. This reproduces the idea that liberals may be at best fair-weather friends of 
democracy, who would be equally happy with an enlightened despotism provided it 
respected private, negative liberties. Fishkin's account of deliberation does not contrast 
it with liberalism, but does provide an account which suggests that the deliberation 
itself may tend towards elitism rather than towards political equality.
The third justification for adopting a deliberative conception of democracy is 
couched in egalitarian terms. As with the epistemic conception of deliberation, the
18 See James Bohman, 'The coming of age of deliberative democracy,1 Journal of Political Philosophy 
6 (1998), pp.400-25.
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contrast is not with representative democracy per se, but rather with interest-group 
politics, which is to say, the idea that politics is concerned with the aggregation of 
preferences. John Dryzek presents this in terms of a contrast between 'participatory' 
and 'liberal' democracy:
Although there is no simple dichotomy between liberal and
participatory democracy, one can think of them as two major
democratic possibilities. As one moves towards the participatory pole 
of the spectrum they help define, politics becomes increasingly 
discursive, educational, oriented to truly public interests, and needful of 
active citizenship. In contrast, the liberal pole is dominated by voting, 
strategy, private interests, bargaining, exchange, spectacle, and limited 
involvement.19
This contrast seems to reproduce elements of the first argument for deliberation, the 
classical, Aristotelian preference for direct democracy, for example, but Dryzek is not 
simply nostalgic for a lost past. He argues that while he should prefer to construct 
some sort of 'public space' other than the modem state, 'if the state, bureaucracy,
private enterprise, and family are always going to be with us, then perhaps they merit
democratising too.'20 That is to say, like other deliberative democrats, he contemplates 
the introduction of deliberation into a variety of sites in modem society and not simply 
the reversion to small scale face-to-face communities in order to institute direct 
democracy. Equally, despite his remarks about the 'discursive and egalitarian classical 
conception of politics', he favours the sort of proceduralist approach to the choice of
19 John Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 13. See also Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond.
20 Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p.220.
244
moral principles favoured by Habermas, rather than the neo-Aristotelian politics 
favoured by communitarians like MacIntyre.21
Dryzek's reliance upon the Frankfurt School is what shapes his preference for 
discursive over liberal democracy because on his view the latter embodies the notion of 
the 'instrumental rationalisation of society' which lay at the centre of their analysis of 
modernity. What is wrong with liberal democracy, understood in terms of party 
competition is that it reduces politics to strategic action, where realising one's goals 
takes precedence over other considerations such that public decisions made as the 
outcome of this competitive process would amount to little more that the coercion and 
manipulation of one's fellow citizens 22 We can interpret Dryzek's opposition to interest 
group politics as based on a version of the injunction never to treat others simply as a 
means but rather as ends in themselves, that is, as based on the norm of equal respect, 
the same norm that prompted Gadamer's opposition to the idea of 'method'. A purely 
instrumental relationship to others, and by implication a politics centred on such 
relationships, violates the requirement to treat others as equals. By contrasting 
deliberative and interest-group politics in this way Dryzek arrives at a more 
satisfactory account of why we should prefer a deliberative conception of democracy. 
This account does not rely on the idea that the life of political participation is of more 
value than any other, and it avoids the potentially elitist consequences of the epistemic 
model of democracy: instead it relies on the idea that if we fail to deliberate with others 
on matters of collective concern, then we are not treating them as equals.
Can liberals recognise the force of this claim? Dryzek does not think so: he 
assumes that liberals are wedded to precisely the sort of preference aggregating politics
21 Dryzek, Discursive Democracy, p. 184. For Habermas' constructivist idea that we choose principles 
which could be chosen as the outcome of deliberation in an 'ideal speech situation', See Habermas, 
'Discourse ethics: notes on a program of philosophical justification,' in Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action. (Cambridge MA: MIT, 1991)
22 Instrumental rationality, Dryzek says, 'can only involve the instrumental manipulation and 
engineering of people (and nature). Discursive designs, in contrast, can facilitate a less manipulative 
and more symbiotic kind of problem-solving intelligence in political life.' Dryzek, Discursive 
Democracy, p.59.
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to which he opposes deliberative democracy. Liberalism, in his eyes, is founded on the 
belief that 'individuals are mostly motivated by self-interest' and this gives rise to a 
preference for a style of politics which allows the pursuit of self-interest to proceed, 
restrained only by a set of minimal constitutional ground rules. Even the 'political 
liberalism' which has been formulated over the last decade or so, a liberalism which has 
become closely associated with deliberative democracy on account of its focus on the 
task of political justification in conditions of pluralism, is criticised by Dryzek for its 
complicity with 'the prevailing liberal political economy' and its constitutionalist 
minimalism which, he argues, is blunting the critical edge of deliberative democracy.'23
There is no doubt that liberalism has been presented by many of its adherents as 
a fundamentally apolitical creed, concerned chiefly to protect the negative liberties of 
atomised individuals.24 Clearly liberalism is not compatible with a 'classical' 
understanding of democracy, which assumes a single version of the good life, and it is 
traditionally regarded as having an ambiguous relationship even to representative 
democracy, as the example of Mill shows. However, the egalitarian defence of 
deliberative democracy seems to provide the sort of defence of democracy which 
overcomes the old contrast between equality and liberty and provides a basis for a 
reconciliation with contemporary egalitarian liberalism. Whatever about the liberal 
tradition, there is clearly no need for contemporary liberals to adhere to an interest 
group conception of politics. Dryzek caricatures liberals with the claim that the only 
motivation they acknowledge is self-interest: contemporary liberalism places at its 
centre the motivation to act justly.25 The connection between liberalism and
23 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Bevond. p.8.
24 The locus classicus of this liberalism is Berlin's much discussed 'Two concepts of liberty', notable 
among other things for its portrayal of Kant as a proto-totalitarian. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
25 See, for example, Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). All take the view that persons can be motivated by 
a desire to act justly. The idea that self-interest is the only motive recognised by liberalism may owe 
something to Jeremy Bentham's 'two sovereign masters' but is almost entirely absent from 
contemporary liberalism.
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deliberative democracy is provided precisely by the claim that acting justly requires us 
to engage in public deliberation. By setting out a normative conception of democracy 
which calls on equality to provide an argument against majoritarianism, instead of 
opposing it with an appeal to the value of liberty, deliberative democrats have cleared 
the way to reconceiving the relationship between liberalism and democracy. In turn, 
what liberalism can bring to this idea is a fuller specification of the norms which should 
govern deliberation itself, namely the idea that deliberation must respect pluralism and 
distinguish between public and private deliberation rather than proceeding on the 
assumption of a consensus on a system of values.
What liberalism brings to deliberative democracy is the idea of respecting 
pluralism, usually expressed in the idea that the state should not promote a particular 
conception of the good, but rather should provide a framework which makes it 
possible for citizens with a variety of conceptions of the good to live together. In 
response to the criticism that liberalism has simply sought to impose its own 
conception of the good life - that centred on private, negative liberty, under the guise 
of neutrality - liberals have sought to reformulate liberalism as a distinctively 'political' 
theory which rests on a distinction between reasons appropriate to private moral 
deliberation, and those appropriate to public, political justification.26 Public 
justification is conceived in procedural terms instead of in terms of a substantive, 
shared conception of the good, in order to accommodate the maximum pluralism. It is 
not claimed, however, that this solution is neutral, as much as it is impartial, the 
distinction lying in the recognition that this proceduralism relies upon a commitment to 
the value of equality, rather than upon the bare idea of what reason requires. The 
liberal idea is that equality in conditions of pluralism requires us to be impartial.
As indicated above, the form of this procedure is provided by contractarianism, 
the idea of contract serving to express the ideas of equality and pluralism, insofar as it
26 See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity: Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and democratic 
legitimacy,' which Rawls includes within the canon of political liberalism, Political Liberalism. 
p.374n.
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represents the idea that acceptable principles must be justified to others.27 The 
construction set out by Thomas Scanlon is the one adopted here for public 
justification:
...that an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances 
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation 
of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
informed, unforced general agreement.28
As Thomas Nagel points out, the condition of reasonable rejection is a relatively 
stringent one, compared with a condition like 'adoptability', the principle appealed to in 
Onora O’Neill's version of constructivism, for example.29 The latter is designed to 
answer the charge that the search for universalisable principles entails a demand for 
uniformity. The condition of adoptability is deliberately weak in order to permit 
individuals to construct principles for guiding individual action which do not require 
others to adopt them: they are sufficiently objective if they are deemed to be 
potentially adoptable by others. This recognises that others, with different values, 
perhaps, may have good reasons to act on different principles.
The rejectability condition, by contrast, would seem to be better suited to 
public deliberation as it imposes a more stringent condition on the construction of 
principles, one that would eliminate many principles which would meet O'Neill's test. 
The first aims at rendering universalisability compatible with the maximum pluralism in 
individual conduct. However, to adopt it as a test for public reason would licence 
coercion on grounds which people might reject, while acknowledging them to be
27 Rawls presents the contractual device as useful insofar as it presents principles of justice as 
principles which would be chosen by 'rational* persons, i.e. that 'conceptions of justice may be 
explained and justified' and also because it contains the idea of a 'plurality' of persons and groups. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 16.
28 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 153.
29 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.36.
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conceivably adoptable. Coercion based on such grounds would clearly be wrong, as it 
would be insufficiently justified. Consequently, the more stringent condition of 
rejectability would seem to be better suited to playing the role of a test for public 
justification.
Such a construction allows a wide range of pluralism, while justifying coercion. 
The resulting bifurcation between public and private reasons does not, however, entail 
the complete separation of our private and our public moral convictions. Rather, the 
relation between the two is complex: as citizens we are obliged to offer others reasons 
which they could not reasonably reject. Resulting agreements would take the form of 
what Rawls calls 'overlapping consensus', so called because the area of overlap is that 
of public reason, supported by a variety of different private reasons. The business of 
deliberation will necessarily require parties to examine the private reasons of others, 
and to have their own private reasons examined in turn, if a public justification is to be 
constructed for a particular proposal, which is to say. a justification which can be 
supported for a variety of private reasons. It is hard to see how we could argue that a 
proposal could be supported in this way, without actually concerning ourselves with 
the plurality of reasons which might count for or against it. Rawls calls principles 
which are found to lie at the centre of an overlapping consensus 'freestanding' not in 
the sense that they are unrelated to citizens' 'comprehensive' moral outlooks, but 
because it"' can be supported from a variety of different comprehensive moral 
outlooks.30
This view rests on the following understanding of justification, which Gerald 
Gaus calls 'weakly externalist'.31 Weak extemalism entails offering people reasons 
which appeal to elements of their existing system of beliefs. Thus it is not enough to 
construct a justification out of one's own beliefs: justification to others entails showing
30 Brian Barry voices the concern that the idea of an overlapping consensus blunts the critical force of 
liberal egalitarianism. Barry, 'John Rawls and the search for stability,' Ethics 105 (1995), pp.874-915. 
See below for a consideration of the problem of stability.
31 Gerald Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.32.
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how the adoption of a particular course of action is justified in terms of one's 
interlocutor's system of beliefs as well as one's own. This can be complicated, insofar 
as we may find, first of all, that they share elements of our own system of belief, but 
have ordered these elements differently. We can imagine, for example, a situation in 
which two persons share a set of religious convictions, yet differ over whether they 
should press for the law to reflect these convictions and, secondly, that our 
interlocutors simply do not share certain beliefs which form part of the structure of 
justification we are proposing. The task of deliberation is to show that one's 
interlocutor has reason to reorder her beliefs, or to include new elements within her 
particular system.
On a 'closed' account of justification, we may proceed only by attempting 
justification in terms of our interlocutor's current system of belief. This excludes the 
possibility that we might reject a logically sound, but factually ill-founded argument 
which was consistent with our interlocutor's system of belief. On an 'open' account, 
however, we might argue that our interlocutor's existing system of belief is too narrow, 
and that it must be enlarged in order to include beliefs which would render her 
argument unsound, and pave the way to acceptance of our own justification. This 
account is not wholly 'external' in the sense that it parts company with the actual beliefs 
of those with whom we deliberate, for it can draw upon those beliefs in order to justify 
enlargement of a system of belief. We can do this, for example, when we appeal to 
beliefs about the nature of evidence, or inference, to justify acceptance of new beliefs.
Given this model of justification to others, public justification would proceed in 
the following ways: first we must ask ourselves whether we might reasonably expect 
others to share these reasons, or whether these are too narrow to have much purchase 
on our fellow citizens. I may favour a policy because my father always supported it or 
because my religion seems to require it, but I cannot expect these reasons to have 
much impact upon my fellow citizens, so I must formulate reasons which they cannot 
reasonably reject. Some might object that a problem arises here: that I am professing to 
hold a justification for a policy which is not my true justification and consequently I am
250
doing little more that manipulating others. This is not the case however, provided I 
believe the public reasons I have offered to be sound. A sincerity condition is clearly an 
element of public reason, then, and to that we may attach a publicity condition, namely, 
that we be required to acknowledge that we have additional, non-public, grounds for 
adopting a policy (even where these are not simply self-interested). Sincerity may be 
required in order to rule out the threat of manipulation, but publicity is important, not 
simply because it may foster trust and remove the suspicion of manipulation, but also 
because it aids the assessment of one's public reasoning. Insofar as we are situated 
beings, the implications of our beliefs may be supposed to be not wholly transparent to 
us, and consequently sincerity cannot guarantee that our efforts to reason impartially 
will be sound. Our non-public reasons may properly be the subject of deliberation 
insofar as knowledge of these may reveal unsuspected flaws in our public reasoning.
While deliberation will typically seek to uncover bases of agreement between 
deliberating parties, it must also cope with disagreement. Where a reinterpretation of 
another's beliefs does not produce assent to my proposal which replicates my own 
justification for it, I may consider the possibility that an alternative justification for this 
proposal be constructed from my interlocutor's set of beliefs. This is simply a correlate 
of the idea that I must formulate public reasons for my proposal, even where I am 
initially drawn to it for purely private reasons. In this case, I may present my 
interlocutor with reasons which I myself do not share, but which are drawn from his 
particular system of beliefs. In doing so, I must, however, sincerely believe that this 
justification is sound: we should not present people with 'reasons' which we believe to 
be spurious.32
Even this strategy may be unsuccessful, however, but this does not exhaust the 
obligations of deliberation, for when we encounter persistent disagreement, we need to 
determine whether this disagreement is to be judged reasonable, or whether it is based 
in ignorance, faulty reasoning, or simply self-interest. Disagreement for these reasons
32 See Gaus' discussion of such justifications in Justificatory Liberalism, pp. 137-51.
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does not count against a proposal, and where we judge disagreement unreasonable in 
this way we are justified in continuing to press our proposal, and implementing it if we 
are successful.33 The idea of public justification is not to be confused with the idea that 
we should seek unanimity. Where we judge disagreement reasonable, however, the 
situation is different: our proposal has failed the test of reasonable rejection and it 
would be wrong to impose it. In such situations we must seek a compromise 
acceptable to both parties.34
This account of the principles regulating public deliberation retains a version of 
the often criticised distinction between the public and private, but in interpreting it in 
terms of a contrast between the sort of principles which may be appealed to in public 
and private deliberation, it avoids the criticisms made against other versions of this 
distinction. Historically this distinction enters political thought with the religious 
pluralism of post-Reformation Europe as religious belief comes to be regarded as a 
private matter, lying outside the concern of political authorities.35 While this remains 
relatively uncontroversial, Marxists and feminists have drawn attention to the way that 
liberalism has traditionally tended to adopt this 'strategy of avoidance' with respect to 
other social institutions, namely the economy and the family, with the consequence that 
these are placed beyond the purview of public regulation and inequalities encountered 
there are left unchallenged. Obviously, the public/private distinction should not operate 
in this way, which is to say, as a means to set a priori limits to public deliberation and 
action. Any attempt to cordon off an aspect of society must itself be justified publicly:
33 As Rawls points out, at a certain point, all that remains is for citizens to vote for that proposal they 
sincerely believe to be publicly justified: 'A vote can be held on a fundamental question as on any 
other; and if the question is debated by appeal to political values and citizens vote their sincere 
opinion, the ideal is sustained.' Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.241.
34 See Larmore's discussion of the idea that reasonable persons 'should retreat to neutral ground' when 
they disagree. By this he means simply that instead of forcing the point, they should seek to construct 
an argument from beliefs other than those in question, or move to another aspect of the problem at 
hand. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 53.
35 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.xxiv-xxvii.
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issues ought not be removed from the public agenda prior to deliberation. Instead of 
thinking of the public/private device as a mechanism for framing the boundaries of the 
political in a potentially ideological way, it should rather be thought of as regulating 
the reasons offered in public debate in such a way that public intervention is restrained 
where adequate public reasons for it cannot be adduced. In a sense, the public/private 
distinction thus comes to be the stuff of politics, rather than as providing an 'extra­
political' boundary to the conduct of politics, as citizens debate the drawing and 
redrawing of the line between what may be subject to public authority and what may 
legitimately lie outside it.
Shane O'Neill argues that Rawls' version of political liberalism operates to 
exclude issues from public deliberation in precisely the way criticised above. O'Neill 
claims that Rawls' distinction between comprehensive and political conceptions serves 
to exclude many controversial issues from public deliberation in the way that the 
traditional distinction between public and private spheres did.36 In particular, he alleges 
that Rawls simply assumes a constitution of individual rights, which 'sets limits to 
political discussion' by removing issues like abortion from the political agenda.37 This 
echoes some of Dryzek's concerns about the influence of 'liberal constitutionalism' 
upon deliberation, namely that it will serve to unreasonably restrict the scope of 
deliberation.38
Rawls certainly speaks, on occasion, as if the distinction between 
comprehensive and political views assumes that political views could be dealt with in 
isolation from the consideration of citizens' comprehensive views. He says, for 
example, that
36 Shane O'Neill, Impartiality in Context, p. 14.
37 O'Neill, Impartiality in Context, p.31,
38 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, pp. 17-20.
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A political conception of justice is what I call freestanding when it is 
not presented as derived from, or as a part of any comprehensive 
doctrine. Such a conception of justice in order to be a moral 
conception must contain its own intrinsic normative and moral ideal.39
O'Neill is also right to suppose that he underestimates the difficulties presented by a 
problem like abortion: he argues that a liberal Catholic could accept legal abortion 
without surrendering his personal opposition to it, but this does not address the 
problem that the contestability of the status of the foetus presents a problem for 
attempts to justify legal abortion to non-liberal Catholics.40
However, it is also the case that on the interpretation of overlapping consensus 
given above, the distinction between public and private justification does not entail the 
claim that political outlooks are 'isolated' from citizens' comprehensive moral views or 
that these could not be the subject of deliberation. Rawls himself argues that political 
values are not 'separate from or discontinuous with, other values.'41 It would be 
difficult to see how an overlapping consensus could be constructed at all if citizens' 
comprehensive views were excluded from deliberation. The point of the distinction is 
not to set limits to discussion, but rather to determine the limits of what actions might 
be justified. In this way, while comprehensive moral views will play a central part in 
deliberation, they should not be regarded as providing a sufficient justification for the 
exercise of public authority. In fact, Rawls does, as Gutmann and Thompson point out, 
restrict the scope of deliberation, but not in the way that O'Neill suggests.42
He does this by restricting deliberation to 'constitutional essentials', while 
seemingly leaving the stuff of ordinary politics open to traditional interest-group
39 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.xliv.
40 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. Iv-lviii.
41 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 10.
42 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), pp.33-9.
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competition.43 This certainly answers O'Neill's objection, as the liberal constitution 
cannot be both an extra-political boundary serving to withdraw issues from public 
concern, and the subject of public deliberation at the same time. However, it does 
seem to be an unjustified restriction upon deliberation. If political equality requires 
deliberation, this seems to require it across the board: we should not be deaf to the just 
claims of others in the daily conduct of politics. Neither might it be justified on the 
grounds that deliberation is too demanding for ordinary politics, that it is easier to 
secure agreement on the relatively 'thin' principles contained in a constitution, for the 
opposite appears to be the case. A brief glance at the constitutional upheavals which 
characterised Irish politics in the 1980s and early 1990s over the issue of abortion 
should serve to dispel the idea that constitutional questions are less divisive than other 
political questions 44 As interpreted here, the idea of distinguishing public and private 
justification, and the idea that a publicly justified policy is one which may be supported 
for a variety of reasons, is not a device for restricting the scope of public deliberation.
There is another sort of objection commonly made against political 
constructivism, namely that the contractarian form of the procedure relies too heavily 
upon the idea of agreement, and is consequently ill-disposed to recognise dissensus 
and, by implication, reasonable pluralism. This reproduces the complaint of 
contextualists against 'universalism': that it is insensitive to genuine plurality. Nicholas 
Rescher objects that the idea of reasonable agreement is hostile to pluralism and simply 
assumes that reasonable people will agree, when in fact reasonable people may equally 
fail to arrive at a consensus, for reasons of both conceptual and value pluralism.45 He 
goes on to argue that agreement does not, in any case, play a significant role in 
theories where it is qualified by the condition of reasonableness. In these theories it is
43 'The first point is that the limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but 
only to those involving what we may call 'constitutional essentials' and questions of basic justice.' 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.214.
44 See Lisa Smyth, 'Narratives of Irishness and the problem of abortion,' Feminist Review 60 (1998), 
pp.61-83.
45 Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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the idea of reasonableness itself which is really doing the work, insofar as agreement 
on its own is not regarded as a sufficient guarantee of the legitimacy of the principles 
agreed upon. We should, on this view, concentrate on spelling out what counts as 
'reasonable1 and simply discard the idea of agreement, with its implication that reason 
provides universally accepted foundations.
Rescher is right to say that it is the idea of the reasonable which does the real 
work: this idea clearly contains substantive commitments to equality and, derived from 
that, impartiality, which serve to rule out agreements produced through coercion or 
manipulation. However, the idea of the contract is not wholly redundant insofar as it 
plays a role in the interpretation of the idea of reasonableness itself. This role is to 
bring out the idea that equality involves justification to others. The significance of the 
contractarian device lies in the fact that it is part of the interpretation of equality, and 
not that it constitutes a demand, redundant or otherwise, for consensus. Understood in 
this way the ideas of the reasonable and of justification to others may be disconnected 
from the idea of consensus to the extent that reasonable people may be understood to 
disagree.
Understood in this way, it is clear that the contractarian form of constructivist 
morality does not operate to blunt the demands of justice by means of a predisposition 
to consensus. Having said that, Rawls' idea of the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus is connected to the idea of stability in ways which give cause for concern. 
Rawls claims that 'the problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy' and 
states the problem driving his conception of political liberalism in the following way: 
'How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and 
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines?'46 Introducing the question of stability in this way 
prompts the concern that overlapping consensus may amount to little more than a 
'modus vivendi', which is to say, a bargain struck between competing groups,
46 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.xx.
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whenever the costs of continued conflict appear too great. Peace and stability can in 
this way come to displace the demands of justice, as the risk is that the terms of such 
agreements will simply reflect the balance of forces between competing parties. The 
Unionist government in Northern Ireland established after partition provides an 
example of the sort of problem posed by the introduction of stability in this way: this 
government was stable although the society it ruled over was marked by significant 
economic and political discrimination against the nationalist minority.
As noted in the discussion of impartiality in Chapter Four, the problem of 
reconciling the demands of justice with other demands such as the desire to live well, 
or in this case, to live in a stable political order, is a deep and difficult one, and not one 
that I can hope to resolve here. The danger is that the demands of justice will be 
repelled by appealing to 'realism', if by interpreting 'realism' in such a way is to accord 
it the status of an independent value. The point of view of justice resists the idea that 
we adapt our principles to fit political realities: ought implies can and the relationship 
between the world and our principles is such that the world should be brought into line 
with just principles, not the other way around.47 Peace is a great value, but we should 
not allow the determination of the unjust to resist the claims of justice by appealing to 
it. However the potential for conflict between the two is to be resolved, it is clear that 
stability is a consideration in competition with the requirements of constructivist 
morality, and not an essential element of it.
In any event, the demands of political stability are in tension with Rawls' own 
requirement that an overlapping consensus be a consensus for the 'right reasons' and 
not a mere 'modus vivendi', a mere accommodation between opposing^parties.48 This
47 See Nagel, Equality and Partiality, and David Copp's discussion of Rawls in particular, 'Pluralism 
and stability in liberal theory,' Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996), pp. 191-206.
48 This model of liberal politics as founded on an accommodation between hitherto warring parties, a 
'modus vivendi' is set out in Charles Larmore's Patterns of Moral Complexity. Rawls addresses the 
difference between this and his idea of an overlapping consensus in the light of Joshua Cohen's . 
discussion of the difference between the two in 'Moral Pluralism and political consensus,' in The Idea 
of Democracy. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp.270-91. Rawls contrasts the two in the following terms: The point is that 
not all reasonable doctrines are liberal comprehensive doctrines; so the question is whether they can
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would exclude compromises based on threats and manipulation. Nonetheless, in 
considering whether justice as fairness could be deemed acceptable from the point of 
view of stability, Rawls suggests that in the event that such principles should appear to 
be inconsistent with stability, 'We should have to see whether acceptable changes in the 
principles of justice would achieve stability; or indeed whether stability could obtain for 
any democratic conception.'49 Here the emphasis must presumably fall upon the idea of 
'acceptable' changes, if Rawls is to avoid allowing stability to outweigh the demands of 
justice.
The contractarian form of the construction of the principles which regulate 
public deliberation does not unduly weight the deliberative process towards consensus. 
We might well hope that consensus be the outcome of political deliberations, but the 
role of contractarian morality is to guide the deliberations of individual citizens not to 
enjoin compromise. This guidance includes the provision of a standard against which 
to judge an existing 'consensus' and where this is judged unjust, contractarianism 
justifies opposition, not acquiescence.
Impartial Deliberation and Context
Can this model of impartial public deliberation respond to contextualist points 
about the significance of situated differences pertaining between the citizens of liberal 
democracies, and can contextual redescription and interpretation play a significant role 
in such deliberation? Both questions may be answered in the affirmative. However, 
there are two sorts of objection to this account. First of all, some theorists, such as 
Anne Phillips, are concerned that the idea of deliberative politics is itself at least
still be compatible for the right reasons with a liberal political conception. To do this, I contend, it is 
not sufficient that these doctrines accept a democratic regime merely as a modus vivendi. Rather they 
must accept it as members of a reasonable overlapping consensus.' Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
p.xxxix.
49 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.66.
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potentially injurious to the demands of marginalised groups. This worry may be 
addressed by distinguishing impartial deliberation from mere reciprocity based 
deliberation. The second objection to this account of deliberation is that impartiality 
itself is incompatible with the recognition of situated differences, which is to say, 
differences of identity and perspective. This claim, made by Iris Young, rests on a 
misunderstanding of impartiality. In fact, it will be argued, impartiality demands that 
we attend to differences of perspective in order that we might construct public 
justifications, as this requires engagement with the beliefs of differently situated others. 
This engagement, by which is meant the understanding and assessment of these beliefs, 
is aided by the sort of contextual interpretation and redescription which can enrich 
individual moral deliberation. Far from opposing contextual considerations, an 
impartial conception of deliberation makes them central to the conduct of deliberative 
politics, for without understanding and reinterpretation, acceptable public justification 
will not be possible.
Anne Phillips is herself drawn towards deliberation because of the requirement 
to include hitherto excluded perspectives in the political process. While it is true that 
political equality depends in large measure on equality in resources, it is also that case 
that a more inclusive, deliberative style of politics can help to secure equality in other 
spheres, as marginal groups will be able to press their claims more forcefully if they can 
participate in political decision-making, instead of being simply the objects of those 
decisions. She is concerned, however, that the second element of deliberation, namely, 
the emphasis on the transformation of pre-deliberative perspectives through the 
deliberative process, may well work to the disadvantage of marginal groups. This risk 
is increased by the antipathy of deliberative democrats to interest-group politics. On 
one hand, they are wary of measures which smack of group representation for this 
appears to serve the construction of new versions of old-fashioned interest-group 
politics, versions which are more inclusive but which are equally hostile to deliberation
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and transformation.50 Phillips goes on to argue that there is a danger that the 
'requirement for equitable representation' be regarded as 'dependent on whether it 
manages to promote 'good' deliberation'.51 Connected with this is the fear that 
deliberation is hostile to the language of interest per se and that this will make it harder 
for disadvantaged groups to articulate and to press their interests in public deliberation, 
thus confirming their subordinate position in society.52 The deliberative focus on 
reaching consensus over simple competition may then serve to produce agreements 
which simply embody adaptive preferences.53
These criticisms are more appropriate to the first two models of deliberative 
democracy outlined above: the Aristotelian and the epistemic. The Aristotelian model 
clearly enjoins that participants set aside their private interests and pursue the common 
good. Benjamin Barber, for example criticises the 'liberal' citizen, who has multiple 
identities and finds himself pulled in different directions by them. Instead of regarding 
this as normal, however, Barber argues that his 'strong' democratic citizenship can 
resolve these tensions by demanding that citizens set aside their particular interests and 
the identities they spring from and devote themselves to the public interest.54 Equally, 
the tension between inclusion and 'good' deliberation is evident in Fishkin's account of 
deliberation in which it is assumed that elitism best serves to produce the best 
deliberation. The egalitarian conception of deliberation is not subject to these
50 The argument of Chapter Three was that standpoint theory justifies inclusion in terms which are 
incompatible with deliberation. A hermeneutic understanding of situation, however, provides the basis 
for arguments for inclusion which avoid the pitfalls of standpoint theory.
51 Phillips, Which Equalities Matter? (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 118.
52 Phillips, Which Equalities Matter? p. 121.
53 Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p. 162.
54 Barber believes that the phenomenon of multiple identifications promotes 'a pervasive sense of 
confusion and political apathy that is corrosive to citizenship and to democracy1. In 'strong 
democracy', by contrast, 'the citizen emerges from the struggle of partisan interest as a whole 
person...He finds himself measuring his private interests by the yardstick of public interests in which, 
as a citizen, he has a growing investment. Citizenship here serves to transform interests and to 
reorient identity; the dilemmas of pluralist society are thereby addressed they are challenged head on.' 
Evidently, pluralism is not so much challenged, as denied on this model, giving the lie to Barber's 
claim that he is not a simple communitarian. Barber, Strong Democracy, p.208-9.
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criticisms, however, for it not only justifies inclusion, but the sort of transformation in 
perspective which it enjoins does not simply exclude interests, or subordinate them to 
the common good.
This understanding of deliberation conceives of it as regulated by impartiality; 
the transformation required is one which distinguishes between legitimate and 
illegitimate interests, considered impartially. On this view, impartial consideration of 
the interests articulated in deliberation requires parties to abandon claims which are 
deemed illegitimate, and support those judged legitimate, whether these serve the 
interests of one's own group or not. Deliberative democracy may be contrasted with 
interest-group competition not because it is hostile to the articulation of group 
interests, but because the unfettered pursuit of these interests is regarded as 
incompatible with equality, which requires us to be open to the legitimate claims of 
others. Phillips, presumably, fears that legitimate interests will be sidelined in 
deliberation, not that illegitimate interests will be excluded from debate. This fear is 
well founded in the case of Aristotelian and epistemic models of deliberation, but not 
with respect to the egalitarian conception of deliberation, which aims to promote the 
articulation of legitimate interests, and to enjoin such transformation of perspectives as 
will promote support for those interests.
Deliberation requires us to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
interests, and it is distinguished from majoritarianism by the idea that equality requires 
us to be impartial, to set aside our interests where they cannot be judged legitimate. 
Majoritarianism is wrong to the extent that it sanctions the implementation of policies 
which are unacceptable, judged impartially. Some deliberative democrats, however, 
believe that requiring deliberation to be governed by impartiality is too stringent a 
requirement, and consequently we should reject it in favour of reciprocity. Gutmann 
and Thompson claim that impartiality, understood as a requirement to act for the 
general good, is too rigorous a norm for regulating public deliberation.55 They go on to
55 Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 54.
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argue that altruism is not only excessively rigorous but that it is not equipped to deal 
with problems of contestability, such as those presented by disputes about legal 
abortion. In such cases, they argue, altruists will simply be unable to identify the 
general good which they should support and consequently, altruism has no special 
power to produce consensus. For this reason it should give way to reciprocity, to the 
desire to cooperate with others conditional on reciprocation of this willingness to 
cooperate. Furthermore, they claim, the desire to cooperate justifies the pursuit of 
compromise whenever insoluble conflicts are identified.
Why should we favour the more demanding ideal of impartiality? Gutmann and 
Thompson are right to suggest that impartiality cannot resolve all conflicts, but they 
provide no argument to the effect that reciprocity can resolve these conflicts, nor that 
persons motivated by impartiality cannot then seek an accommodation. Impartiality 
demands that we must refrain from imposing views we understand to be partial and to 
this extent it provides a basis for seeking an accommodation. Gutmann and Thompson 
fail to show that reciprocity is superior to impartiality with respect to conflict 
resolution. Furthermore, they do not consider the danger of weakening the normative 
requirements governing deliberation which are entailed by the substitution of 
reciprocity for impartiality.
The difference lies in the way that, as Brian Barry argues, a concern for 
impartiality brings the background conditions of deliberation into consideration.56 
Reciprocity, he argues, differs from the theory of justice as mutual advantage only 
insofar as it introduces a moral motive: the desire to cooperate, where this is 
reciprocated. Otherwise, it is insensitive to the potential for unfairness present in 
agreements struck between unequal parties. Provided both parties are willing to 
compromise, the terms of the compromise itself are not considered. These terms may 
simply reflect the existing imbalance of power between the parties concerned. By 
subjecting public deliberation to the requirement of impartiality, however, impartial
56 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.59.
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deliberation is sensitive to such imbalances in a way that reciprocity is not. Whereas a 
group may support a refusal to compromise on legitimate demands with reference to 
impartiality, the danger of adopting the requirement of reciprocity is that such refusal 
to compromise must itself be deemed illegitimate and consequently, as Anne Phillips 
fears, the disadvantaged will be prevented from pressing legitimate interests.
To take a practical example, The current negotiations over the reform of the 
RUC serve to bring out the contrast between the two. Nationalists have an interest in 
refusing to compromise on the issue of the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Patten report, while Unionists have an interest in resisting the full implementation 
of the report.57 On the understanding that implementation of the Patten 
recommendations will result in the creation of an impartial police service in the North 
of Ireland, while the failure to implement these proposals will frustrate this aim, it is 
clear that impartial consideration of this conflict falls on the side of the implementation 
of Patten's recommendations, and justifies the Nationalist refusal to compromise on 
this demand. Reciprocity, by contrast enjoins compromise on this question, which can 
only result in the failure to establish an impartial police force. On this view unionists 
are free to exploit their superior bargaining position, which is to say, their deliberately 
created political majority within Northern Ireland, in order to achieve a compromise. 
From the point of view of impartiality, reciprocity would enjoin a compromise that was 
itself unfair: it skews deliberation towards compromise, and ignores the imbalances of 
power which serve to determine the nature of the compromises thus sanctioned. By 
conceiving of the conduct of deliberation in terms of impartiality rather than merely in 
terms of reciprocity, we may distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable 
compromises, and we can justify the refusal of parties to compromise where legitimate
57 A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland: The Report of the Independent Commission for 
Policing in Northern Ireland. (1999). Recommendations include: renaming the RUC; the symbols of 
the new police service should be free from associations with British or Irish states; policing boards 
representative of the community as a whole be established; these should have the power to review the 
activities of the police; recruitment policy should seek to be inclusive with respect to political 
tradition, religion, and gender.
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interests are at stake. Conceiving of deliberation in these terms preserves its radical 
potential.
Impartiality has itself been criticised by Iris Young, as providing an inadequate 
basis for an inclusive, deliberative, politics. She repeats communitarian arguments to 
the effect that impartiality is impossible, to the extent that it requires us to 'abstract 
from the particularities of situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view.'58 She 
introduces a new element into this critique of impartiality, however, insofar as she 
argues that it is incompatible with deliberative politics because the impartial point of 
view is unable to recognise pluralism. Consequently, appeals to impartiality can only 
serve the interests of dominant groups, who employ impartiality as an ideology to 
justify the continued exclusion of marginal groups from the political process.
As Young sees it, adopting an impartial point of view effectively reduces 'the 
plurality of all moral subjects to one subjectivity.'59 Insofar as it substitutes the 
judgement of a single person for the public deliberation, it renders actual deliberation 
redundant:
The decision arrived at by the impartial decisionmaker is one all those 
affected would have arrived at if they had discussed it under 
circumstances of mutual respect and equal power. So provided we find 
impartial decisionmakers we have no need for discussion.60
Consequently, a commitment to impartiality will tend towards an undemocratic style of 
government. In institutional terms this gives rise to a predilection for government by an
58 Young. Justice and the Politics of Difference, p.97.
59 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 100.
60 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, p. 112.
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elite of impartial bureaucrats, and 'impartiality' functions then as an ideology 
legitimating their rule.
Young goes on to argue that because of this opposition between discussion and 
impartiality, the public sphere, such as it is, will be shaped by elites which will define as 
normal and impartially vindicated, their own particular views. Typically these have 
been the views of white, upper class men and this has worked to the detriment of other 
groups who find that their concerns are excluded from consideration in the public 
sphere as merely 'particularist'.61
In fact, far from opposing public deliberation, impartiality requires the 
articulation of the full range of perspectives present in society and engagement with 
them as a condition of constructing public justifications. The first point which can be 
made in response to Young's criticisms is that her argument itself rests on the 
assumption that public decision making should be impartial: how else are we to make 
sense of her opposition to the partiality of elites? She is right to point to the way that 
claims to impartiality can be made as part of a strategy to sideline one's opponents by 
representing them as partial, and self-interested, rather than as committed to the public 
interest, but any concept is open to this sort of abuse. Political elites typically represent 
themselves as honest, truthful, morally justified, etc. but the fact that they do so to 
further their own interests does not invalidate these ideas themselves. Young fails to 
admit the distinction between impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. Her 
argument, like that of Marxists against the partiality of the bourgeois state, rests upon 
the value which she purports to criticise.
This places Young's argument about the supposed connection between 
impartiality and elitism into perspective. Elite rule can still be criticised from an 
impartial point of view even where these elites seek to represent themselves as
61 'The standpoint of the privileged, their particular experience and standards, is constructed as 
normal and neutral. If oppressed groups challenge the alleged neutrality of prevailing assumptions 
and policies, and express their own experience and perspectives, their claims are heard as those of 
biased, selfish special interests that deviate from the impartial general interest.' Young, Justice and 
the Politics of Difference, p. 116.
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impartial, and we can appeal to impartiality in order to justify measures to make 
government more accountable. It does not follow from the idea that we should like our 
bureaucracies to be impartial that we should be happy to trust in the assurances of 
those who direct them that they actually are impartial. On the contrary, if we want 
impartiality rather than its appearance we would choose to open the activities of those 
in these institutions to scrutiny in order to test their commitment to impartiality. For 
example, an essential element of the Patten report on the reform of the RUC are the 
provisions for undertaking independent inquiries into the activities of the police: 
impartiality justifies accountability.
Finally, there is Young's claim that the impartial point of view is essentially 
inimical to pluralism. This can be taken in two ways: first of all as a point about the 
construction of impartial judgements, and secondly as a point about the place of 
individual moral deliberation vis a vis public deliberation. On the first point the claim is 
that impartiality requires us to ignore the particularities which differentiate people and 
to this extent it is effectively 'monologicar rather than 'dialogical', in the sense that the 
only perspective which remains once differences have been eliminated in this way is 
that of the individual moral reasoner.62
The best example of this is provided by Rawls' account of moral reasoning in 
which the individual moral agent is supposed to adopt the device of the original 
position in order to help determine his choice of principles of justice.63 This choice is 
then tested against his moral intuitions in the hope that a 'reflective equilibrium' may be 
achieved between principles and intuitions. The construction of the original position, 
which is to guide the choice of principles has two unusual features: the assumption that
62 See also Shane O'Neill for this criticism of Rawls in Impartiality in Context. While Rawls' 
construction of the 'original position' in A Theoiy of Justice is flawed, O'Neill, like Young, 
uncritically accepts the claim that Habermas' 'ideal speech situation' is significantly different from the 
basically contractualist position adopted by Rawls. It is claimed that Habermas' position is 'dialogical' 
in a way that ordinary contractualism is not. However, as Christopher McMahon argues, the 
difference between the two positions is negligible unless one takes Habermas to be arguing for an 
implausibly consensualist account of morality, i.e. one that makes unanimity a condition of right 
judgement. See McMahon, Discourse and ethics,' Ethics 110 (2000), pp.514-36.
63 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp.48-51.
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those choosing principles do so on the basis of self-interest and, secondly, that they 
choose from behind a 'veil of ignorance', which is to say, without knowledge of their 
particular situation in the society that would result from the choice of the principles in 
question. In this way, it is hoped, the choice of principles will be impartial.
This account of the role of impartiality in the construction of principles adds 
weight to Young's charge that the demands of impartiality are in direct conflict with 
the recognition of our situatedness and the resulting plurality of identities and 
perspectives. While Rawls presents the contractual device which informs the original 
position as representing plurality, it is hard to see how this can be so, given that the 
hypothetical choosers in the original position lack all the particularising features which 
would give content to this plurality, for example, age, gender, ethnicity, class, etc. We 
cannot imagine real debate taking place in the original position because it lacks the 
plurality of perspectives present in real politics. It is as if Rawls' hypothetical chooser 
were to argue with himself, in the same way as he might play chess against himself.
However, the case for impartiality does not stand or fall with Rawls' notions of 
the original position and the veil of ignorance. Rawls’ construction, after all, is 
regarded as flawed by other impartialists. Its weakness stems form the way that the 
parties in the original position are assumed to choose on the basis of self-interest. This 
is what requires the implausible device of the veil of ignorance in order to 'baffle' the 
self-interest of the parties and to ensure that they will choose impartially.64 As Barry 
argues, it is simpler to dispense with the whole device of the original position, and to 
make a more direct argument for the principles which Rawls' supposes will be chosen 
in the original position.65 The original position and the veil of ignorance are simply an 
unhelpful complication. A better account of the impartial standpoint is that provided by
64 Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 101.
65 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 57-61.
267
Thomas Nagel, in that it does not rely upon the sort of implausible idealisation which 
characterises the original position.66
This has the virtue that it makes it clear that adopting an impartial point of view 
does not entail ignorance of the particularities which are essential to plurality. As 
Nagel conceives it, the impartial point of view is a form of objective standpoint, a 
standpoint which includes one's subjective perspective within it. To adopt an impartial 
view is simply to describe oneself in the third person, as simply one person among 
others in order to bracket out the 'mineness' which may otherwise bias our assessment 
of competing beliefs and interests. Described in this way, our projects must be judged 
as if they were the projects of any other person in the world. Unlike Rawls' 
construction Nagel's account of impersonal morality does not exclude particularity and 
the separateness of persons from consideration.
This more economical account of impartiality answers Young's charge that the 
construction of impartial principles relies on the exclusion of plurality, for as Nagel 
presents it, impartiality relies on recognition of this plurality. By this I mean that 
impartiality is a rule for guiding our treatment of others, in the sense that it first of all 
recognises the existence of alternative perspectives and interests, and secondly requires 
us to judge which of these must be affirmed, regardless of which happens to be our 
own. There can be no question of being partial or impartial with respect to our own 
interests where we do not recognise the existence of others with alternative interests. 
The existence of others with distinct needs, interests, and perspectives is the logical 
precondition of the impartial standpoint, while egalitarianism is its moral basis. 
Impartiality is simply the egalitarian response to the recognition of reasonable 
pluralism. Nagel's account of the impartial standpoint, in contrast to that set out in 
Rawls' original position, does not exclude particularising information about myself or 
others, but rather seeks to bracket out partiality, not particularity, by adopting a third 
personal description of myself, presenting my own interests and beliefs alongside those
66 Nagel, The View from Nowhere.
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of the others I must judge. Instead of presenting others in a way which makes them 
impossible to distinguish from myself, we might say that this version of the impartial 
standpoint works in the opposite way: it seeks to present my claims to myself in the 
same way that I present those of others to myself.
Understood in this way, impartiality need not entail the substitution of 
individual deliberation for actual public deliberation, for without actually engaging with 
the perspectives of others there is no prospect of arriving at an impartial judgement 
with respect to them. Neither does it replace individual judgement with public 
deliberation in the sense that individuals are required to defer to any consensus 
achieved through deliberation. The extension of individual deliberation into the public 
sphere imposes special obligations: where public authority is to be exercised, our 
justifications must meet the test of reasonable rejection. At the end of the day, it is for 
individuals to judge whether their proposals meet this test, or whether objections are 
reasonable or not. The main difference between individual and public deliberation is 
that, in the former, justifications must be constructed from one's own system of beliefs, 
while in the case of the latter, justification must be constructed from a plurality of 
systems of belief. Just as I cannot construct sound justifications for my own actions 
where I do not fully understand the content of my interests and beliefs, so too I cannot 
hope to successfully justify my proposals for collective action to others where I do not 
understand their interests and beliefs.
The fact of situation, the fact of the existence of a plurality of interpretable 
identities and perspectives, is a condition of impartial deliberation, which is to say that 
it forms the circumstances of such deliberation. On a foundationalist view of reason, 
public deliberation would be relatively straightforward, as all reasonable persons could 
be shown to agree upon basic principles, and in principle, upon a uniform system of 
belief from which justifications could then be constructed. A foundationalist 
understanding of reason would be unable to appreciate the need for a distinction 
between public and private reasoning, as there is no essential difference between the 
two: they proceed from the same uniform system of belief. However, what a
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hermeneutic understanding of reason, one which rests on conceptual pluralism and sees 
this as embodied in various belief forming traditions, insists upon is the fact that public 
deliberation has no such foundation and the construction of public justifications will 
have to deal with a plurality of reasonable systems of belief We all start from different 
situations, and bring distinct perspectives to public deliberation.
Impartiality, on this understanding, is not inimical to the plurality of situations 
and perspectives, but, on the contrary, requires the articulation of these differences as 
an essential element of the construction of public justifications. The hermeneutic 
understanding of situation enriches our understanding of what impartiality requires in 
two ways: firstly, it serves to explain plurality with reference to the ideas of 
thrownness and tradition and secondly in affirming an anti-foundational, conceptual 
pluralism it presents this plurality of perspectives as a permanent feature of theoretical 
and practical reason. However, this understanding of situation does not, it has been 
argued, exclude a commitment to impartiality, which is the egalitarian response to such 
pluralism. This requires us not only to recognise that others have distinct needs and 
interests, but also that they may interpret these in ways which may not be initially 
obvious to us. Where impartiality requires us to justify our policy proposals to others 
we are therefore required to engage with their actual interpretations of themselves and 
their interests. Appreciation of the way in which context shapes our identities and 
beliefs thus becomes central to the conduct of impartial deliberation as this is essential 
to the interpretation of these perspectives.
Contextualisation, which is to say, socio-historical interpretation concerned 
with identifying beliefs in terms of their place in a narrative of the development and 
transformation of a discourse, or tradition, must therefore play a central role in the 
construction of public justifications. We need to identify what others actually believe, 
and also to understand what part a belief plays in the configuration of their particular 
system of beliefs if we are to construct justifications from these systems. 
Contextualisation is not limited to achieving understanding, of course, but also serves, 
as was indicated above, to transform beliefs through redescribing and reinterpreting
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both the objects of moral judgement and the terms in which these judgements are 
made.
It has been argued in this Chapter that socio-historical contextualisation can be 
combined with moral deliberation to form an interpretive social criticism. Socio- 
historical redescription of our situations can lead to revisions of our beliefs and 
judgements by addressing itself not only to the circumstances to which we apply our 
principles, but also by revealing hitherto unnoticed complexities in our conceptual 
resources. Having shown how critical morality and socio-historical redescription can 
be combined, the next problem was to address the ethical concerns of contextualists, 
with recognition and with transformation. It was argued that these concerns could be 
best accomodated within the framework of a deliberative conception of politics, 
premised on the idea of impartial public justification. While many have criticised 
impartialist politics for its inability to cope with contextual considerations, it was 
argued here that, on the contrary, such a politics will, if it is to be successful, have an 
interpretive social criticism at its centre.
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C o n c l u s io n
This thesis set out to consider the role of contextualisation in the conduct of social 
criticism and the conflict between the normative claims of contextualists and those of 
impartialist liberals. It was argued that contextualisation can serve as part of a project of 
social criticism and that the resulting interpretive social criticism is not only compatible with 
liberal egalitarian politics, but also that a commitment to impartial public deliberation 
requires us to engage in the practice of such criticism.
The task has been to determine the place of context within the framework of liberal 
egalitarian politics when, on one hand, contextualists present appeals to situation and to 
interpretation as key elements in a critique of liberal politics, and of impartial morality in 
particular, and on the other hand, liberals are unwilling to attach any significance to such 
phenomena, remaining, at best, indifferent, and, at worst, openly hostile to the claims made 
on behalf of context. The aim of this thesis has been to do justice to the sociological realism 
of contextualism without compromising critical, impartial morality. If context is not allowed 
to count against impartiality, however, what role can it possibly play? I f  we attach no moral 
weight to it, in the form of special obligations to those amongst whom one is situated, for 
example, then how can it be relevant to our moral and political deliberations? If  we deny that 
we can easily derive moral judgements from ontological claims, then have we not rendered 
contextual considerations irrelevant?
It has been argued here that contextual considerations must actually play a 
central role in our deliberations, albeit not in the way that contextualists suppose. It is argued 
that liberal egalitarian politics must be deliberative, which is to say that if we are to treat 
others as equals, in conditions of pluralism, we must engage in impartial deliberation with 
them concerning the employment of public authority. It is here that context comes to play a 
role in liberal egalitarian politics in the form of an interpretive social criticism, premised on 
the fact of situation. Deliberative politics requires participants to be open to the possibility 
that they have misinterpreted both their own interests and those of others and it is hoped that, 
through the process of deliberation, participants may come to reinterpret themselves and their
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relations to others, forming better judgements as a result. It is argued here that an interpretive 
social criticism is not simply an aid to deliberation, but, given the fact of situation and a 
commitment to impartiality, it is positively required by it. In this way, contextualisation 
comes to play a central role in liberal egalitarian politics, not compromising the commitment 
to impartiality, but, on the contrary, following from it.
In setting out this account of contextualisation, two aspects of context have been 
distinguished: firstly the idea of contextualisation, or interpretation, and secondly, the idea of 
situations, namely, the fact that one is situated in a context. In order to arrive at a model of 
contextual social criticism which may form part of a deliberative conception of politics we 
need a proper understanding of both contextualisation and of situation. It has been argued 
here that an adequate understanding of interpretation must rely on conceptual pluralism, 
which is to say, that it must deny that metaphysical primacy can be accorded to any particular 
range of description or standpoint. The resulting model of interpretation makes use both of 
generalising and particularising descriptions and permits interpreters to adopt both the 
objective standpoint of socio-historical description and that of impartial morality, as required. 
This model of interpretation can then play a part in social criticism to the extent that it can be 
employed to redescribe situations and can combine redescription with moral deliberation. 
These two, on this account, need not be regarded as mutually exclusive.
With respect to situation, a basically hermeneutic understanding of context was set 
out, comprising of the idea of conceptual pluralism, a public account of meaning, and the 
traditionalisation of interpretive schemes and problematics. This understanding of situation 
explains pluralism at the societal level without succumbing to claims to the effect that certain 
situations and perspectives are in some way 'privileged1. This hermeneutic understanding of 
situation is significant in that it presents situated persons as opaque, both to themselves and 
to others. This opacity, which is derived from the fact that we come to understand ourselves 
through public, historical, languages, is a premise not only of social criticism, but also of 
deliberative politics. This opacity is not to be regarded solely as a limit, as part of our finite 
nature, for it also represents an opportunity. Only where one is opaque in this way can one
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reinterpret and revise one's self-understanding. The possibility o f revision rests on the right 
sort of understanding of what it means to be situated in a context.
The contextualisms reviewed here rely, however, not only upon certain ideas about 
the limits of interpretation and the nature and implications of situation, but also upon two 
distinct sorts of ethical concern. On one hand, contextualists frequently appeal to the 
phenomenon of context in order to draw attention to hitherto unacknowledged sorts of 
pluralism and in order to demand recognition of these. On the other hand, radical 
contextualists, while also pointing to the plurality of perspectives attending the fact of 
situation in different social contexts, have argued that we must reinterpret in order to 
transform, rather than in order to evince respect for, the perspectives present in a given 
society. It has been argued here that both concerns are legitimate and that social criticism 
must aim at both the transformation of beliefs and identities and at achieving recognition for 
these. It is also argued, however, that this can only be achieved where social criticism forms 
part of an impartial, deliberative, politics, for otherwise it will be unable to distinguish 
between those identities and perspectives in need of transformation and those worthy of 
recognition.
The first step in this argument was to set out an account of interpretation which would 
permit the sort of redescription on which any social criticism must rest. The sophisticated 
version of the history of political thought advanced by Quentin Skinner was seen to avoid the 
reductionism of treating context as a cause, and ideas as an effect, or reflection of their 
context, by making context internal to texts. By this I mean that attention to context becomes 
part of the business of identifying the arguments contained in the texts concerned. However, 
it was argued that Skinner's claim that a truly historical contextualisation would restrict itself 
to the identification of authorial intention and avoid descriptions not intended by historical 
authors, is unduly restrictive. If  Skinner were right, then redescription is never legitimate and 
socio-historical contextualisation can never play a role in normative deliberation or social 
criticism.
Clearly, an account of context and interpretation which permitted redescription was 
necessary. It was argued, in Chapter One, that Skinner was relying on an implausibly
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intentionalist reading of speech-act theory in order to rule out redescription. By contrast, an 
appropriately public account of language and meaning allows for the possibility of texts 
carrying a surplus of meaning, and therefore, for the possibility of redescription or 
reinterpretation. An account of interpretation was then set out which centred on the ideas that 
the sort of a priori restriction on redescription advanced by Skinner was misconceived. If we 
were to accept the model of contextualisation advanced by Skinner, then we should have to 
deny socio-historical contextualisation a role in the conduct of social criticism. Furthermore, 
Skinner's claim that redescription is illegitimate and the account of meaning on which it rests, 
would rule out the possibility of revising one's self understanding, presenting an 
insurmountable difficulty not only to the project of social criticism, but also to that of a 
deliberative politics.
Relying on an anti-foundationalist conceptual pluralism it was argued in Chapter 
Two that there was no way to demonstrate that any particular characterisation of an object 
could be deemed either comprehensive or final, but rather, given that no conceptual scheme 
is, in metaphysical terms, more fundamental that any other, there are a limitless range of 
interpretive possibilities open to interpreters. The second feature of this account of 
interpretation is its pragmatism. No interpretation can be final, or comprehensive, but some 
are nonetheless, better than others in the sense that they are not only more accurate, and more 
or less systematic, but also insofar as they better serve to answer the questions posed by the 
interpreter. It was argued that it is the questions of the interpreter which determine the value 
of a particular characterisation or level of description: given the immense variety of true 
statements which can be made about objects of inquiry, the value of a particular 
characterisation cannot be determined without reference to the interpretive problem at hand.
What this means for understandings of context, is that we must give up the idea that 
there is such a thing as 'context' which is independent of contextualisation, that is to say, 
interpretation. There is no set of relations between an idea, or text and its author, 
circumstances of origin, other texts, subsequent history etc., which can claim to be the 
authentic context which finally unlocks the meaning of that idea. This makes the question of 
context one of determining what sort of interpretation, what level, or levels o f descriptions,
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best suits our aims. If  we wish to examine what authors originally meant by what they said, 
then we may well proceed as Skinner suggests. If we want to trace discontinuities in bodies 
of thought, then perhaps we ought to follow Foucault's precepts instead. In particular, it is 
argued here that the sort of contextualisation which will be of most use to social criticism is 
one which allows for the possibility of redescription. This dictates focusing social criticism at 
the level of traditions, ideologies or discourses, insofar as these schemes focus on the idea 
that individuals' pronouncements may be instances of larger wholes without this necessarily 
being transparent to the individuals concerned. It is stressed that this account of pragmatic 
contextualisation privileges neither particularising nor generalising descriptions: both forms 
of abstraction have a place in the work of redescription. Neither does it accord a privileged 
status to a descriptive-explanatory standpoint over a moral/practical standpoint: both are 
equally viable perspectives to adopt on this account and social criticism must make use of 
both.
Having set out an account of context and interpretation which may serve the aims of 
social criticism, the argument then turns to the normative claims tied up with various 
understandings of context and situation and different models of social criticism. Two models 
of what it means to be situated in a context were identified: the epistemic and the 
hermeneutic. Likewise, two models of social criticism were identified: a particularist, 
communitarian social criticism, and a radical, transformative social criticism. In all of this, 
two sorts of ethical concern were seen to be at work: one with the recognition of distinct 
identities and one with the transformation of oppressive identities.
It was argued, in Chapter Three, that the epistemic conception o f situation was 
deficient in that it rested upon a private conception of meaning and was unable to explain 
why communication was possible amongst persons sharing a particular situation, but not 
between persons differently situated. It relied on this account of meaning to make implausible 
claims about self-transparency and the authority of self-interpretation. If we were to accept an 
epistemic understanding of situation, then we should have to deny that social criticism and 
deliberative politics were possible, for these rely on the absence of self-transparency and on 
the possibility of communication with differently situated others. The resulting solipsism
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would undermine not only liberal egalitarian politics, but also radical social criticism insofar 
as transformation through reinterpretation is ruled out by this understanding of situation.
By contrast, the hermeneutic understanding of situation, set out in Chapter Four, was 
seen to rely both on a conceptual pluralism, and on a public, language-based account of 
meaning. Treating languages as expressing conceptual pluralism on one hand and making this 
concrete, by emphasising the historical, institutional character of languages and problematics, 
the hermeneutic account of situation can explain pluralism at the level of social groups but 
also the possibility of communication between differently situated persons. The hermeneutic 
view also places the practice of interpretation in context by showing how the problems of 
interpreters can themselves be institutionalised, thus completing the account of pragmatic 
contextualisation set out in Chapter Two. On account of the hermeneutic premise of self­
opacity and reinterpretability it also provides an account of situation which is compatible 
with the redescriptive aims of social criticism.
It was argued, however, that the version of social criticism derived from the 
hermeneutic understanding of situation was unnecessarily reductive insofar as it excluded the 
possibility of adopting an impartial standpoint and with it a critical morality. This view, it 
was shown, rested on an insufficiently pluralist conception of context and interpretation and 
was rejected: there is no need to adopt a parochial attitude to morality because one accepts a 
hermeneutic ontology.
Chapter Five then turned to the radical transformative social criticism of Marx and 
Foucault. While these styles of criticism are sensitive to the way that traditions embody 
power relations, they too suffer from an insufficiently pluralist understanding of context and 
they use this to debunk the normative views which are required to direct the redescriptive 
work of social criticism. Dissatisfaction with historical materialism has prompted many on 
the left to adopt a Foucauldian style of criticism while others remain suspicious of what they 
regard as post-modern irresponsibility. However the point insisted upon here is that, despite 
philosophical differences, both versions of social criticism are disabled by their hostility to 
normative deliberation and their resulting normative inarticulacy.
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Finally, it was argued that, having disposed of reductive accounts of contextualisation, 
socio-historical contextualisation and normative deliberation could be usefully combined to 
form an interpretive social criticism. Insofar as judgement combines beliefs about 
circumstances with beliefs about normative principles the redescription of circumstances has 
the potential to effect a revision of one's judgements. It was also argued that, on account of 
the way that our deliberations take place against the backdrop of inherited languages and 
institutionalised problematics, the contextualisation of these can also lead to a revision of our 
beliefs, theoretical and normative. While the choice of conceptual schemes employed in 
contextualisation depends on the sort of problem, or aspect of a problem, faced by the 
interpreter concerned, it is emphasised that social criticism is premised on the absence of self- 
transparency and the possibility of redescription, so that schemes which can accommodate 
this are to be preferred over those which do not.
Having indicated the way in which socio-historical contextualisation and normative 
theorising may be combined, it is then argued that the ethical concerns of contextualism: with 
the recognition of identities and perspectives, and with the transformation of oppressive 
identities can both be accommodated, and, indeed, much more effectively advanced, within 
the framework of impartial public deliberation. This normative framework in necessary if 
these concerns are to be adequately addressed for, as argued in Chapters and Four and Five, 
concerning hermeneutic-based and radical styles of social criticism, the contextualisms 
examined here lack the normative resources necessary to distinguish between those 
perspectives worthy of respect and those in need of transformation.
The connection between liberalism and deliberative democracy is examined and a 
distinctively egalitarian argument for the duty to deliberate is identified. This, it is argued, is 
what commits liberals to impartial public deliberation and as such to engaging in the sort of 
interpretive social criticism outlined above. If public justifications are to be constructed then 
engagement with and criticism of the identities and perspectives of others and an openness to 
the criticism of one's own identities and perspectives is required by the commitment to 
impartiality. The claim that 'political liberalism' is 'apolitical' and that impartiality serves to 
circumscribe deliberation and limit contestation is misconceived. An interpretive social
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criticism is not only possible but is required by the commitment to impartiality. The result is 
a conception of politics which finds a place for context and situation within liberal egalitarian 
politics without compromising critical morality.
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